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Other debts extend beyond the walls and street of BU. My family has always 
supported me as I followed my intellectual interests, for which I am immensely grateful. 
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which is to say: they taught me that to care about the humanities is to care about other 
human beings. For the innumerable ways in which they have supported me, I dedicate 
this dissertation to them. My sister’s commitment to her craft and brilliant artistic vision 
are an inspiration to me, and I enjoy thinking about how she and I are both striving to 
bring literature to life for other people, albeit while working in very different media. 
Friends like LG, MB, NO, BBB, and VM have been waiting impatiently for me to finish 
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THE SILENT SOLILOQUY OF OTHERS: 
LANGUAGE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT IN MODERNIST FICTION 
 
GREG CHASE 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2018 




This study claims that formally experimental novels written in the early twentieth 
century place urgent, if often implicit, demands for acknowledgment upon their readers. 
Scholars have long held that the economic and cultural upheavals of the early twentieth 
century led novelists to doubt language’s referential capacities. But, even as signal 
modernist works by E.M. Forster, Virginia Woolf, William Faulkner, and others move 
away from a view of language as a means of gaining knowledge, they also underscore its 
capacity to grant acknowledgment; they treat words as tools for recognizing and 
responding to the inner lives of others. Stanley Cavell finds such a vision of language in 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953), a work Cavell describes as 
“modernist.” This dissertation demonstrates that Wittgenstein’s interest in 
acknowledgment emerges via his negotiation of the same historical forces with which 
literary modernism grapples: industrialization, World War, cross-cultural encounter. I 
argue that modernist representations of consciousness offer readers a way of hearing what 
Wittgenstein calls “the silent soliloquy of others,” giving us words by which we might 
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adopt an attitude of acknowledgment toward the otherwise unvoiced inner lives of 
socially marginalized figures.  
Chapter One considers the crisis of reason that convulses early twentieth-century 
Britain and demonstrates how Forster’s Howards End (1910) and Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway 
(1925) critique excessive commitments to rationality as counterproductive to the 
acknowledgment of politically disenfranchised citizens. Chapter Two discusses Ford 
Madox Ford’s The Good Soldier (1915), Woolf’s To the Lighthouse (1927), and Nella 
Larsen’s Passing (1929): three texts that, I show, cast traditional Victorian marriage as an 
unsatisfying form of intimacy and depict speakers hesitant to acknowledge their desires 
for alternative, same-sex modes of intimate relation. Chapter Three examines Faulkner’s 
portrayal of capitalist modernization in The Sound and the Fury (1929) and As I Lay 
Dying (1930), arguing that characters in these novels insist on the immitigable privacy of 
their experiences and struggle accordingly to gain acknowledgment from family 
members. Chapter Four reads Richard Wright’s Black Boy (1945) and Ralph Ellison’s 
Invisible Man (1952) as two texts that represent the psychological experience of having 
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In “Blood-Burning Moon,” a vignette from Jean Toomer’s Cane (1923), a 
descendent of slaveholders named Bob Stone reflects on his relationship with Louisa, a 
black woman who works for his family: 
His family had lost ground. Hell no, his family still owned the niggers, 
practically…. He was going to see Louisa tonight, and love her. She was lovely—
in her way. Nigger way. What way was that? Damned if he knew. Must know. 
He’d known her long enough to know. Was there something about niggers that 
you couldnt know? Listening to them at church didnt tell you anything…. Talking 
to them didnt tell you anything… (34) 
Toomer portrays Bob as frustrated that the physical intimacy of his sexual encounters 
with Louisa has left him unable to “know” her as he would like. When Bob describes 
“[l]istening” and “[t]alking” as similarly ineffective modes of knowing, he sounds the 
widespread modernist theme of skepticism toward language’s epistemological capacities. 
Many formally experimental texts from the literary-historical period during which 
Toomer wrote display similar pessimism toward language’s ability to convey knowledge 
of an individual’s inner life to others.  
But Bob is not just any speaker lamenting the incomprehensibility of his 
interlocutor; he is a white, property-holding man in modernizing Georgia, concerned 
about the possibility that his family has “lost ground.” Any adequate account of this 




the Stones can no longer profit from slavery, the economic power dynamics of the 
antebellum South nonetheless extend into this twentieth-century moment: white families 
like Bob’s still control the labor of black workers like Louisa, who presumably makes an 
exploitatively low salary. Louisa works for the Stones at a moment when many African-
Americans—fed up with the persistent economic inequalities they faced in Southern, 
rural spaces—headed for Northern centers of industry as part of the Great Migration. In 
both sexual and economic terms, then, Bob and Lousia’s lives are deeply enmeshed, and 
yet Bob perceives that a certain distance remains between them. Toomer’s representation 
of Bob’s inner monologue shows this character trying to make sense of this distance 
through his theory about the unknowability of “niggers”—a theory that reflects his deeply 
ingrained, culturally conditioned racism, as well as the significant social barriers that 
persist between those in his position and those in Louisa’s. In this passage, Bob 
understands knowledge as a form of mastery. Responding to his anxiety over his family’s 
waning ability to control the lives of women like Louisa, he searches for—but cannot 
find—the words to capture some perfect or essential knowledge of both her and her race. 
Bob’s lack of certainty concerning Louisa induces his linguistic skepticism: his 
experience has suggested to him that language cannot tell him everything he wants to 
know. 
Though modernist studies and literary studies more broadly have turned 
increasingly to historicist analysis in recent years, we literary scholars have remained 
unwilling to subject modernist attitudes toward language to this same historically-




specific social contexts, and that speakers who lament the inadequacy of linguistic 
expressiveness often reveal as much about their own particular circumstances as they do 
about the limits of language as such. This study aims to situate modernist fiction’s 
skepticism toward language in its fuller cultural and material contexts. Along the way, it 
revises the standard scholarly narrative of modernity, according to which material and 
social upheaval shatters stable paradigms of knowledge and precipitates an age of 
skepticism.1 My study argues that, even as signal works of modernist fiction move away 
from a view of language as a means of gaining knowledge, they also underscore its 
capacity to grant acknowledgment; they treat words as tools for recognizing and 
responding to the inner lives of others. Acknowledgment, a term I adopt from Stanley 
Cavell, offers a middle path between unjustified claims to truth and the self-defeating lure 
of other-mind skepticism. Examining novels by E.M. Forster, Virginia Woolf, Ford 
Madox Ford, Nella Larsen, William Faulkner, Richard Wright, and Ralph Ellison, I 
contend that these writers engage in sustained investigations of language’s capacity to 
acknowledge the inner lives of other human beings. This understanding of language—as 
a vehicle by which we request and provide acknowledgment—is precisely that which 
Bob Stone lacks. By representing Bob’s oppressive demand for knowledge, Toomer uses 
his own authorial language to foreground this character’s restrictive mindset and thereby 
to lament the absence of acknowledgment in this social milieu, as Bob and the land-
																																																						
1 Philip Weinstein’s Unknowing: The Work of Modernist Fiction provides perhaps the most astute 




owning class he represents stubbornly refuse to take seriously the voices and viewpoints 
of women like Louisa.  
While scholarly discussions of literary modernism have rarely engaged Cavell’s 
work, in fact Cavell’s attention to dynamics of acknowledgment proves uniquely relevant 
to the historical moment out of which aesthetic modernism arises.2 Cavell develops his 
crucial distinction between knowledge and acknowledgment via his reading of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, perhaps the seminal figure in twentieth-century analytic philosophy’s 
‘linguistic turn.’ Cavell offers us a way of understanding Wittgenstein as a “modernist” 
philosopher (CR xx)—a figure who, like the literary modernists, produced formally 
experimental work in response to altered historical circumstances. Writing in 1945, in the 
preface to his Philosophical Investigations (published posthumously in 1953), 
Wittgenstein laments, “It is not impossible that it should fall to the lot of this work, in its 
poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into one brain or another—but, of 
course, it is not likely” (4). Worrying that he speaks an incommunicable language, 
Wittgenstein expresses his own version of the linguistic skepticism with which literary 
modernism frequently grapples. As with Toomer’s representation of Bob Stone, 
																																																						
2 Weinstein also raises the question of acknowledgment’s potential relevance to modernist fiction, 
writing, “Are there alternatives to knowing other than not-knowing? Is acknowledging—in which 
one’s encounter with the other refuses mastery or reduction of the other to an economy of the 
same—one of them?” (119). Acknowledgment, writes Weinstein, “involves a continuous subject-
other traffic, registering that I am in the midst of—touched by—more than I know” (259). 
Although Weinstein’s study generally holds that acknowledgment emerges most fully as a literary 
phenomenon only after modernism (in post-colonial fiction, for example), his conclusion suggests 
that the language of acknowledgment may also manifest in modernism more extensively than 
scholars have explored (252-60). Weinstein’s discussion of acknowledgment remains truncated, 




Wittgenstein indicates that these doubts about his own intelligibility have a historical 
basis, connecting them to the “darkness” of a moment in which widespread, nationally-
sponsored violence convulsed his world for the second time that century.     
 
Historical Pressures on the Problem of Other Minds 
 
 Why might the linguistic doubts the modernists express emerge during the 
particular historical moment in which they write? My study claims that a set of economic 
and cultural factors specific to the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Western 
world placed unique pressures on the relation between knowing others and 
acknowledging them—pressures explored, in formally distinct ways, by philosophers like 
Wittgenstein and novelists like Woolf. This section outlines five distinct but interrelated 
reasons why doubts about the possibility of knowing others through language arise at this 
particular moment in the histories of Great Britain and America: the emergence of a 
modern, capitalist economy; the loosening and alteration of traditional familial relations; 
the increased convenience and ease of travel; the development of social movements that 
critique oppressive systems of knowledge and control; and the growing pessimism, on the 
part of prominent intellectuals, toward the perceptual and epistemological capacities of 
the human mind.  
 The spread of modern, industrial capitalism is perhaps the most overarching 
historical development relevant to this study, important in its own right but also for the 




industrial capitalism proceeded out of a prior phase in capitalist development—what he 
terms “war capitalism”—characterized by “the violent expropriation of land and labor” 
(xv). In its drive to maximize profitability, industrial capitalism extended the logic of this 
older system, but it also restructured relations between individual economic agents in 
significant ways. Across the nineteenth century, as technological advances made 
industrial labor more and more efficient, a generation of workers “left behind their 
agricultural tools and headed to the factory,” ushering in the kind of mass production of 
consumer goods that still remains with us today (xii). By 1900, the industrial labor force 
in America included more than a third of the general population (Trachtenberg 87)—a 
number that gives some sense of how many lives were fundamentally reshaped by these 
economic shifts.3 As Fredric Jameson writes, human subjects constituted by modern 
capitalism were forced to reconceive the relation between language and lived experience, 
as the “traditional contextual unity between words, places, bodies, and gestures” broke 
down (ASM 155). Familiar words, uttered in familiar contexts, proved inadequate to 
capture modern experiences and sensations, and language entered a “crisis of 
representation” (158).  
A second major development, which follows from the first, concerns the ways in 
which the modern economy altered family relations. In part, industrial capitalism induced 
unfamiliar experiences because laborers were no longer producing goods primarily for 
family members and other immediate acquaintances. In one manifestation of this trend, 
																																																						
3 American economic innovations quickly spread to Britain as well; starting around 1915, 
“American-style assembly lines and the use of interchangeable parts … were applied on a 




poor farmers in the U.S. South began increasingly to produce cotton to meet the demands 
of the national and international marketplaces, rather than exchanging it with those in 
their local communities (Doyle 307). In another, many British landowners recognized the 
waning profitability of their estates during the pre-WWI years and began selling off their 
land (Cannadine 71). As the Estates Gazette noted in 1914, “the unanimity of large 
English landlords in selling their estates clearly points to some great change in the 
condition of affairs in this country” (qtd. in Cannadine 110). Instead of participating in 
reciprocal economic transactions with family members and other people they knew, 
laborers were now producing goods only to sell them to distant strangers. This shift 
“heighten[ed] and intensifie[d]” laborers’ experiences of their own bodies as 
fundamentally private, cut off from those of their relations (Scarry 267).  
This largescale restructuring of family relations took other forms as well. For 
example, increased numbers of women entered the workforce, undercutting simplistic 
Victorian notions of the home as women’s space. World War I heightened this trend, 
given how many women actively participated in the wartime effort—working in factories 
to produce military supplies, and entering battle zones as nurses, ambulance drivers, and 
doctors (Grayzel 11).4 Whereas Victorian domestic norms called for the exclusion of 
potentially unpleasant or culturally subversive subjects from social discourse, modern 
writers and intellectuals attacked this prevailing social code on the grounds that it 
encouraged secrecy and concealment (Rosner 88-9). Writing in 1896, the sexologist 
																																																						
4 In Britain, 24% of women were employed in 1914; by 1918, this number had jumped to 38% 




Edward Carpenter offered one early expression of this critique, arguing that Victorian 
domestic norms had created “maximum divergence and absolute misunderstanding” in 
marital relations (qtd. in Collins 1). In the post-War world, higher standards of living led 
to a broader movement away from this older domestic model, with individuals of all 
classes increasingly marrying for “love” rather than “practicality” (Langhamer 37).5 This 
trend reflects the widespread recognition that an older set of social practices had failed to 
establish genuine, non-oppressive forms of intimate relation.  
A third key development is the increased convenience of travel, which contributed 
to the deformation of traditional familial and communal bonds, as more and more 
individuals left their homes and journeyed to major urban centers for purposes of work 
and leisure. Michael North argues that increasingly frequent cross-cultural encounters 
exposed the contingency of belief systems and social practices, creating a situation 
wherein “the multiplicity and incompatibility of human points of view were never more 
unavoidably obvious” (Reading 15). Newcomers to emergent metropolises would have 
found themselves surrounded by vast numbers of people, all of them unfamiliar, and such 
experiences would understandably have heightened concerns about the apparent 
inaccessibility and unknowability of others. One major example of this broader 
phenomenon was the Great Migration, in which millions of African-Americans moved 
from Southern to Northern areas, and from rural to urban ones. Even as these individuals 
and families often relocated in response to the specific conditions of Jim Crow racial 
																																																						
5 At the same time, marriage and motherhood remained firmly entrenched as the expected social 




control, they also experienced the more generalized sense of urban “alienation” that 
Raymond Williams identifies as crucial to the development of aesthetic modernism (45).  
The brutal conditions of Jim Crow also connect to a fourth crucial historical 
development: namely, growing protestations against hierarchical systems of human 
relation. As traditional familial and communal ties altered, new forms of social relation 
also carried with them the recognition that older models of community tended to be, as 
Scott Romine puts it, “hegemonic”—that is, committed to defining and controlling the 
experiences of African-Americans, women, the lower classes, immigrants, and others 
(22). Such oppressive systems of classification and categorization yield a range of human 
relationships characterized by dangerous fantasies of knowledge: Bob Stone’s feeling that 
he “[m]ust know” Louisa in Cane provides just one example. In a similar vein, starting 
around the 1890s, white Southerners participated in public “spectacle” lynchings, as a 
way to enforce and perpetuate a rigid conceptual divide between whiteness and blackness 
(Hale 203).6 In a British context, accelerating income inequality contributed to a 
proliferation of labor strikes in the pre-War years, as the working classes voiced 
frustration that they had been systematically excluded from whatever benefits their 
political system might theoretically provide (Robb 31).7 These protests, which came to a 
head in 1910, raised fundamental questions about the ongoing viability of British 
																																																						
6 As Grace Elizabeth Hale emphasizes, such public lynchings were specifically modern rituals, 
relying on newspapers to disseminate information about the proceedings and trains to transport 
would-be participants to pre-arranged sites (203-9).  
7 Although the Third Reform Act of 1884-5 expanded the voting population of the United 
Kingdom from three million to six million men, many members of the working classes did not 
gain the right to vote until the passage of the Fourth Reform Act, in 1918—a bill that also 




liberalism—a political philosophy founded upon the Enlightenment8 conception of 
humans as “inherently rational creatures, capable of making logical choices that best 
serve the interests of both self and society” (Ho, “Crisis of Liberalism” 54). A few years 
later, the onset of war only heightened this societal recognition as to the oppressive 
potential of rationalist thought, as ostensibly cool-headed reason led directly to mass 
atrocity.9  
 Concomitant with these widespread economic and cultural changes, developments 
in long-standing fields of epistemological inquiry also influenced the intellectual climate 
in which the modernists lived and wrote. Charles Taylor traces the intellectual history 
that, he argues, gave rise to our modern, Western understanding of the self as “inner,” 
contrasted with some outer or external world (Sources 111). For Taylor, Augustine stands 
as a crucial forebear to our modern understanding of selfhood. Augustine argues that, in 
order to gain knowledge of God, the individual must first look within, thus establishing 
“the first-person standpoint” as “fundamental to our search for the truth” (133).10 René 
																																																						
8 In my use of “Enlightenment” here, I follow Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s 
conception of the term in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944). “Enlightenment,” for Adorno and 
Horkheimer, refers in the broadest sense to the “advance of thought” and is associated with such 
concepts as rationality, progress, and order (1). 
9 Analyzing the British press’s nationalistic justifications for the War, Vincent Sherry finds “a 
rhetoric of reason” operating “in nearly inverse ratio to the credibility of the cause” it purports to 
justify (26).  
10 Wittgenstein opens Philosophical Investigations with a passage from Augustine’s Confessions 
(400) that reflects this emphasis on first-person knowledge: “When grown-ups named some 
object and at the same time turned toward it, I perceived this, and I grasped that the thing was 
signified by the sound they uttered…. In this way […], I learnt to understand what things the 
words … signified. And once I got my tongue around these signs, I used them to express my 
wishes” (qtd. PI, §1). According to this account, Augustine reflects internally on his “wishes” 
even before he has “grasped” the correspondences between word and thing that allow him to 
convey these wishes to others. Wittgenstein pushes back against this Augustinian picture, finding 




Descartes’ cogito (“I think, therefore I am”) emerges out of and extends this Augustinian 
picture, similarly locating the path to knowledge within the introspective human mind. 
More than Augustine, Descartes makes rationality “an internal property of subjective 
thinking,” arguing that “clear and distinct perception is … self-generated,” and that the 
thinking subject’s reasoning faculties are themselves sufficient to prove the existence of 
God (156). Descartes outlines a picture of the self-contained, rational human mind, which 
Taylor argues has remained with us ever since. 
 While this Cartesian picture remains important to our modern understanding of 
selfhood, a couple of significant challenges to Descartes’ understanding of the mind arose 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. One challenge concerns the increasing 
secularization of Western intellectual life, a broader, post-Darwinian trend most famously 
encapsulated by Friedrich Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of God (§125). Cavell 
writes that loss of belief in the existence of God has crucial implications for the problem 
of other minds: by emphasizing the self-enclosed nature of the mind, Descartes 
establishes “privacy” as a defining mark of mental life (CR 470). Yet, Cavell writes, “As 
long as God exists, I am not alone” (470). As such, in the modern context, “the 
philosophical problem of the other” marks “the trace or scar of the departure of God” 
(470); if God turns out to be unreal, then the question becomes: how do we know that 
other people aren't similarly illusory? So the problem of other minds takes on particular 
																																																						
is: “Someone who describes the learning of language in this [Augustinian] way is, I believe, 
thinking primarily of nouns like ‘table’, ‘chair’, ‘bread’, and of people’s names, and only 
secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as 




urgency in an intellectual climate that no longer allows the individual subject to fall back 
upon the comfortable certainty of God’s existence.  
Relatedly, Sigmund Freud’s theory of the unconscious presents a second major 
challenge to the Cartesian picture of mind.11 Freud suggests just how irrational a place the 
mind turns out to be, and how many of our motivations and desires we keep hidden even 
from ourselves. Under a Freudian framework, the knowledge the human psyche generates 
can no longer be trusted; Philip Weinstein writes that the Freudian subject moves through 
the world in a “constant fog of self-unknowing” (Unknowing 91). Or perhaps we could 
say that, by endeavoring to forget or repress unpleasant truths, the Freudian subject often 
refuses to acknowledge what it does know.   
 
From Tractatus to Investigations: Wittgenstein’s Turn Toward Acknowledgment  
 
																																																						
11 The Cartesian picture of selfhood undergoes additional challenges around this time as well, but 
I focus here on two that are particularly influential for twentieth-century aesthetic practices, as 
well as particularly relevant to the concerns of this study. In The Vanishing Subject, Judith Ryan 
makes a case for the relevance of a different intellectual development to modernist literary 
practices, discussing the claim made by nineteenth-century empiricist psychologists that “the only 
reality [is]… our consciousness” (2). Ryan argues that Woolf and other modernist writers 
endeavor to represent “consciousness and sensory perception” according to an empiricist 
framework (3). The issue with Ryan’s argument is that it makes modernist texts into nothing but 
thought experiments in depicting the operation of consciousness; when she writes that “[t]o look 
into the works of these writers for attempts to delve into the psyches of their characters is to miss 
the point … entirely,” she herself misses the point that modernist writers are also representing the 
psychologies of historically-constituted characters, who respond to particular economic and 




 Wittgenstein’s self-described “literary” philosophy emerges from this unstable 
historical and intellectual moment.12 The dates of Wittgenstein’s philosophical career 
correlate precisely with the years in which literary modernism takes hold in Britain and 
America. Wittgenstein began studying philosophy with Bertrand Russell in 1911, the 
year after Forster published Howards End (1910), which I understand as a work of proto-
modernism and which constitutes the first text I treat at length in this study. Wittgenstein 
died in 1951, the year before Ellison published Invisible Man (1952), which I understand 
as a work of later, second-generation modernism and which is chronologically the latest 
text this study considers. Cavell helpfully identifies Wittgenstein’s Investigations as 
“modernist,” insofar as it is “esoteric” (CR xx). Cavell’s comments on modernism reflect 
a view that was dominant during the period in which he wrote: modernist works, he 
writes, “seek to split their audience into insiders and outsiders” and “demand for their 
sincere reception the shock of conversion” (xx). Cavell describes “the burden of 
modernism” as the endeavor to update the aesthetic practices of a medium in order to 
address the new historical situation in which the practitioners of this medium find 
themselves (MWM 187). The formal difficulty of modernism reflects an attempt on the 
part of artists to re-establish lines of communication, to re-construct an audience, in order 
to sustain their aesthetic medium in the face of the widespread skepticism and alienation 
that Western modernity has wrought. Modern art, Cavell writes, “promises us, not the re-
assembly of community, but personal relationship unsponsored by that community, not 
																																																						
12 In 1919, in a letter to Ludwig von Ficker, Wittgenstein describes his work as “strictly 




the overcoming of our isolation but the sharing of that isolation” (MWM 229).13 Cavell 
emphasizes that “philosophy shares the modernist difficulty now everywhere evident in 
the major arts” (MWM xxxvi), and he positions Wittgenstein as the exemplary figure 
whose work provides a philosophical analogue to the convention-shattering impulses of 
aesthetic modernism.  
 While Cavell locates Wittgenstein’s modernism primarily in the Investigations, in 
fact the modernist inclinations of Wittgenstein’s philosophy appear even earlier in his 
career. In my view, Wittgenstein’s first work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, shows 
his burgeoning interest in the language of acknowledgment—an interest that comes to the 
fore most fully in the Investigations. The first and only book Wittgenstein would publish 
in his lifetime, the Tractatus appeared in English in 1922, the same year of such 
modernist touchstones as James Joyce’s Ulysses and T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land.14 The 
Tractatus reflects its author’s thinking on language and logic over the preceding decade, 
years during which Wittgenstein went from studying at Cambridge under Bertrand 
Russell to fighting for the Austrian army on the front lines of WWI. The ostensible 
																																																						
13 In this respect, Cavell’s understanding of modernism echoes Georg Lukács’ influential view 
that modernist writers depict “[m]an” as “solitary, asocial, unable to enter into relationships with 
other human beings” (20). Despite characterizing modernism similarly, Cavell and Lukács differ 
as to the value of this aesthetic movement, with Lukács taking the more critical view that the 
modernists negate “outward reality” (25), shirking their responsibility to present characters as 
products of a broader historical environment. My study challenges Lukács’ claim that the 
modernists disregard history; on the contrary, in their depictions of solitary characters, the writers 
I discuss show how this solitude results from specific historical circumstances. (For Cavell’s most 
extensive comments on modern art, see his “Music Discomposed” essay [MWM 180-212].)  
14 This edition follows a version published in German in 1921, but the German version was so 
riddled with errors that Wittgenstein always held that the work was not properly published until 
’22. Wittgenstein closely supervised C.K. Ogden’s translation from German to English. See 




project of the Tractatus consists in establishing the rules of logic that determine what can 
sensibly be said in language.15 Generally speaking, the tone of the Tractatus makes it 
seem like a work that attempts to codify parameters of knowledge, one with little interest 
in dynamics of acknowledgment—though there are significant exceptions to this rule, as I 
discuss below.  
Crucial to the Tractatus’ project is its so-called ‘picture theory,’ which posits an 
isomorphic relation between language and the world. Wittgenstein outlines this theory as 
follows:  
2.12 The picture is a model of reality. 
[…] 
2.161 In the picture and the pictured there must be something identical in order 
that the one can be a picture of the other at all. 
2.17 What the picture must have in common with reality … is its form of 
representation. 
As is typical of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein does not provide examples to illustrate these 
succinct pronouncements. In his biography of Wittgenstein, Ray Monk helps to clarify 
the picture theory, providing the following account of its inspiration: 
Wittgenstein read in a magazine a report of a lawsuit in Paris concerning a car 
accident, in which a model of the accident was presented before the court. It 
occurred to him that the model could represent the accident because of the 
																																																						
15 In an entry from his Notebooks 1914-1916, Wittgenstein writes, “Is there an order in the world 
a priori, and if so what does it consist in?” (qtd. in Ware 33). The Tractatus is Wittgenstein’s 




correspondence between the parts of the model (the miniature houses, cars, 
people) and the real things (houses, cars, people). It further occurred to him that, 
on this analogy, one might say a proposition serves as a model, or picture, of a 
state of affairs, by virtue of a similar correspondence between its parts and the 
world…. That is to say, there is—and must be—a logical structure in common 
between a proposition (‘the grass is green’) and a state of affairs (the grass being 
green), and it is this commonality of structure which enables language to 
represent reality. (118) 
On the basis of this theory, Wittgenstein arrives at a crucial distinction between what can 
be said in language—propositions describing states of affairs—and what can only be 
shown—the rules of logic that undergird this linguistic system.16 Working from this 
distinction, Wittgenstein finds that many of the concerns that have traditionally 
preoccupied philosophers are in fact nonsensical; for instance, metaphysical speculations 
																																																						
16 Witttgenstein proposes the picture theory as a solution to problems of logic that he inherited 
from Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege. One problem concerns the truth or falsity of statements 
like “The present king of France is bald.” For Frege, “the present king of France” is a name with 
sense but no reference; therefore, the sentence has no truth value. For Russell, the sentence 
contains an implicit claim that its subject exists; when re-written in its logical form (as opposed to 
its ordinary mode of expression) it asserts that there exists at least and at most one present king of 
France, and that this king is bald. Thus, for Russell, the sentence is false because it does not 
picture any actual state of affairs. The early Wittgenstein follows Russell by making the 
proposition, rather than the name, into the basic building block of logic. On this account, 
“[n]ames on their own are without sense; it is only in the context of logical relations between 
them that they are intelligible” (Janik and Toulmin 186). But Wittgenstein takes issue with 
Russell’s claim that the rules of logic can be sensibly stated in language. Against Russell, 
Wittgenstein determines that propositions describing reality cannot “simultaneously describe how 
they describe it, without becoming self-referential and consequently meaningless” (Janik and 
Toulmin 190). This realization leads Wittgenstein to his crucial saying versus showing 
distinction. For more on the Tractatus as a response to the work of Frege and Russell, see Floyd, 




(such as those in which both Descartes and Augustine engage) are meaningless attempts 
to speak from “outside the limits of the world” (T 5.61).  
Ben Ware has characterized the Tractatus as a work of high modernist aesthetics, 
insofar as it is “formally innovative, austere, [and] … concerned with the perfection or 
purification of the medium itself” (48). While Ware is correct that these qualities give the 
work a certain modernist sensibility, I would emphasize that the aesthetic commitments 
of the picture theory are closer to those of nineteenth-century realism than to those of 
twentieth-century modernism. Generally speaking, works of realist fiction tend to exhibit 
a more trusting attitude toward the referential capacities of language than their modernist 
successors. Weinstein has identified “verisimilitude” as the fundamental tool of realist 
narration (Unknowing 66), arguing that realist novels use language in order to gradually 
familiarize readers with a recognizable world.17 So when George Eliot writes, on the 
second page of Daniel Deronda (1876), “Round two long tables were gathered two 
serried crowds of human beings, all save one having their faces and attention bent on the 
tables,” her novel relies on this combination of words to communicate to readers some 
image of the scene described (2). Similarly, Wittgenstein’s picture theory relies on the 
capacity of language to mimetically represent states of affairs. An analysis of Eliot’s 
																																																						
17 The Tractatus has often been read as a work of philosophical (as distinct from literary) realism. 
In the years prior to the publication of the Tractatus, analytic philosophers like Frege, Russell, 
and G.E. Moore championed realism as an alternative to Hegelian idealism. The appeal of formal 
logic, for a philosopher like Russell, is that it offers a way of mapping out the world 
“objectively,” describing features of reality that exist irrespective of any individual subject’s 
beliefs (Floyd and Shieh 4-5). For a helpful expression of the realist position in analytic 
philosophy, see Moore’s “The Refutation of Idealism” (1903). For more on the philosophical 




sentence, in accordance with the picture theory, might understand it as asserting the 
interrelation between a number of different “facts” (T 1.1):  the two “tables,” the 
“crowds” of people, the objects of their “attention.”  
 It is only when we examine some of Wittgenstein’s final additions to the 
Tractatus that the work’s modernism most fully emerges. The preface, composed in 1918 
(McGuinness 265), shows clear resonances with modernist literary works that take a 
more skeptical view of language’s communicative capacities. The first sentence reads, 
“This book will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already 
thought the thoughts which are expressed in it” (27). With this sentence, Wittgenstein 
makes what for Cavell is the characteristically modernist move of dividing his audience 
into insiders and outsiders—one group (implicitly smaller) who can understand what he 
is saying, and another group (implicitly larger) who cannot. In a such a moment, the basic 
trust that the picture theory places in the communicative capacities of language begins to 
break down; Wittgenstein signals the contingent intelligibility of his utterance, 
recognizing that it may make sense only to a few.18 Whereas the realist picture of 
language presupposes a wide-ranging set of shared beliefs, customs, and ways of seeing 
the world, Wittgenstein’s line registers his sense that this shared experiential fabric has 
frayed, leaving him to search for those select few interlocutors who might find him 
																																																						
18 Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin have argued that, though Frege and Russell were the early 
Wittgenstein’s most obvious intellectual forebears, Wittgenstein was also significantly influenced 
by the intellectual and artistic climate in Vienna, where he grew up. Sentences like the opening 
one of the preface provide support for their thesis; Janik and Toulmin write, for instance, that 
concerns over “the incapacity of language to explain men’s innermost being to others” were 
widespread in pre-WWI Viennese society, evident in the work of Karl Kraus, Hugo von 




intelligible. On the one hand, the preface highlights Wittgenstein’s growing dubiousness 
toward the possibility that knowledge can be widely communicated. On the other, it 
signals his hope that certain others might accept or acknowledge his words as speaking to 
their own experiences as well. 
 In this respect, the preface displays Wittgenstein’s incipient interest in the 
language of acknowledgment. And this interest reappears in the Tractatus’ final pages, 
which display a similarly vexed attitude toward the possibility of making meaning 
through language. This section, in which Wittgenstein turns his attentions toward “the 
mystical” (T 6.522), is the only portion of the numbered propositions that he wrote later 
than 1916, and Monk argues that Wittgenstein’s war-time experiences crucially shaped 
these final additions to the work.19 For Wittgenstein understood going to war as a 
personal moral test, and his near-death experiences at the front prompted him to reflect 
on the nature of religious experience and the meaning of his life: “Was shot at,” he wrote 
in his journal in April 1916. “Thought of God. Thy will be done. God be with me” (qtd. 
in Monk 138).20 In light of such experiences, Wittgenstein expanded the Tractatus by 
writing remarks like “[d]eath is not an event of life. Death is not lived through”—a stark 
departure, in tone and content, from the work’s earlier propositions on logical form (T 
																																																						
19 Russell encouraged Wittgenstein to publish the work in 1916. If Wittgenstein had taken 
Russell’s advice, Monk writes, the published work “would have contained almost everything the 
Tractatus now contains—except the remarks at the end of the book on ethics, aesthetics, the soul, 
and the meaning of life” (134).   
20 As Monk puts it, “Wittgenstein felt that the experience of facing death would, in some way or 
another, improve him. He went to war … not for the sake of his country, but for the sake of 
himself” (112). When Wittgenstein reaches the front lines in 1916, “he asked to be assigned to the 
most dangerous of places, the observation post. This guaranteed that he would be the target of 




6.4311). Wittgenstein’s examination of the limits of language leads him to the final 
propositions of the Tractatus, which radically call into question everything that has 
preceded them:  
6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me 
finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on 
them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has 
climbed up on it.) […] 
7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.  
Just as intensive modernist representations of alienation challenge the realist novel’s 
presumptions to widespread communicability, so the end of the Tractatus abandons the 
picture theory’s confident attitude toward mimetic representation.21  
These final remarks confirm the Tractatus’ status as a work curiously divided 
against itself. Increasingly, as the work nears its conclusion, a significant dichotomy 
emerges. As Wittgenstein puts it in his preface, the “whole meaning [of the Tractatus] 
could be summed up as follows: ‘What can be said at all can be said clearly, and whereof 
one cannot speak thereof one must be silent’” (27). The picture theory proposes precisely 
to delineate logical relationships, in a way that clears up ambiguities characteristic to our 
ordinary form of expression.22 It is, thus, a proposal for mapping the world from a 
confident stance of knowing. At the same time, the final pages of the work show 
																																																						
21 In addition, Ware characterizes the end of the Tractatus as modernist in that Wittgenstein 
employs the tactic of “shock,” described by Walter Benjamin “as the ubiquitous sensation of 
modern metropolitan life” (59).  
22 An example of such an ambiguity would be a sentence like, “Green is green,” wherein the same 




Wittgenstein increasingly recognizing the inadequacy of language with respect to 
subjects that seemingly defy logic, like the inevitability of death. Wittgenstein thus 
arrives at an acknowledgment of limitation—in language, and in his personal attempt to 
map out relations between word and world. While this acknowledgment is already 
implicit in his distinction between saying and showing, these final remarks bring the 
limits of language to the fore most fully. Here, Wittgenstein concedes the limits of his 
knowledge when it comes to subjects like how to lead an ethical life: writing that “ethics 
cannot be expressed,” Wittgenstein finds that he cannot pronounce what the ethical life 
entails, as previous philosophers have hubristically attempted to do; he can only seek to 
live it (T 6.421).23 These final pages of the Tractatus, then, provide an early example of 
																																																						
23 Unsurprisingly, the conclusion of the Tractatus has spurred a range of views over how to 
interpret the relation between these final remarks and the work as a whole. These views can be 
divided into two major schools of interpretation: ‘traditional’ or ‘metaphysical’ readings, and 
‘resolute’ or ‘therapeutic’ readings. Traditional readings hold that Wittgenstein draws a sharp 
distinction between what can logically be said (scientific propositions and other statements about 
objects in the world) and metaphysical truths, which can only be shown. For an example of a 
reading along these lines, see Hacker, esp. 22-7. Resolute readings, by contrast, propose that we 
should take Wittgenstein at his word in remark 6.54 and understand all prior propositions as 
nonsense. Such readings are also termed ‘therapeutic,’ in the sense that they understand the 
Tractatus as setting out to clarify misleading pictures of language and thereby to dissuade its 
readers from the temptation to think they are speaking meaningfully when they are not. For 
examples of such readings, see Diamond; Conant. The different commitments of these two 
approaches produce a seemingly intractable interpretive conflict. Against traditional readings, 
resolute readings point out that the propositions preceding 6.54 are, by Wittgenstein’s own 
definition, nonsensical, since they purport to use language to speak about the logical limits of 
language—limits that cannot be said. On the other hand, resolute readings cannot satisfactorily 
answer the question of why, if everything that precedes 6.54 is nonsense, Wittgenstein devotes so 
much space to delineating these prior propositions as carefully as he does. Juliet Floyd offers one 
productive approach to reconciling these two interpretive positions. She sets out to take seriously 
the insights of Diamond and other resolute readers, while still maintaining that the Tractatus’ 
project is a “constructive” one (“Wittgenstein and the Inexpressible” 187). For Floyd, 
Wittgenstein does not make one overarching distinction between saying and showing; rather, his 
discussion highlights a number of distinct and “particular points at which misunderstandings of 
the logic of our language emerge” (180). For more on the conflict between traditional and 




the link between Wittgenstein’s modernism and his interest in the language of 
acknowledgment. In its final form, the Tractatus exhibits a distinctively modernist 
inclination to place significant limits on what words can say.24 As it grapples with the 
epistemological limits of words, the text implicitly raises the question of whether there 
might be alternative ways of conceptualizing the purposes and powers of language. But 
the end of the Tractatus leaves this question hanging in the air, with Wittgenstein 
offering only the silence that follows his final remark. 
 The sense of crisis with which the Tractatus ends provides the point of departure 
for Wittgenstein’s later work. After abandoning philosophy for the better part of a 
decade, spending much of this time as a schoolteacher in rural Austria, Wittgenstein 
returned to Cambridge in the late ‘20s. There, he developed what commentators have 
called his ‘ordinary language philosophy,’ which endeavors to attend more fully to the 
diversity of ways in which words get used in actual, everyday human speech. In this later 
theory—the fullest expression of which would be published as Philosophical 
Investigations—Wittgenstein abandons the idea, crucial to the Tractatus, “that there had 
to be a commonality of structure between the world and language” (Monk 274). He 
determines that the “rules for what it does and does not make sense to say … [are] not … 
																																																						
24 Janik and Toulmin put this point by saying that the Tractatus is “a polemic against … 
rationalism,” insofar as it seeks “to distinguish the legitimate sphere of rational speculation from 
that of fantasy” (200). Michael LeMahieu also reads the silence at the end of the Tractatus as a 




fixed by immutable laws of logical form” (468). Rather, the Investigations understands 
language as inseparable from the social “activities into which it is woven” (§7).25  
As Wittgenstein turns to everyday usage, so the language of acknowledgment 
becomes increasingly central to his inquiry. In this respect, the Investigations takes an 
impulse that, I’ve argued, is already present in the Tractatus and pursues it more fully. 
The form of his later work reflects Wittgenstein’s shift in emphasis from knowledge to 
acknowledgment. Whereas the Tractatus relies on the direct assertion of logical 
propositions, with few examples and no dissenting voices, the Investigations employs a 
less assertive, more exploratory tone. The text puts forward a series of imagined, fictive 
scenarios, and it invites readers to investigate, for themselves, what these scenarios reveal 
about the workings of language. North has argued that Wittgenstein’s later 
“anthropological method”—his interest in the diversity and contingency of language 
practices—results from his recognition of the potential for cross-cultural 
misunderstanding in an increasingly globalized world (Reading 42). Wittgenstein’s sense 
in the Tractatus that “there is but one limit to human reason” comes to look increasingly 
																																																						
25 The extent to which Wittgenstein’s later work extends or departs from his earlier work is 
another major point of disagreement within Wittgenstein scholarship. As Ware notes, where one 
comes down on this question is liable to correspond roughly to whether one takes a traditional or 
a resolute view of the Tractatus (see fn. 23), since one crucial feature of the resolute view is that 
it “insist[s] upon a much greater degree of continuity between Wittgenstein’s early and later 
work” (32). This continuity, for resolute readers, consists in the idea that both the Tractatus and 
the Investigations engage in the therapeutic project of attempting to free readers from their 
temptations to misuse language. While I have certain reservations about the resolute reading 
(mentioned in fn. 23), my own understanding of Wittgenstein’s career shares with resolute 
readings the sense that the Investigations constitutes an elaboration on the work of the Tractatus, 
rather than a fundamental departure from it. For helpful discussions of what does and what does 
not change in the movement from Wittgenstein’s early to late philosophy, see Kuusela; Floyd, 




“imperial in its pretensions” when contrasted with the case-by-case approach to language 
the philosopher takes in his later work (38).26 Wittgenstein himself suggests as much in 
the Investigations’ preface, writing that his “thoughts soon grew feeble if [he] tried to 
force them along a single track against their natural inclination. – And this was, of course, 
connected with the very nature of the investigation. For it compels us to travel criss-cross 
in every direction over a wide range of thought” (3). So Wittgenstein presents the 
Investigations’ fragmented form as crucial to its project: like Joyce’s Ulysses or 
Faulkner’s Yoknapatawpha novels, the Investigations attempts the impossible project of 
accounting comprehensively for a social world. As North implies, this fragmented style is 
more conducive to the project of acknowledgment, since the Investigations asks us to 
take seriously the particular, contingent ways in which various speakers use words. In 
addition, by admitting the impossibility of achieving the kind of comprehensive view for 
which he strove in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein more fully acknowledges the limits 
inherent to any one perspective or way of speaking—his own included.  
The Investigations develops the view that “the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language” (§43), that it does not make sense to theorize about the meaning of a word, as 
																																																						
26 Wittgenstein’s work as a schoolteacher vividly illustrates the cultural contingency of language 
and the attendant potential for misunderstanding. Wittgenstein had “high expectations” for what 
he could teach his students, but he soon grew frustrated by how little positive impact his strict 
instructional methods seemed to have (Monk 212). One of Wittgenstein’s projects while teaching 
in Austria was to design a vocabulary book for elementary schools. Wittgenstein recognized the 
urgent need for a new book of this sort, since the one currently in use “contain[ed] many foreign 
words which the children were unlikely ever to use, and omit[ed] many words commonly 
misspelt by children” (226). This experience forces Wittgenstein to confront the fact that the 
abstract theories of the Tractatus do not adequately describe the actual uses of language in places 




such, outside particular uses of that word. For instance, Wittgenstein asks us to consider 
the diversity of activities that we describe as games—“board-games, card-games, ball-
games, athletic games, and so on”—and points out that we do not require an exact 
definition for “game” in order to use this word across a range of contexts (§66). 
Wittgenstein suggests that shared human customs create a certain degree of “regularity” 
in language use (§207); it is because words tend to be used in similar ways in similar 
contexts that we are able to learn language at all, and that we actually succeed in 
understanding and communicating with one another, insofar as we do. There are, of 
course, exceptions built in to our language practices, cases wherein it becomes “doubtful 
… what we are to say” (§142). But these uncertain cases nonetheless exist against a 
backdrop of common usage; “if there were … no characteristic expression of pain, of 
fear, of joy; if rule became exception and exception rule […]— our normal language-
games would thereby lose their point” (§142).27 
 Wittgenstein indicates that the shared nature of language even informs our 
descriptions of our own internal experience. He tries to imagine a language in which 
words “refer to what only the speaker can know—to his immediate private sensations. So 
another person cannot understand the language” (§243). As Saul Kripke points out, 
Wittgenstein raises this issue of ‘private language’ in order to explore a possible 
																																																						
27 Some of the words Wittgenstein discusses (like “game”) are liable to manifest more cultural 
and historical variation in their uses than others (like “red”). Though Wittgenstein does not 
extensively develop this point, the Investigations suggests that language might change over time 
in response to new cultural or historical developments; he writes, for instance, of how “new types 
of language, new language games […], come into existence, and others become obsolete and get 
forgotten” (§23). Cavell takes up this issue of language’s potential changeability over time; for 




counterexample to the theory of meaning he has already outlined (3). Surely, 
Wittgenstein imagines someone skeptically asking, the shared nature of language does 
not adequately describe my inner sensations, which are mine alone? The remarks 
following §243 show Wittgenstein addressing the perspective of this speaker who “feels 
that the use of the same word ‘pain’, to talk about both his own sensations and other 
people’s, understates or fails to acknowledge what it distinctive about his own pains” 
(Child 394).28 Like many works of modernist literature, the Investigations presents a 
conversation between someone pessimistic about language’s epistemological efficacy and 
someone who seeks to dispel or mitigate such pessimism.29 Though Wittgenstein does not 
put it in exactly these terms, this section of his text examines the possibilities and limits 
of shared language in the acknowledgment of private pain.  
																																																						
28 Scholars have often argued that the so-called ‘private language argument’ (a phrase 
Wittgenstein himself never uses) constitutes the Investigations’ definitive rejection of this 
skeptical position. David Stern terms this line of analysis the orthodox view (335). Against these 
readings, Cavell’s “unorthodox” (Stern 344) interpretation proceeds from the recognition that 
Wittgenstein never says explicitly “there can be no private language” (CR 344). Instead, for 
Cavell, Wittgenstein attempts to imagine what it would mean to speak a private language, and he 
discovers “that we cannot really imagine this … or rather that when we … try to imagine this we 
are imagining something other than we think” (344). For a helpful review of the extensive 
scholarship on Wittgenstein’s account of private language, see Stern. For a more complete 
reading of this section, one which I find generally persuasive, see Mulhall, Wittgenstein’s Private 
Language.  
29 In his own discussion of the Investigations, Richard Eldridge foregrounds the work’s literary 
qualities by referring to its “protagonist” (Leading 6). For the purposes of my discussion, it’s 
helpful to imagine this section of the text as a conversation between two voices, Wittgenstein’s 
(or his protagonist’s) and an interlocutor’s. With that said, Cavell is certainly correct when he 
writes that it would be a mistake to read the Investigations as simply a dialogue between two 
speakers. First of all, as he notes, “there is no reason to think that there is just one interlocutor 
throughout the book,” as opposed to many (CR 344). Second, these interlocutors voice versions 
of Wittgenstein’s own attitudes—attitudes he may wish to resist but to which he also finds 




 In his first attempt to address the concerns of this skeptical voice, Wittgenstein 
asks whether it makes sense to understand internal sensations as ‘private’ at all: 
In what sense are my sensations private? Well, only I can know whether I am 
really in pain; another person can only surmise it. – In one way this is false, and in 
another nonsense. If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and 
how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if I’m in pain. – 
Yes, but all the same, not with the certainty with which I know it myself! … 
 This much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt 
whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself. (§246).  
In this imagined dialogue, Wittgenstein’s first move is to point out that we frequently 
speak about knowing another’s pain in perfectly intelligible ways: I could say, for 
example, “I knew he was in pain as soon as he hit the ground.” That is, the language 
practices governing “knowing” and “pain” certainly allow for a variety of coherent ways 
to talk about knowing another’s pain. Still, the skeptical voice responds, my knowledge 
of my own pain remains categorically different from my knowledge of someone else’s. In 
the final sentence of the remark, Wittgenstein concedes that a distinction does obtain: my 
pain is immediate, direct, not allowing for the possibility of doubt, in a way another’s is 
not.   
 Wittgenstein next comes at the issue of private language by asking how we have 
learned to talk about inner pains in the first place. He proposes a different thought 
experiment in an attempt to capture and take seriously the skeptic’s point: “suppose I 




simply associate names with sensations, and use these names in descriptions” (§256). 
This proposal gets at the skeptic’s anxiety that the words we use to describe our 
sensations are essentially arbitrary, and so we could theoretically name our sensations in 
non-standard, private ways. In response, Wittgenstein writes, “When one says ‘He gave a 
name to his sensation’, one forgets that much must be prepared in language for mere 
naming to make sense” (§257). Here, Wittgenstein’s earlier discussion of language’s 
“regularity” shows why the skeptic’s position breaks down. An individual learns to name 
sensations by entering into common human practices for naming sensations; in this sense, 
the connection between name and sensation is arbitrary only insofar as we could logically 
imagine a different word (or words) naming the private experience of pain. Wittgenstein 
brings out this point by wondering, “What would it be like if human beings did not 
manifest their pains (did not groan, grimace, etc.)?” (§257). Of course, imagining such a 
world is logically possible; however, Wittgenstein’s inclusion of this counterfactual only 
emphasizes the intimate relation between pain and pain-behavior in our own world. As 
such, the skeptic’s picture in §256 goes wrong because it implies too much of a gap 
between sensation and name; in §257, as Stephen Mulhall writes, Wittgenstein reminds 
us that “there is no gap to bridge in the first place”; “pain naturally finds expression in 
certain forms of behavior,” and to learn to associate the word “pain” with this behavior is 
simply to learn what pain is (Private Language 28).30  
																																																						
30 Elaborating on this point, Mulhall helpfully clarifies Wittgenstein’s picture of how humans 
learn to speak about inner pain: “The child, who hurts himself, cries; it is not he, but the adults 
around him, who make the connection between his cries and the domain of exclamations and 
sentences in the language of pain. There is no moment of recognition on his part that mediates 




 In pushing back against the idea of private language, Wittgenstein recognizes that 
he risks being misread as a “behaviorist in disguise”—that is, as denying that human 
beings have distinctive, intensely personal inner lives (§307). Wittgenstein’s response is 
to remind us that we speak about pain only in the context of sharing a world with other 
human beings: after the skeptical voice asks, “But doesn’t what you say amount to this: 
that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour?,” Wittgenstein answers, “It 
amounts to this: that only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a 
living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is 
conscious or unconscious” (§281). Here, Wittgenstein reaffirms that we learn to talk 
about “pain” at all because we are living beings who have relatively consistent ways of 
outwardly expressing our inner experiences of pain. Far from denying inner experience, 
Wittgenstein is pointing out that our ability to understand linguistic concepts like “pain” 
is inextricable from certain shared conditions of human existence, such as the fact of 
embodiment. To this point, he highlights the crucial role that other people’s “facial 
expressions” play in enabling us to recognize pain (§283, italics removed). Responding to 
the objection that it does not make sense to talk about a body’s having pain, Wittgenstein 
argues that we cannot disassociate the pain of the body from the pain of the person; the 
																																																						
he is feeling as pain…. It is the adults who recognize his cries as cries of pain, and hence are in a 
position to replace them with primitive linguistic forms of pain behavior, and so induct him into 
(this dimension of) life with language” (29-30). Notice that, in arguing against the idea that the 
child has a moment of internal realization that what he is feeling is called ‘pain,’ Wittgenstein 
pushes back against Augustine’s picture of language acquisition, quoted in the opening remark of 




body is the person: “if someone has pain in his hand, then … one does not comfort the 
hand, but the sufferer: one looks into his eyes” (§286).31  
Wittgenstein reveals, then, that part of why it is so difficult to coherently imagine 
private language is because doing so often turns out to misrepresent one element or 
another of what it is like to develop language as a human being—of our human interest in 
language (as, let’s say, a way of expressing the sensations of our bodies to other people 
with different bodies). As Wittgenstein describes his project at another point in the text: 
“What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings; not 
curiosities, however, but facts that no one has doubted, which have escaped notice only 
because they are always before our eyes” (§415). Thus the therapeutic dimension that 
many scholars have found in Wittgenstein’s work becomes clear, in the sense that one of 
his goals in tracing this “natural history” is to dispel philosophical doubts, whenever such 
doubts prove unproductive. At one point in the discussion of private language, 
Wittgenstein writes—in what can only be described as a tone of exasperation—“Just 
try—in a real case—to doubt someone else’s fear or pain!” (§303). Here, Wittgenstein 
suggests that, even if he cannot prove that the picture of private language is incoherent, 
even if one remains unconvinced by his arguments against the skeptic, the fact remains 
that real, living beings often articulate their pain to us and invite us to respond. While it 
may be true that we do not know with certainty whether these people are really in pain 
																																																						
31 In this way, Wittgenstein’s critique of private language is also a response to Cartesian dualism: 
Wittgenstein suggests that, insofar as it makes sense to talk about mental or conceptual 
experience at all, it is only because we are bodies, living and feeling this experience. I take 
Wittgenstein to be making this same point with his well-known remark in a later section of the 




(or what their pain, as opposed to ours, feels like), ignoring their expressions of internal 
sensation means acceding to an overly defeatist form of skepticism.32 To focus too much 
on the limits of our knowledge is to fail to exercise our capacities for acknowledgment. A 
remark from Wittgenstein’s posthumously published volume On Certainty (1969), which 
he wrote near the end of his life, concisely summarizes the epistemological stance that all 
of his later work has sought to articulate: “Knowledge is in the end based on 
acknowledgement” (§378).  
 
Elucidating Acknowledgment: Examples, Political Implications, Related 
Terminology  
 
Cavell takes this notion of acknowledgment, already so deeply embedded in 
Wittgenstein’s remarks, and theorizes it more explicitly. In “Knowing and 
Acknowledging,” the penultimate essay in his first book, Must We Mean What We Say? 
(1969), Cavell returns to the distinction Wittgenstein has left intact in remark §246 of the 
Investigations: a distinction, let us recall, between my certain knowledge of my own pain 
and my uncertain knowledge of another’s. Cavell argues that the skeptic is basically 
correct to feel that this distinction can never be fully overcome. In §253, Wittgenstein 
writes, “In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also 
possible for us to have the same pain.” In his reading of this remark, Cavell emphasizes 
																																																						
32 Elsewhere, expressing a similar sentiment, Wittgenstein writes, “If I see someone writhing in 





that “Wittgenstein says merely ‘in so far as it makes sense to say …’; he does not say that 
it always makes sense, nor even that it ever does fully” (MWM 246). After all, Cavell 
points out, “the obvious fact that we can (or can be said to) have the same is undercut by 
the discovery that we cannot have literally or numerically the same” (248). To respond to 
the skeptic, Cavell writes, involves recognizing that when we talk about pain, we are not 
merely interested in matters of epistemological fact: “The fundamental importance of 
someone’s having pain is that he has it; and the nature of that importance—namely, that 
he is suffering, that he requires attention—is what makes it important to know” about the 
pain (245). This version of knowledge—what Cavell calls acknowledgment—is bound up 
with our interest in pain as the pain of other people, people who may be suffering. In this 
sense, to say “‘I know you’re in pain’ is not an expression of certainty […]; it is an 
expression of sympathy” (263). As an epistemological stance, acknowledgment involves 
accepting our own human finitude, recognizing the limits to our knowledge, while still 
engaging with the world (rather than skeptically retreating from it). Wittgenstein, Cavell 
writes, “wishes an acknowledgment of human limitation which does not leave us chafed 
by our own skin, by a sense of powerlessness to penetrate beyond the human conditions 
of knowledge” (61).  
 Having introduced the stance of acknowledgment, Cavell uses the final essay in 
Must We Mean What We Say? to elaborate this term more fully, via a reading of King 
Lear (1608/1623). In so doing, Cavell underscores the value of literary works in vividly 
representing human relationships and therefore in illuminating acknowledgment’s 




unwillingness to acknowledge Cordelia’s love; he wants to be admired for his power, and 
he fears the vulnerability that being loved apart from his kingly authority would imply. 
As such, in the famous abdication scene, Lear attempts to solicit false love from all three 
of his daughters; Cordelia, however, offers “the real thing” and thus “threatens to expose 
… his terror of being loved, of needing love” (MWM 290). So he disinherits her. Cavell 
argues that “Lear’s dominating motivation” is “to avoid being recognized,” and that the 
play signals this motivation via its recurrent use of eye-related imagery (274, italics 
removed). He writes that “the failure to recognize others is a failure to let others 
recognize you, a fear of what is revealed to them” (277-8). So he characterizes acts of 
acknowledging others as bound up with acts of recognizing something about ourselves—
namely, with recognizing the extent and nature of our commitments to others. For this 
reason, it becomes difficult to generalize about precisely what would constitute a 
successful act of acknowledgment and what would not, because the answer to this 
question always depends on the specific relationship between two (or more) individual 
speakers.   
 Cavell’s discussion, begun in Must We Mean What We Say? and extended in The 
Claim of Reason (1979),33 also suggests that there exist degrees—or, stronger and weaker 
forms—of acknowledgment. In the Lear essay, Cavell makes this point through his 
examination of Gloucester’s attitude toward Edmund, his bastard son: “[Gloucester] 
																																																						
33 The fourth and final section of this later work, “Between Acknowledgment and Avoidance,” 
offers a lengthy elaboration of his thinking on the subject of acknowledgment. I will be turning 
periodically in my own discussion to points Cavell introduces for the first time in The Claim of 




recognizes the moral claim upon himself, as he says twice, to ‘acknowledge’ his bastard; 
but all that means to him is that he acknowledge that he has a bastard for a son. He does 
not acknowledge him, as a son or a person, with his feelings of illegitimacy and being 
cast out” (MWM 276). Gloucester, we might say, acknowledges Edmund only in the 
barest sense of admitting that he is Edmund’s father. He acknowledges his legal 
obligation to Edmund, but he does not consider what the ethical and psychological 
consequences of admitting this relation might be. He does not ask himself, for instance, 
whether his society’s social and economic prejudices against bastards are justified, or 
whether he has potentially mistreated Edmund on the basis of his son’s bastard status. In 
this respect, his ‘acknowledgment’ of Edward hardly qualifies as an example of what 
Cavell typically means by the term, which tends to imply a fuller reckoning with one’s 
commitments to another than that which Gloucester undertakes. Insofar as Edmund has 
found the words to express his unacknowledged pain, either Gloucester has not listened 
to them, or Edmund has deemed it pointless to say anything, knowing his father as he 
does.34  
 Different cultural conditions also affect what forms acknowledgment might take, 
as a comparison between Lear and a canonical modernist work illustrates. In Faulkner’s 
Absalom, Absalom! (1936), much of the plot revolves around Thomas Sutpen’s refusal to 
acknowledge Charles Bon as his son. According to one version of the story, Sutpen 
repudiates the young Bon upon discovering that Bon’s mother (and thus Bon himself) has 
																																																						
34 Tellingly, of course, Edmund waits to deliver his famous “Now gods, stand up for bastards!” 




black blood. As an adult, Bon attempts to force the issue of his relation to Sutpen, first 
befriending his other son and then becoming engaged to his daughter. After Bon visits the 
Sutpen family over Christmas, meeting his father in person but receiving no sign of 
recognition from him, the novel depicts Bon departing the Sutpen property, “thinking But 
why? Why? since he wanted so little, could have understood if the other had wanted the 
signal to be in secret” (AA 257). Bon’s wish for acknowledgment from his father has 
gone unmet; Bon has not received even the weaker form of acknowledgment that 
Edmund receives from Gloucester, an acknowledgment of the fact that Sutpen is his 
father.35 Even though the relation between the two characters is the same in both texts, an 
act of acknowledgment from Sutpen would—given the historical world Faulkner 
depicts—expose him to consequences greater than those Gloucester faces. In Lear, 
Gloucester is able to identify Edmund as his bastard without his own social position 
suffering significantly.36 For Sutpen, by contrast, acknowledging Bon in even the barest 
legal sense would mean the failure of his single-minded pursuit to establish his family 
within the Southern aristocracy (since it would mean that his oldest son is someone 
whose race excludes him absolutely from joining this aristocracy), and it would mean, 
further, admitting to the strict social taboo of miscegenation. Acknowledging a part black 
																																																						
35 Arguably, Faulkner’s novel does conclude with Bon receiving a version of this 
acknowledgment. According to the story that Quentin Compson and his Harvard roommate 
Shreve imaginatively reconstruct, Sutpen eventually speaks to his acknowledged son Henry, 
informing him, first, of Bon’s connection to the family and, second, of Bon’s racial heritage. 
After learning this latter piece of information, and finding that Bon still intends to marry their 
sister, Henry murders his brother. Thus, in a sense, Bon finally achieves the paternal recognition 
for which he has been looking—though he does so only indirectly and in a manner that costs him 
his life.  




son would also invite the question of why such an individual occupies an inferior social 
position in the first place, and Sutpen does not want to pursue this line of inquiry, since 
doing so would raise larger, more troubling moral questions about the aristocratic way of 
life he wishes to emulate.  
 As these briefly sketched examples indicate, acknowledgment (and its failures) 
often becomes an issue in the context of the family. Family relations tend to carry with 
them certain commitments, commitments to which we may not have consciously agreed, 
and which we may be inclined to shirk. As Cavell writes, “there are no lengths to which 
we may not go in order to avoid being revealed, even to those we love and are loved by. 
Or rather, especially to those we love and are loved by: to other people it is easy not to be 
known” (MWM 284). In light of the emphasis Cavell places on family relations, it 
becomes evident that the restructuring of these relations in modernity makes 
acknowledgment an issue in historically specific ways; thus, this study devotes 
significant attention to modernist representations of relations between husbands and 
wives, parents and children, and siblings (as well as to intimate same-sex relations, which 
become queer alternatives to traditional family arrangements). But relations that either 
produce or foreclose acknowledgment also extend beyond the context of the family. 
Often, acknowledgment simply involves accepting other people’s words as the best 
“criteria” we have available to us for understanding their inner lives (CR 6).37 For 
																																																						
37 Cavell defines “criteria” as “the means by which we learn what our concepts are” (CR 16) and 
The Claim of Reason provides an extensive discussion of the important role that criteria play in 
Wittgenstein’s thought. Cavell writes that “Wittgenstein’s appeal to criteria is meant … to call to 
consciousness the astonishing fact of the astonishing extent to which we do agree in” our uses of 




example, if I’m walking down the street and pass by a woman on the ground, who yells, 
“Help! I think I’m having a heart attack,” I could either take her words seriously and 
attempt to aid her or I could keep walking. In this case, acknowledging her plight would 
also mean acknowledging myself as the person best positioned to respond to this plight—
not because I have any long-standing relationship with her, but simply because I am the 
nearest person on the street.  
Examining such social dynamics also raises the question of what larger political 
or ethical implications acts of acknowledgment might hold. Cavell’s most explicit foray 
into this question occurs early in The Claim of Reason, wherein he emphasizes that 
Wittgenstein’s ordinary language philosophy makes a “claim to community,” which takes 
the form of an “appeal to what we say” (CR 20).38 For Cavell, this “we” is not some 
stable or monolithic group; it is always subject to rejection or reformulation by its 
prospective members. He writes: 
To speak for oneself politically is to speak for others with whom you consent to 
association, and it is to consent to be spoken for by them—not as a parent speaks 
for you, i.e., instead of you, but as someone in mutuality speaks for you, i.e., 
																																																						
mutual attunement that allows us to say things like, “It terrified me” or “I was looking forward to 
it until I was not” and trust others to understand what we mean. For Cavell’s complete discussion 
of criteria, see CR 3-125.   
38 It is important to emphasize that Cavell’s use of the term ‘ordinary’ is not meant to apply any 
kind of normative judgment. “Ordinary language philosophy,” Cavell writes, “is about whatever 
ordinary language is about” (MWM 95); as a philosophical approach, it consists of “placing the 
words and experiences with which philosophers have always begun in alignment with human 
beings in particular circumstances who can be imagined to be having those experiences and 
saying and meaning those words” (MWM 270). Given this expansive conception of the ordinary, 
Toril Moi emphasizes that “[c]alls for uprising and revolution are also made in ordinary 




speaks your mind…. To speak for yourself then means risking the rebuff … of 
those for whom you claimed to be speaking; and it means risking having to rebuff 
… those who claimed to be speaking for you. (CR 27) 
Political engagement constitutes an effort to achieve these moments of speaking “in 
mutuality” with others. Searching for acknowledgment means asking to have one’s 
perspective taken seriously, incorporated into the community. Conversely, failures of 
acknowledgment may lead an individual to discover that the political community does 
not speak (or no longer speaks) for her, or they may reveal that she has not spoken for the 
broader community as fully as she thought. Cavell suggests that we learn to speak by 
observing our elders, but he wonders, “[W]hat happens if ‘my elders’, all of them […], 
will not accept what I say and do as what they say and do?” (CR 28).39 Naomi Scheman 
aptly characterizes Cavell’s political philosophy when she writes that “the achievement 
of a we lies beyond a rolling horizon, and part of what moves us toward that horizon is 
attentiveness toward those who are excluded from the we’s that shape our practices, 
excluded by our culpable ignorance, fear, or contempt” (“Storied World” 104).40 
																																																						
39 Robert Chodat writes that Cavell seeks to dissuade us from talking “about ‘the community’ as 
if it were a stable entity, some ready-made physical space existing apart from the 
acknowledgment of its members” (“Empiricism” 219). In Conditions Handsome and 
Unhandsome (1990), Cavell objects to Kripke’s reading of the Investigations on the grounds that 
it problematically reifies the concept of community; see 64-100.  
40 In an essay extending Cavell’s philosophy to feminist thought, Moi argues that one way to 
understand the political project of feminism is that it involves establishing a woman’s right to 
posit her own speech as exemplifying that of her community. Moi writes, “[B]ecause I am a 
human being I am as good an example of a human being as you are. By making myself 
exemplary I am assuming that I am no better and no worse than anyone else” (“I Am a Woman” 
227). For a more complete discussion of the feminist implications of Cavell’s political 
philosophy, see Moi, “I Am a Woman,” esp. 207-45; see also Scheman, “Forms of Life” and 
“Storied World”; Zerilli, “Feminism’s Flight.” For further discussion of Cavell’s political theory, 




 Why focus, as I shall be doing here, on “acknowledgment,” as opposed to other 
terms with potentially similar political and/or ethical implications? First and foremost, the 
value of the term ‘acknowledgment’ results from its etymological relation with, and 
embedded connection to, knowledge. On the one hand, acknowledgment functions as 
what Cavell calls “an interpretation of” knowledge (IQO 8); the epistemological stance of 
acknowledgment offers us a way of understanding what ‘knowledge’ means, in the 
context of our relations with other people. But acknowledgment can also constitute an 
alternative to (certain conceptions of) knowledge. Since we can never establish proof or 
achieve certainty with respect to what other people are feeling or experiencing, to rely too 
narrowly on our rational faculties, as Descartes would have us do, is to set ourselves up 
for disappointment. In this respect, the stance of acknowledgment involves treating other 
people and our relations with them not merely as “objects of knowledge” but as subjects 
“of human concern, of value” (Bertacco and Gibson 109).41 Cavell notes that 
acknowledgment often relies on a certain knowledge of facts, but that these facts do not 
in and of themselves constitute acknowledgment or ensure its taking place: “from my 
acknowledging that I am late it follows that I know I’m late […]; but from my knowing 
that I’m late it does not follow that I acknowledge I’m late—otherwise, human 
relationships would be altogether other than they are” (MWM 256-7). 
																																																						
41 Moi writes that acknowledgment “changes the dimension in which we assess our understanding 
of others” (Revolution 208). Along similar lines, Peter Dula points out that other-mind skepticism 
is fundamentally a different type of issue than skepticism toward the material world. In the former 
case, the issue is not simply whether or not we should trust our sensory perceptions; “there is 
something we want to know about humans that isn’t reducible to the senses, something invisible 
which makes a human a human and not just something that looks like a human” (137). I return to 




 The deep interrelation of knowledge with acknowledgment provides one reason 
why my study prefers to use Cavell’s term, rather than the related concept of ‘empathy.’ 
Another reason for this preference concerns the crucial connection between 
acknowledgment and language: acknowledgment, in Cavell’s philosophy, tends to be 
effected linguistically. These acts of acknowledgment may reaffirm that we speak about 
the world in shared ways, or they may illustrate our attempts to develop shared ways of 
speaking when confronted with their absence.42 Empathy, like acknowledgment, centers 
on the acceptance of shared humanity; my empathizing with another involves my 
recognizing and taking seriously the idea that this person has her own inner life, like I do, 
and that she is capable of experiencing pain or humiliation, like I am. But, unlike 
acknowledgment, empathy describes an emotional attitude that may exist apart from 
specific linguistic acts (though acts of acknowledgment do tend to demonstrate empathy). 
Acknowledgment also proves a more precise term to use when it comes to discussing 
literary works. As readers, we can acknowledge the meaningfulness of a character’s 
words, and we might even acknowledge something about ourselves by virtue of how a 
text depicts human relations. But we cannot coherently empathize with figures in literary 
fiction; to suggest otherwise would be to collapse the distinction between linguistic 
constructs and real people.43  
																																																						
42 It is possible, of course, to understand acknowledgment as a non-linguistic act—say, patting 
someone on the back when she is upset. But my focus in this study will be on acknowledgment as 
a way of using language, which is how it typically functions in Cavell’s work.  
43 Though we may not be able to empathize with fictional characters themselves, recent work in 
cognitive science has nonetheless suggested that reading literature may help us to empathize with 
other people. See Bollinger for a helpful overview of this research and a discussion of how 




Acknowledgment is also distinct in important ways from concepts like Jurgen 
Habermas’ ‘intersubjectivity’ or Richard Rorty’s ‘solidarity.’ Habermas operates with an 
overly stable conception of political community and an overly generalized notion of the 
human speaker or subject; he describes intersubjectivity as resulting from acts of rational 
argumentation in the public sphere, and he does not adequately address how successes or 
failures of acknowledgment, in the context of specific interpersonal relations, contribute 
to the forging or thwarting of political community.44 Habermas’ dismissal of the language 
of acknowledgment comes through most clearly in his discussion of J.L. Austin and 
perlocutionary speech. For Austin, Cavell’s other major influence besides Wittgenstein, 
perlocutionary speech acts are those that endeavor to “produce certain consequential 
effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience” (How 101). Perlocutionary 
speech acts often function as what Cavell calls “passionate utterances” (PTDAT 177), 
attempts to solicit acknowledgment from another. When Habermas takes up Austin’s 
concept of perlocutionary speech, he gives such utterances a distinctly negative cast, 
which they do not have in Austin’s account: with the perlocutionary speech act, 
Habermas writes, “one subject … harnesses another for his own purposes, that is, induces 
him to behave in a desired way by manipulatively employing linguistic means and 
thereby instrumentalizes him for his own success” (I, 288). However, as Danielle Allen 
																																																						
44 He writes, for example, that “communicative rationality” results from “the unconstrained, 
unifying, consensus bringing force of argumentative speech, in which different participants 
overcome their merely subjective views and, owing to the mutuality of rationally motivated 
conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of 




also notes, perlocutionary speech not need be understood as manipulative; it might 
simply reflect one subject’s effort to express or convey her experience to another.45 
Though Rorty does not share Habermas’ commitment to preserving and updating 
the project of Enlightenment rationalism, his notion of ‘solidarity’ relies on its own too-
sharp distinction between personal and political speech. For Rorty, cultivating solidarity 
involves negotiating between the various contingent moral vocabularies with which 
others understand their experiences; we can respect another’s vocabulary, Rorty argues, 
without finding it productive to the pursuit of our own individual flourishing. Rorty 
advocates “separat[ing] the question ‘Do you believe and desire what we believe and 
desire?’ from the question ‘Are you suffering?’”—that is, “distinguish[ing] the question 
of whether you and I share the same final vocabulary with the question of whether you 
are in pain” (Contingency 198). But Cavell’s philosophy indicates that we may not be 
able to separate these two questions as fully as Rorty would like. For, as Jessica Berman 
also notes, we are liable to interact with those who employ a different vocabulary not in 
some “idealized public sphere” but in our own everyday relationships (Modernist Fiction 
12). That is to say, different conceptions of belief and desire, which manifest themselves 
via different ways of using words, lead to failures of acknowledgment—failures that take 
place in the context of specific interpersonal relations but that have broader consequences 
for the project of promoting political consensus.46   
																																																						
45 For more on this point, see Allen 53-68. 
46 Part of the issue with Rorty’s notion of contingent moral vocabularies is that it relies on a 
reading of the later Wittgenstein that makes his conception of language too contingent: Rorty 
associates Wittgenstein with the position that we should “treat everything—our language, our 




Perhaps the term from recent political theory that comes closest to Cavell’s 
‘acknowledgment’ would be ‘recognition.’ Taylor outlines the rationale behind the 
politics of recognition, writing, “The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by 
recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or a 
group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around 
them mirror back to them a conflicting or demeaning or contemptible picture of 
themselves” (“Politics” 25). Like Cavell’s acknowledgment, Taylor’s recognition 
involves a relationship between two (or more) parties, wherein one either accurately 
recognizes something about the other or refuses to do so.47 (Recall Lear’s refusal to 
recognize Cordelia’s love.) The challenge inherent to the politics of recognition, Taylor 
																																																						
argue that the later Wittgenstein investigates our language practices in order to see what they can 
tell us about certain broadly shared aspects of human existence. When Wittgenstein asks 
questions like, “What would it be like if human beings did not manifest their pains (did not groan, 
grimace, etc.)?,” he implicitly gestures toward certain natural features of human expressive 
behavior (§257). While the words we use to discuss such behavior may be contingent, the 
behaviors themselves are not; they are fundamental to what Wittgenstein calls our ‘form of life.’ 
He writes, for example, “[w]hat is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their 
language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life” 
(§241). Such a passage is incompatible with Rorty’s picture of influential poet figures who 
persuade their communities to speak in new ways. Rather, Wittgenstein suggests that it is often 
the condition of being an embodied human being, sharing a world with other humans, that 
dictates how we use words. Another consequence of Rorty’s reading of Wittgenstein, as Linda 
Zerilli recounts, is that it suggests the possibility of “incommensurable” differences between 
communities, such that conversation between them becomes impossible (“Wittgenstein” 37). But 
again, this view miscasts Wittgenstein’s understanding of what it means to share a “form of life” 
with others. “In Wittgenstein’s account,” writes Zerilli, it is precisely “where arguments fail […], 
where I cannot convince you and must simply face up to your point of view, that I may actually 
be able to see something new” (40). For more on this point, see Zerilli, “Wittgenstein,” esp. 36-
41. 
47 The connection between these two terms makes sense given that, as Eldridge points out, 
Cavell’s term ‘acknowledgment’ owes a debt to G.W.F. Hegel’s concept of Anerkennung—a 
word that, roughly, translates into English as ‘recognition’ (“Introduction” 9). Recognition is 
crucial to Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, which raises the question of whether the master will 
identify and acknowledge his interrelation with, and thus dependence upon, the slave. See Taylor, 




writes, resides in its attempt to negotiate between universality and difference; it upholds 
the dignity of all individuals, suggesting that everyone should be entitled to “an identical 
basket of rights and immunities,” but it also asks us “to recognize the unique identity of 
this individual or group, their distinctness from everyone else” (“Politics” 38).48  
The issue of political recognition is therefore intimately connected with 
Wittgensteinian and Cavellian concerns about the extent to which we do or do not find 
ourselves linguistically attuned with others. Taylor writes that the politics of recognition 
asks us to accept the worth of different cultures, but “for a sufficiently different culture, 
the very understanding of what it is to be of worth will be strange and unfamiliar to us” 
(“Politics” 67). Similarly, Wittgenstein comments:  
It is … important as regards our considerations that one human being can be a 
complete enigma to another. One learns this when one comes into a strange 
country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, even though one has 
mastered the country’s language. One does not understand the people…. We 
can’t find our feet with them. (PI II, §325)  
Such lack of attunement is liable to make it more difficult for individuals to recognize or 
acknowledge one another.  
Still, unlike Wittgenstein or Cavell, Taylor theorizes recognition primarily in the 
context of the political sphere, as something the polity does or does not extend to 
“established cultural groups” (Berman, Modernist Fiction 11), such as French speakers in 
																																																						
48 Taylor explains that belief in the dignity of the individual is bound up with the specifically 





Quebec (“Politics” 51-61). As Winfred Fluck writes, Taylor’s discussion casts the 
individual subject’s sense of identity as “something that is already in place through 
membership in a group” (46). In other words, Taylor misses an opportunity to consider 
“the search for recognition” as an experience of “constant struggle,” “produc[ing] 
winners and losers, manipulators and victims, betrayers and betrayed, insiders and 
outsiders, all driven to establish a sense of distinction or moral superiority over others”—
all of which makes up, as Fluck says, “the stuff of literature” (49). Another limitation to 
political theories of recognition, as Nikolas Kompridis notes, is that they tend to focus 
exclusively on “those demanding recognition, not … those from whom it is demanded. 
Thus, missing from these theories is the struggle to acknowledge demands for 
recognition—which is to say, the struggle to overcome something in ourselves that resists 
the acknowledgment of others” (18-9). Lear’s refusal to admit his own vulnerability 
exemplifies this “struggle to overcome something in [oneself]” and thus shows why his 
rejection of Cordelia is most precisely described as a failure of acknowledgment, rather 
than one of recognition in Taylor’s sense.49  
																																																						
49 Another relevant term with which to compare ‘acknowledgment’ would be ‘trust,’ which 
Annette Baier defines as “accepted vulnerability” in the context of one’s interactions with others 
(99). Baier sets up her discussion of trust as an important corrective to the history of Western 
moral philosophy, which she argues has been limited by its near exclusive focus “on fairly cool 
relationships between those who are deemed to be roughly equal in power” (116). (Habermas’ 
theory of communicative rationality would be one example of a philosophy that exhibits this 
narrower focus.) Baier points to “infant-parent relations” as one type of social tie for which 
political theorists have not adequately accounted (106); she thereby demonstrates her interest in 
getting case-specific about how trust works, as Cavell suggests we should do for 
acknowledgment. Baier’s work suggests that acts of acknowledgment enable the gradual 
development of trust, even as she argues that trust often transcends what “can … be spelled out in 
an explicit acknowledgment” (106). Allen extends Baier’s work, pointing out that, in American 




 Indeed, by virtue of their capacity to vividly illuminate personal relationships and 
conflicts, literary texts become indispensable to the project of investigating 
acknowledgment. Insofar as they represent how characters do, or don’t, achieve 
“mutuality” in their uses of language, works of literature possess undeniable political 
relevance (CR 27). With that said, this study proceeds from the premise that it is not the 
role of literature (at least, not good literature) to offer explicit political theory. Rather, by 
representing human life in all its diversity and complexity, literature offers a corrective to 
political theory, which may often ignore or oversimplify certain aspects of human 
existence. David Schalkwyk writes that literary works make what Cavell calls “claims to 
community” (CR 20); they “explore and perhaps even shake the deepest levels of 
agreement upon which not only our language but also our sense of ourselves and the 
world we share and struggle over depend” (296).50 Similarly, Kwame Anthony Appiah 
argues that literary works play a crucial role in helping us develop a shared “moral 
language” (60): “evaluating stories together,” he writes, “is one of the central human 
ways of learning to align our responses to the world” (29).51 So literary works have the 
																																																						
are capable of breaking down racial distrust and cultivating what Allen calls “political friendship” 
(140). I return to Allen’s work on trust and racism in my fourth chapter. 
50 For a similar, Wittgenstein-informed account of literature’s role in shaping linguistic 
agreement, see Gibson.  
51 Appiah recognizes, of course, that we will not always agree with the moral judgments of others: 
“Because … language is open-textured and essentially contestable, even people who share a 
moral vocabulary have plenty to fight about” (60). But he maintains that, in an increasingly 
globalized world, the attempt to develop and elaborate a shared vocabulary functions as a crucial 
alternative to moral relativism (13-31). Appiah’s idea of shared moral vocabulary provides a 
helpful counterweight to Rorty’s emphasis on the contingency of language: Appiah describes 
human beings as generally sharing certain capacities, like the abilities to feel pain and 
humiliation, and he points out that on the basis of these shared capacities we might construct a 




capacity to do more than simply represent acknowledgment’s successes and failures; they 
also may also initiate an attitude of acknowledgment in readers.    
 
The “Rough Ground” of Modernist Fiction  
 
 Charles Altieri voices the concern that “acknowledgment gets dangerously sappy 
without some kind of test of adequate attention to actual behavior” (“Cavell and 
Wittgenstein” 70). Literary works go farther than philosophical ones in addressing this 
important concern. In a key passage from the Investigations, Wittgenstein outlines the 
supposed advantages of his late-career approach to language: 
The more closely we examine actual language, the greater becomes the conflict 
between it and … the crystalline purity of logic…. We have got on to slippery ice 
where there is no friction, and so, in a certain sense, the conditions are ideal, but 
also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk; so we need 
friction. Back to the rough ground! (§107) 
Wittgenstein here contrasts “actual language” with the “crystalline purity” toward which 
the Tractatus has aimed. In truth, however, neither he nor Cavell returns to this rough 
ground as fully as we might expect. Despite their emphasis on the embeddedness of 
language within social contexts, the irony of both writers’ work is how little grounding it 
has in historical particularities. The Investigations provides numerous examples of 
speakers using specific words in specific imagined situations, but none of these examples 




reason, Wittgenstein’s thought experiments tell us less about “actual language” than they 
might. When Wittgenstein writes, “we need friction,” he may as well have written: we 
need fiction. 
Cavell’s turn to literary analysis shows his implicit recognition that literature 
provides sui generis insight into human linguistic practices, portraying characters who 
participate in certain historically specific forms of social relation, as members of families 
and of broader communities. Still, even Cavell does not discuss history in anything but 
the most abstract terms. He notes that skepticism is a “problem of modern human 
history” (CR 468), but he does not consider how the specific historical circumstances of 
twentieth-century modernity create conditions in which other-mind skepticism might take 
root.52 Others who have sought to adopt a Cavellian approach to literary scholarship have 
often replicated his relative inattention to historical (including literary-historical) change. 
Martha Nussbaum, for instance, has essays on moral and emotional knowledge in Henry 
James’s The Ambassadors (1903) and The Golden Bowl (1904) and Samuel Beckett’s 
Molloy (1951). However, perhaps because Nussbaum reads these texts as illustrations of 
broader philosophical truths, she does not note the respective places that James and 
Beckett occupy in the development of aesthetic modernism—the fact that James’s work 
predates high modernism, whereas Beckett might be understood as a later, second 
																																																						
52 What Cavell means by “modern” seems to shift across his writings. In the rough history of 
skepticism he sketches near the end of The Claim of Reason, he associates the “modern” first and 
foremost with Descartes, and he goes on to discuss Shakespeare as the key literary contributor to 
modern intellectual history (468-78). By contrast, in his “Music Discomposed” essay, “modern” 
refers specifically to the work of experimental twentieth-century artists: Samuel Beckett, John 




generation modernist. Such omissions are consequential for her readings: by divorcing 
Molloy from its place in literary history, she overlooks how deeply Beckett calls into 
question the very possibility of epistemological inquiry, in a way James does not.53  
It is only in recent years that literary critics have begun to fill in the gaps in our 
understanding of how Wittgenstein’s philosophy and aesthetic modernism develop out of 
and respond to the same broader historical moment. Often, such work has proceeded by 
establishing the influence of Wittgenstein and his philosophical interlocutors on specific 
literary figures: Ann Banfield’s The Phantom Table (2000) traces the variety of ways in 
which Cambridge analytic philosophy found its way into Woolf’s fiction54; Megan 
Quigley’s Modernist Vagueness (2015) extends Banfield’s work on Woolf and 
undertakes a comparable project with respect to Joyce55; and Michael LeMahieu’s 
Fictions of Fact and Value (2013) illuminates the familiarity of post-WWII American 
writers like Saul Bellow and Thomas Pynchon with the Tractatus and other touchstones 
of logical positivist thought.56 While such studies have made valuable contributions to 
																																																						
53 For Nussbaum’s accounts of how The Golden Bowl and The Ambassadors, respectively, train 
readers to develop moral perceptiveness, see Love’s Knowledge 125-67 and 168-94. For her 
discussion of Beckett’s novel, which she reads as illustrating how shared stories give rise to 
particular understandings of emotions like “love,” see 286-313. Nussbaum also brings Cavell’s 
philosophy to bear on a reading of Woolf’s To the Lighthouse (1927), a novel I discuss at 
length—along with Nussbaum’s reading of it—in my second chapter. (For Nussbaum’s account, 
see “Window.”) 
54 In fact, the key philosophical figure in Banfield’s study is not Wittgenstein but Russell. 
Because Banfield focuses on the period between 1900 and 1918 (Banfield 8-9), the Tractatus 
plays only a small role in her book and the Investigations plays basically none at all. (It is 
mentioned once, in a footnote.)  
55 Quigley explains that Joyce was not directly influenced by Wittgenstein, but she justifies 
writing about them together by noting that each corresponded with Ogden, who translated both of 
their work (10).  
56 In focusing on these post-WWII writers, LeMahieu also puts forward an oversimplified 




twentieth-century intellectual history, they have had less to say about the broader cultural 
and material conditions of Western modernity that the writers of this period—both 
philosophical and literary—confront.57 Such scholarship misses an opportunity to 
consider modernist philosophy and literature as two formally distinct sets of responses to 
a more widespread set of historically-conditioned uncertainties and anxieties. Toril Moi’s 
Henrik Ibsen and the Birth of Modernism (2006) makes one important salvo along such 
lines; Moi argues that Ibsen is a modernist precursor insofar as his plays critique idealist 
aesthetics and thereby anticipate the more widespread phenomenon of linguistic 
skepticism that emerges with high modernism.58 But by focusing on Ibsen, Moi follows 
																																																						
writers challenge solipsism and suggest acknowledgment as an alternative (165). In so doing, 
however, he overlooks the degree to which the modernists have already identified 
acknowledgment as a response or corrective to solipsistic doubt. 
57 The same argument could be made about LeMahieu and Karen Zumhagen-Yekplé’s recent 
essay collection Wittgenstein and Modernism (2017). In their introduction, the editors write that 
“Wittgenstein’s philosophy enacts or embodies […] modernism as a historical period, an 
aesthetic style, and a philosophical worldview” (1). But the subsequent essays address these latter 
two conceptions of Wittgenstein’s philosophy more than they do the former. Two recent studies 
that do provide a more historically-grounded perspective on Wittgenstein’s work are Rebecca 
Schuman’s Kafka and Wittgenstein: The Case for an Analytical Modernism (2015) and Marjorie 
Perloff’s Edge of Irony: Modernism in the Shadow of the Habsburg Empire (2016). Schuman 
considers how Kafka and Wittgenstein both respond to and participate in the “language crisis … 
in Austrian modernism,” also evident in the work of writers like Hofmannsthal, Mauthner, and 
Kraus (23). Similarly, Perloff places Wittgenstein alongside “Austro-Modernist” writers like 
Kraus, Robert Musil, and Joseph Roth and focuses in particular on how these figures responded 
to the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (3). My own study seeks to replicate this 
attentiveness to early twentieth-century historical upheaval, while highlighting Wittgenstein’s 
relevance to the British and American strands of modernism.   
58 Moi writes, for instance, that “Ibsen’s modernist plays … tell us that the death of idealism gave 
free reins to modern skepticism, and that skepticism makes us doubt the power of words.… To 
doubt language … is to exile oneself from human community and from love. In Ibsen’s theater 
the only alternative to love is an unbearable solitude that either destroys us or drives us to 
madness … in a desperate attempt to make our existence heard and have it acknowledged by 
others” (13-4). Moi’s newest monograph, Revolution of the Ordinary (2017), makes a powerful 
argument for the relevance of Wittgenstein and Cavell’s thought to literary studies, though it does 
not offer sustained readings of particular literary texts in the way her Ibsen book does. Also worth 




Cavell’s own tendency to foreground drama in his literary readings, and thus she does not 
consider how modernist fiction might engage with skeptical impulses in formally 
distinctive ways.59 
My own study argues that representations of interiority in modernist fiction offer 
a set of formally and historically specific strategies for addressing skeptical doubt. As 
part of his discussion of King Lear, Cavell argues that part of why theater—and, more 
specifically, tragedy—is emotionally powerful is because the relationship between actors 
and audience “literalize[s] the conditions” of “hiddenness, silence, [and] isolation” that 
define of our everyday failures to acknowledge others (MWM 333). In both cases, Cavell 
writes, “people in pain are in our presence,” and we remain in the dark, saying and doing 
nothing (332). Cavell casts such forced confrontations with our own failures of 
acknowledgment as specific to drama, which he distinguishes from fiction on the grounds 
that, in theater, “[n]o mere character … commands the absolute credibility of a narrator” 
(MWM 335). With this statement, he seems to have in mind the fact that characters in 
																																																						
Revolution—invokes Wittgenstein as part of an argument about how literary scholars should read 
and engage with texts. Altieri treats Wittgenstein less as an historical figure than as an aesthetic 
theorist, setting out to show how Wittgenstein “free[s] us from the various versions of historicism 
that sell the imagination short because they reduce the aesthetic to little more than escapist 
fantasy” (24). So his book displays relatively little interest in actually historicizing Wittgenstein’s 
work alongside that of the literary modernists.    
59 E. Joseph Sharkey’s Idling the Engine (2006) offers one account of how modernist fiction 
engages with and pushes back against linguistic skepticism. But Sharkey’s discussion of 
linguistic skepticism (which focuses on works by Joyce, Kafka, and Julio Cortázar) relies on an 
incomplete, and historically vague, understanding of its causes. The principal feature of linguistic 
skepticism, as Sharkey defines it, is the “refusal to acknowledge the dependence of the self on 
things greater than the self,” which results in the attempt to exert total control over language (41). 
This claim overlooks the prominence of figures in modernist fiction whose attitude toward 





drama are always finite human beings, whereas narrative voice in fiction has the ability to 
transcend the limited epistemological capacities of individual characters. But this 
conception of fiction seems to collapse even on Cavell’s own terms: if language is 
necessarily limited in its ability to capture another’s experience, then this logic 
presumably applies to fictional representations of character as well, given that such 
representations necessarily proceed through language. Therefore, nobody in a novel has 
absolute credibility, not even a narrator. Rather than offering an alternative to other-mind 
skepticism, fiction—like drama—encapsulates what Cavell calls “the truth of 
skepticism,” the insurmountable limits in our access to other subjectivities (CR 496).  
But I do not simply mean to say that Cavell’s argument about drama also applies 
to fiction, in ways he does not see. In fact, modernist fiction approaches and confronts the 
problem of skepticism from a different angle than drama does. As I’ll be showing in the 
following chapters, in novels like Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway (1925), Larsen’s Passing, and 
Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury (both 1929), intensive representations of interiority 
purport to give readers access to the unvoiced thoughts and attitudes of characters—to 
everything that they resist saying, or that they cannot find a way to say. Unlike drama, 
then, fiction takes on the problem of other-mind skepticism from the inside-out, so to 
speak, linguistically representing characters’ internal conceptions of their experiences and 
relations with others. Whereas drama, according to Cavell’s argument, attempts to 
replicate the conditions of everyday life, modernist fiction marks an important departure 
from these conditions. These works give us, as readers, sustained linguistic access to the 




Such fictive representations of interiority instantiate Cavell’s conception of 
acknowledgment as both an alternative to and an interpretation of knowledge. They 
foreground the unavoidable limits of language in conveying knowledge of other 
subjectivities, and in this respect they function as the expressions of epistemological 
disappointment that other scholars have made them out to be. But they also show how 
language works to enable acknowledgment—and it is this second piece of the modernist 
puzzle that scholars have too often tended to overlook.  
A remark from Wittgenstein’s Investigations sheds light on the distinctive formal 
project of modernist fiction. Wittgenstein writes: 
“Man’s thinking goes on within the inner recesses of his mind in a seclusion in 
comparison with which any physical seclusion is a lying in full view.” 
 If there were people who always read the silent soliloquy of others—say 
by observing the larynx—would they too be inclined to use the picture of 
complete seclusion? (II, §316) 
In staging this brief exchange between two different perspectives, Wittgenstein asks 
whether the first speaker’s “picture of complete seclusion” might be misleading. The 
second voice proposes a scenario that would call the first speaker’s picture into question, 
showing that it is not logically necessary, and Wittgenstein invites readers to consider the 
extent to which such an imagined scenario challenges the initial speaker’s claim. Works 
of modernist fiction put forward imagined scenarios of their own, which implicitly call 
this “picture of complete seclusion” into question—not through observing characters’ 




way, all of the texts I discuss in this study put readers in a position to acknowledgment 
“the silent soliloquy” of socially marginalized speakers, giving linguistic shape to the 
historically-specific anxieties that have prompted them to doubt their own communicative 
capacities or to conceive of the meanings of words in unusual, idiosyncratic ways.   
In what follows, I examine a series of modernist novels that together illuminate 
both the persistence with which modernist novels explore the language of 
acknowledgment and the variety of forms this exploration takes. Informed by the later 
Wittgenstein’s own case-specific approach to mapping the meanings of words, this study 
argues that when modernist speakers lament their inability to make themselves 
understood, such skepticism reflects unfamiliar historical circumstances, as much as it 
does the inherent shortcomings of language. My project proceeds from the conviction 
that reading early twentieth-century philosophy and literature together reshapes our 
understandings of both fields: we come to see Wittgenstein’s gnomic remarks as 
reflective of the social and economic conditions of modernity, and we come to see formal 
innovations by contemporaneous novelists as the analogue of Wittgenstein’s misgivings 
about the capacity of words to delineate truth.  
Each chapter addresses one representative way in which this historical period 
threatened to fray the shared fabric of language, tracing how those who feel alienated 
from the normative language of their world endeavor to find words by which they might 
achieve some measure of acknowledgment. My first chapter explores how the rhetoric of 
rationalist progress, valorized by classical liberalism, reaches a point of crisis in early 




Dalloway critique this rhetoric for promulgating an exclusionary conception of 
community. Forster and Woolf were both members of the Bloomsbury intellectual scene 
in which Wittgenstein also (reluctantly) participated, and their fiction explores how the 
social and economic inequalities of British liberalism create linguistic distance between 
individuals, making it more difficult for marginalized figures to gain acknowledgment. 
My study next considers how changing cultural norms around gender and 
sexuality gave rise to new possibilities for achieving intimate understanding of another’s 
inner life. My second chapter compares heterosexual marriage and same-sex intimacy as 
two potential examples of what Cavell calls a “best case” for knowing another mind (CR 
432). Ford’s The Good Soldier (1915), Woolf’s To the Lighthouse (1927), and Larsen’s 
Passing all cast traditional Victorian marriage as incapable of meeting the high 
epistemological expectations its proponents place upon it. Each novel contrasts its central 
marriage with a close same-sex relation, an alternative form of intimacy that promises to 
overcome the epistemological limitations of more conventional, easily nameable social 
bonds. I argue that all three texts present culturally-conditioned ideals of knowledge as 
persisting within these same-sex relationships: to the extent that characters like John 
Dowell, Lily Briscoe, and Irene Redfield insist on trying to know their most intimate 
interlocutors, they struggle to identify their own deep-seated needs for acknowledgment. 
This chapter forges new links between these British writers and Larsen, who offers a 
narrative of the search for domestic fulfillment that foregrounds the experiences of those 




subjectivity. Larsen follows Ford and Woolf in critiquing unrealistic ideals of knowledge, 
even as she also brings this critique bear on restrictive American racial categories.  
Chapter Three elaborates on the issue of close interpersonal relations by 
examining Faulkner’s representation of the shift from an agrarian to an industrial 
economy, highlighting how characters begin to conceive of themselves as individual 
economic agents, rather than as members of family units. Both The Sound and the Fury 
and As I Lay Dying (1930) illuminate how emergent economic uncertainties, combined 
with ongoing commitments to traditional social codes, prompt speakers to insist on the 
privacy of their own experiences and to doubt language’s capacity to mitigate this 
privacy. Just as Wittgenstein pushes back against the possibility of ‘private’ language, so 
Faulkner’s representations of interiority dissolve what Cavell calls “the fantasy … of 
private language” (CR 351), emphasizing the degree to which all members of the 
Compson and Bundren families—even the mute Benjy—participate in broader linguistic 
practices. At the same time, Faulkner’s texts explore the feelings of displacement that 
prompt these characters to distort or misconstrue the ordinary meanings of words.  
My fourth and final chapter addresses the experience of having one’s humanity go 
brutally unacknowledged under Jim Crow, and it reads Wright’s Black Boy (1945) and 
Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man as taking up the problem of how racialized others might 
convey their inner lives within a culture that stubbornly twists the meanings of their 
words. Cavell glosses Wittgenstein’s philosophy as emphasizing “that we learn language 
and learn the world together, that they become elaborated and distorted together” (MWM 




depths of linguistic distortion that racism enforces. Together, Wright and Ellison’s texts 
offer a distinctive perspective on the philosophical problem of other minds, featuring 
narrators who—rather than doubting the existence of others’ inner lives—recognize 
others as doubting the existence of their own. While neither Wright’s adolescent self nor 
Ellison’s nameless narrator achieves much acknowledgment at the diegetic level, both 
texts nonetheless maintain faith in language’s capacity to promote acknowledgment, 
using first-person perspective to express what Ellison calls the “human content” that a 
person’s “outer form” at once disguises and reveals (Collected Essays 143).   
 The primary scholarly aim of this study is to make a case for the heretofore under-
examined importance of the language of acknowledgment in American and British 
modernist fiction; as such, the following chapters center on historical and aesthetic 
developments taking place between the years 1910 and 1952. But, in closing this 
introduction, I want to emphasize that the language of acknowledgment holds crucial 
relevance for our contemporary historical moment as well. Despite modernist narratives 
that challenge previously stable epistemological paradigms, Western presumptions to 
knowledge and rationality have continued to reassert themselves throughout the twentieth 
century and now into the twenty-first, often with devastating consequences. America’s 
bellicose foreign policy, of which the invasions of Vietnam and Iraq are only two 
examples, reflects a long history of our government assuming the superiority of its own 
knowledge, and displaying a corresponding disinclination to acknowledge unfamiliar 
experiences and values in others. In the field of education, our culture’s current 




dismiss or overlook acknowledgment in favor of knowledge. Certainly, subjects like 
physics and economics have essential societal roles to play, but they offer us—at best—
only partial frameworks for making sense of human existence.60 To champion them at the 
expense of the humanities is to favor generalized explanations about the purpose of an 
education, whereas the later Wittgenstein encourages us to “look at what really happens 
in detail, as it were from close up” (PI §51). Once we look more closely, we see that the 
humanities help us to negotiate questions of what we should value, of how we might seek 
to understand others’ experiences, of why people care about art—all subjects wherein the 
language of acknowledgment makes its importance felt. Indeed, I would go so far as to 
suggest that the humanities offer us unparalleled “training” in how we might learn to 
cultivate and adopt the stance of acknowledgment (§5).  
As modernist texts and contemporary cultural conversations both show, focusing 
too exclusively on knowledge sets us up for disappointment, when we realize how little 
we actually know. It is in such moments, Wittgenstein and Cavell suggest, that the threat 
of skepticism grows most pronounced, prompting us to distort the relation between our 
words and our world and to shirk our commitments to others. The works of fiction to 
which I now turn show writers vividly grappling with this skeptical threat: exploring its 
causes, taking it seriously, and endeavoring—insofar as they can—to combat it.  
																																																						
60 As Cavell puts it, such modes of inquiry “soak up knowledge of the world” and “leave us drily 




CHAPTER ONE: “WHO’S ‘WE’?”: CLAIMS TO COMMUNITY IN FORSTER’S 
HOWARDS END AND WOOLF’S MRS. DALLOWAY 
 
In February of 1901, about two weeks after the death of Queen Victoria, a twenty-
two-year old King’s College undergraduate named Edward Morgan Forster joined the 
Cambridge intellectual society known as the Apostles. Forster’s admission into this club 
brought him into contact with many eventual affiliates of the Bloomsbury set: analytic 
philosophers Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore, economist John Maynard Keynes, and 
Leonard Woolf—best known today, of course, as husband to Virginia. Though Forster 
never read Moore’s Principia Ethica (1903), nonetheless he shared the Bloomsbury 
group’s dedication to the liberal values of “tolerance and enlightenment inaugurated in … 
Moore’s Cambridge” (Furbank vol. 2, 1).1 In 1910, Forster established himself as one of 
the foremost English novelists of the age with Howards End, a work that signals his 
liberal sympathies, even as it criticizes the material realities that his society’s liberalism 
has wrought. 
The following year, 1911, another shy, uncertain young man entered this sphere 
of influence: Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein had been studying engineering in 
Manchester but, having grown depressed, he traveled to Cambridge and showed up 
unannounced in Russell’s rooms, wanting to discover whether he had any talent for 
philosophy. Like Forster’s admission into the Apostles, Wittgenstein’s sudden arrival in 
																																																						
1 In his history of the Apostles, W.C. Lubenow identifies liberalism as one of three core values 
(along with imagination and friendship) that “defined … the civil society which the Cambridge 
Apostles … helped to shape and sought to occupy” (20). For the biographical details of Forster’s 




Cambridge proved a crucial turning point in his career. Under Russell’s tutelage, 
Wittgenstein developed his early philosophy before the outbreak of World War I 
prompted him to volunteer for the Austrian army. Upon the publication of his Tractatus 
Logico-Philosphicus (1921), Wittgenstein abandoned philosophy for several years, but he 
eventually returned to Cambridge in the late 1920s and spent much of the next two 
decades developing his later, more “anthropological” (Monk 261) approach to problems 
of language and epistemology, encapsulated in the posthumously published Philosophical 
Investigations (1953).2 Wittgenstein’s work responds to the same historical circumstances 
that Forster, (Virginia) Woolf, and other modernists found disorienting. Like many works 
of literary modernism, his writings are permeated by anxieties about the fragmentation of 
human community, about the possibility that we may not be able to go on understanding 
or communicating with one another.  
In the particular cases of Forster and Woolf, the resonances between their fiction 
and Wittgenstein’s philosophy extend even farther. These three figures occupied a shared 
intellectual space; despite his more solitary nature, Wittgenstein moved in many of the 
same social circles as Forster and Woolf did.3 On Russell’s encouragement, he joined the 
Apostles in 1912, though he soon resigned his membership, determining the club’s 
conversations to be (as Russell wrote to Keynes) “a waste of time” (qtd. Monk 66). He 
																																																						
2 For the details of Wittgenstein’s initial meeting with Russell, see Monk 38-41. For more on his 
war service, see 105-66. For more on his brief membership in—and later re-election to—the 
Apostles, see 66-9, 255-8.   
3 As Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., and Madelyn Detloff have recently written, Wittgenstein stands as “an 
important figure in the network of interpersonal relations we call Bloomsbury—albeit a 




met the Woolfs on at least a couple of occasions in the post-War years (Banfield 34), 
likely at Keynes’ house (Monk 256).4 With Howards End and Mrs. Dalloway (1925), 
Forster and Woolf examine how the social and economic inequalities of early twentieth-
century British society create linguistic distance between individuals, making it more 
difficult for marginalized figures to have their perspectives acknowledged. In this way, 
they deepen Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigations by grounding them within the 
“particular circumstances” (PI §154) of this historical and political moment.   
An Austrian national and native German speaker, Wittgenstein never stopped 
feeling like “a foreigner” in England; as his biographer Ray Monk writes, he found that 
he “could not fully confide in the people at Cambridge because, given the linguistic and 
cultural differences of which he was far more conscious than they perhaps realized, he 
could not feel entirely sure that he would be understood” (267). This sense of his own 
linguistic marginality crucially shapes his philosophical thought. As Stanley Cavell 
writes in his illuminating interpretation of Wittgenstein’s frequently gnomic remarks, 
Wittgenstein portrays human communicative capacities as “astonishing” because there 
exists no metaphysical or a priori ground for their success; it emerges naturally from our 
“mutual attunement” with one another (CR 32). But this vision of language means that 
such attunement is constantly under threat of failure. In a remark that gestures toward his 
own linguistic alienation, Wittgenstein proposes that “someone who did not understand 
our language, a foreigner, who had fairly often heard someone giving the order ‘Bring me 
																																																						
4 On the few occasions when they did meet, it seems neither Wittgenstein nor Woolf “made much 




a slab!’, might believe that this whole sequence of sounds was one word corresponding 
perhaps to the word for ‘building stone’ in his language” (PI §20).5 It is presumably on 
the basis of such remarks that Cavell describes Philosophical Investigations as “the 
portrait of the modern subject […], the subject perpetually seeking peace, therefore 
endlessly homeless” (LDIK 100).  
 As Cavell discusses, then, Wittgenstein’s “philosophical investigations of what 
we say” are always also investigations of who comprises this “we” (CR 32). To use 
language is to make “claims to community”—claims that might always be rejected or go 
unheard (20).6 Cavell writes that “[t]o speak for oneself politically is to speak for the 
others with whom you consent to association, and it is to consent to be spoken for by 
them…. Who these others are, for whom you speak and by whom you are spoken for, is 
not known a priori” (27). On this account, political communities are composed of people 
willing to accept the meaningfulness of one another’s words, and they fragment 
whenever you or I find ourselves alienated from the linguistic practices of “we.” This 
capacity to recognize the meaningfulness of another’s words involves adopting the 
epistemological stance of acknowledgment—perhaps the key concept Cavell draws from 
his reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. As an epistemological stance, acknowledgment 
																																																						
5 See PI §32 for another illustrative example along similar lines.   
6 Cavell has played a crucial role in making explicit the political implications of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy. As Sandra Laugier comments, “[O]nly since Cavell’s radical reading of 
Wittgenstein… are we able to see a genuine political dimension” to Wittgenstein’s thought (19). 
As for Wittgenstein’s own politics, Monk tells us that his “sympathies were with the working 




involves accepting our finitude, recognizing the limits to our knowledge, while at the 
same time taking seriously others’ words as expressive of their inner experiences.7 
 Though Cavell has written less about prose fiction than he has about, say, drama 
or film, he does make telling mention of Howards End in order to illustrate his concept of 
“passionate utterance” (PTDAT 179). For Cavell, a passionate utterance makes “a 
demand” upon the listener to recognize and respond to another’s suffering; it functions, 
that is, as a call for acknowledgment (179).8 Cavell gives the following example: “You 
know he took what you said as a promise,” which he contextualizes as “[r]oughly a 
rebuke from Margaret Schlegel to Mr. Wilcox in Howard’s End [sic]” (PTDAT 177). 
Though this particular line never appears in the novel—as Cavell evidently means to 
signal with the modifier “roughly”—nonetheless this brief description provides sufficient 
information for us to fill in the plot details Cavell wants to evoke: Henry tells Margaret 
and her sister Helen that the insurance company for which Leonard works is likely to 
“smash” (HE 134) and suggests Leonard find a new job; acting on this tip, Leonard 
secures a different, lower-paying position, from which he is promptly laid off; 
meanwhile, his original employer remains financially sound. The Schlegels hold that 
Henry has promised to look out for Leonard and is therefore responsible for redressing 
																																																						
7 For a more extensive discussion of how Cavell develops his notion of acknowledgment from his 
reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, see my introduction.  
8 Cavell distinguishes passionate utterance from J.L. Austin’s more famous concept of the 
performative utterance. In the case of the performative, the words themselves effect action; for 
instance, to say, “I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth” is, under the right circumstances, actually 
to name the ship (Austin, How 5). In the case of a passionate utterance, by contrast, the speaker’s 
words attempt to convince the listener to act a certain way. For Cavell’s complete comparison 




his reduced circumstances; Henry does not see wherein his responsibility lies.9 As 
Cavell’s brief allusion suggests, the narrative drama of Howards End turns, 
fundamentally, on questions of acknowledgment. At one point in the novel, after Henry’s 
son Charles counsels his father against inviting Helen to Howards End on the grounds 
that “[w]e don’t want any more mess,” Henry responds in a way that captures the 
Wittgensteinian stakes of Forster’s project: “Who’s ‘we’?” he asks (HE 284). “Pray, my 
boy, who’s ‘we’?” (284). Howards End and Mrs. Dalloway participate in a shared, 
evolving investigation of “who’s ‘we’?”—of whose membership in this community 
deserves to be acknowledged, and on what grounds.   
 The question of “Who’s ‘we’?” was gaining particular urgency for Great Britain 
during precisely the years in which Forster and Woolf published their novels. The British 
state began the twentieth century committed to the political philosophy of liberalism, 
which takes its intellectual justification from the Enlightenment view of humans as 
“inherently rational creatures, capable of making logical choices that best serve the 
interests of both self and society” (Ho, “Crisis of Liberalism” 54). But by 1910—the year 
“human character changed,” as Woolf famously and hyperbolically pronounces (Mr. 
Bennett 195)—British society was embroiled in a contentious debate over what form its 
liberalism should take. Howards End indicts liberal rationality for facilitating 
exclusionary conceptions of community. The novel attributes this attitude of restrictive 
																																																						
9 Cavell notes that he has also employed a version of this exchange in The Claim of Reason, as 
part of his discussion of the relationship between knowledge and morality. Though this earlier 
work does not explicitly refer to the novel or any of its characters, Cavell characterizes this same 
conflict between Henry and the Schlegels as an investigation of “whether, or to what extent, 




rationality to the Wilcox men, illuminating how they ignore claims to communal 
inclusion from anyone who uses words differently than they do. Margaret exposes the 
shortcomings of their purported rationality and gives voice to a more tolerant, socially 
inclusive version of liberalism. However, even as Margaret voices a more tolerant, 
inclusive version of liberalism, the novel highlights the degree to which she, too, proves 
complicit in the Wilcoxes’ restrictive thinking. In this way, Howards End wonders 
whether any community founded upon liberal rationality might prove, at bottom, 
oppressive and exclusionary. Woolf returns to these same questions fifteen years later, 
writing a novel in which the increased fragmentation of narrative perspective suggests the 
increased instability of the British state’s claims to community. With its portrayal of the 
shell-shocked Septimus Smith, Mrs. Dalloway suggests how liberal rationality has itself 
become a form of madness.  
 
Privacy, Poverty, Progress: The Condition of British Liberalism in 1910 
 
Before we turn to Howards End, it is worth briefly reviewing the political and 
intellectual environment from which Forster’s novel emerged. As Janice Ho discusses, 
classical liberalism arose in Europe as a critique of, and alternative to, systems of 
authoritarian control. Liberal philosophy championed the individual’s inherent “capacity 
for reason, autonomy, and self-regulation” (48). Economically, liberalism tended to 
defend the individual’s right to private property, promote laissez-faire capitalism, and 




when left alone to exercise his rational capacities, should develop into a productive 
member of society.  
By the turn of the century, however, the British citizenry had grown increasingly 
frustrated with the extreme inequalities codified by the liberal state. As Ho writes, “[t]he 
limitations of liberalism revealed themselves in the unresolved tension between 
liberalism’s theoretical claims for universal rights and equality on the one hand, and the 
systemic exclusions on which it rested on the other—particularly of gender, class, and 
race” (“Crisis” 49). When it came to the distribution of property, for example, a small 
number of families controlled most of Britain’s privately-held land, giving them 
significant financial and political power, while much of the population lived in poverty.10 
As a slowdown in industrial growth led to stagnating wages and spiking unemployment 
rates, the working classes began to strike increasingly often, with 1910 in particular 
proving a year of significant labor unrest (Fraser 145; Robb 31). While the Third Reform 
Act of 1884-5 doubled the population of eligible voters from three to six million men 
(Cannadine 36-9), Suffragettes argued that the British state could not fulfill its 
democratic promise until women were enfranchised as well. To this end, tens of 
thousands of women participated in suffrage demonstrations in 1910 (Froula 22). In 
addition, British imperial expansion meant that higher standards of living for citizens at 
home were bound up with the exploitation of colonial subjects abroad, geographically 
distant individuals “whose own life experience and life world,” as Frederic Jameson 
																																																						
10 Around 1880, roughly 7000 families owned between them four-fifths of the land in the British 




writes, “remain[ed] unknown and unknowable” to citizens in England proper 
(“Modernism” 51).11 All these structural disparities gave the lie to the notion that 
classical liberal policies were necessarily democratic ones.     
 In response to what Ho calls “the unresolved tension” within the liberal state, a 
more socially progressive strand of liberal politics—known as the New Liberalism—
emerged during the pre-War years. The New Liberals argued that a greater degree of 
governmental intervention, far from being inconsistent with liberalism, was in fact 
essential to carrying forward its project. With his ‘People’s Budget’ of 1909, Liberal 
leader David Lloyd George sought to attack Britain’s wealth inequality by increasing the 
tax burden on the traditional landed gentry (Fraser 170). The journalist and sociologist 
L.T. Hobhouse grew to prominence as one of the major intellectual advocates for this 
newly interventionist strand of liberalism; Hobhouse saw the Liberal Party’s enactment 
of socially progressive policies as a crucial step in the inevitable forward march of 
history.12 In Morals in Evolution (1906), Hobhouse writes that “ethical progress” results 
from “the rationalization of the moral code which, as society advances, becomes more 
clearly thought out and more consistently and comprehensively applied” (qtd. in Collini 
213). Hobhouse thus envisions a direct correlation between an increasingly rational set of 
																																																						
11 The British Empire was at a point of maximum power and influence during the pre-War years, 
but it was also poised to begin its decline; the Irish Home Rule movement was steadily gaining 
momentum and would lead eventually to Irish independence in 1921, and the extreme brutality of 
the War would seriously undermine the notion of British cultural superiority (Robb 93-4, 116).  
12 Other pieces of socially progressive legislation passed during this period included the Old Age 
Pensions Bill of 1908 and the Trades Board Act of 1909, which established a minimum wage in 




governmental policies and an increasingly just society. In 1910, this optimistic vision still 
looked much more plausible than it would just a few years later.13  
Forster publishes Howards End at a moment when what Jeffrey Alexander calls 
“the dream of reason” remained alive in Britain (69). This “dream” consists in the idea 
that the increased acquisition of knowledge and the proper exercise of rational faculties 
should be sufficient, over time, to bring about a just society. Given liberalism’s emphasis 
on the rationality of the individual, this more equitable society should theoretically be 
achievable within the parameters of the liberal state, as Hobhouse suggests. Although 
Forster remained a committed liberal throughout his life, Howards End shows that as 
early as 1910 he had already begun to suspect that liberalism’s valorization of rationality 
might be inadequate to prevent intolerance and cruelty. Writing in 1939, Forster 
recognizes that the previous three decades of European history have exposed the dream 
of reason as a naïve ideal: “Tolerance, good temper, and sympathy are no longer enough 
in a world which is rent by religious and racial persecution” (“Two Cheers” 67). Forster 
moves here in the direction of an argument that Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer 
would make in more extreme form at the close of World War II: namely, that the 
valorization of rationality is not merely compatible with, but actually essential to, 
persistent injustice and violence. In Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), Adorno and 
																																																						
13 Hobhouse outlines the philosophical foundations of his progressive liberalism in his book 
Development and Purpose, which comes out in 1913—as Stefan Collini notes, “not an auspicious 




Horkheimer cast rationality as an oppressive force, which relentlessly categorizes 
individuals as “friend or foe,” same or different (147).14 
Reading Howards End in conversation with the linguistic dynamics that 
Wittgenstein explores helps to clarify wherein the rationalist project of liberalism breaks 
down. Cavell writes that “[t]he wish and search for community are the wish and search 
for reason” (CR 20). Reason, as he imagines it here, resides in our shared “criteria” for 
what and how words mean (14).15 So in his extension of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to the 
political sphere, Cavell makes rationality consistent with communal efforts to cultivate 
and maintain linguistic attunement. Stephen Mulhall sees this political vision as largely 
compatible with liberalism, writing that Cavell “reveals the possibility of accommodating 
a liberal emphasis upon the individual whilst allowing scope for the development and 
sustenance of community” (Stanley Cavell 72). However, when we move from the more 
abstract ground of Cavell’s writings to the historically-specific world of Forster’s novel, 
we discover the difficulty of reconciling the individualism liberalism prizes with tolerant, 
non-oppressive forms of political community.16 Forster’s putatively optimistic text 
																																																						
14 While Adorno and Horkheimer see this dialectic unfolding throughout human history, they also 
suggest that it has grown even more extreme under conditions of modern capitalism: “The 
increase in economic productivity which creates the conditions for a more just world also affords 
the technical apparatus and the social groups controlling it a disproportionate advantage over the 
rest of the population” (xvii). The Holocaust represents the acme of such tendencies: “The 
disregard for the subject makes things easy for the administration. Ethnic groups are transported 
to different latitudes; individuals labeled ‘Jew’ are dispatched to the gas chambers” (167).    
15 As Robert Chodat notes, it is easier to achieve this collective criterial agreement when it comes 
to words like “red” or “blue,” but more difficult when it comes to words like “humility” or 
“courage” (Worldly Acts 170).  
16 Espen Hammer argues that it can be difficult to see how Cavell’s vision of linguistic 
community sheds light on “specifically modern conditions” of political organization (183). My 




displays a deep-seated anxiety that rationality functions as an inherently restrictive force 
within the liberal state, more likely to foreclose community than to enable it.  
 
Howards End: Restrictive Rationality and the Limits of Connection 
 
 Starting with Lionel Trilling’s foundational study from 1943, Forster scholars 
have sought to map the contours of the author’s engagement with “the liberal 
imagination” (13). When Trilling argues that the core question of Howards End is “Who 
shall inherit England?,” he correctly casts the novel as an exploration of who gets to 
participate in early twentieth-century England’s liberal community (118). Richard Rorty, 
who spent much of his career making the case for liberalism, sees Forster’s vision as 
largely compatible with his own: “[Forster] hopes, as all us liberal gentlefolk hope, that 
eventually the Wilcoxes will produce so much money that, when shared out as it should 
be, there will be nobody left who is very poor” (“Love” 13). Whereas Rorty argues that 
proponents of liberalism should separate questions of private self-creation from those of 
public justice, Daniel Born argues that Howards End preemptively critiques Rorty’s 
position by showing the deep connections between private choices and public 
consequences—evident, for instance, when Margaret scales back her interest in the poor 
in order to focus on her marriage instead (Born 123-4).17 But previous discussions of the 
novel’s political vision have not sufficiently attended to the way in which Howards End 
																																																						
17 Rorty outlines this private-public split in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989), wherein he 
argues that we should “treat the demands of self-creation and of human solidarity as equally 




registers—at the level of language—the fissures in England’s liberal community.18 While 
clearly owing a debt to realist conventions of plot development and narrative perspective, 
Howards End also explores how the social conditions of modernity disrupt or prevent 
linguistic attunement between individuals. This reflection on the tenuous linguistic 
attunement within English society makes Howards End a proto-modernist novel—and, 
thus, a fitting text with which to open this study.19 
 The partial modernism of Howards End emerges via the disguised subjectivity of 
the novel’s narrator. Philip Weinstein has identified the fundamental tool of realist 
narration as “verisimilitude,” which “invokes the reader’s growing sense of familiarity 
with the… scene being put into words,” purporting to credibly represent a recognizable 
social world (Unknowing 53). Howards End makes consistent use of this narrative 
convention; for instance, the novel’s fourth chapter, which concerns the aftermath of 
Helen’s aborted engagement to Paul Wilcox, begins firmly in this realist mode:  
																																																						
18 Brian May is a partial exception here, since he does note that Howards End displays what Rorty 
would see as “an ironist attitude toward language, the self, and the community” (Modernist 56), 
meaning that the novel recognizes the contingency of the vocabulary by which its characters 
describe their world. But May provides only one example of this linguistic contingency, pointing 
out that Margaret displays the ironist’s talent for re-description when she turns Leonard’s death 
from “Squalor” into “Tragedy” (60). Moreover, the persuasiveness of his analysis is undercut by 
the fact that the line “Let Squalor be turned into Tragedy” is actually spoken by the narrator, not 
by Margaret herself (HE 330). Other scholars (Thomson; Langland) have noted Forster’s interest 
in linguistic miscommunication, but these critics fall into the trap of conflating communicative 
difficulties between characters with the inadequacy of language as such. Thus, both contrast Ruth 
Wilcox favorably with Margaret, praising the former for her reticence and arguing that the latter 
gradually learns to accept and share Ruth’s skepticism toward words (Thomson 130; Langland 
93).  
19 Jameson writes that Forster is “at best a closet modernist” (“Modernism” 54). Paul Armstrong 
notes that the novel employs such “classic modernist maneuvers” as “foreground[ing] the 




Helen and her aunt returned to Wickham Place in a state of collapse, and for a 
little time Margaret had three invalids on her hands. Mrs. Munt soon recovered. 
She possessed to a remarkable degree the power of distorting the past, and before 
many days were over she had forgotten the part played by her own imprudence in 
the catastrophe. (HE 23) 
Here, the narrator carries forward the novel’s plot, elucidating for readers the progression 
in these characters’ geographical movements and mental states. As readers, we are liable 
to treat this information about Mrs. Munt’s “power of distorting the past” as a credible 
assessment of her character, since it comes to us from a seemingly knowledgeable 
observer of the action, rather than a character (say, one of the Schlegel sisters) who might 
have her own unfair biases. The text implicitly contrasts the unreliability of Mrs. Munt’s 
perspective with the clarity of its own detached viewpoint.   
 Just a few paragraphs later, however, this presumption to narrative detachment 
breaks down, as the narrator reveals his own subjectivity and capacity for linguistic 
distortion. I say “his” because Forster explicitly genders the narrator male. After 
reviewing the details of Helen’s sudden infatuation with Paul, he (the narrator) 
comments: 
That was ‘how it happened,’ or rather, how Helen described it to her sister, using 
words even more unsympathetic than my own. But the poetry of that kiss, the 
wonder of it, the magic that there was in life for hours after it—who can describe 





The novel thus identifies the narrator as “an Englishman” who attempts to convey 
emotions he has not experienced himself. This designation suggests that his authority 
resides in his specific gender and national identity, giving us a window into the 
historically-determined power relations that have made possible his claim to narrative 
reliability. The shift from “how it happened” to “how Helen described it” crucially 
captures in miniature the disguised subjectivity that permeates the entire novel. The 
narrator initially gives the impression of objectively recounting “what happened”; only 
retroactively does he admit that his account constitutes his own subjective re-telling, 
based on someone else’s subjective telling, of what has taken place. The narrator then 
undercuts the authority of his language even further by asserting that any attempt to 
describe “the poetry of that kiss” is doomed to be inadequate.  
These ruptures in the novel’s verisimilitude are politically significant: they 
suggest the limits of linguistic attunement within early twentieth-century British society. 
Forster’s novel illuminates social and economic division via moments of linguistic 
misalignment, which cast doubt on the ability of characters from different subject 
positions to achieve a shared sense of community, a shared “we.” While linguistic 
attunement is hardly sufficient to redress social or economic ills, the novel suggests that it 
is nonetheless a crucial step toward these more explicitly political goals. To have the 
meaningfulness of one’s words accepted is to have one’s claims to community 
acknowledged, and the eventual upshot of this acknowledgment might be greater 




1910.20 Forster’s narrator seeks to wield language to facilitate understanding of characters 
from a diverse range of backgrounds, even as his representation of these characters also 
exposes deep communicative rifts between them. “Only connect!” the novel famously 
exhorts us (186); “[l]ive in fragments no longer” (187). But against this impassioned call 
for interpersonal understanding, the text suggests that the social fragmentation of British 
society is—far from disappearing—only growing more pronounced.  
The novel illuminates this state of fragile linguistic attunement via its portrayal of 
the vexed relation between the Schlegels and Wilcoxes. The first major conflict between 
these two families is specifically figured as a linguistic misunderstanding, thus setting the 
stage for Forster’s investigation of the consequences—comic and tragic—that result from 
such communicative fissures. The novel begins in the comic vein, as Mrs. Munt ventures 
to investigate Helen and Paul’s engagement, unaware that it has already been broken off. 
Meeting Charles at the train station, Mrs. Munt asks him, “Are you the younger Mr. 
Wilcox or the elder?” and Charles responds, “The younger” (16). Mrs. Munt, then, 
assumes that she is speaking with the younger brother—Helen’s putative fiancé—
whereas Charles means that he is “the younger” in contrast to his father. Given Charles’ 
social traditionalism, it is unsurprising that he would understand himself as the younger 
Mr. Wilcox, since doing so reflects his deference to his father, the economic head of the 
																																																						
20 Hammer points to the “absence of institutional anchoring” in Cavell’s political thought (181). 
Even if different members of a community achieve linguistic attunement with one another, it 
remains an open question how to structure the institutions of governance so as to minimize 
suffering and promote social cohesion. Forster’s novel, like Cavell’s philosophy, does not answer 
this question explicitly. But Howards End does go farther than Cavell in vividly illustrating how 
individuals interact with their political system, and in so doing it exposes shortcomings in the 




family. By the same token, Paul likely does not factor into his calculations at all, since—
not knowing about the engagement—Charles cannot imagine a possible reason why Mrs. 
Munt would wish to speak with his younger brother specifically. Once this 
misunderstanding has been exposed, the narrator tries to maintain a sense of community 
between these speakers, commenting that “[t]here is much to be said for either view” 
(20). However, his championing of diverse speech practices exists in ironic contrast to 
the positions of Charles and Mrs. Munt, each of whom condemns the other for having 
spoken incoherently.  
As we’ve seen, Forster writes Howards End at a moment when British liberals 
were engaged in an internal debate about the proper balance between laissez-faire 
individualism and governmental intervention. With its portrayal of the Wilcoxes, the 
novel enters into this conversation by considering the limits of privacy as a liberal ideal. 
In Forster’s account, these limits are both ethical and epistemological.21 The Wilcox men 
tend to act on the ideology of classical liberalism: they run a profitable rubber company, 
with significant holdings in Africa, and they are dismissive of socially progressive policy 
proposals like giving women the vote.22 The Wilcoxes seek to exercise their rational 
																																																						
21 Previous scholars (for instance, Womack; Sidorsky; Cucullu) have traced the ethical vision 
underlying Howards End to Forster’s familiarity with Moore’s Principia Ethica; Forster follows 
Moore in advocating compassion toward the larger community of which one is a part. Scholars 
have generally not considered Forster’s interest in the epistemological problem of other minds, an 
interest that may also have been spurred by his associations with Bloomsbury philosophers. Ann 
Banfield notes that Forster’s novel The Longest Journey (1907) opens with a philosophical 
discussion of epistemology, but she does so only to contrast Forster with Woolf by arguing that 
such epistemological concerns are merely “incidental” to his fiction—an assessment with which I 
disagree (4).  
22 For a discussion of how Forster critiques the Wilcox men’s imperialism, see Green. Kim 





faculties in order to improve their financial position, and they wish to leave others alone 
to act similarly. They subscribe to the liberal conception as privacy as what Linda Zerilli 
calls “a boundary line that separates subjects from each other, and whose crossing 
constitutes a violation or transgression” (“Skepticism” 36). The novel suggests that the 
Wilcoxes wield this mentality to avoid making sense of those who do not share their 
experiences, whose linguistic “training” has led them to develop different pictures of the 
relation between words and world (PI §5). Confident in their prowess as knowers, as 
rational subjects, the Wilcoxes refuse to see that—as Cavell says—other minds are meant 
not “to be known, but acknowledged” (MWM 324).  
The Wilcoxes display their characteristic language practices during the scene in 
which the family discovers Ruth Wilcox’s posthumous note, expressing her wish that 
Margaret inherit Howards End. Other than quickly discerning that the note is “not legally 
binding,” the remaining members of the Wilcox family, with their economically-driven 
mindset, struggle to understand its meaning (HE 97). The Wilcoxes are accustomed to 
dealing with practical matters; they are a family for whom, as Margaret has attested 
earlier in the narrative, “love means marriage settlements” (27). According to the 
traditional liberal mindset with which they operate, it is a cardinal rule that property 
should remain in the family, not be given away to relative strangers. As the narrator 
writes, to the rest of the Wilcoxes “Howards End was a house; they could not understand 
that to [Ruth] it had been a spirit, for which she sought a spiritual heir” (98). As such, the 
Wilcoxes respond in what seems to them the only rational way: they ignore the note and 




In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer describe the repressive 
consequences of rationality through the legend of Odysseus and the Sirens. In their 
reading, the Sirens represent the lure of the irrational, the temptation to free oneself from 
the routines of work and productivity. Odysseus resists their call by binding himself to 
the mast, seeking to preserve his sanity by resisting the influence of his passions. He is 
able to maintain his sense of self only by adopting a narrow-minded view of selfhood, 
which conflates disciplined purposiveness with selfhood as such (Dialectic 25-7, 46-7). 
This reading captures how an overemphasis on the importance of rationality gives rise to 
a restricted view of the world. Forster concludes the chapter in which the Wilcoxes 
consider Ruth’s note by invoking the same image Dialectic employs: 
Charles and his father … always parted with an increased regard for one another, 
and each desired no doughtier comrade when it was necessary to voyage for a 
little past the emotions. So the sailors of Ulysses voyaged past the Sirens, having 
first stopped one another’s ears with wool. (HE 101) 
As this passage suggests, Forster’s portrayal of the rationalist Wilcox mindset anticipates 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s more full-fledged attack on the dark side of Enlightenment 
reason. 
Howards End elaborates on the negative consequences of restrictive rationality 
via its portrayal of how the Wilcoxes exclude Leonard from their conception of “we.” 
Both Henry and Charles tend to divide up their world into spheres they understand—in 




which they display a distinct lack of imagination or curiosity. As Henry explains to the 
Schlegel sisters,  
That’s where we practical fellows… are more tolerant than you intellectuals. We 
live and let live, and assume that things are jogging on fairly well elsewhere, and 
that the ordinary plain man may be trusted to look after his own affairs. I quite 
grant—I look at the faces of the clerks in my own office, and observe them to be 
dull, but I don’t know what’s going on beneath. (146) 
Here, Henry voices the classical liberal defense of privacy, cautioning against potentially 
paternalistic interventions into the lives of the poor. Having increased his own wealth via 
his “practical” business dealings, Henry contends that “the ordinary plain man” need only 
be left alone so he can attempt to accomplish something similar.23 The epistemological 
implication of Henry’s position, as he himself readily admits, is that he neither knows nor 
wants to know the minds of these less privileged individuals.   
 By describing Henry’s sense “that what he did not know could not be worth 
knowing,” the novel highlights the ethical consequences of this epistemological position 
(131). The word “worth,” with its multiple meanings, is crucial: Henry presumably 
understands “worth” in financial terms, assuming that it would not be productive, 
economically speaking, for him to venture beyond his familiar spheres of knowledge. But 
“worth” also connotes the idea of fundamental, non-quantifiable value, and it is this 
inherent human “worth” that Henry refuses to grant to those with unfamiliar experiences. 
																																																						
23 Henry’s speech testifies to Lois Cucullu’s description of class bias as “the underside of 
Enlightenment commonality”: if everyone is theoretically equal as an autonomous, rational agent, 




The limits of his acknowledgment ensure the limits of his knowledge; people like 
Leonard are outside his social sphere, part of ‘they’ rather than ‘we,’ and he declines to 
imagine—let alone invite—any connection between himself and them. His liberal 
rationality thereby restricts community rather than enabling it. As Cavell notes, when the 
Schlegels appeal to Henry to take some responsibility for Leonard’s plight, he proves 
unmoved by their account of this stranger’s pain. He characterizes poverty as an 
unavoidable fact of existence but not one that significantly affects his belief in historical 
progress: “The poor are poor, and one’s sorry for them, but there it is. As civilization 
moves forward, the shoe is bound to pinch in places, and it’s absurd to pretend that 
anyone’s responsible personally” (191). Henry’s statement that “[t]he poor are poor” 
captures his exclusionary logic, equating adjective with noun, contingent attribute with 
essential nature, in order to facilitate his disregard for this social class.  
With Leonard’s sudden death at the end of the novel, the narrator’s indictment of 
classical liberalism reaches its most dramatic pitch. In the pages leading up to this 
climatic moment, the narrator provides one of his most extended forays into Leonard’s 
consciousness, as though probing the depths of his own capacity to linguistically 
represent the same inner life that the Wilcoxes have ignored. Leonard travels to Howards 
End looking for Margaret, half delirious with hunger and fatigue, and the novel 
articulates the workings of his confused subjectivity: 
He entered a garden, steadied himself against a motor-car that he found in it, 
found a door open and entered a house. Yes, it would be very easy. From a room 




aloud, and a man whom he had never seen said: ‘Oh is he there? I am not 
surprised. Now I thrash him within an inch of his life.’ (324) 
In contrast to its usual detached, epistemologically confident narrative tone, here the 
novel inhabits Leonard’s consciousness in order to highlight his perceptual limitations. 
The language signals his trance-like motion through these unfamiliar environs: Leonard 
finds “a door open” (not ‘the’ door) and enters “a house” (not ‘the’ house), only to 
encounter the unfamiliar face of “a man” he has never seen. With the line, “Yes, it would 
be very easy,” the novel articulates Leonard’s thought process via free indirect discourse, 
making use of a tactic for representing subjectivity that later modernist texts like Mrs. 
Dalloway will employ more extensively.  
It is precisely at this moment when the novel’s narrative voice grows most 
characteristically modernist that its fragile liberal community most fully breaks down. 
The man who is “not surprised” to see Leonard turns out to be Charles Wilcox, who 
follows his father in conceiving of ‘the poor’ as little more than an abstract threat from 
which he must protect his family, and who therefore assumes Leonard has been “hiding” 
out at Howards End, likely abetted by the Schlegels (327). Charles’ response to this 
sudden intrusion onto his family’s private property is to kill Leonard by hitting him with 
the Schlegel family sword. As Charles leaves the scene after this dramatic turn of events, 
the narrator comments that “it did not seem to [Charles] that he had used violence” (326). 
Thus, the restrictive rationality of the Wilcoxes reaches its tragic acme. A perverse model 




extreme inability to include Leonard within his conception of community ensures that 
murder does not register upon his consciousness as a violent act.  
 Margaret spends much of the novel attempting to keep at bay the liberal 
community’s fragmentation. She plays what Forster suggests is a crucial role in 
pluralistic liberal society; she tries to help different social groups understand each other’s 
values, thus potentially improving each side’s ability to perceive and acknowledge the 
other’s pain. Margaret sees that her family’s privileged upbringing has left them largely 
inured from the “great outer life” in which the Wilcoxes participate (27). More than her 
sister, she is willing to concede and argue for the advantages of this outer life, pointing 
out to Helen that Schlegel leisure is bound up with Wilcox labor: “If the Wilcoxes hadn’t 
worked and died in England for thousands of years, you and I couldn’t sit here without 
having our throats cut. There would be no trains, no ships to carry us literary people 
about[…]. Just savagery” (175). With such statements, Margaret attempts to make a case 
for the benefits of the Wilcox worldview. Even if Henry does not seem especially 
concerned with disadvantaged people like Leonard, Margaret maintains that people like 
him nonetheless create the societal conditions that allow people like the Schlegels to 
display their own concern.  
 One of Margaret’s recurring roles in the novel is attempting to convert Helen’s 
impassioned outrage into terms the Wilcoxes can understand. For instance, after Leonard 
loses his job and Helen tries to confront Henry, Margaret steps in to act as an 
intermediary: “I will speak to Henry […]—in my own way, mind; there is to be none of 




understands what the word “justice” means in this context to a social progressive like 
Helen: in the specific case of Leonard, it means that he deserves (at minimum) a job; in 
more general terms, it means improving the poor’s living conditions so that they are at 
least comparable to, if not actually equivalent with, those of the Wilcoxes. But Margaret 
also perceives that Helen’s passionate utterance, her appeal to the ethical imperative of 
“justice,” does not actually represent the most effective means of getting through to 
Henry. Instead, Margaret proposes a more practical alternative: “Mr. Wilcox hates being 
asked favors, as all business men do. But I am going to ask him… because I want to 
make things a little better” (228). She discerns that Henry is more likely to intervene on 
Leonard’s behalf if he thinks he is doing someone a “favor,” because this terminology 
appeals to Henry’s sense of himself as someone with influence in the business world. 
Asking Henry for a favor will not achieve the broader goal of social justice, but it may at 
least “make things a little better” in this particular case.24 
 Meanwhile, on the other side of this equation, Margaret tries to give Henry a 
greater understanding of the injustices that motivate Helen’s passion. After her sudden 
discovery that Henry has slept with Leonard’s wife Jacky while married to Ruth, 
Margaret endeavors to use this information to make Henry view Helen’s own 
																																																						
24 In this recognition of, and attempt to negotiate between, contingent language practices, 
Margaret plays the role of Rorty’s “liberal ironist,” as May also notes (Contingency xv; May, 
Modernist 54). Margaret’s attempt to negotiate between different language practices shows why 
Rorty’s sharp distinction between public and private life is doomed to collapse: in conversing 
with people like her sister and her husband, Margaret attempts to use language to navigate her 
private life, but these conversations always have public consequences, insofar as they represent 
attempts on Margaret’s part to find the words that will strengthen connections between people 




extramarital relationship with Leonard more compassionately: “You shall see the 
connection if it kills you, Henry! You have had a mistress—I forgave you. My sister has 
a lover—you drive her from the house…. [S]ay to yourself: ‘What Helen has done, I’ve 
done’” (308). Like many of the Suffragettes and laborers protesting in 1910, Margaret 
argues that the liberal state must resolve its gender- and class-based inequalities if it truly 
wishes to make progress.25 Henry’s response to her speech makes clear the difficulty of 
her task: “I perceive you are attempting blackmail,” he says, interpreting her appeal to 
principles of equality in his own narrowly economic way (308).26  
 Crucially, Howards End indicates that Margaret cannot attempt this negotiation 
between Schlegel passion and Wilcox practicality without imposing certain limits on 
herself. Margaret summarizes her worldview by saying that she wishes “to live by 
proportion” (73). But the novel suggests that Margaret’s attempt to strike a balance 
between opposed political positions may make her an underwhelming representative of 
any position.27 Thus, her attempt to get along with Henry necessitates a partial 
moderation of her commitment to Leonard. While Margaret may treat “Only connect!” as 
her sincere life philosophy, the novel encourages us to read this phrase more skeptically: 
Only connect? That is to say, Margaret certainly makes a compelling argument for the 
																																																						
25 It is evident that this particular conflict involves class, as well as gender, as the Wilcoxes seem 
especially dismayed to learn that Helen has slept with someone whose social position is so far 
below her own.  
26 Ho points out that whenever Margaret acts in a way that is inconsistent with traditional 
patriarchal codes of conduct, the Wilcox men find “her behavior unreadable” (Nation and 
Citizenship 50).  
27 Paul Armstrong similarly points out that attempting to balance two opposed philosophies does 




connections between, say, Henry’s relationship with Jacky and Helen’s with Leonard, but 
how much do her words actually improve Leonard’s material circumstances? When 
Leonard dies at Charles’ hands, the novel proposes an answer to this question: not 
much.28 
 Indeed, by tolerating the belief system of the Wilcoxes, Margaret comes to 
replicate in her own way their restrictive rationality. As Paul Armstrong points out, when 
Margaret tells Henry he will “see the connection if it kills [him],” she expresses her 
desire for greater tolerance in strikingly violent language, “inadvertently expos[ing] the 
will-to-power in efforts to merge perspectives and forge unity out of differences” (Play 
119). When, unsure why Helen is avoiding her, Margaret goes to Henry for advice, Henry 
proposes luring Helen to Howards End under false pretenses, and for good measure he 
brings along a doctor to ascertain whether or not she has gone mad. Listening to Henry 
and the doctor discuss whether or not Helen is “normal,” Margaret seethes inwardly, 
thinking, “How dare these men label her sister! […] What impertinences that shelter 
under the name of science!” (HE 288). Cavell writes that designations like ‘mad’ suggest 
the shortcomings in our willingness to tolerate difference: “[I]f I say ‘They are crazy’ or 
‘incomprehensible’ then that is not a fact but my fate for them. I have gone as far as my 
imagination, [or] magnanimity… will allow” (CR 118). Whereas Cavell imagines that the 
limits of a community’s tolerance mark the limits of its reason, Margaret recognizes the 
potential for cruelty to operate under the guise of reason, dividing up humans into the 
																																																						
28 Born also notes that “for all her talk about connection, Margaret seems rather ill-equipped, and 




normal and the abnormal, the sane and the mad. Yet Margaret has become complicit in 
the oppressive rationality she critiques, since Henry has involved himself only at her 
request.  
While indicting the Wilcoxes as classical liberals who prove insufficiently 
concerned about the poor, the novel also suggests that New Liberalism proves oppressive 
and intolerant in its own ways. When Margaret and Helen’s debating society discusses 
how a millionaire ought to give away her money, one young woman proposes a system of 
“‘personal supervision and mutual help,’ the effect of which was to alter poor people 
until they became exactly like people who were not so poor” (HE 128). The novel thus 
highlights the worrisome logic behind upper class attempts to aid the lower classes by 
imposing specifically upper class social norms upon them. Whereas the traditional 
liberal’s attitude toward the poor proves one of skepticism without acknowledgment, as 
with Henry’s expressing neither knowledge of nor interest in the minds of men like 
Leonard, here it seems that the New Liberal’s attitude may be one of knowledge without 
acknowledgment—in the sense that people like the Schlegels assume they know what is 
best for someone like Leonard, without sufficiently acknowledging the particularities of 
his experience. Complaining to Henry that his business tip has only made Leonard worse 
off, Helen captures this New Liberal epistemological bias: “We—we, the upper classes—
thought we would help him from the height of our superior knowledge—and here’s the 
result!” (HE 191). This presumption to “superior knowledge” produces its own set of 
consequential misunderstandings and unaddressed injustices: for instance, in contrast to 




passion. But she also leaves their hotel without settling the bill, thus unthinkingly adding 
to his financial hardships. The further implication here is that, despite the promise of the 
New Liberalism, it may offer insufficient improvement over the old in its ability to 
rectify social injustice. 
The problem Margaret faces is how to include people like Leonard within her and 
Helen’s “we” without authoritatively presuming knowledge of them. Howards End asks 
how sympathetic social progressives like the Schlegels might relate to those members of 
their society whose linguistic “training” (PI §5) has led them to develop radically 
different pictures of the relation between words and world. Scholars have disagreed about 
the extent to which Forster’s narrator praises or condemns Margaret’s liberalism: whereas 
Brian May contends that “Margaret and the narrator share a single idiom throughout the 
novel” (Modernist 60), my own view is closer to that of Born, who argues that the 
narrator “stands implicitly behind Schlegelian liberalism, but often subjects it to scathing 
interrogation” (124)—for instance, by pointing out how Margaret’s marriage to Henry 
results in the dulling of her responsiveness toward the poor. But I would add that it is far 
from clear that the narrator examines Margaret from any kind of superior moral or 
epistemological position. After all, Margaret is capable of pre-empting critiques of her 
liberalism by voicing them herself; for instance, when she comments that “all our 
thoughts are the thoughts of six-hundred-pounders, and all our speeches” (61), she admits 
the limits of her and Helen’s epistemological access to the inner lives of people like 




Moreover, the narrator grapples with precisely the same problem as Margaret 
does, and his solutions are hardly more satisfying than hers. Like Margaret, he recognizes 
that his sympathies for the poor coexist uneasily alongside his lack of linguistic 
attunement with them. With the opening of the sixth chapter, the narrator signals his own 
restrictive conception of community: “We are not concerned with the very poor. They are 
unthinkable, and only to be approached by the statistician or the poet” (45). As Rae 
Harris Stoll discusses, Forster publishes Howards End at a time when urban populations 
were expanding rapidly, and so “the very poor” had in fact become increasingly 
“unthinkable” to the upper classes, “at once more oppressively present and less actually 
visible” to their fellow city dwellers (25). In this environment, statistical and sociological 
analysis grew to increasing prominence as tools for making sense of the disadvantaged 
classes, but of course such approaches were hardly conducive toward the illumination of 
individual particularity for which a novel like Howards End strives. As others have 
noted, the narrator’s assertion that Leonard “was not in the abyss, but he could see it” 
(HE 45) echoes the language of C.F.G. Masterman, whose work From the Abyss (1902) 
describes the depths of Edwardian poverty (Stoll 33; Born 126). But this word choice 
also looks ahead to Cavell’s description of language as “a thin net over an abyss” (CR 
178). The novel’s use of “abyss” links Masterman’s critique of economic inequality to 
Cavell’s anxiousness about linguistic fragmentation, suggesting that the material 
circumstances of the very poor leave them cut off from the “we” for which Forster’s 





Howards End also links the epistemological limits of New Liberalism to those of 
putatively detached realist narration. Just as well-intentioned New Liberalism still runs 
the risk of making knowledge into an oppressive force, so Forster’s novel suggests that 
realist narrative perspective carries the same exclusionary potential. Continuing his 
description of Leonard in Chapter VI, the narrator writes, “[H]e was inferior to most rich 
people, there is not the least doubt of it. He was not as courteous as the average rich man, 
nor as intelligent, nor as healthy, nor as lovable” (45-6). Though we’ve seen that the 
narrator occasionally undercuts his own epistemological authority, these sentences carry 
the stamp of objectivity, with the narrator presenting these claims as straightforward 
factual information about Leonard’s character. The narrator might be attempting to make 
the sympathetic point that Leonard’s disadvantaged background has left him incapable of 
acquiring these more positive character traits. Nonetheless, these lines fittingly illustrate 
how narrative presumptions to ‘know’ a marginalized character might exceed efforts to 
acknowledge this figure. Generally speaking, the novel’s depiction of Leonard highlights 
this character’s effort to overcome his social and economic disadvantages, encouraging 
readers to feel compassion for his plight. But, to the extent that we take the narrator—a 
cultured Englishman with liberal sensibilities—as a figure for Forster himself, the novel’s 
portrayal of someone from a different background still relies, to a large extent, on 
emphasizing similarity: Leonard is well-educated for someone in his financial position, 
and he aspires to gain precisely the kind of cultural capital that Forster himself possessed. 
By contrast, the character of Jacky shows the novel pushing up against the limits of its 




Jacky also lacks Leonard’s intellectual ambitions, and she becomes much more of a 
caricature in the text’s portrayal. Even the task of describing Jacky’s physical appearance 
appears to overwhelm the narrator: “As for her hair, or rather hairs, they are too 
complicated to describe…. The face—the face does not signify” (51).29 
 Casting its representation of this social world as unavoidably partial, 
exclusionary, and biased, the novel moves away from the more confident epistemological 
stance of realist narration and toward high modernism’s more radical experiments in 
representing subjectivity. Both politically and formally, the novel closes on a note of 
uneasy stability, which looks ahead to more major disruptions on the historical horizon. 
The final scene avoids the proto-modernist stream of consciousness style that has 
periodically arisen earlier in the text and returns instead to more straightforward realist 
verisimilitude. Correspondingly, the scene conveys a sense of possibility concerning 
Margaret’s New Liberal vision, uniting Wilcoxes, Schlegels, and even—through the 
presence of Leonard’s son—Basts. Margaret thinks enthusiastically that she and her 
various family members are “building up a new life,” and that while they hadn’t always 
“seen[n] clearly” in the past, “[i]t was different now” (336). Just as Margaret suggests 
that she and the novel’s other principal characters have regained some clarity of 
perspective, the lack of formal experimentation in this scene suggests that the narrator has 
managed to vanquish the modernist perspectival disorientation that periodically affected 
him earlier in the text.  
																																																						
29 Armstrong similarly argues that the narrator’s difficulty describing Jacky shows the limits of 




Forster, however, is too perceptive a writer, too realistic about the potential limits 
of his own liberal sympathies, to write the simplistically positive ending that some critics 
have described.30 For the scene shows that Margaret’s liberal optimism still relies on 
refusing to acknowledge those who might challenge it: “She lowered her eyes a moment 
to the black abyss of the past. They had crossed it, always excepting Leonard and 
Charles”—one dead, the other in prison (336). In attempting to move beyond this 
“abyss,” the novel cannot help invoking it once more, implicitly challenging the narrative 
of progress Margaret asserts. Similarly, the scene includes Helen’s apocalyptic prediction 
that “[l]ife’s going to be melted down, all over the world” (339). The phrase “melted 
down” suggests accelerating industrial production and attendant labor inequalities—
historically contemporaneous realities that the last chapter’s idyllic pastoralism can 
neither forestall nor negate. Helen, of course, is right: just a few years later, Forster’s 
hopeful vision of liberal community would come to seem like something that could only 
exist within a work of fiction.  
 
1910-25: The Destruction of British Liberalism?  
 
																																																						
30 Jeane Olson writes that “[t]he new Wilcox-Schlegel blended family has… learned how to give 
texture to the human reconciliation that can grow out of working through life’s unexpected 
challenges” (357); Kenneth Womack writes that “Leonard’s “brief and intimate connection with 
Helen signals a sense of resolution between the classes and foreshadows the possible emergence 
of a new social order” (265). By contrast, I agree with Anne Wright that the ending “enact[s] a 
liberal wish-fulfillment of total control” (61), and that despite the novel’s attempt “to make things 





 The War quickly shattered two of liberalism’s foundational assumptions: the idea 
that history inevitably is progressive, and the idea that humans inherently act rationally. 
Hobhouse exemplifies this societal shift in attitude; by 1915, he has already begun to 
lament that his erstwhile optimism had been so badly misplaced. Looking back, he 
determines that “the Victorian age believed in law and reason,” whereas the modern age 
is defined by anarchy and violence (qtd. in Collini 246). Vincent Sherry discusses how 
pro-War arguments made by the liberal press contributed to British society’s loss of 
belief in “public reason” (9); in these publications, Sherry finds a “rhetoric of reason” 
operating “in nearly inverse ratio to the credibility of the cause” it purports to justify 
(26).31 Whereas traditional liberalism upholds public discourse as a check against 
individual biases, in the post-War years broader popular awareness of Freudian 
psychology contributed to the growth of a starkly different view: “Once a court in which 
prejudice and bias might be tried and exposed, the public sphere is now itself the very 
source of prejudice and bias” (North, Reading 70). Wittgenstein’s Investigations reflects 
this post-War pessimism: the preface, written in 1945, laments “the darkness of this time” 
(3), and for the work’s epigraph Wittgenstein chose a quotation from Johann Nestroy: 
“The trouble about progress is that it always looks much greater than it really is” (2).32  
																																																						
31 For instance, Sherry discusses how the major newspapers affiliated with the Liberal Party 
initially expressed support for the Germans. However, once Britain joined the opposing side of 
the conflict, these papers abruptly shifted their rhetoric and began attacking German character 
(35-41).  
32 Wittgenstein reiterates his deep skepticism toward progressive theories of history in a letter to 
Norman Malcolm, also from 1945: “[T]he pretence that the complete stamping out of the 
‘aggressors’ of this war will make this world a better place to live in, as a future war could, of 
course, only be started by them, stinks to high heaven &, in fact, promises a horrid future” (qtd. in 




 This altered historical and intellectual climate prompted a number of significant 
changes to Britain’s political system. Whereas Howards End, like Hobhouse’s pre-War 
writings, suggests that inequality in British society might be resolved through gradual 
updates to the prevailing liberal consensus, after the war it became increasingly difficult 
to believe that exploitation and oppression would simply take care of themselves over 
time. The result was more concerted challenges to the political status quo, from both the 
Left and the Right. By “call[ing] into question the fitness of the upper classes to rule” 
(Robb 50), the War emboldened the rest of the population in its push for greater social 
equality, and state support for the working classes expanded significantly in the post-War 
years.33 In 1918, the Representation of the People Act extended suffrage to an additional 
thirteen million working class men, as well as to eight million women, partially in 
recognition of the contributions both groups had made to the war effort (Grayzel 208-9). 
Such developments speak to an environment in which those who had felt excluded from 
the “we” of British liberalism pushed to have their perspectives acknowledged and their 
demands taken seriously.  
																																																						
“dream of reason,” Wittgenstein abandons this dream after the War (81). While it is certainly true 
that Wittgenstein did not subscribe to the narrative of historical progress during the post-WWI 
years, I am also unconvinced by Alexander’s assertion that he did hold such a view in the pre-
War era. While the Tractatus lends itself to being read as a work of unproblematic rationalism 
more than the Investigations does, nonetheless Wittgenstein was always personally skeptical 
toward claims that the modern world was necessarily better than what came before. To this point, 
the younger Wittgenstein was deeply influenced by the Viennese philosopher Otto Weininger’s 
work Sex and Character (1903), which relentlessly criticizes “the decay of modern times” (Monk 
20).  
33 Notable pieces of legislation that improved social conditions for the working classes included: 
the Fisher Education Act of 1918, which created a more egalitarian educational system, and the 
Unemployment Insurance Act of 1920, which expanded unemployment benefits for “soldiers and 




Still, post-War political changes did not fundamentally alter the old social order. 
An economic depression in 1921 led to renewed labor unrest and checked the momentum 
of the expanding welfare state.34 These years also saw “discourses of biological 
nationalism … directed against the working classes as racial others” in order to prevent or 
limit their participation in new welfare programs (Ho 18). Such exclusionary discourses 
functioned as attempts to maintain a more restrictive form of liberal community. The 
other issue, as Howards End anticipates, is that increased governmental involvement in 
the lives of ordinary citizens also brought with it the potential for new forms of state 
control.  
The Bloomsbury circle played an active role in seeking to update the project of 
British liberalism in the post-War world. Promoting pacifism and internationalism, post-
War Bloomsbury thinkers put forward a vision “of history not as inevitable progress but 
as an unending fight” to create a better, more inclusive future (Froula xii). During the 
peace talks of 1919, Keynes contended—correctly, as it turned out—that imposing overly 
harsh conditions on Germany would only lead to a second major war, and he 
unsuccessfully encouraged the Allied leaders to take a less nationalist stance (104). 
Christine Froula argues that Woolf’s distinctive contribution to post-War Bloomsbury 
discourse consists in her emphasis on gender inequality as a conceptual problem for 
British liberalism. Woolf “extended Bloomsbury’s critique of the barbarity within Europe 
to the women’s movement” (Froula 2). With Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf returns to Forster’s 
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question of “Who’s ‘we’?,” who gets to participate in the English liberal community, 
considering how post-War conditions alter the social and linguistic dynamics Forster has 
begun to explore. The novel portrays England’s upper classes as continuing to valorize 
the restrictive rationality of men like Henry Wilcox, but it also indicates that—in the 
aftermath of the War—such rationalism has grown increasingly indistinguishable from 
madness. 
 
Mrs. Dalloway: The Madness of Knowledge  
 
 Cavell reminds us that political questions of who comprises a particular 
community are always also epistemological questions of to what extent we find ourselves 
attuned with our interlocutors. As Woolf’s participation in Bloomsbury intellectual 
circles shaped her political thinking, so it also shaped her philosophical preoccupations, 
in ways that remain insufficiently explored. Ann Banfield’s The Phantom Table provides 
an extensive account of how Bloomsbury debates on epistemology find their way into 
Woolf’s fiction. Banfield explains that Woolf’s father, Leslie Stephen, was preoccupied 
with the question of how we might gain access to the external world when “we cannot get 
outside our own consciousness” (47), and she notes that Woolf socialized regularly with 
Russell and would certainly have been aware of his own thinking on this same issue (34-
5). As such, Banfield argues, Woolf responded to her lack of formal philosophical 




between subjectivity and material reality in her own distinctive way.35 While I find the 
general thrust of this account entirely convincing, I would also note that Banfield makes a 
point of excluding Wittgenstein, as much as possible, from the intellectual milieu she 
presents: “Bloomsbury’s preoccupation with epistemological questions thus places it 
squarely within the period of [Russell’s career] which ends with Wittgenstein’s 
ascendency…. We can thus take the rise of Wittgenstein’s influence as a kind of cut-off 
point for the philosophical background of Bloomsbury” (9). In some ways, this exclusion 
is warranted, given Wittgenstein’s reluctance to involve himself in the Bloomsbury social 
scene. Still, the lack of direct intellectual exchange between Wittgenstein and Woolf 
belies the deep commonalities between his philosophy and her fiction. Just as 
Wittgenstein’s later work investigates how language both enables and forecloses 
community, so Mrs. Dalloway concretizes this investigation by connecting it to the 
particular historical conditions of post-War English society. 
 With her novel, Woolf takes up Forster’s challenge to realist verisimilitude and 
pushes it much farther than Howards End does, abandoning distanced, putatively 
objective narration in favor of representing a diverse range of individual subjectivities.36 
In her diary, Woolf wrote that she was greatly interested in what Forster would say about 
																																																						
35 Banfield argues that modern fiction, as Woolf understood it, “ultimately aims to describe a 
reality beyond privacy” (298). Timothy Mackin, in a reading that expands on Banfield’s work, 
argues that Woolf shared Russell’s interest in photography as a technology that removes the 
human agent from its representation of the world.  
36 Kathy Mezei similarly writes that, with Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf “seems to have worked out a 
technical response… to realism by doing away with the concept of a central authoritative voice 
normally located in a narrator (as in… Howards End)” (82). While I agree with the thrust of this 
claim, I think the contrast Mezei sets up between Forster and Woolf is too strong, since we’ve 




Mrs. Dalloway (Hoffmann and Ter Harr 48). Commenting on the novel shortly after it is 
published, Forster notes her innovative approach to the representation of character, 
writing that “to convey the actual process of thinking is a creative feat, and I know of no 
one except Virginia Woolf who has accomplished it” (“Early Novels” 145). Woolf’s 
formal experimentalism carries a political thrust: the increasingly fragmented narrative 
voice reflects the significant societal fractures Woolf finds in Britain’s post-War political 
community.37 The novel’s frequent perspectival shifts indicate how little knowledge 
individuals have of one another within the densely populated modern metropolis. For 
instance, as Septimus talks to himself in Regent’s Park and his embarrassed wife Rezia 
tries to make him stop, Peter Walsh walks by and thinks, “[T]hat is being young…. To be 
having an awful scene… in the middle of the morning” (MD 70). By representing 
Septimus and Rezia’s experiences, and then shifting to Peter’s point of view, Woolf puts 
readers in a position to see the limits of the latter’s vision: Peter treats this emotionally 
overwrought couple as a synecdoche for the broader condition of “being young,” 
unaware of the historically specific cause for this couple’s unhappiness: Septimus’ war-
time trauma. Recently returned after five years in India, Peter soon moves on to thinking 
that he has never “seen London look so enchanting” and marveling at its “civilization,” 
																																																						
37 My reading of Mrs. Dalloway seeks to build off the work of other critics who have sought to 
clarify the cultural and material conditions of the world Woolf depicts. This line of analysis 
pushes back against earlier readings that attend insufficiently to the historical particularity of 
Woolf’s novel; Nancy Armstrong, for instance, concludes that “[e]verything finally signifies the 
author’s style rather than things in the world outside” (357), and So-Hee Lee writes that “Woolf’s 
innovations in narrative form are based on the feminine sensibility originated from the female 
body” (701). Such readings sever Woolf’s aesthetic innovations too sharply from her political 




remaining blissfully unaware that he has just witnessed evidence of the grave 
shortcomings in this purported civilization (71). This moment recalls the movement, in 
Howards End, first into and then out of Leonard’s consciousness during the scene of his 
death—a formal choice that reflects the lack of understanding between Leonard and 
Charles Wilcox. The difference is that these perspectival jumps occur much more 
regularly in Woolf’s novel; the cohesive liberal community that Howards End still 
intermittently presents has become, in Mrs. Dalloway, increasingly difficult to find.  
In its portrayal of Septimus, Woolf’s novel suggests that English society has 
conditioned him to demonstrate the same kind of rationalist individualism that Forster 
ascribes to the Wilcox men.38 As we’ve seen, Howards End indicates that the Wilcoxes’ 
confidence in their abilities as knowers is bound up with their difficulties bestowing 
acknowledgment, and Mrs. Dalloway casts Septimus as developing an extreme version of 
this same mentality. Though originally harboring ambitions as a poet, Septimus spends 
the pre-War years working for a company of “auctioneers, valuers, land and estate 
agents,” and his boss Mr. Brewer pushes him to follow the Wilcox model of business and 
financial success, predicting that Septimus will have an auspicious career if only “he 
keeps his health” (85). The onset of the War prompts Septimus to develop the kind of 
psychological “health” Mr. Brewer recommends: “There in the trenches the change 
which Mr. Brewer desired… was produced instantly; [Septimus] developed manliness; he 
was promoted” (86). Evidently, the same rationalist mindset that makes Septimus an 
																																																						
38 Richard Russell sees Woolf’s portrayal of Septimus as informed by Forster’s depiction of 
Leonard, pointing out that both characters come from lower class backgrounds and aspire to 




effective assessor of estate and property values is also what allows him to navigate the 
War. When his friend Evans is killed, “Septimus, far from showing any emotion or 
recognising that this was the end of a friendship, congratulated himself upon feeling very 
little and very reasonably. The War had taught him” (86).39 
 The novel indicates that the apparent madness Septimus exhibits in the post-War 
world is simply an extension of the rationalist attitude he has cultivated during war-time. 
As such, Mrs. Dalloway highlights how inadequate the rationality valorized by traditional 
liberalism—and exhibited by the Wilcox men—proves when confronted with the 
barbarity of WWI.40 The novel’s representation of Septimus’ consciousness highlights the 
limitations of his mentality: though periodically expressing concern that “he could not 
feel,” Septimus nonetheless maintains that “his brain was perfect” (88). Woolf casts him 
as subscribing to the pre-War dream of reason; like the opening sentence of 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, he promulgates the view that “the world is the totality of facts” 
(1.1).41 Septimus similarly exemplifies the corruption of liberalism’s emphasis on 
																																																						
39 Kathryn Van Wert examines Woolf’s early drafts of Mrs. Dalloway and finds that they portray 
Septimus’ sense of alienation from his interlocutors as a product of his childhood; on this basis, 
she seeks to de-emphasize the War as the specific historical source of Septimus’ breakdown. But 
Woolf also excludes much of this material from the final version of Mrs. Dalloway, a choice that 
may reflect her desire to emphasize the War itself as the most formative factor in Septimus’ 
psychological development.   
40 Sherry describes Woolf as writing works of “aesthetic reason,” which employ the language of 
rationality in order to parody and critique it (53). He notes that her portrayal of Septimus is 
crucial to this project (293), but he devotes little space to discussing the specifics of this portrayal.  
41 While I’ve suggested (see fn. 32) that it would overly simplistic to read the Tractatus as 
participating straightforwardly in this pre-War dream of reason, nonetheless lines like the opening 
sentence certainly lend themselves to such a reading. As Michael LeMahieu discusses, such an 
interpretation of the early Wittgenstein has had a number of important adherents: “Wittgenstein’s 
reputation as the ‘Prince of Positivists’ […] stems from a tendentious but historically influential 




privacy, in the sense that he places complete trust in the powers of his own mind, refusing 
to admit the growing disorder in his thought process. For instance, he wonders, “[W]hat 
was the scientific explanation (for one must be scientific above all things)? Why could he 
see through bodies, see into the future, when dogs will become men? It was the heat wave 
presumably, operating upon a brain made sensitive by eons of evolution” (MD 68). With 
his invocation of “evolution,” Septimus signals his belief in historical progress, while his 
use of “brain” highlights his strictly materialist understanding of the universe.42 He 
recognizes that he is undergoing an atypical experience, but his commitment to being 
“scientific” leads him to conclude that he possesses a more highly evolved mind—not 
that he has been traumatized by the pain of his war years and the loss of his friend.   
The Wilcoxes are willing to admit their own finitude, insofar as they recognize 
their limited access to certain spheres of human existence; by contrast, Septimus takes his 
rationalism to greater extremes, arrogating to himself epistemological capacities that 
exceed what is possible in the context of ordinary human existence. As Rezia recounts,  
…[G]oing home he was perfectly quiet—perfectly reasonable. He would argue 
with her about killing themselves; and explain how wicked people were; how he 
could see them making up lies as they passed in the street. He knew all their 
thoughts, he said; he knew everything. He knew the meaning of the world, he 
said. (66)  
As with his belief in his ability to “see through bodies,” Septimus here reveals the 
oppressive, imperialist inflection of his epistemological stance toward other minds, which 
																																																						




become territory for his own mind to conquer. He ascribes to himself precisely what 
Cavell cautions us against imagining we can have: namely, knowledge of other minds.43 
This moment highlights the madness of seeking to know, rather than acknowledge, one’s 
interlocutors. With her initial comment that Septimus’ conversation on their walk home is 
“perfectly reasonable,” Rezia implicitly reveals the skewed status of reason in this post-
War context. She may offer her subsequent recollections as evidence against, rather than 
for, Septimus’ capacity to act reasonably, but the text does not say so explicitly. This 
ambiguity reflects the increasingly blurred distinction between reason and madness in the 
world Woolf depicts.  
 Following Forster’s investigation of linguistic miscommunication in Howards 
End, Mrs. Dalloway similarly casts Septimus as alienated from his community by 
showing that he has begun to conceive of word-world relations in private, idiosyncratic 
ways. Just as a child gradually grows into the language of his culture, so Woolf’s 
representation of Septimus’ interiority shows him trying to learn the words by which he 
might speak about his own unfamiliar, unprecedented experiences. When Rezia 
encourages Septimus to look at the sky-writing—a modern marketing tactic that 
ominously recalls war-time aerial bombings—he thinks, “[T]hey are signalling to me. 
Not indeed in actual words; that is, he could not read the language yet, but it was plain 
enough this beauty” (21).44 The novel casts Septimus, in his traumatized state, as 
																																																						
43 Gregory Wilson argues that Septimus’ claim to know other minds demonstrates his capacity for 
sympathy (36). But this reading overlooks the oppressive potential of Septimus’ drive for 
knowledge.  
44 The first demonstration of sky-writing occurs in 1922, and it serves to advertise The Daily Mail 




endeavoring to expand his linguistic capabilities, to learn the formerly obscure 
“language” of the non-human world. Sparrows sing to him “in Greek words” (24), telling 
him “how there is no crime […], how there is no death” (24-5). He feels “connected by 
millions of fibres” to leaves (22).45 He notices how “[t]he trees waved, brandished. We 
welcome, the world seemed to say; we accept; we create” (69). As the repetition of “we” 
in this passage indicates, Septimus seeks to find linguistic community with a set of 
potential new interlocutors: trees, sparrows, and other denizens of the non-human world. 
In making this effort, Septimus takes words he has learned from his human community 
and brings them to these new contexts. In Cavell’s terms, he comes “to speak ‘outside 
language games,’” to “consider expressions apart from, and in opposition to, the natural 
forms of life which give those expressions the force they have” (CR 207). Unfortunately 
for Septimus, his sense of attunement with birds and trees is also the measure of his 
alienation from his fellow humans, who do not share this experience of heightened 
connection with the world.  
 Septimus believes that the world has singled him out to convey an important 
message; this role makes him “the greatest of all mankind,” but it also forces him to 
confront “eternal loneliness” (MD 25). In a comment that resonates with Septimus’ 
situation, Cavell writes,   
																																																						
same message to many individuals simultaneously, Mrs. Dalloway lampoons this belief by 
showing how the various individuals who witness the sky-writing all interpret it differently; see 
Reading 81-6.   
45 This image, too, shows how Septimus has been constituted by this particular historical moment, 
since it evokes the powerful communicative capacities of telephone cables, another modern 




Human beings do not naturally desire isolation and incomprehension, but union or 
reunion, call it community. It is in faithfulness to that desire that one declares 
oneself unknown…. The wish to be extraordinary, exceptional, unique, thus 
reveals the wish to be ordinary, everyday. (CR 463)    
As Cavell’s comment suggests, Septimus’ sense of his own greatness reflects his feeling 
of separation from the other (human) members of his society. Buried under Septimus’ 
sense of greatness is his mourning for lost ordinariness, since he has grown alienated 
from his community for reasons he does not fully understand. But Septimus struggles to 
convey this sense of loss, even to himself; his rationalist mentality makes it hard for him 
to identity his need for acknowledgment.46  
 Mrs. Dalloway portrays Septimus’ society as reflecting his own rationalist refusal 
of acknowledgment back at him. The two doctors Septimus visits, Holmes and Bradshaw, 
provide additional instantiations of how Wilcox rationality persists into the post-War 
world. Both doctors display their own versions of the tendency to prioritize knowledge at 
the expense of acknowledgment—though they differ from Septimus in their ability to 
employ this mentality in socially acceptable ways, having been less directly touched by 
war-time trauma. Holmes, the first doctor who examines Septimus, describes his 
condition in language that minimizes its seriousness, telling him, “You’re in a funk,” and 
insisting that “there was nothing whatever the matter with him” (MD 92). Holmes 
functions as a mouthpiece for post-War English society’s ongoing commitment to 
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rationalist individualism, even in the face of a growing body of evidence that suggests the 
shortcomings of this mentality. Holmes exhibits what Alex Zwerdling has described as 
the tendency of the novel’s upper-class characters to “ignor[e] the more devastating facts 
and deep scars of recent history” in order to preserve and maintain the pre-War social 
order (124). By minimizing Septimus’ difficulties, Holmes reveals his unwillingness to 
confront the full depth of the former soldier’s war-induced trauma—and, by implication, 
he rejects any possibility that he might be incapable of satisfactorily addressing his 
patient’s condition. The novel exposes the antiquated nature of Holmes’s supposed 
medical expertise, which distils to the cheerful adage that “health is largely a matter in 
our own control” (MD 91). Woolf’s portrayal of Septimus suggests that the trauma of the 
War should render obsolete such unproblematic confidence in psychological self-
sufficiency, in the mind’s ability to find a reasonable solution to any problem it might 
face.47 
 Bradshaw, the second doctor, reacts to Septimus with much greater concern than 
Holmes does. Yet the text shows that his exaggerated dismay is similarly predicated on 
his own absolute confidence in himself and is therefore similarly unhelpful:   
																																																						
47 As scholars have noted, Woolf’s portrayal of Septimus reflects her critique of the Report of the 
War Office Committee of Enquiry into Shell-Shock (1922). Under the auspices of seeking to gain 
an improved understanding of this condition, the War Office casts shell-shock as largely resulting 
from weakness on the part of the individual soldier. The Report councils that doctors should treat 
shell-shock by seeking to “persuade… the patient to make the effort necessary to overcome the 
disability” (qtd. in Thomas 53)—a recommendation Holmes basically follows. For more on how 
the War Office Report actually increased hostility toward shell-shocked veterans, see Thomas; 




He could see the first moment they came into the room (the Warren Smiths they 
were called); he was certain directly he saw the man; it was a case of extreme 
gravity. It was a case of complete breakdown—complete physical and nervous 
breakdown, with every symptom in an advanced stage, he ascertained in two or 
three minutes (writing answers to questions, muttered discretely, on a pink card). 
(95) 
Despite their conflicting diagnoses, Bradshaw and Holmes share the sense of being 
“certain” that their response is appropriate, displaying the same easy confidence in their 
professional expertise that Henry Wilcox does. The novel implicitly lambasts Bradshaw’s 
diagnostic assurance, given the relative haste of his examination; his pronouncements—
“complete breakdown,” “every symptom in an advanced stage”—are equal parts serious 
and vague. Holmes and Bradshaw respond differently to Septimus in part because they 
are two different types of doctor: whereas Holmes is a general practitioner, Bradshaw is a 
psychological specialist (Ho, Nation and Citizenship 70-1). Bradshaw is therefore a 
representative of the expanding welfare state, and he encapsulates the possibility that 
New Liberal policies, in attempting to provide for the socially disenfranchised, might in 
fact codify new forms of oppression and control. Bradshaw proposes to treat Septimus by 
sending him away to “a home,” officially designating him as mad and separating him out 
from the community accordingly (97). As Cavell notes, to deem someone mad is to 




Bradshaw—in his capacity as employee of the liberal state—takes pride in policing and 
maintaining the boundaries of this “we.”48 
 The novel describes Bradshaw as championing the benefits of “proportion,” the 
same word Howards End uses to summarize Margaret’s liberal philosophy (99). With 
Bradshaw’s encomium to proportion, Woolf signals her indebtedness to Forster’s project 
of imagining liberal community. At the same time, Woolf’s use of this word also suggests 
her dubiousness toward the cautious optimism of her predecessor. In order to comment 
on the consequences of Bradshaw’s mindset, the novel momentarily abandons stream of 
consciousness representation and assumes a more distanced, non-embodied narrative 
perspective:  
Worshipping proportion, Sir William not only prospered himself but made 
England prosper, secluded her lunatics, forbade childbirth, penalised despair, 
made it impossible for the unfit to propagate their views until they, too, shared his 
sense of proportion… (99) 
In Howards End, as we have seen, Margaret advocates “proportion” as a way of 
reconciling Wilcox practicality with Schlegel sentiment, and Forster’s narrator makes 
clear his sympathies for her approach. By contrast, the mocking tone of this passage 
suggests an even stronger critique of the injustices to which the search for proportion 
gives ruse. While this passage seems like a return to more traditional narrative 
perspective, in fact Woolf’s narrator adopts realist perspectival conventions precisely in 
																																																						
48 After experiencing a psychological breakdown in 1913, Woolf herself was ordered to take a 
rest cure, and her bitter memory of this experience informs her critical portrayal of Bradshaw 




order to critique their presumption to represent a cohesive social world. Men like 
Bradshaw believe that they employ their rational faculties in order to bring about a 
calmer, more well-ordered society—the kind of society in which the narrator of Howards 
End also wants to believe.49 But Woolf’s text highlights how the philosophy of proportion 
brings with it the disinclination to acknowledge social difference: proportion, the narrator 
writes, “has a sister” named “Conversion,” who “feasts on the wills of the weakly, loving 
to impress, to impose, adoring her own features stamped on the face of the populace” 
(100). As Mrs. Dalloway makes more explicit than Howards End does, the philosophy of 
proportion allows for the institutionalization of “lunatics,” the ratcheting up of British 
imperialism (Conversion is “even now engaged” in India and Africa [100]), and the 
preservation of the patriarchal status quo (Bradshaw’s wife has experienced “slow 
sinking… of her will into his” [100]).  
 In contrast to the lack of acknowledgment Septimus receives from these enforcers 
of the social status quo, the novel’s representation of Rezia shows her making a more 
concerted effort to understand and address his pain. An Italian by birth, now living in a 
country where she knows no one, her situation parallels that of the “foreigner” in 
Wittgenstein’s Investigations (§20).50 Like her husband, then, albeit for different reasons, 
Rezia occupies a marginalized position within post-War English society. Listening to 
Septimus’ prophetic ramblings, Rezia asks him, “What are you saying?”—a comment 
that reflects her struggle to understand his distorted thinking, but also her desire to try 
																																																						
49 Sherry points out that the word “proportion,” implying a proper balance between parts, is 
related to the word “ratio,” from which “rationality” takes its root (289). 




(25).51 Reacting against Bradshaw’s desire to send Septimus away, Rezia proclaims that 
“nothing should separate them,” emphasizing her continued commitment to include 
Septimus in her community, even if it turns out to be a community of two (148). Rezia’s 
loyalty to Septimus prompts her to conceal his condition from the world, as when she 
proclaims that she “would never, never tell that he was mad!” (24).52 But this desire to 
protect Septimus cuts Rezia off further from everyone else; writing to her mother, she 
refers to her husband’s condition only by saying that “Septimus has been working too 
hard” (23).53 When she laments that she can “tell no one” the depth of her suffering, 
Rezia implicitly admits that this “no one” includes Septimus himself, whose 
preoccupation with his own inner life makes him woefully inadequate as someone with 
whom Rezia can share her difficulties (23). Committed deeply to a man who cannot 
acknowledge the pain this commitment gives her, Rezia concludes: “To love makes one 
solitary” (23). 
 By committing suicide, Septimus confirms the failure of post-War English 
society—this broader political community of which he is nominally a member—to 
adequately acknowledge his suffering. At the same time, and on a more personal level, he 
																																																						
51 Kaley Joyes describes Rezia’s attitude toward her husband as an example of ‘failed witnessing’ 
in Mrs. Dalloway, writing that Septimus needs someone “to turn toward him, but Rezia turns 
away” (74). But this reading strikes me as overly harsh on Rezia, who makes a more sustained 
effort to understand what Septimus is going through than any other character in the novel does.  
52 Of course, her and Septimus’ visits to the doctors become an exception to this rule, but Rezia 
also takes Septimus to meet both Holmes and Bradshaw because she is genuinely hopeful that 
they will prove more helpful to Septimus than they turn out to be.  
53 Like Holmes, then, Rezia uses language that minimizes the significance of war-time trauma, 
with the difference that Rezia, in her less privileged social position, is acutely aware that her 
words are deceptive. (For an historical analysis of the difficult circumstances faced by the wives 




confirms his own failure to adequately acknowledge his wife’s. The precipitant of 
Septimus’ death is an unannounced house call from Holmes: Rezia, as usual the only one 
who truly represents her husband’s interests, seeks to prevent the doctor’s entry, but 
Holmes “put[s] her aside” and proceeds into the house, prompting Septimus to throw 
himself out the window (149). Before he jumps, Septimus’ inner monologue underscores 
his ongoing trouble understanding how he is meant to relate to other people: “He did not 
want to die. Life was good. The sun hot. Only human beings—what did they want?” 
(149). In these final musings, Septimus recognizes that his purportedly powerful intellect 
has been unable to solve the problem of other minds—that is to say: not how to know 
them, but what value they hold, and what responsibilities to them he might have. As he 
maintains his restrictively rationalist attitude, so his escape from his own trauma leaves 
Rezia even more isolated than she was before.   
 The other character whom Septimus’ suicide significantly impacts, of course, is 
Clarissa Dalloway, who learns of the death from Bradshaw’s wife during the novel’s 
climatic party scene. Clarissa’s reaction to this news, her sense that “[s]omehow it was 
her disaster—her disgrace,” has generated more critical discussion than perhaps any other 
moment in the novel (185). Scholars have proven sharply divided concerning the ultimate 
value of her emotional identification with this dead stranger; one reading of the scene 
holds that Clarissa “fully comprehend[s] him and what made him kill himself,” and that 




community” (Russell, “Radical Empathy” 358, 375).54 By contrast, another reading 
claims that when Clarissa returns to her party, she “recommits herself to a life, like 
Bradshaw’s, devoted to perpetuating the status quo. Clarissa silences Septimus and robs 
his death of meaning by refusing to change in response to his message” (DeMeester 
663).55 Negotiating between such sharply divergent readings proves crucial to 
determining wherein the novel ultimately comes down in its assessment of England’s 
post-War liberal community.  
 First of all, against the most pessimistic assessments of her behavior, it is worth 
emphasizing that Clarissa does legitimately understand Septimus’ death as “an attempt to 
communicate,” and that she does make an effort to discern what message her society 
might take from his sudden act (MD 184). As the novel’s representation of her interior 
monologue reveals, Clarissa accurately interprets the suicide as a reaction against 
Bradshaw and his tendency to “make life intolerable” (185) by “forcing your soul” (184), 
commending Septimus for defying the controlling state apparatus the doctor personifies. 
In contrast to the restrictive rationalism Septimus and Bradshaw both exhibit in their own 
ways, Clarissa becomes a model of attempting to acknowledge others without presuming 
to know them. As Peter explains, Clarissa has developed a theory to address the feeling 
of “dissatisfaction” that results from “not knowing people; not being known” (152). She 
maintains that she is “laid out like a mist between the people she knew best” and also 
																																																						
54 For readings that take a similarly optimistic stance on this scene, see Lee 709; Wilson 40; 
Berman, “Ethical Folds” 168.  
55 For more readings along these lines, see Rosenfeld 139-40; Joyes 84-5. Zwerdling points out 
that, despite her supposed gift for connecting with others, Clarissa populates her party with a 




“part of people she had never met” (9). So she feels an unusually heightened sense of 
attunement with other people, even as she proves more willing than Septimus to accept 
the inevitable epistemological limits that result from her finite perspective on the world. 
Moreover, the attitude of Woolf’s titular character corresponds to that of the novel more 
broadly: by intensively representing the inner lives of these various characters, Mrs. 
Dalloway encourages readers to feel the same kind of attunement with other subjectivities 
that Clarissa does.  
 On the other hand, the novel makes clear the limits of Clarissa’s emotional 
identification with Septimus. Richard Russell’s claim that Clarissa “fully comprehend[s]” 
Septimus, quoted above, makes it sound as though learning about his death somehow 
gives her privileged access to his inner life; in fact, however, the novel shows that 
feelings of connection cannot overcome realities of separation. Just as the compassion of 
the Schlegels does not prevent Leonard’s death, so Clarissa becomes aware of Septimus 
only after his suicide, when her concern can make no difference whatsoever in his 
particular case. Despite the critical praise Clarissa’s compassion has received, it is not 
Clarissa but Rezia who, as we have seen, demonstrates the most sustained interest in 
Septimus’ tumultuous inner life. In such instances, the practical distinction between 
acknowledgment and knowledge seems to thin to nothing, with successful 
acknowledgment of others requiring at least some knowledge of them—in the case of 
Septimus, the kind of partial knowledge that Rezia has, and that Clarissa lacks. Here, the 




in speaking for figures (like Septimus and Rezia) whose upbringings have been markedly 
different from her own.56  
 In addition, the novel presents Clarissa as periodically displaying a more 
emotionally disengaged attitude toward the misfortunes of others. Earlier in the text, as 
she reflects on her husband’s political work, she thinks that “[s]he cared much more for 
her roses than for the Armenians. Hunted out of existence, maimed, frozen, victims of 
cruelty and injustice (she had heard Richard say so over and over again)—no, she could 
feel nothing for the Albanians, or was it the Armenians?” (120). This passage represents 
an important counterpoint to the more famous moment of her emotional identification 
with Septimus. Here, the text suggests the possibility of an implicit nationalist sentiment 
embedded within its protagonist’s responsive capacities; Clarissa evidently finds it much 
easier to react strongly to Septimus’ sufferings than to the those of the Albanians (or was 
it the Armenians?).57 The novel also sets Clarissa’s compassion for Septimus against her 
lack of compassion for Doris Kilman—a socially marginalized figure with whom 
Clarissa actually interacts, and whom she condescendingly describes as “[h]eavy, ugly, 
commonplace, without kindness or grace” (125). Even as the novel emphasizes Clarissa’s 
																																																						
56 When Woolf writes an introduction to Life As We Have Known It (1930), a collection of life 
writings by working class women, she admits that her own economic advantages have made it 
difficult for her to understand the embodied experiences of lower class individuals (Rosenfeld 
146; Berman, Modernist Fiction 118).  
57 Conversely, whereas elsewhere the novel indicts Richard, Clarissa’s husband, for his lack of 
emotional responsiveness—as with his comment that the War is “already half forgotten” (115)—
here the text shows that his political work might at least potentially improve the lives of these 
distant foreigners, while Clarissa’s sympathies for others have little material impact and prove 
inconsistent in any case. On the other hand, as Joyce rightly points out, Clarissa’s gender 




ability to emotionally identify with others, then, it also admits that the socio-economic 
difference between Clarissa and Doris keeps these two women significantly divided from 
each other.58  
Woolf casts Clarissa in the mold of Margaret Schlegel, a liberal humanist who 
seeks to embody the philosophy of “Only connect.” But Woolf also develops Forster’s 
suggestion that “only connect” may be only an appealing slogan, one that does little to 
mitigate the real material inequalities liberalism leaves in its wake. Consistent with its 
status as a post-War novel, Mrs. Dalloway expresses dubiousness toward the idea that 
British society is making inevitable progress, that it will ever be arranged in such a way 
as to ensure the flourishing of all, not just some, of its members. Still, like Howards End, 
Mrs. Dalloway does not articulate any kind of coherent political alternative to liberalism; 
rather, as Froula notes, it participates in the larger Bloomsbury project of trying to make 
post-War liberalism as tolerant and inclusive as possible.59  
Ultimately, Woolf provides an aesthetic re-working of Forster’s political vision. 
With Mrs. Dalloway, she takes up Forster’s proto-modernist example and abandons more 
fully all pretense toward objective narration, concerning herself instead with probing the 
complex workings of individual psychologies. Voicing the “silent soliloquy of others” in 
this way (PI II, §31), Mrs. Dalloway models the epistemological stance of 
																																																						
58 The novel emphasizes that Doris has been a victim of spiking nationalist fervor during the War; 
she loses her teaching position because she has German heritage and refuses to “pretend that the 
Germans were all villains” (124). Froula describes Kilman as “a walking allegory of the 
aggressively aggrieved post-War Germany” (105).  
59 The novels of D.H. Lawrence, for instance, often go much farther than either Howards End or 




acknowledgment, rendering its speakers neither totally unfathomable nor transparently 
comprehensible. With her attentiveness to these silent soliloquies, Woolf helps to 
establish the suitability of modernist aesthetic strategies to the project of 
acknowledgment. Modernist representations of consciousness become at once a 
corrective and an alternative to liberal politics: they seek to promote compassion for 
those who have been excluded from or disenfranchised by the liberal state, but they also 
suggest that others maintain their fundamental individual worth, and their deservingness 
of social and economic enfranchisement, irrespective of mainstream society’s ability to 
achieve linguistic attunement with them. 
Wittgenstein writes in the Investigations that “one human being can be a complete 
enigma to another” (PI II, §325). Woolf, like the other novelists I discuss in the chapters 
to follow, engages in determined efforts to represent the enigmatic figures that populate 
this modernizing world. Her fiction demonstrates the capacity of language to give readers 
some sense of the inner turmoil such individuals undergo. At the same time, these efforts 
at linguistic representation also gesture toward that which remains unrepresented, and to 
those who remain unheard. In this way, modernist representations of consciousness 
reaffirm an important Wittgensteinian point: namely, that linguistic acknowledgments of 
pain never reach all the way to the pain itself. Woolf’s modernist example implies that 
literary acts of acknowledgment are hardly sufficient to redress societal injustice. 





CHAPTER TWO: THE SEARCH FOR A “BEST CASE” OF HUMAN 
KNOWLEDGE: MARRIAGE AND SAME-SEX INTIMIACY IN FORD, WOOLF, 
AND LARSEN  
 
 As we saw in the last chapter, one of Woolf’s preoccupations in Mrs. Dalloway 
(1925) is the idea that certain kinds of human relation present possibilities for 
interpersonal intimacy that others do not. Thus, despite her strong emotional 
identification with Septimus, Clarissa does not actually understand his language practices 
or the nature of his inner life in the way that his wife Rezia does. Sally Seton, Clarissa’s 
friend and erstwhile romantic interest, speaks of the barriers that restrict us in our efforts 
to understand other people:  
[F]or what can one know even of the people one lives with every day? she asked. 
Are we not all prisoners? She had read a wonderful play about a man who 
scratched on the wall of his cell, and she had felt that was true of life—one 
scratched on the wall. (MD 192) 
Sally provides an apt expression of what Cavell calls “the truth of skepticism” (CR 496), 
the insurmountable limits in our knowledge of other minds. As Cavell has shown, the 
idea that other-mind skepticism does not need to be defeated, so much as accepted, runs 
throughout Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953). When Wittgenstein 
writes, “An ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria,” he indicates that these 
“outward criteria” are the means by which we gain understanding of others’ inner lives 
(PI §580). If someone grimaces and says, “I am in pain,” we can accept that what she 




course, be lying, but “[l]ying is a language-game that needs to be learned like any other” 
(§249); falsehoods become only against the backdrop of “established usage” (§198). At 
the same time, it remains the undeniably the case that these “outward criteria” can never 
give us full access to her “inner process” itself.1   
 In capturing how little we know of others’ inner lives, Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
also invites the converse question: namely, how much can one know about another 
person? Are there particular forms of human relation that most fully enable interpersonal 
knowledge? These are questions into which literary works provide unparalleled insight. 
Sally’s image of “scratch[ing] on the wall” gestures self-referentially toward the written-
ness of Woolf’s text, which—by representing consciousness in language—examines the 
capacity of words to provide knowledge of other subjectivities. It is notable that Sally, 
specifically, voices this sense of epistemological limitation, since the novel suggests that 
her and Clarissa’s aborted romantic relationship may have offered possibilities of 
interpersonal intimacy that are lacking in the more conventional marriages into which 
both women enter. Clarissa recalls “the purity, the integrity, of her feeling for Sally,” 
which possesses “a quality which could only exist between women” (MD 34). Her 
comments suggest that those looking to do more than simply scratch on the wall of 
another’s inner life may find heterosexual marriage disappointing and may need to seek 
non-normative alternatives. In this way, Woolf raises an epistemological issue that she 
explores more fully in her next novel, To the Lighthouse (1927): how might one arrive at 
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what Cavell calls a “best case” of human knowledge (CR 432)? Insofar as such a “best 
case” is possible, is heterosexual monogamous marriage its ideal vehicle? Or might 
another type of human relationship—say, between two individuals of the same gender—
enable stronger forms of intimacy?  
 These are epistemological questions, but they are also historical ones. Both 
Wittgenstein and Woolf wrote during a period of increasing popular dissatisfaction with 
the social norms surrounding Victorian marriage: an institution that came to look 
increasingly outdated in a twentieth-century context, its patriarchy and oppressiveness 
increasingly apparent. Though Woolf married and Wittgenstein did not, both engaged in 
same-sex romantic relationships in their own lives, exploring firsthand the possibilities 
afforded by this alternative mode of intimate relation.2 This chapter examines how three 
formally experimental, modernist novels enter into this ongoing cultural conversation: 
Ford Madox Ford’s The Good Soldier (1915), Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, and Nella 
Larsen’s Passing (1929) all reflect on what the traditional Victorian marriage promises 
and on how and why these promises disappoint. Each of these novels presents a 
heterosexual marriage as a potential best case of human knowledge, while also showing 
how this institution cannot meet the high epistemological expectations its participants 
place upon it. Each novel then contrasts its central marriage with a close same-sex 
relationship, which stands as an alternative, potentially superior, form of intimacy. All of 
these texts, I argue, caution readers against imposing an overly high standard for what 
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269-74. For details on Wittgenstein’s relationships with men, see Monk, esp. 57-61, 76-9, 84-90, 




knowledge of another might look like. All three cast disappointments with knowledge as 
leading to failures in what Cavell calls acknowledgment—that is, in our ability to 
recognize and respond to others’ expressions of pain.   
 
Marriage as Knowledge: A Brief History of an Impossible Ideal  
 
 Cavell’s inquiry into what a potential “best case for knowing another” (CR 432) 
might look like leads him, in the final pages of The Claim of Reason (1979), to a reading 
of Othello (1602-3). Cavell seeks to explain the stunning rapidity with which the titular 
figure moves from absolute belief in his wife’s faithfulness to irreversible doubt. 
Othello’s pronouncement in Act I, “My life upon her faith!” (I.iii.293), captures what 
Cavell describes as “[t]he logic … necessary to best cases; the sense … expressed by the 
imaginary major premiss [sic], ‘If I know anything, I know this’” (CR 483). The 
subsequent action of the drama does not actually convince Othello that Desdemona has 
been unfaithful, but it does convince him of the impossibility of knowing, with certainty, 
the truth about her. The more he reflects on his own finite epistemological position, the 
more desperate his demands for proof become. Cavell’s reading proposes that the 
consummation of this marriage awakens Othello’s anxiety as to Desdemona’s hiddenness 
from him. Othello moves from idealizing their spiritual attunement to discovering that 
Desdemona “is flesh and blood” and therefore that she is “separate from him, outside” 
(491). Having set such a high standard for what knowledge of another would entail, 




Cavell argues, Othello’s “skepticism over her faithfulness is a cover story for a deeper 
conviction[,] a terrible doubt covering a yet more terrible certainty” (493). But Othello 
recoils at the prospect of acknowledging his own finitude and the reality of Desdemona’s 
separateness. When he murders her at the end of the play, this text about the search for a 
best case of knowledge becomes an illustration of worst case consequences—a 
cautionary tale of the extreme devastation that may result from one’s refusal to adopt the 
stance of acknowledgment.3  
 Cavell’s reading of this seventeenth-century play implicitly captures cultural 
dynamics that persist into nineteenth-century Britain and America.4 The Victorian 
conception of marriage—a conception that Ford, Woolf, and Larsen all critique in their 
own ways—represents precisely the kind of best case knowledge Othello craves. In 
Sesame and Lilies (1865), his treatise on gender relations, John Ruskin voices this 
idealizing logic: 
Each has what the other has not: each completes the other, and is completed by 
the other: they are nothing alike, and the happiness and perfection of both depends 
																																																						
3 Cavell’s philosophical interest in marriage resurfaces in Pursuits of Happiness (1981), in which 
he reads a series of early Hollywood films as together constituting a genre that he calls “the 
comedy of remarriage” (1). Cavell writes, “The overarching question of the comedies of 
remarriage is precisely the question of what constitutes a union, what makes these two into one, 
what binds, you may say what sanctifies in marriage” (53). In this context of this discussion, 
Cavell describes Othello as “a failed comedy of remarriage, a narrative in which the reunion is 
hideously parodied and becomes possible only a moment too late” (142).  
4 The subsequent discussion focuses primarily on British cultural history—the relevant context 
for Ford’s and Woolf’s novels. The historical background to Larsen’s text is sufficiently distinct 




upon each asking and receiving from the other what the other only can give. (qtd. 
in Collins 17) 
Such rhetoric portrays heterosexual marriage in Platonic terms, as the merging of 
separate halves into one unified whole. Ruskin suggests that such an idealized relation 
can only exist between a man and a woman; it is precisely because the sexes are “nothing 
alike” that one of each is needed to achieve this harmonizing balance.  
This conception of marriage—as a merging of two separate identities into one—
is, crucially, a fantasy of knowledge. That is to say that, behind the idealized rhetoric of 
Victorians like Ruskin, lay a set of controlling and oppressive social practices. Ruskin’s 
image found its objective correlative in nineteenth-century British property law, which 
held husband and wife to be, legally speaking, “one person” (Pines 5). These laws 
exhibited a clear patriarchal bias, with husbands gaining control of whatever property 
their wives possessed, even that which women had acquired before marriage (5). Divorce 
laws codified a similar double standard: the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 granted 
men the right to divorce women on the grounds of adultery, whereas women had to prove 
adultery plus an additional “matrimonial offense such as cruelty, bestiality, or incest” (5). 
In addition to such legal inequalities, cultural norms governing domestic life proved 
deeply restrictive in their own ways. Victoria Rosner explains that middle-class Victorian 
homes “reflected a carefully conceived vision of social order, based in large part on a 
class-bound definition of clean and proper family life” (61). In order to signal 
respectability, Victorians sought to exclude potentially unpleasant or culturally 




emotions” or “sexual transgressions” remained largely absent from discussion, if not 
from thought (68).5   
 As the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, a number of progressive 
thinkers articulated and challenged the patriarchal logic of Victorian social norms. In 
contrast to Ruskin’s idealized vision of unity through gender difference, the sexologist 
Edward Carpenter argues in Love’s Coming of Age (1896) that Victorian culture has 
created “maximum divergence and absolute misunderstanding” in male-female relations 
(qtd. Collins 1). Carpenter advocates replacing the Victorian ideal of marriage with a new 
model of “companionate marriage,” governed by notions of mutual equality rather than 
male control (2). In her best-selling work Married Love (1918), Marie Stopes provides a 
frank discussion of women’s capacities for sexual pleasure, thus challenging typical 
Victorian habits of reticence on these matters (Pines 10). More progressive legislation 
emerged from these years as well: in the 1880s, updated laws in both Britain and America 
gave women the right to keep “property acquired before and during marriage” (Pines 6). 
In 1912, Britain’s Royal Commission on Divorce recommended abolishing the additional 
obstacles that women faced in petitioning for a divorce, a recommendation that 
eventually became law (9).   
																																																						
5 Rosner identifies dirt as a physical representation of life’s more unsavory aspects, and she writes 
of how the Victorians sought to keep their houses clean, in both literal and metaphorical terms. 
As the modernists recognized, however, dirt is more easily concealed than eliminated: “The 
domesticated Victorian body is not a clean body, but rather a body that … conceals its dirt. The 
proper Victorian household is not a household with nothing to hide, but one where secrets are 




 Interestingly, even as cultural expectations around gender slowly shifted, many 
social progressives preserved the Victorian view of heterosexual marriage as the best case 
of human knowledge. Indeed, their efforts at cultural reform signal their attempt to 
materialize more fully this heteronormative ideal. Carpenter, for instance, draws a 
contrast between “real marriage” and “actual marriage” (qtd. Pines 10). Despite his 
lamentations over the many shortcomings inherent to “actual marriage” as manifested in 
late nineteenth-century Britain, he still maintains an idealized conception of “real 
marriage” as founded upon “the great mystery of human Love, […] that most intimate 
personal relation of two souls to each other—perhaps the firmest, most basic and 
indissoluble fact (after our own existence) that we know” (qtd. Pines 10). This language 
contributes to a cultural understanding of heterosexual marriage as a uniquely privileged 
relationship, epistemologically speaking. By suggesting that the intimate knowledge we 
gain of another soul through “real marriage” is second only to our knowledge of “our 
own existence,” Carpenter proposes a corollary to the cogito, that famous Cartesian 
statement of certainty: if to think is to know our own existence, to marry is to know 
another’s. Carpenter was hardly alone in wielding such rhetoric; a range of socially 
progressive thinkers, from Havelock Ellis to Ellen Key, “viewed the principal function of 
sex to be … the creation of an exquisite concord between woman and man […], the 
pooling of identities” (Collins 30, fn107). Such thinkers, then, do not challenge the 
Victorian conception of marriage on the grounds that it establishes an unrealizable 




oppressive treatment of women.6 As long as heterosexual marriages become more 
equitable, this line of thinking goes, they remain the best vehicles at our disposal for 
intimately knowing another.7  
 Whether in more traditional or modern form, then, heterosexual marriage 
maintained its place as the socially normative platform for intimate human relation 
throughout the early decades of the twentieth century. At the same time, as Eve Sedgwick 
argues, following Michel Foucault, the late nineteenth century gave rise to a new cultural 
understanding of ‘the homosexual’ as a distinctive category of identity. While of course 
the range of sexual behaviors “denoted by the new term ‘homosexual’… already had a 
long rich history,” Sedgwick writes, “[w]hat was new from the turn of the century was 
the world-mapping by which every given person, just as he or she was necessarily 
assignable to a male or a female gender, was now considered necessarily assignable as 
well to a homo- or a hetero-sexuality” (EC 2). The rise of this new epistemological 
category was bound up with Victorian-era economic and cultural concerns. In a newly 
industrial economy, middle class men increasingly took on the role of “head of the 
household,” their participation in the labor force enabling them to support their families 
single-handedly (Brady 29). So Victorian culture linked masculinity to economically 
productive heterosexuality. But periodic financial downturns made the husband’s position 
																																																						
6 In Married Love, too, Stopes discusses sexual relations only in the context of heterosexual 
marriage, so her socially progressive text still preserves a more traditional emphasis on this 
particular form of human intimacy (Robb 87).  
7 In a historical development that likely contributed to this ongoing idealization of heterosexual 
marriage, Clare Langhamer discusses how higher standards of living in post-WWI Britain made 
the possibility of marrying for love, rather than practicality, seem more widely accessible than it 




as sole provider an unstable one (34). In order to channel their anxieties about whether 
men were adequately performing their social duty, the Victorians put forth the “vilified, 
effeminate, unmanly sodomite” as a paradigmatic image of deviant masculinity (23). 
Emerging out of this cultural climate, the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885 made 
sex acts between men into crimes (27).    
 After the turn of the century, new spaces for same-sex intimacy emerged, and 
with them greater popular awareness of homosexuality. World War I facilitated “[c]lose, 
affectionate relations” between male soldiers, in part by removing them from the rigid 
cultural expectations of civilian life (Robb 82). (The friendship between Septimus and 
Evans in Mrs. Dalloway is one such relationship; Woolf certainly suggests an intimate, 
homoerotic dynamic between the two men, if not an explicitly homosexual one.8) These 
years also saw many men and women move to cities to do war work, and the increased 
concentration of people in urban areas led to the formation of more publicly visible 
homosexual communities (82). Popular awareness of lesbianism lagged behind that of 
male homosexuality; after conservative politician Noel Pemberton Billing impugned the 
moral character of the actress Maud Allan in 1918, the extensive media coverage of her 
libel suit against him catalyzed more widespread awareness of female same-sex desire 
(Cohler 128-30).9 In 1921, the British House of Commons proposed amending the 1885 
																																																						
8 As George Robb writes, “[t]o what extent these relationships were homosexual is difficult to 
say, and many of the men involved were probably not entirely clear about their own feelings” 
(82).  
9 Billing sought to stir up popular outrage, and to challenge the suitability of the Liberal 
government to oversee the war effort, by publishing an article that posited the existence of a 
secret file listing 47,000 “corrupted” British citizens, many of them members of the ruling classes 




Criminal Law to explicitly criminalize female homosexuality, and while the law did not 
end up actually being altered, this discussion nonetheless reflects the increased societal 
attention being paid to lesbian sexuality (Cohler 143).   
 The possibility of intimate physical and emotional relationships between two 
individuals of the same gender raises an implicit challenge to the cultural privileging of 
heterosexual marriage as the best case of human knowledge. In light of the codification 
of ‘the homosexual’ as a particular category of identity, those who define themselves 
according to this category might reasonably conclude that a relationship with someone of 
their own gender represents the highest possible form of human intimacy. In light of the 
intense male bonding that took place during WWI, in light of the increased visibility of 
homosexual relationships in urban areas, this historical moment raises the question: might 
not same-sex intimacy rival the ideal of interconnectedness represented by heterosexual 
marriage? Might not same-sex intimacy exceed this ideal? John Addington Symonds’ 
essay “A Problem in Greek Ethics,” published in 1897 as part of Ellis’ Sexual Inversion, 
provides one expression of this possibility, outlining a Greek-inspired “ideal” of “heroic 
love” between men (169).10 According to this doctrine of “gender separatism,” as 
Sedgwick calls it, “it is … the most natural thing in the world that people of the same 
																																																						
moral character, Billings’ article is notable in specifically linking female (as well as male) 
homosexuality to seditiousness. After Allan performed the title role in Oscar Wilde’s Salomé 
(1894), Billing published a brief notice suggesting her association with these supposed 47,000 
degenerates, thus prompting her libel suit. For more, see Cohler 128-43.  
10 Symonds and Ellis had originally intended to be co-authors of Sexual Inversion; however, 
Symonds’ death in 1893 made this collaboration impossible, and Symonds’ essay on classical 
models of male friendship, included by Ellis as an appendix, ended up being his main 




gender, […] people whose economic, institutional, emotional, physical needs and 
knowledges may have so much in common, should bond together on the axis of sexual 
desire” (EC 87).11 For the purposes of our discussion, it bears emphasizing that those 
living through this historical moment must negotiate between three forms of intimate 
interpersonal relation: more traditional, patriarchal marriage; more modern, equitable 
marriage; and same-sex intimacy. Competing for primacy as the most compelling best 
case of human knowledge, each model carries with it the potential to impose unrealistic 
expectations concerning what it would mean to know another human being. Such 
unattainable epistemological standards produce the kind of skepticism, and the 
difficulties giving or receiving acknowledgment, that Ford, Woolf, and Larsen 
investigate.   
 
“To see with the same eyes”: Insistent Skepticism and Unacknowledged Intimacy in 
The Good Soldier 
 
 In the opening paragraph of The Good Soldier, Ford’s narrator John Dowell 
announces, “My wife and I knew Captain and Mrs. Ashburnham as well as it was 
possible to know anybody, and yet, in another sense, we knew nothing at all about them” 
																																																						
11 Sedgwick emphasizes that “gender separatism” is one of two competing models by which late 
Victorian culture made sense of homosexuality; the other is that of “inversion,” according to 
which a homosexual man possesses a woman’s soul, trapped within a man’s body (EC 87). 
Unlike that of gender separatism, the theory of inversion preserves the cultural privileging of 
heterosexuality as the highest form of intimacy, since it locates sexual “desire … in the current 
that runs between one male self and one female self, in whatever sex of bodies these selves may 




(TGS 5). With this statement, Ford’s novel voices an extreme, distinctively modernist 
version of other-mind skepticism. According to Philip Weinstein, protagonists in 
nineteenth-century realist fiction gradually gain increased familiarity with the “objects 
and others” of their world (Unknowing 66). “Repeated sightings enable insight,” so 
characters whom the protagonist initially designates as strangers can grow into intimate 
acquaintances (66). For instance, in Henry James’s The Portrait of a Lady (1881), after 
Gilbert Osmond professes his love for Isabel Archer, she tells him, “I don’t at all know 
you” (259). But the novel never suggests that it would be impossible for her to attain such 
knowledge; on the contrary, Isabel does eventually marry Osmond, and James portrays 
her as coming to know him quite well (unfortunately for her, of course). Against this 
precedent, Ford’s opening paragraph sets in motion the more radical confusion of 
familiar with strange, as Dowell raises the possibility that one could know “nothing at 
all” even about one’s most intimate acquaintances.  
 How does Dowell arrive at such a radically skeptical stance? The most proximate 
cause of his epistemological pessimism, readers soon learn, is his belated discovery that 
his wife, Florence, and the titular good soldier, Edward Ashburnham, have surreptitiously 
conducted a lengthy affair. Thus, the “uninterrupted tranquility” Dowell thought he had 
enjoyed with these companions was really a screen disguising their adulterous 
relationship (TGS 37). This realization, it seems, has plunged Dowell into extreme 
confusion; he says things like, “I know nothing—nothing in the world—of the hearts of 
men” (9), and, “After forty-five years of mixing with one’s kind, one ought to have 




doesn’t” (45). As much scholarship on the novel has discussed, Dowell’s hesitation to 
make either truth claims or moral judgments renders it difficult to trust the version of 
events he narrates; readers must often read against Dowell’s narrative, attempting to 
discern key details he has overlooked or avoided. Such scholarship has established 
Dowell as the paradigmatic modernist narrator, a figure demonstrating the inevitable bias 
and subjectivity through which individuals perceive and interpret their reality.12 Even his 
claim from the opening paragraph is misleading, since it suggests that he and Florence 
were united in their misunderstanding of Edward and his wife Leonora, whereas the 
subsequent pages make clear that in fact Dowell directs his sense of betrayal, first and 
foremost, at Florence herself.   
 This scholarly focus on the epistemological difficulties that Dowell’s narration 
foregrounds, while certainly understandable, has underplayed the historical background 
that informs and shapes his skepticism.13 Why do such thoroughgoing doubts about the 
possibility of knowing another human being affect this particular speaker? Still in the 
																																																						
12 Scholars who have emphasized Dowell’s biased, unreliable narrative perspective include: Mark 
Schorer, who writes that even the so-called “facts” the narrative discloses remain in doubt, since 
they are presented at every turn by “the distorted understanding of the narrator” (xii); Samuel 
Hynes, who argues that the novel points to the impossibility of gaining an objective perspective 
on reality, writing, “Absolute truth and objective judgment are not possible; experience is a 
darkness, and other hearts are closed to us” (230); and Sara Haslam, who characterizes Dowell as 
“psychologically unfit … to grasp the whole” of the story he seeks to tell (7). Paul Armstrong 
takes a more moderate position, arguing that Dowell’s ability to narrate a coherent story gradually 
improves as the novel goes on: “[Dowell’s] growth in mastery in writing is an index of what he 
has discovered by writing” (Challenge 198).    
13 One critic who has tried to synthesize an epistemological approach to the novel with an 
historical one is Brian May, who argues that Dowell’s impressionism is “a social practice,” and 
specifically a practice “of the leisured and luxurious classes” (“Ford” 91). That is, Dowell’s 
economic security enables his passivity, encouraging him to take a primarily aesthetic attitude 




opening paragraph, Dowell himself gestures toward the cultural context for his 
epistemological position: “This is, I believe, a state of things only possible with English 
people of whom, till today, when I sit down to puzzle out what I know of this sad affair, I 
knew nothing whatever” (5). Dowell’s comment that it is specifically “English people” 
he has misjudged so badly proves hardly an incidental detail, nor is it coincidental that 
Ford’s text voices this epistemological dissatisfaction in the mid-1910s. For The Good 
Soldier captures, via Dowell’s fumbling observations, the broader modern 
disillusionment with Victorian social ideals—ideals that, under the auspices of creating a 
harmonious, well-ordered society, have in fact sown precisely the “divergence and 
absolute misunderstanding” that Carpenter laments. In this cultural context, as false 
ideals of knowledge fall away, Ford’s text proposes an alternative model of human 
relations: as opportunities for giving and receiving acknowledgment. At the same time, 
this model remains only obliquely present in the novel, as Dowell’s staunch commitment 
to a more traditional social code makes it difficult for him to elaborate explicitly the kind 
of acknowledgment he craves.  
The novel makes clear that the Dowells and Ashburnhams have conducted 
themselves according to strict Victorian standards of reticence. As Dowell puts it, 
… what characterized our relationship was an atmosphere of taking everything for 
granted. The given proposition was that we were all ‘good people.’ We took for 
granted that we all liked beef underdone but not too underdone; that both men 
preferred a good liqueur brandy after lunch; that both women drank a very light 




Both couples have their reasons for seeking to conform rigidly to Victorian standards of 
socially proper behavior. John and Florence are Americans attracted to upper class 
British culture, so they attempt to adhere to the norms of this culture as closely as 
possible.14 Leonora and Edward come from landed families (his English; hers Irish), a 
group whose financial and political control over the rest of Britain has grown 
increasingly tenuous since the mid-nineteenth century, and their behavior reflects their 
wish to preserve this cultural heritage.15 As part of his reflections on “the traditional 
reticence of such ‘good people’ as the Ashburnhams,” Dowell comments that “Leonora 
with an odd English sense of decency had determined to wait until Edward had been in 
his grave for a full week before” finally speaking to him about Edward and Florence’s 
affair (118). Again, Dowell’s inclusion of the modifier “English” shows that such 
reticence is a historically specific mode of behavior—a holdover from a traditional value 
system, which has increasingly come under attack in the twentieth century.   
 Dowell’s narration shows the extent to which he continues to employ the 
language of this older value system, despite the problems with these social codes that his 
																																																						
14 Dowell notes that Florence “wanted her husband to have an English accent” (87) and mentions 
in passing that her ancestors had actually owned Edward’s property “two centuries before the 
Ashburnhams came there” (72). He expresses his own identification with the traditional British 
upper classes by noting that he comes from Philadelphia, “where, it is historically true, there are 
more old English families than you would find in any six English counties taken together” (7). 
15 Dowell gestures obliquely toward this historical context in his account of the disputes between 
Edward and Leonora over how to manage the shrinking profits from Edward’s land: “I 
understand … that those years—the nineties—were very bad for farming” (157). Leonora’s 
family, despite owning an estate, has already descended into a state of relative poverty—a 
financial situation that motivates her father’s marrying off Leonora to Edward in the first place. 
For more on the changing social position of the traditional landed classes, see Cannadine, esp. 71, 





own marriage has exposed. One of the clearest examples of his continuing to abide by 
Victorian social mores involves his repeated use of the word “good,” as in his 
descriptions of the Ashburnhams above. Arriving at Edward’s estate, in the midst of the 
bitter conflict between Edward and Leonora over Edward’s passion for Leonora’s ward 
Nancy Rufford, Dowell comments that “all those three presented to the world the 
spectacle of being the best of good people. I assure you that during my stay for that 
fortnight in that fine old house, I never so much as noticed a single thing that could have 
affected that good opinion” (267). With the benefit of hindsight, Dowell is now in a 
position to question his naïve judgments as to the ‘goodness’ of his story’s key actors. As 
he recounts how Edward and Leonora calmly make arrangements to send Nancy away, 
Dowell’s use of his favorite descriptor grows increasingly sarcastic: “I think it would 
have been better in the eyes of God if they had all attempted to gouge out each other’s 
eyes with carving knives. But they were ‘good people’” (270). Here, Dowell recognizes 
that the attempt to act like “good people” prevents the expression of genuine emotion, 
often with significant ethical and psychological consequences: Nancy is driven mad by 
others’ attempts at goodness, and Edward keeps playing the part of the ‘good soldier’ 
right up until he kills himself.  
 Yet, even as his narration shows how “good” breaks down as an accurate signifier 
of moral character, Dowell nonetheless maintains his reliance on this very signifier. The 
same paragraph that ends with Dowell’s sarcastic “But they were ‘good people’” begins 
with his commenting, “It is queer the fantastic things that quite good people will do in 




paragraph by matter-of-factly describing Edward and Leonora as “good people,” and he 
ends it by implying how overly simplistic—and morally problematic—it is to describe 
them this way. While his final “But they were ‘good people’” seems to gesture toward a 
more thoroughgoing critique of the value system by which Edward and Leonora have 
lived, Dowell does not carry this critique any farther. The paragraph’s implicit attack on 
the logic of “good people” exists alongside its more straightforward use of this 
terminology to describe the Ashburnhams, each usage canceling the moral weight of the 
other.16 If Dowell is criticizing the Victorian norms that have enabled Edward and 
Florence’s affair (and brought about Nancy’s madness), then he is doing so in a distinctly 
inconsistent way, exposing in some places the emptiness of moral language that he uses 
unproblematically in others. His vacillation suggests that, while his own experiences have 
suggested the moral bankruptcy of Victorian social vocabulary, such language practices 
remain so deeply ingrained in Dowell’s psyche that he cannot find any other words to 
use.  
 Dowell uses his belief in the Victorian logic of “good people” as a convenient 
explanation for his longstanding ignorance of Florence’s marital infidelity. Early in the 
novel, he presents his attempt to narrate the history of their marriage as a kind of 
philosophical thought experiment: “If for nine years I have possessed a goodly apple that 
is rotten at the core and discover its rottenness only in nine years and six months less four 
																																																						
16 The paragraph’s opening, “It is queer,” employs another of Dowell’s commonly used 
adjectives, another term that facilitates his ethical vagueness. Dowell often describes behavior 
that he finds surprising or difficult to understand as “queer,” allowing him to pass over such 




days, isn’t it true to say that for nine years I possessed a goodly apple?” (9). With his 
perversely hopeful suggestion that, because he has only recently learned of Florence’s 
infidelities, it would be “true to say that for nine years [he] possessed a goodly apple,” 
Dowell signals his ongoing emotional attraction to the Victorian prohibition on 
discussing untoward subject matter. Through their adherence to this prohibition, Dowell’s 
interlocutors have kept him in the dark about Florence and Edward’s affair. Dowell 
responds to this long-held silence by claiming that something does not exist until it is 
known, and that it cannot be known until it is discussed. Indeed, the formulation of his 
question shows his continued commitment to this view, insofar as he equates what is true 
with what is “true to say.” Dowell makes a version of Wittgenstein’s point that 
knowledge of concepts like “goodness” comes about through language—though 
Wittgenstein would hardly accept Dowell’s claim that the not-yet-discussed does not yet 
exist.  
It is on the basis of this epistemological framework, Dowell’s narrative suggests, 
that he has ignored the ample evidence of Florence’s infidelity. For example, early in the 
Dowells’ acquaintance with the Ashburnhams, when the two couples travel to see Martin 
Luther’s Protest, Florence criticizes Catholics and touches Edward’s wrist, causing 
Leonora to storm out of the room and John to follow. After Leonora informs him that she 
is an Irish Catholic, Dowell comments, somewhat bizarrely, “Those words gave me the 
greatest relief that I have ever had in my life” (50). As Dowell tells it, his “relief” stems 
from his conclusion that Leonora is upset about Florence’s attack on her religion and not 




Florence’s behalf, Leonora expresses her willingness to “accept the situation … if you 
can,” while adding that Florence better not criticize Catholics any more (73).17 Dowell 
describes his reaction as follows: 
I remember thinking, at the time, that it was almost as if Leonora were saying, 
through me, to Florence:  
 “You may outrage me as you will; you may take all that I personally 
possess, but do not you dare to say one single thing in view of the situation that 
that will set up—against the faith that makes me become the doormat for your 
feet.” 
 But obviously, as I saw it, that could not be her meaning. Good people, be 
they ever so diverse in creed, do not threaten each other. So that I read Leonora’s 
words to mean just no more than: 
 “It would be better if Florence said nothing at all against my co-
religionists, because it is a point that I am touchy about.” 
 That was the hint that, accordingly, I conveyed to Florence when, shortly 
afterwards, she and Edward came from the tower. And I want you to understand 
that, from that moment until after Edward … and Florence were … dead […], I 
had never the remotest glimpse, not the shadow of a suspicion, that there was 
anything wrong … (74) 
This passage begins by suggesting Dowell’s early awareness of a possible affair between 
Florence and Edward, and it concludes by denying categorically this suggestion. Dowell 
																																																						




writes that he remembers thinking “at the time” that Leonora is making a veiled threat, 
founded upon her recognition of Edward and Florence’s impending adulterous 
relationship. But Dowell retreats from this interpretation of Leonora’s comment by 
relying on the logic of social decorum, according to which “[g]ood people … do not 
threaten each other.” As such, Dowell accepts a more innocuous interpretation of 
Leonora’s words. Now, recalling this scene with full knowledge of his wife’s adultery, 
Dowell wants to maintain that his original thinking made sense—that he and Leonora 
were conversing only about the religious kind of “faith,” not the marital kind. He 
continues using his beliefs about how ‘good people’ act to justify his past ignorance of 
the affair, even though his present awareness of the affair has called into question 
precisely these beliefs. After showing readers that he was in a position to recognize 
Florence’s infidelity even at this early moment, Dowell asks us to accept that he never 
had “the remotest glimpse” of any deception on her part.18  
 But it is not simply that Dowell relies on these Victorian social and linguistic 
codes as a convenient excuse to avoid believing anything unpleasant; his strange, 
insistent refusal to accept any evidence of Florence’s adultery also results more 
specifically from his belief in—and subsequent disappointment with—the Victorian ideal 
																																																						
18 Dowell’s suggestion at the end of this passage that he remained entirely in the dark until after 
Florence and Edward were dead leads him, later in the text, to censure Leonora for not being 
more honest with him: “She acted very badly to me” (209). Even as Dowell makes this claim, 
however, he also puts readers in a position to see that Leonora has assumed Dowell also knew 
about the affair and was choosing not to say anything. After Edward’s death, she says to him, 
“[I]sn’t it odd to think that if your wife hadn’t been my husband’s mistress, you would probably 
have never been here at all?”—a comment that clearly demonstrates her assumption that he has 




of marriage.19 In his description of what a man searches for when he loves a woman, John 
voices the fantasy of knowledge that this ideal encapsulates:  
With each new woman that a man is attracted to there appears to come a 
broadening of the outlook …. He wants to get … behind those eyebrows with the 
peculiar turn, as if he desired to see the world with the eyes that they overshadow 
…. Of the question of the sex instinct I know very little and I do not think that it 
counts for very much in a really great passion …. I don’t mean to say that any 
great passion can exist without a desire for consummation. That seems to me to be 
a commonplace …. But the real fierceness of desire, the real heat of a passion 
long continued and withering up the soul of a man, is the craving for identity with 
the woman he loves. He desires to see with the same eyes, to touch with the same 
sense of touch, to hear with the same ears … (126-7) 
Here, Dowell outlines his conception of heterosexual love as a best case of knowledge: a 
total perspectival unification with one’s beloved, enabling unique access to her “inner 
process” (PI §580).20 In the same way that he has treated Victorian codes of reticence and 
																																																						
19 The evidence available to Dowell of Florence’s infidelities extends far beyond the Protest 
scene. Before Dowell marries Florence, her aunts “almost brought themselves to say that 
Florence’s early life had been characterized by flirtations”—their tacit way of alluding to her pre-
marital sexual relationship with the painter Jimmy, a relationship that continues after the 
Dowells’ marriage (90). Also, despite initially claiming that Florence was never “out of my sight” 
(10), Dowell subsequently notes that “she was out of my sight most of the time”: he would say 
good-night to her at ten o’clock at night and not see her again until ten o’clock the next morning 
(97).     
20 Sally Bachner points to this passage as capturing Dowell’s epistemological ideal of 
identification. For Bachner, such moments of interpersonal identification “overcome the limits of 
both objectivity and subjectivity in the production of truth” (105). Her article accurately describes 
Dowell’s attitude, but it does not sufficiently note the problems with such an ideal. Bachner 
writes that “[w]hile visual perception is inadequate to penetrate interiority, identification can 




decorum as accurately capturing the truth of social relations, here he conflates the 
idealized rhetorical presentation of marriage with its literal reality.21 But Dowell also 
begins the paragraph with the comment that he has “come to be very much a cynic in 
these matters,” so it seems that—as the elegiac tone of the passage suggests—he has 
discovered how disappointing the actuality of his married life has been when measured 
against this ideal (126). His description of this “craving for identity” as “withering up the 
soul of a man” cuts two ways: it suggests the overpowering nature of this desire, but also 
the disillusionment its dissipation effects.  
Like Othello, Dowell moves from idealized fantasies of marriage to ordinary 
realities, discovering along the way the inalterable fact of his wife’s separateness. Cavell 
suggests that it is upon his taking of her virginity that Othello begins to obsess over his 
distance from Desdemona; in a Fordian deflation of these Shakespearan dynamics, it may 
be that Dowell’s own disillusionment with the ideal of heterosexual intimacy begins 
when Florence embraces him on the night of their wedding: “[I]t was the first time I had 
ever been embraced by a woman—and it was the last time a woman’s embrace has had in 
it any warmth for me” (91). In the same way that Cavell reads Othello as dismayed to 
find that Desdemona is “flesh and blood,” so this brief moment of physical contact with 
his bride-to-be may awaken Dowell as to the unattainability of his own marital ideal. 
																																																						
we might overcome our finitude by emotionally identifying with others is to accept the unrealistic 
epistemological standard that I see Ford’s text as critiquing.    
21 As Davida Pines writes, Dowell “had assumed that marriage ‘signifiers’ would enact marriage 
‘signifieds,’ that the surface would be the depth” (40). Pines also notes that, besides Dowell, the 
other character in the novel who takes this attitude toward marriage is Nancy, whose strict 




 Whereas Othello responds to his realization of finitude by embarking on an 
impossible quest to re-establish certainty, Dowell takes a markedly different approach. 
Realizing the unattainability of the best case he has imagined, he gives up altogether in 
making knowledge claims about his wife. In this way Dowell becomes a skeptic in the 
Cavellian sense: he imposes an ideal of knowledge on other minds, and he retreats into 
skepticism upon finding that this ideal cannot be met. This epistemological attitude 
informs Dowell’s willful blindness toward the proliferation of evidence that Florence is 
not a faithful wife. Having discovered the impossibility of attaining certainty, Dowell 
does not bother making inferences or drawing conclusions from partial or incomplete 
evidence. Paul Armstrong argues that, prior to learning of Florence’s affair, Dowell has 
been “living in a semiotic universe without knowing it,” blissfully unaware of the 
difference between appearance and reality (Challenge 202). But Dowell does know that 
he has been living in a semiotic universe. The point is that he has been content to accept 
the apparent meanings of signs, seeing no way by which he might transcend his own 
finitude in order to gain knowledge of their true realities.  
Even when Dowell receives seemingly irrefutable evidence for Florence’s affair 
with Jimmy, her lover before Edward, this moment does not puncture his skepticism but 
only re-affirms it. Speaking with Dowell, a man called Bagshawe remarks off-handedly 
that he has once seen Florence coming out of Jimmy’s bedroom at four in the morning, 
and Dowell describes his response to this information as follows: 
I suppose that my inner soul … had realized long before that Florence was a 




feelings, with sympathies, and with emotions only as a bank note represents a 
certain quantity of gold. I know that that sort of feeling came to the surface in me 
the moment … Bagshawe told me that he had seen her coming out of that fellow’s 
bedroom. I thought suddenly that she wasn’t real … (TGS 134) 
Dowell describes his skepticism as “com[ing] to the surface” in this moment. A scholar 
like Armstrong might say that Dowell undergoes a fundamental change in his 
understanding of his wife here; he learns that, prior to their own chaste marriage, 
Florence has had a lover. In fact, however, Dowell’s language characterizes the scene as 
a confirmation of something he has long recognized: not Florence and Jimmy’s 
relationship, but the broader truth of his wife’s hiddenness. In effect, Dowell admits that 
he has known Florence only as ‘Florence,’ a set of attributes standing in for a person, in 
the same way that “a bank note represents a certain quantity of gold.” The fact that 
Florence has kept her relation with Jimmy secret only strengthens Dowell’s sense that her 
outward displays of emotion do not yield any true insight into her “heart.”  
In a remark that sheds light on Dowell’s situation, Wittgenstein writes, “If I give 
anyone an order, I feel it to be quite enough to give him signs. And I’d never say: these 
are just words, and I’ve got to get behind the words” (PI §503). Whereas Wittgenstein’s 
remark foregrounds the capacity of words themselves to convey meaning, Dowell focuses 
on the potential divide between “words” and the feelings “behind” them. He has placed 
little stock in his wife’s words, since he has “realized long before” that they need not 
correspond to her underlying “sympathies” and “emotions,” which remain so inaccessible 




paper” reminds us that she is, literally, just that: a character composed of words, 
possessing as much inner life as a printed page. The line thereby highlights the crucial 
link between fiction and Wittgenstein’s philosophy, reminding us that the task of trying 
to understand characters in novels mirrors that of trying to understand lived human 
beings through the medium of language—through the scratches we make on the walls 
that separate us.    
In Pursuits of Happiness (1981), Cavell suggests that an enduring marriage will 
be one in which participants respond to their separateness through “conversation … of a 
sort that leads to acknowledgment” (19). Dowell’s narrative shows that the dynamics of 
his marriage have thwarted this sort of conversation. In his insistence on Florence’s 
unreality—his idea that she is simply a collection of appearances with an unfathomable 
heart—Dowell avoids asking any hard questions about her own frustrations and 
disappointments with married life; his narrative makes strikingly little effort to imagine 
what being married to him has been like for her. The strict avoidance of “the personal 
note” (TGS 37) that the Dowells cultivate in concord with the Ashburnhams gives John 
an excuse to avoid learning about Florence’s adultery, but it also gives him an excuse to 
avoid learning much else about her either. In particular, he seems unable or unwilling to 
imagine that, despite her purported heart condition, she might retain romantic and sexual 
feelings, which she might direct at someone other than him. While Dowell criticizes 
Florence for her deceptiveness, the novel offers us a more sympathetic reading of her 




a marriage that will enable her to live as a socially respectable, economically secure 
women, while still giving her room to act on her sexual desires.22  
At the same time, Dowell’s reluctance to imagine Florence’s inner life reflects the 
lack of acknowledgment he has received from her. Despite his comments about the tragic 
shattering of their “uninterrupted tranquility” (37), it seems Dowell has found marriage to 
Florence to be a distinctly lonely affair. His sense of isolation is evident when, for 
instance, he asserts that he would have found it “unbearable” if Florence had known 
about his “secret” greediness for food, and then—after stating that Florence never 
discovered this secret—he adds, “Certainly she never alluded to it; I dare say she never 
took sufficient interest in me” (130). What Dowell presents as a wish to remain hidden 
from Florence, then, actually seems to reflect an unstated longing for her to have taken a 
greater interest in his undisclosed thoughts and desires. Recognizing that his inner life has 
been hidden from her, Dowell insists that he has been aiming at precisely this state of 
secrecy. This confused articulation of his desires stems from the fact that he has limited 
himself to a pair of bad options: on the one hand, an impossible ideal of intimacy; on the 
other, isolating skepticism.  
The other relationship in which these constrictive epistemological options play a 
crucial role is, of course, his professed bond with Edward. Throughout his narrative, John 
remains strikingly reluctant to condemn Edward’s conduct, strikingly willing to ascribe 
positive motivations to the man who has surreptitiously slept with his wife for nine years. 
																																																						
22 As Pines says, Florence recognizes all along that the form of marriage need not reflect the 
content; she “uses the institution to cloak herself in the social respectability necessary for the life 




For instance, in explaining one of Edward’s earlier marital infidelities, Dowell writes, “I 
dare say he was driven to it, by the mad passion to find an ultimately satisfying woman” 
(55). This ascription of motive redirects culpability away from Edward and toward 
women, whom Dowell indicts for failing to measure up to some constructed male ideal. 
He gives a similarly sympathetic explanation for why Edward initially refuses to admit 
his affairs to Leonora: “[H]e really had such a sort of respect for the chastity of Leonora’s 
imagination that he hated … the thought that she should know that the sort of thing that 
he did existed in the world” (62). So Dowell praises Edward for his adherence to 
Victorian standards of reticence and social propriety, despite elsewhere condemning 
Florence and Leonora for abiding by these same standards.  
 How might we make sense of Dowell’s favorable attitude toward Edward? One 
possibility, as others have noted, is that Dowell’s positive views are more than simply 
those of one good friend for another. The John-Edward relationship provides ripe terrain 
for an investigation of the male homosocial dynamics Sedgwick describes. “In any male-
dominated society,” Sedgwick writes, 
there is a special relationship between male homosocial (including homosexual) 
desire and the structures for maintaining and transmitting patriarchal power …. 
For historical reasons, this special relationship may take the form of ideological 
homophobia, ideological homosexuality, or some highly conflicted but intensively 
structured combination of the two. (BM 25) 
The novel makes clear that Dowell admires Edward for, in Sedgwick’s phrase, the 




member of Britain’s traditional landed class. As Rose De Angelis notes, Edward’s 
interest in Florence may indirectly benefit John’s attempted performance of masculinity, 
enabling Dowell to “capitalize on his valuable property, his wife” (434).23 In a vivid 
example of the “erotic rivalry” Sedgwick describes, Dowell seeks to perform masculinity 
by emulating Edward, desiring what his masculine idol possesses (BM 21). So, after 
Edward’s passion shifts from Florence to Nancy, Dowell quickly follows suit in his own 
professions of desire, telling Leonora two hours after Florence’s death, “Now I can marry 
the girl [i.e., Nancy]” (TGS 116).24 Ultimately, Dowell attempts to codify this masculine 
bond by purchasing Edward’s property and living there with Nancy after she goes mad.  
 In Sedgwickian fashion, Dowell’s attempt to emulate Edward’s masculinity 
functions simultaneously as a coded expression of homoerotic desire. Dowell tells us, for 
instance, that his “affection for that couple”—the Ashburnhams—was “so intense that 
even to this day I cannot think of Edward without sighing” (72). This statement is 
emblematic of a strategy of indirection Dowell often employs, and it speaks to 
Sedgwick’s description of “[c]losetedness” as a particular kind of speech act, “the speech 
																																																						
23 De Angelis argues that, despite his protestations to the contrary, Dowell is aware of Florence 
and Edward’s adultery while it is going on. Dowell says nothing, De Angelis writes, because 
“[a]n open acknowledgement of Florence’s infidelity would cast doubt on his sexual performance 
as her husband and possibly on his sexual preferences” (433). While Dowell is certainly in a 
position to be aware of Florence and Edward’s affair, my own stance—as I’ve argued above—is 
that Dowell ignores the substantial evidence for this relationship because he is committed to an 
epistemological position of claiming not to know anything about Florence beyond what she 
explicitly divulges to him.    
24 On this point, Sedgwick’s study is informed by René Girard’s account of mimetic desire in 
Deceit, Desire, and the Novel (1961): Girard theorizes a “triangular” relation (24), wherein—as 
Sedgwick puts it—“the choice of the beloved is determined … not by the qualities of the beloved, 





act of a silence” (EC 3). In an image that evokes the closet as physical space, Dowell 
narrates, “[I]f I ever penetrated into his private room, it would be to see him standing 
with his coat and waistcoat off” (TGS 29). After this description of “penetrat[ing]” 
Edward’s “private room” to find him in a state of partial undress—an image that seems 
like half memory, half constructed fantasy—Dowell suddenly strikes a much different 
tone, asking, “Good God, what did they all see in him? … How could he rouse anything 
like a sentiment, in anybody?” (29). With this abrupt shift from memorializing Edward to 
denigrating him, Dowell apparently experiences a moment of what Sedgwick terms 
“homosexual panic” (BM 89)—a reaction against the “minimal difference” between 
normative male bonding and overt homosexuality (201).  
 Interestingly, Cavell has noted the deep resonances between Sedgwick’s work and 
Wittgenstein’s—resonances that prove particularly apparent in the case of a novel like 
The Good Soldier. In Contesting Tears (1996), Cavell writes that “Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations … more than any other work brings home to me questions 
of the inside and the outside” (156). According to Cavell, Wittgenstein discovers that the 
idea of speaking a private language “turns out … to be a fantasy, or fear, either of 
inexpressiveness, one in which I am not merely unknown, but in which I am powerless to 
make myself known; or one in which what I express is beyond my control” (CR 351).25 In 
Contesting Tears, reflecting on his earlier interpretation of Wittgenstein’s work, Cavell 
writes that Wittgenstein has described “a fantasy of suffocation or of exposure. It sounds 
																																																						
25 For more on Wittgenstein’s discussion of private language, and Cavell’s distinctive 




like the inside and the outside of the closet to me[,] now” (157). In other words, through 
his recent reading of Sedgwick, Cavell has come to see that Wittgenstein’s sustained 
interest in the possibility of communicating one’s private experience to others has much 
in common with the dynamics of the closet: a fear, which doubles as a fantasy, of utter 
incommunicability on the one hand and sudden exposure on the other.26 Dowell’s 
treatment of his relationship with Edward certainty reflects these dynamics; Dowell 
seems at once to be hiding his attraction to Edward and daring his readers to identify this 
attraction.  
To see that Philosophical Investigations is, among other things, an investigation 
of the closet, we need only to consider the analogy Wittgenstein draws between the 
expression of pain and the signifier “beetle”: “Suppose that everyone had a box with 
something in it which we call a ‘beetle.’ No one can ever look into anyone else’s box, 
and everyone says that he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle” (§293).27 
																																																						
26 Cavell goes on, in his discussion of Sedgwick, to consider her analysis of James’s novella The 
Beast in the Jungle (1903). In her reading of the “secret” possessed by John Marcher, James’s 
protagonist, Sedgwick claims that “to the extent that Marcher’s secret has a content, that content 
is homosexual” (EC 201). While Cavell is clearly intrigued by Sedgwick’s work, and the 
reconsideration of Wittgenstein toward which it has prompted him, he nonetheless remains 
hesitant to follow her in reading Marcher’s “secret” via the interpretative device of homosexual 
panic. As Stephen Mulhall discusses, in Cavell’s work, “the perspective which produces” 
skepticism is “open to all human beings”; it “cannot be restricted to … men who are not 
consciously or self-acceptingly homosexual, and so can be thought of as vulnerable to … 
homosexual panic” (Stanley Cavell 329). Cavell proposes castration anxiety as an alternative 
explanation of Marcher’s plight and thereby “commits himself to a more orthodox psychoanalytic 
reading” of James’s text (329). For Sedgwick’s complete reading of “Beast,” see Epistemology 
182-212; for Cavell’s complete response, see Contesting 151-94; for Mulhall’s helpful 
commentary on Cavell’s response, see Stanley Cavell 313-43.    
27 Wittgenstein employs his ‘beetle in the box’ analogy in order to illustrate a particular picture of 
how we speak about inner experience, a picture that he takes seriously but ultimately wishes to 
reject. As he says at the end of the remark, “if we construe the grammar of the expression of 




Wittgenstein here employs an apt image for being closeted: knowing one has “a 
Something” inside (§296), unsure whether or not others have it too. Wittgenstein’s 
imagery here reflects Sedgwick’s point that the metaphor of ‘the closet’ reflects 
twentieth-century Western culture’s broader conception of knowledge as structured 
according to “the pairings secrecy/ disclosure and private/ public” (EC 72). In 
Sedgwick’s formulation, the threshold of the closet is the line between the world’s 
ignorance and its knowledge. Wittgenstein’s picture of beetles in boxes relies on a 
similarly sharp split between what is hidden and what is known, thus leaving similarly 
little space for the epistemological middle ground of acknowledgment.  
Ray Monk provides biographical support for this Sedgwickian reading of the 
Investigations, writing that “[t]he determination not to conceal ‘what one is’ [was] central 
to Wittgenstein’s whole outlook” (18). In addition, Monk enables us to see the marked 
similarities between Wittgenstein’s sexuality and Dowell’s. Wittgenstein participated in 
several intimate relationships with men, though he also once asked a woman to marry 
him, but Monk emphasizes that the most salient fact about Wittgenstein’s sexual identity 
is how troubled the philosopher was “by even the slightest manifestation of sexual 
																																																						
(§293). The conditional form of this sentence is important (and potentially misleading): 
Wittgenstein points out that if we understand “pain” as a label for an inner object, then we cannot 
say anything of substance about this inner object itself: “The thing in the box doesn’t belong to 
the language-game at all; … the box might even be empty” (§293). In this remark, Wittgenstein 
wishes to caution us against conceptualizing inner sensation via the model of ostensive definition; 
he suggests that to employ such a picture of language is to focus too exclusively on the gap 
between name and thing and, correspondingly, to de-emphasize the role that words like “pain” 
actually play in human life. For more on this remark, see Mulhall, Wittgenstein’s Private 




desire” (584).28 Like Dowell, Wittgenstein combines ambiguous sexuality with an 
aversion to physical passion. As Monk details, Wittgenstein’s attitude toward sexuality 
was deeply informed by the Viennese philosopher Otto Weininger’s Sex and Character 
(1903). Weininger’s book participates in the discourse Sedgwick calls “gender 
separatism” (EC 87), upholding Platonic bonds between men as the highest form of 
intimacy, and it insists on the “strict separation of love from sexual desire” (Monk 25). 
Notably, Ford had also read Sex and Character (Haslam 55). So Dowell’s sexual 
passivity reflects his Wittgensteinian view of intimacy as a spiritual, rather than physical, 
ideal—and Weininger’s book may be the common source that informed both 
Wittgenstein and Ford in their respective engagements with this view.  
In a passage near the end of The Good Soldier, Dowell grows most explicit about 
his intimate feelings for Edward. It is as though, having come to terms with the fact that 
his marriage to Florence has fallen short as a best case of human knowledge, Dowell 
turns to the possibility that the intimacy he has felt with Edward may represent a superior 
alternative. He admits, “I can’t conceal from myself the fact that I loved Edward 
Ashburnham—and that I love him because he was just myself. If I had had the courage 
and the virility and possibly also the physique of Edward Ashburnham I should, I fancy, 
have done much what he did” (TGS 275). John’s assessment of Edward as “just 
myself”—on its face absurd—signals his retrospective attempt to paint his relation with 
Edward as the kind of idealized bond that he has previously looked for, and not found, in 
heterosexual marriage. To say that Edward is “just myself” is, for John, to suggest that it 
																																																						




is this relationship through which he might come closest to his fantasy of “see[ing] 
through the same eyes” as his beloved. Dowell’s comments sound remarkably similar to a 
passage from Weininger’s Sex and Character: “In love, man is only loving himself. Not 
… the failings and smallnesses which he outwardly exhibits; but all that he wants to be, 
all that he ought to be” (qtd. in Monk 24).  
Dowell proves caught between his feelings of intimacy for Edward and his 
concern that these feelings may be incompatible with normative Victorian masculinity. 
Cavell writes that “shame” restricts the giving and receiving of acknowledgment, and 
even though he is not specifically discussing same-sex desire, his point nonetheless sheds 
light on Dowell’s dilemma (MWM 278). “Under shame,” Cavell writes, “what must be 
covered up is not your deed, but yourself. It is a more primitive emotion than guilt, as 
inescapable as the possession of a body” (278). Dowell’s narrative contains a strong 
undercurrent of shame, perhaps reflecting his sense that his body has betrayed him by 
making him desire Edward as he does. This shame prompts him to engage in language 
practices that leave his inner life largely hidden from others, and it prevents him from 
making stronger efforts to extract acknowledgment from his interlocutors. It is only after 
Edward’s death that Dowell reveals the depth of his feelings for this other man, and it is 
only in the novel’s final pages that he does so most explicitly. His belated avowal of love 
for Edward is consistent with Wittgenstein’s tendency to conduct his most intense 
romantic attachments in the “splendid isolation” of his own consciousness, rather than in 




of [Wittgenstein’s] later work is addressed … has its parallel in the emotional solipsism 
in which his romantic attachments were conducted” (428).   
Dowell’s final confession of “love” for Edward reflects the novel’s implicit 
project of encouraging acknowledgment. The conceit of the novel is that Dowell is 
actually writing his story, and he often imagines the kind of attentive, compassionate 
reader he has not otherwise found. Dowell appeals to this “sympathetic soul” for help 
constructing and interpreting his story, asking at one point, “Is all this a digression or 
isn’t it a digression? Again, I don’t know. You, the listener, sit opposite me. But you are 
so silent” (TGS 17). The silence of the reader means that Dowell cannot receive the kind 
of acknowledgment he desires; although he can tell his story, he cannot actually elicit a 
response.29 On the other hand, Dowell’s creation of an imagined reader confronts us—the 
novel’s actual readers—with the question of how we might respond to this “saddest 
story” (5). We may leave the novel feeling that Dowell is a deluded figure, 
problematically committed to a more traditional set of social mores, unfairly harsh in his 
treatment of the novel’s female characters. We may suspect that, had the text given us 
access to another character’s perspective, this rival subjectivity would have presented 
Dowell in a starkly different light. But the novel forces us to confront the uninterrupted 
narration of this solitary figure’s inner life, encouraging us to recognize the historically-
constituted frustration and shame that motivate Dowell’s confused reflections. Still, by 
																																																						
29 As Miriam Bailin notes, this silence also means that Dowell’s account can proceed 
unchallenged; his imagined reader represents someone “to whom he can pour out his woes and 
intimate secrets but with whom he need never engage in passionate and potentially disruptive 




representing only this one isolated subjectivity, The Good Soldier risks re-instantiating 
the solipsistic perspective it supposedly condemns. The novel laments Dowell’s lack of 
acknowledgment, but it rarely provides readers with a model of what acknowledgment 
might look like, on either the level of form or plot. For a work of modernist fiction that 
actually enacts the stance of acknowledgment, we turn to Woolf.  
 
“Not knowledge but unity”: Learning to Acknowledge in To the Lighthouse 
 
 In To the Lighthouse, Woolf returns to many of the key questions that Ford has 
raised in The Good Soldier: Is traditional Victorian marriage a best case of interpersonal 
knowledge? Do Victorian social and linguistic practices facilitate or foreclose the 
realization of this potential best case? Might same-sex relationships represent a superior 
form of intimacy? What are the ethical implications of seeing human relations in terms of 
knowledge, rather than of acknowledgment? Perhaps because of how explicitly this novel 
signals its epistemological preoccupations, scholars have explored its philosophical 
contexts and implications more extensively than they have for either Ford’s text or 
Larsen’s. Mr. Ramsay is, of course, a professional philosopher, grappling obsessively 
with “[s]ubject and object and the nature of reality” (TTL 23), as his son Andrew puts it. 
While the primary model for Mr. Ramsay is Woolf’s father Leslie Stephen, Ann Banfield 
argues that he stands for the Cambridge philosopher more broadly (188).30 Martha 
																																																						
30 For more on the biographical basis for Woolf’s portrayals of both Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay 
(modeled on her mother, Julia Stephen), see Zwerdling 180-91. For a thorough summary of the 




Nussbaum has also linked Woolf’s novel with Wittgenstein’s philosophy, exploring how 
Woolf grapples with the insurmountable limits in our knowledge of other minds.  
Because its approach appears, on the surface, similar to my own, Nussbaum’s 
article provides a helpful starting point for my discussion of To the Lighthouse. 
Nussbaum argues that Woolf presents the search for knowledge of other minds as 
problematic and doomed to failure, but she insufficiently ties the novel’s philosophical 
concerns to its historical circumstances; tellingly, for instance, her article does not 
mention World War I. She focuses on Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay’s relationship, as presented 
in the first part of the novel, and thus she does not consider how the third part—set after 
Mrs. Ramsay’s death, in a moment of post-War disillusionment—invites readers to 
reconsider the issues presented in Part One.31 Perhaps because of this ahistorical 
approach, Nussbaum largely accepts the idea that Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay’s marriage 
represents a best case of knowledge.32 In so doing, she misses the fact that the novel does 
not straightforwardly endorse Victorian ideals; it also critiques them and explores more 
subversive alternatives.33  
																																																						
31 Karen Zumhagen-Yekplé has recently provided a different philosophical approach to the novel, 
but one that also takes Wittgenstein’s thought as its jumping off point. She discusses the work of 
Wittgenstein scholar Cora Diamond, in particular Diamond’s concept of “the difficulty of 
reality,” which consists in “a sudden inability of the mind to encompass” (1117). Zumhagen-
Yekplé argues that the difficulty of reality “haunts the novel in a pervasive, general way” (1122), 
showing how the vibrant world of “The Window” is always on the verge of being “obliterate[d]” 
by “war and death and the passage of time” (1121).     
32 For instance, she argues that “Mr. Ramsay knows his wife … in a way in which he knows no 
other character” (“Window” 744), and that within this relationship, Mr. Ramsay “move[s] from 
interpretation to knowledge” (749).   
33 As Rosner notes, the sexual assaults that Woolf endured at the hands of her half-brother George 
Duckworth made her acutely aware of the oppression and suffering that Victorian social norms 




Nussbaum also misses an opportunity to consider how the novel’s narrative 
perspective participates in and contributes to its call for acknowledgment. To the 
Lighthouse follows the modernist example of The Good Soldier by highlighting the 
unavoidable subjectivity of perception. The difference is that, whereas Ford gives 
sustained attention to one individual perspective, Woolf gives voice to many, and the 
novel’s sudden shifts in point of view show her responding to the problem of other minds 
by representing the subjectivities of various characters—even while never losing sight of 
what Cavell calls “the truth of skepticism” (CR 496).34 For example, early in the novel, 
Mrs. Ramsay watches her husband stride “up and down the terrace,” loudly reciting 
poetry to himself, and she worries that someone will hear him (TTL 16). Relieved to find 
that the only one who has is Lily Briscoe, Mrs. Ramsay thinks, 
[T]hat did not matter. But the sight of the girl standing on the edge of the lawn 
painting reminded her; she was supposed to be keeping her head in as much the 
same position as possible for Lily’s picture…. [O]ne could not take her painting 
very seriously; she was an independent little creature, and Mrs. Ramsay liked her 
for it; so, remembering her promise, she bent her head. (17)  
The passage captures the train of thought prompted in Mrs. Ramsay’s consciousness by 
the sight of Lily; Mrs. Ramsay suddenly remembers that Lily has asked a favor of her, 
																																																						
34 I make a similar point about Mrs. Dalloway in Chapter One, arguing that in this novel Woolf 
reworks the aesthetic example of Forster’s Howards End (1910), linguistically representing the 
subjectivities of a range of characters, and thus providing a fictional model for what improved 
practices of acknowledgment might look like on the societal level. Formally, To the Lighthouse 
employs many of the same strategies, though it focuses them primarily on the kind of close, 




and, while moving to comply, she gives her private assessment of her friend’s character. 
These lines close the section’s third chapter, and the fourth begins as follows: “Indeed, he 
almost knocked her easel over, coming down upon her with his hands waving…. Never 
was anybody at once so ridiculous and so alarming. But as long as he kept like that, 
waving, shouting, she was safe; he would not stand still and look at her picture” (17). 
Here, then, readers gain access to what Mr. Ramsay’s conduct looks like from Lily’s 
perspective; we learn that Lily finds Mr. Ramsay just as “ridiculous” and “alarming” as 
Mrs. Ramsay has worried people might. Whereas Mrs. Ramsay feels that Lily’s judgment 
of Mr. Ramsay does “not matter” (presumably because she counts on Lily to view him 
sympathetically, or because she knows that Lily has seen Mr. Ramsay act this way 
before), from Lily’s perspective his actions certainly do matter, insofar as they distract 
her from her work, which she—unlike Mrs. Ramsay—takes quite seriously. In this way, 
Woolf’s multi-perspectival representation of this social world offers her readers the kind 
of broadening of perspective that The Good Soldier does not. Despite what scholars like 
Banfield and Erich Auerbach have argued, this narrative method aims less at constructing 
an ‘objective’ view of reality and more at putting readers in a position to gain some 
understanding of various subjectivities.35 
 Through its representation of Mrs. Ramsay’s consciousness, the novel highlights 
her commitment to the Victorian ideal of marriage as the best case scenario for knowing 
																																																						
35 Auerbach writes, in his foundational discussion of point of view in Woolf’s text, that “[t]he 
multiplicity of persons suggests that we are here after all confronted with an endeavor to 
investigate an objective reality” (536). Similarly, Banfield argues that “[t]he method of multiple 




another mind. Mrs. Ramsay largely endorses Victorian social norms concerning the 
division of the sexes: while her husband pursues his more individualistic mental labors, 
she feels herself responsible for the comfort and “protection” of the opposite sex, 
admiring men “for their chivalry and valour, for the fact that they negotiated treaties, 
ruled India, controlled finance” (6). “The Window,” the first part of the novel, shows Mr. 
Ramsay repeatedly “demanding sympathy” from his wife (37), exploiting patriarchal 
gender norms that position women as responsible for providing emotional succor to men. 
For the most part, Mrs. Ramsay willingly accepts this gendered role, motivated by her 
belief that “of the two he was infinitely the more important, and what she gave the world, 
in comparison with what he gave, negligible” (39). After an instance in which she 
successfully comforts him, Mrs. Ramsay thinks impassionedly of how she and her 
husband provide for each other “that solace which two different notes, one high, one low, 
struck together, seem to give each other as they combine” (39). She rhetorically positions 
marriage as the merging of two distinct perspectives—a view strikingly similar to the 
idealized vision of marital intimacy Dowell has put forward in The Good Soldier.36  
Consistent with her idealization of heterosexual marriage, Mrs. Ramsay makes a 
point of encouraging others to enter such unions as well. “The Window” finds her 
arriving at the “admirable idea” that Lily Briscoe and William Bankes “must marry!” 
after she sees them walking together (71), and it finds Paul Rayley proposing to Minta 
Doyle on Mrs. Ramsay’s advice. After Paul and Minta, returning from their trip to the 
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beach, arrive late to the formal dinner Mrs. Ramsay has organized, Paul explains, “We 
went back to look for Minta’s brooch” (100). On the basis of this simple statement, Mrs. 
Ramsay infers that the engagement has taken place and thinks enthusiastically: “‘We’—
that was enough…. They’ll say that all their lives” (100). Mrs. Ramsay’s exaltation in 
Paul’s use of “we” reflects the high epistemological hopes she places upon heterosexual 
marriage. The way she imagines it, this pronoun indexes the transformation Paul and 
Minta have undergone now that they are engaged; henceforth, they no longer represent 
two first-person singular subjectivities, but one first-person plural. 
Just as Dowell finds that the realities of heterosexual marriage do not measure up 
to his fantasies, so Mrs. Ramsay, in her own way, makes the same discovery. For, despite 
her idealizing rhetoric, she displays acute awareness of the extent to which her inner life 
remains hidden from her husband. In some respects, she finds, her deep concern for her 
husband paradoxically increases the distance between them, since she is reluctant to 
speak of subjects she knows will upset him. She laments  
… not being able to tell him the truth, being afraid, for instance, about the 
greenhouse roof and the expense it would be, fifty pounds perhaps, to mend it; … 
and then to hide small daily things […]—all this diminished the entire joy, the 
pure joy, of the two notes sounding together… (39) 
These reflections lead her to the “painful” realization of “the inadequacy of human 
relationships, that the most perfect was flawed” (39). Given her secrets from her husband, 
she sees that their knowledge of each other pales in comparison to her “perfect” vision of 




thoroughgoing deceptiveness that Dowell ascribes to Florence; what Mrs. Ramsay 
confronts is rather the inevitable, even quotidian, limits in one person’s knowledge of 
another’s consciousness. She thinks of how, whenever she gets a rare break from her 
social duties, she can retreat into herself, into what she imagines as “a wedge-shaped core 
of darkness, something invisible to others,” and she realizes that this feeling of being 
herself, being within her body, is something she can never fully convey to anyone else 
(62).37   
 This recognition of her sui generis access to her own inner experience leads Mrs. 
Ramsay to distrust language, since she feels that it cannot overcome her separateness 
from others. The novel illustrates her views on the shortcomings of language during the 
dinner party scene, as she endeavors to draw her various guests into conversation. 
Sensing his dissatisfaction at having to participate in this elaborate social ritual, she turns 
to address William Bankes: 
“How you must detest dining in this bear garden,” she said, making use … of her 
social manner. So, when there is a strife of tongues, at some meeting, the 
chairman, to obtain unity, suggests that everyone shall speak in French. Perhaps it 
is bad French; French may not contain the words that express the speaker’s 
thoughts; nevertheless speaking French imposes some order, some uniformity. 
(90) 
																																																						
37 As Banfield notes, Mrs. Ramsay’s sense of her incommunicable private self is reflected in her 
domestic policy “[t]hat windows should be open and doors shut” (TTL 27)—a philosophy that 
combines openness toward others with recognition of an individual’s “core of impenetrable 
privacy” (Banfield 180). For scholarly discussions of the novel that focus on its representation of 




The passage contrasts the “order” and “uniformity” of polite discourse with Mrs. 
Ramsay’s hidden thoughts, which constitute a more pessimistic attack on the “social 
manner” she outwardly displays. The moment shows that she understands language to 
have a certain use value in social settings, but she feels that such efficacy comes at a cost, 
restricting or blunting the expression of individuality.38 This view of language is 
culturally conditioned. Like Dowell, she abides by a strict code of reticence concerning 
personal matters, and her Victorian values make her more widely dismissive of 
language’s communicative capacities than she needs to be. The issue is not language as 
such, but rather her own linguistic “training” (PI §5). While of course no one else’s 
understanding of her private experience can rival her own, nonetheless she could 
theoretically say more about her inner life than she does. Indeed, the novel’s use of 
interior monologue indicates the degree to which her private concerns are linguistically 
communicable. For instance, when she thinks, “But what have I done with my life?” at 
the beginning of the dinner scene, the novel affirms that this moment of self-doubt is 
expressible in words; (82) it is simply not a question the social codes of this world 
encourage her to ask aloud.39  
 Still, despite Mrs. Ramsay’s doubts about language’s ability to convey private 
selfhood to others, it would not be fair to describe her as a skeptic. According to Cavell’s 
																																																						
38 As Nussbaum writes, Mrs. Ramsay sees language as “too crude to express what is most 
personal, what is deepest in the individual consciousness” (“Window” 734-5). In the next chapter, 
we will see a wife and mother—Addie Bundren in Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying (1930)—whose 
social circumstances lead her to denigrate language in even more extreme terms.   
39 The novel shows that this self-doubt is expressible in words, that is, precisely by expressing it 




framework, frustration with the impossibility of certainty is liable to prompt skepticism, 
and skepticism is characterized by a refusal to grant acknowledgment. In the case of John 
Dowell, his realization that language often obfuscates, rather than reveals, people’s true 
sentiments leads him to a state of undiscriminating doubt. He stubbornly refuses to make 
any inferences about the inner lives that exist behind or beyond the world of external 
appearances. The irony of Mrs. Ramsay’s character, in Woolf’s portrayal, is that despite 
her disappointments with knowledge she proves uniquely adept at bestowing 
acknowledgment. In her more optimistic moments, Mrs. Ramsay experiences “that 
community of feeling with other people which emotion gives as if the walls of partition 
had become so thin that practically … it was all one stream” (113-4)—a feeling of 
thoroughgoing emotional attunement with others despite their ongoing condition of 
separation behind private “walls.” At one point in the Investigations, reflecting on our 
ability to discern another person’s feelings, Wittgenstein asks, “Is there such a thing as 
‘expert judgment’ about the genuineness of expressions of feeling? … Can one learn this 
knowledge? Yes; some can learn it. Not, however, by taking a course of study in it, but 
through ‘experience’” (II, §355). Mrs. Ramsay is an example of a figure who possesses 
such “expert judgment” regarding the sentiments of others. As Wittgenstein’s remark 
suggests, she has reached this level of discernment not through any formal “study”—of 
the kind her husband has extensively pursued, say—but simply through her lived 
“experience” of compassionate engagement with other subjectivities.    
 Mrs. Ramsay displays this “expert” emotional attunement during the dinner scene 




namely, Augustus Carmichael’s request for another plate of soup. In its representation of 
the Ramsays’ respective reactions to this request, the novel captures the extent of her 
access to his mind: 
He hated people wallowing in food, Mr. Ramsay frowned at her. He hated 
everything dragging on for hours like this. But he had controlled himself, Mr. 
Ramsay would have her observe…. But why show it so plainly, Mrs. Ramsay 
demanded (they looked at each other down the long table sending these questions 
and answers across, each knowing exactly what the other felt). (96) 
Before the parenthetical, the narrative perspective during this exchange is presumably 
Mrs. Ramsay’s, given that the novel has been tracking her point of view in the preceding 
sentences. The representation of Mr. Ramsay’s unvoiced comments indicates that his 
wife knows him well enough to infer—simply from his frown—what he is thinking. The 
parenthetical statement seems to introduce a more distanced, omniscient narrator, but it 
might also constitute an additional comment from Mrs. Ramsay herself. If we as readers 
accept that Mrs. and Mr. Ramsay “each know[…] exactly what the other” is feeling, then 
the implication would be that an omniscient perspective is unnecessary. By making it 
difficult to distinguish between Mrs. Ramsay’s voice and that of an omniscient narrator, 
the novel validates her emotional expertise. Whether or not she is the one speaking, the 
text suggests, the information imparted retains comparable legitimacy in either case.40 
																																																						
40 Another moment that highlights the Ramsays’ emotional attunement occurs in the final section 
of “The Window,” which is the moment with which Nussbaum concludes her analysis. In this 
scene, Mrs. Ramsay’s conviction that her husband wants her to say she loves him is consistent 
with her previous “expert judgment” regarding his inner life, and her hesitation to speak is 




According to Woolf’s portrayal, then, Mrs. Ramsay’s “experience” has enabled 
her to learn a great deal about her husband, and this knowledge facilitates her project of 
granting him the acknowledgment he craves. Though we can certainly recognize the level 
of emotional intimacy that exists between the Ramsays, we need not follow Nussbaum’s 
unequivocally positive conception of their marriage. After all, by internalizing the social 
expectations placed on her as a Victorian wife and mother, Mrs. Ramsay becomes much 
more focused on giving acknowledgment than on receiving it. Woolf’s representation of 
the Ramsays’ unspoken communication indicates that Mr. Ramsay knows a great deal 
about his wife, just as she does about him, but he seems much less interested in using his 
knowledge to grant acknowledgment to her. “The Window” suggests how thoroughly the 
lack of reciprocity in this relationship has worn on Mrs. Ramsay: when she reflects that 
“her capacity to surround and protect” has left her with “scarcely a shell of herself left for 
her to know herself by” (38), the novel foreshadows the sudden death—the total 
eradication of self—she suffers in the “Time Passes” section. 
 Just as Dowell’s narration in The Good Soldier suggests that the best case of 
interpersonal knowledge may not be heterosexual marriage, but rather an idealized bond 
between two men, so To the Lighthouse makes a similar suggestion about same-sex 
intimacy between women. Sedgwick, explaining her specific focus on male-male 
																																																						
she tells him that he was “right” in his prediction of the next day’s weather, the section concludes: 
“For she had triumphed again. She had not said it: yet he knew” (124). Michael Levenson points 
out that it is unclear whether the speaker of these final lines is Mrs. Ramsay or an omniscient 
narrator (24)—the same kind of perspectival ambiguity we see in the dinner party scene. This 
final “knew,” we might say, does not exactly convey certainty, but it does show that Mrs. 
Ramsay’s deep attunement with her husband’s emotional life allows her to operate with a high 




relations, argues that the conceptual “opposition between the ‘homosocial’ and the 
‘homosexual’ seems to be much less thorough and dichotomous for women … than for 
men…. Thus the adjective ‘homosocial’ as applied to women’s bonds … need not be 
pointedly dichotomized as against ‘homosexual’; it can intelligibly dominate the entire 
continuum” (BM 2-3). In To the Lighthouse, Lily’s attitude toward Mrs. Ramsay provides 
an apt illustration of Sedgwick’s point. Her feelings for Mrs. Ramsay exist in the blurry 
conceptual space between friendship and erotic attraction, but Lily does not exhibit the 
same tendency toward “homosexual panic” that Dowell does (89).  
 Lily’s interior monologue shows that she feels torn between getting married, as 
Mrs. Ramsay recommends, and remaining “exempt” from this normative social destiny 
(50). Reflecting on the options available to her, Lily recalls an occasion on which, while 
“[s]itting on the floor with her arms round Mrs. Ramsay’s knees” (50), she began to think 
of 
… how in the chambers of the mind and heart of the woman who was, physically, 
touching her, were stood, like the treasures in the tombs of kings, tablets bearing 
sacred inscriptions, which if one could spell them out, would teach one 
everything, but they would never be offered openly, never be made public. What 
art was there … by which one pressed through into those secret chambers? What 
device for becoming, like waters poured into one jar, inextricably the same, one 
with the object one adored? … Could loving, as people called it, make her and 




inscriptions on tablets, nothing that could be written in any language known to 
man, but intimacy itself, which is knowledge… (51) 
As Nussbaum notes, this passage presents Lily engaged in “the project of knowing,” with 
respect to Mrs. Ramsay’s inner life (“Window” 742). Lily shares Mrs. Ramsay’s sense of 
language as an inadequate tool with which to pursue this project. She imagines Mrs. 
Ramsay’s interiority via the figure of “tablets bearing sacred inscriptions.” But, after 
specifying that her wish is to become “inextricably the same, one with the object one 
adored,” she finds that this epistemological goal cannot be adequately achieved through 
“inscriptions on tablets”; these tablets may be partial representations of Mrs. Ramsay, but 
they remain an overly indirect means of accessing the other woman’s core self. In part, 
her comment that the level of connection she craves cannot “be written in any language 
known to man” reflects the absence of language available to Lily, in her historical 
moment, for explaining the attachment she feels to this other woman.41 But she may also 
be recognizing that language as such is simply not capable of providing the connection 
she craves.42 As if to reflect the incommunicability of her desires, Lily describes them 
using shifting terminology: after presenting her goal as “not knowledge but unity,” she 
shifts to the formulation “intimacy itself, which is knowledge” (emphasis mine). So first 
																																																						
41 As Cohler writes, pre-WWI “British culture lacked any coherent narrative of female 
homosexual identity” (112).   
42 Lily’s dismissal of “any language known to man,” for instance, might be read as a critique of 
controlling, patriarchal discourse or as a more generalized statement of linguistic skepticism. The 
choice between these two interpretations turns on whether we read “man” in a narrower, gender-




she contrasts her epistemological goal against knowledge, and then she equates it to 
knowledge.  
 Lily’s shifting uses of “knowledge” speak to an issue that Wittgenstein raises in 
the Investigations. An important thrust of his discussion is that “knowledge” need not be 
understood to mean ‘total certainty’; on the contrary, such an understanding of 
“knowledge” would be incompatible with our finite epistemological position vis-à-vis 
other human beings. Staging a conversation around this issue, he writes,  
[O]nly I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. 
– In one way this is false, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word 
“know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people 
very often know if I’m in pain. (PI §246)  
Against the skeptical suggestion that “only I can know whether I am really in pain,” 
Wittgenstein points out that we regularly speak about knowing others’ pains in perfectly 
intelligible ways.43  As Cavell highlights, Wittgenstein encourages us to see that—with 
respect to the inner lives of others—‘knowledge’ carries with it the goal of mutual 
acknowledgment. Lily’s interior monologue shows her moving toward a similar 
realization. When she states that she craves “not knowledge but unity,” Lily signals her 
frustrated recognition that her desire for total access to Mrs. Ramsay’s subjectivity 
surpasses the bounds of what one human can know about another. Then, when she 
equates knowledge with “intimacy,” she endows “knowledge” with a more emotive 
																																																						





connotation, and in so doing she comes closer to Cavell’s point that the problem of 
knowing other minds is really the problem of knowing how to acknowledge them.    
 “The Lighthouse,” the novel’s third and final section, shows Lily devoting herself 
more wholeheartedly to this project of acknowledgment.44 In moving away from her 
desire for some idealized state of interpersonal “unity,” Lily responds to personal 
circumstances—most obviously, the death of Mrs. Ramsay—but also to broader 
historical conditions. As I discussed in Chapter One, the violence of World War forced 
British society to grapple with the negative consequences of restrictive, compassionless 
forms of rationality—of knowledge without acknowledgment. In “The Window,” Mrs. 
Ramsay faults her husband for “pursu[ing] truth with such astonishing lack of 
consideration for other people’s feelings” (32); in “Time Passes,” this same rationalist 
attitude reaches a devastating acme in the bracketed passages of narration, which matter-
of-factly inform readers that Mrs. Ramsay and her two eldest children have all suddenly 
died (32).45 In addition, in the time (ten years, to be precise) that passes between “The 
Window” and “The Lighthouse,” British society’s disillusionment with the Victorian 
marital ideal has proceeded apace. Now confirmed in her own single status, Lily gestures 
toward this cultural context with her reflections on the outcome of Paul and Minta’s 
marriage: Paul has taken up with a mistress; he and Minta are “‘in love’ no longer” (174). 
																																																						
44 Nussbaum argues that Lily shifts immediately to the stance of acknowledgment during this 
same moment in “The Window.” But Nussbaum’s reading doesn’t explain why Lily would so 
abruptly abandon her desire for interpersonal “unity”; a fuller account of Lily’s evolving 
epistemological views requires considering (as Nussbaum does not) the development of her 
character in the third part of the novel.  
45 For a fuller treatment of the ethical issues raised by Woolf’s use of non-individualized narrative 




But Lily reflects that, “[f]ar from breaking up the marriage,” these new circumstances 
have “righted it. They were excellent friends, obviously” (174). Their marriage 
constitutes a modern alternative to the idealized “we” Mrs. Ramsay has envisioned. 
Moving beyond the restrictive sexual and social mores of Victorian society, Paul and 
Minta have evidently arrived at a model of marriage no longer premised on the 
assumption that it need be—as Mrs. Ramsay imagines it—the “most perfect” of human 
relationships (40).46  
 In her interactions with the widowed Mr. Ramsay, Lily endeavors to establish a 
model of mutual acknowledgment in gender relations, in contrast to the unequal, 
patriarchal dynamic she has witnessed in the Ramsay marriage. As Lily seeks to complete 
the painting she began ten years earlier, Mr. Ramsay distracts her with his “enormous 
need … to approach any woman, to force them … to give him … sympathy” (150-1). Mr. 
Ramsay maintains his reliance on a traditional Victorian understanding of gender roles, 
according to which women comfort men and not vice versa. As in Part One, he 
demonstrates how coercive the demand for acknowledgment can be when a figure with 
comparatively more social power directs it at someone with comparatively less. Whereas 
Mrs. Ramsay willingly plays the traditionally feminine role, hastening her own death in 
the process, Lily resists and resents the gendered expectations he foists upon her: “All 
																																																						
46 In other words, even as Paul and Minta abandon the traditional model of marriage, they also 
apparently avoid more modern conceptions that preserve the unrealistic epistemological 
expectations of the older model. Commenting on Woolf’s portrayal of Paul and Minta’s marriage, 
Alex Zwerdling writes, “Such unorthodox relationships were familiar in Bloomsbury and were 
treated as a form of liberation from ancient superstition” (195). With that said, the novel does not 




Lily wished was that this enormous flood of grief …, this demand that she should 
surrender herself up to him entirely …, should leave her, should be diverted” (151). She 
“stand[s] there dumb,” unsure what to say in response to his visible performance of self-
pity (152). When she does finally speak, her comment—“What beautiful boots!”—
sounds comically inadequate, and Lily immediately chastises herself for failing to match 
the intensity of her interlocutor’s passion (153).  
 But the surprising result of this exchange is that Lily’s response does succeed in 
cheering Mr. Ramsay up; he tells her proudly about the history of the boots and shows 
her his original method for knotting laces. In one respect, these responses show Mr. 
Ramsay continuing to take a condescendingly gendered attitude toward his interlocutor: 
he imparts knowledge, while still hoping to receive sympathy in return. But the scene 
also shows Lily taking a successful step toward replacing a more traditional gendered 
relation with a mutually satisfying relation of acknowledgment. By “prais[ing] his boots 
when he asked her to solace his soul,” Lily implicitly communicates to him that she will 
not attempt to replicate the self-abnegating emotional attentiveness of Mrs. Ramsay 
(153). Nonetheless, by praising his boots, Lily does offer him a response to his pain—
and, as it turns out, her response succeeds in reminding Mr. Ramsay of one of his life’s 
small sources of happiness. As Lily thinks happily that she and Mr. Ramsay have 
“reached … the blessed island of good boots,” the novel casts their exchange as a 
comically deflated version of the gender dynamics in “The Window” (154). Mr. Ramsay 




some ideal state of unity with another—discovers instead the usefulness of ordinary 
language, its efficacy in granting acknowledgment. 
 As the novel moves toward its conclusion, Lily’s reflections on the enigmatic 
figure of Augustus Carmichael provide another instance of her increased comfort with the 
epistemological stance of acknowledgment.47 Looking across the lawn at him, Lily 
reflects on their hiddenness from each other and the corresponding stiltedness of their 
interactions: “They only mumbled at each other on staircases; they looked up at the sky 
and said it will be fine or it won’t be fine” (194-5). Taken on their own, these lines would 
seem to suggest Lily’s continued disappointment with the epistemological options 
available to finite human beings, the impossibility of “press[ing] through into those secret 
chambers” of another’s heart. “But,” Lily’s interior monologue continues, “that was one 
way of knowing people […]: to know the outline, not the detail, to sit in one’s garden and 
look at the slopes of a hill running purple down into the distant heather. She knew him in 
that way” (195). This idea of “know[ing] the outline, not the detail” evokes the abstract 
images in Lily’s painting, and it recalls Mrs. Ramsay’s conception of herself as “a 
wedge-shaped core of darkness”—an image that registers language’s inability to provide 
total access to a person’s inner life (62). With her commendation of “outline,” Lily 
indicates that she has abandoned her search for total unity with another; she has come to 
see that her limited access to other minds need not preclude the possibility of 
acknowledgment. Notably, Lily’s image of sitting in a garden anticipates a passage in 
																																																						
47 Both Mrs. Ramsay, in “The Window,” and Lily, in “The Lighthouse,” ascribe to Carmichael a 
certain inscrutability, and the novel’s narrative perspective bears out this view, consistently 




which Cavell similarly proposes the image of being stuck within one’s garden as a 
metaphor for the human mind (MWM 261).48 Cavell’s discussion and Lily’s figure both 
suggest that we are each confined to our own garden, but that this position does not 
prevent us from looking out, from seeing and acknowledging others, to the degree that 
they reveal themselves to us and we to them.  
 The novel ends by implicitly validating the more measured epistemological stance 
at which Lily has arrived. In the final chapter, after Lily senses that Mr. Ramsay and his 
children have completed their journey to the lighthouse, Carmichael walks over to where 
she is painting and says, “They will have landed,” prompting Lily to note, with pleasure, 
that he and she “had been thinking the same things” (208). For Lily, this moment 
constitutes a clear example of her mental attunement with another human being, even as 
the “detail” of his inner life remains hidden from her. By putting into words exactly what 
she herself has been thinking, Carmichael shows that—in this moment, anyway—his 
train of thought and hers follow similar tracks, and he shows language’s ability to convey 
this correspondence from one subjectivity to another. As such, their exchange pushes 
back against the extreme, self-defeating version of other-mind skepticism with which 
Wittgenstein grapples and to which John Dowell accedes.  
This final scene reminds us that, in its own way, Woolf’s novel has been engaged 
in a similar project. For the encounter with Carmichael prompts Lily to finish her 
																																																						
48 Cavell adopts this example from the work of John Cook (MWM 259). Cavell elaborates on 
Cook by emphasizing that the metaphor of minds as gardens proves most accurate when we 
understand it as capturing not only the way in which “I am sealed out” from another’s garden, but 
also “the way in which he is sealed in. He is not in a position to walk in that garden as he pleases, 




painting, which she describes as her “attempt at something” (208): imperfect, but an 
achievement nonetheless. Lily succeeds in memorializing (a version of) Mrs. Ramsay; 
more than an objectively accurate representation, the painting becomes a token of love 
for her dead friend. In this way, her artistic “vision” stands as a model of acknowledging 
others without attempting to know them (209). Woolf’s own aesthetic creation functions 
similarly. Through Mrs. Ramsay and Lily’s musings on the inadequacies of language, 
Woolf self-referentially signals her recognition that—measured against the idealized 
standard of knowledge as “unity”—the linguistic representation of individual 
consciousness is bound to fall short. On the other hand, understanding Woolf’s 
representations of interiority as acts of acknowledgment, rather than fantasies of 
knowledge, puts us in a position to appreciate what the novel’s language does 
accomplish. By representing these multiple perspectives, shifting from one character’s 
interiority to another’s and back again, To the Lighthouse encourages us, as readers, to 
extend our compassion in various directions at once. We learn to understand Mr. 
Ramsay’s grief, for instance, even as we also sympathize with Lily’s resistance to the 
gendered expectations his sentiment places upon her.  
 
Crossing the Atlantic  
 
 Alongside their detailed examinations of interpersonal relations, both The Good 
Soldier and To the Lighthouse also obliquely invoke a larger transnational context. Ford’s 




admires Edward for both his virility and his membership in the British gentry. As Karen 
Hoffmann points out, Edward’s urge to possess more and more women mirrors the 
British imperialist desire to possess more and more colonies; in this way, the novel 
suggests that “in late Victorian/Edwardian culture, masculinity and imperialism cannot be 
understood apart from one another” (37).49 Meanwhile, Leonora—an Irish national—uses 
her knowledge of Edward’s affairs to exert greater control over his finances, and the 
success of her efforts reflects the waning power of British imperial rule. The tensions in 
the Ashburnham marriage bear out Amy Kaplan’s argument about what she calls 
(adopting a phrase from W.E.B. Du Bois) “the anarchy of empire” (13): the fear that 
foreign expansion might precipitate the breakdown of clear divisions in the domestic 
sphere, with “domestic” having a double meaning “as both the space of the nation and of 
the familial household” (18). Dowell aptly captures these domestic-imperialist dynamics 
when he describes how “it struck [Edward] that Leonora must be intending to manage his 
loves as she managed his money affairs and it made her more hateful to him—and more 
worthy of respect” (TGS 190).  
  To the Lighthouse, another novel about ‘domestic’ relations in the modernist 
period, also implicitly registers a wider and longer history of British overseas expansion. 
As Laura Doyle has shown in some detail, settlers who left England for America in the 
1600s “employed the rhetoric of a special English birthright to freedom” (“Transnational 
History” 537) and “understood themselves to be reclaiming their trammeled native rights 
																																																						
49 Hoffmann also notes that the novel “strengthens [this] link … by placing the beginnings of two 




from foreign usurpers—Norman, French, and popish” (535). As Britain grew into an 
imperial power, this discourse of “revolutionary racialism became a nationalist and 
imperial racism” (Freedom’s Empire 46); British colonists cast the non-white peoples 
with whom they came into contact as mentally and morally undeserving of the same 
freedoms as they themselves were seeking. Doyle points out that To the Lighthouse 
closes with a sea voyage, which portrays Cam and James Ramsay as “united in their 
compact to resist tyranny”—in the person of their father—“to the death” (TTL 164). Lily, 
who never marries and who has “Chinese eyes” (26), stands on the shore and watches, a 
dissenting “witness to … the Anglo-American imperial-freedom project” (Freedom’s 
Empire 427).50  
 Larsen’s fiction also takes up this transatlantic history, exploring what it looks 
like from the perspective of those who have historically been excluded from Eurocentric 
conceptions of freedom. As Doyle notes, Anglo-American imperialism relies on a rigid 
“racial and heteronormative logic,” according to which “‘our’ women couple with ‘our’ 
men, and ‘your’ women with ‘your’ men, to reproduce ‘our’ race and ‘your’ race—and, 
in turn, the uneven order of things” (“Transnational History” 533). The history of racial 
categorization in America constitutes one manifestation of this anxious effort to separate 
those deserving of freedom from those who are not. Allyson Hobbs, in her history of 
racial passing, quotes from a letter written by Thomas Jefferson in 1815, in which he 
employs a complicated series of calculations “to answer the question, ‘What constitutes a 
																																																						
50 For Doyle’s complete reading of To the Lighthouse, see Freedom’s Empire 426-31. This 
discussion is part of a longer chapter on Woolf, which also includes readings of The Voyage Out 




mulatto by our law?’ By the third cross, or the result of ‘q, (quarteroon) being 1⁄4 negro 
blood crossed with C−q/2+C/2=a/8+B/4+C/2’ was an e (eighth), and having only 1/8 of 
negro blood, was no longer a mulatto” (qtd. 10). As his rhetoric of quantification shows, 
Jefferson here participates in the construction of racial identity as an oppressive category 
of knowledge, one that restricts possibilities for acknowledgment. This exclusionary logic 
reached its greatest heights (or lowest depths) in the early twentieth century. Virginia’s 
“one drop rule,” codified into law in 1924, promulgated a standard of whiteness that was 
at once extremely strict and entirely unenforceable, given that so many individuals of 
mixed racial heritage could plausibly ‘pass’ for white (128-9).51 In her representations of 
such racially fluid individuals, Larsen illuminates the inner lives of those whose very 
existence challenged America’s simplistic categorization system.  
 In addition to taking up this history of racial categorization, Larsen’s oeuvre 
registers the historically significant role that heterosexual marriage has played for 
African-Americans in making the case that they deserve the same rights and liberties as 
those of European descent do. In the years prior to the Civil War, enslaved African-
Americans did not possess the right to marry each other legally; as a result, Davida Pines 
argues, postbellum fiction written by black women often suggests that marriage 
“demonstrated newly won freedom” and that it “confirmed and showcased black civility 
and morality within a racist society” (76). Marriage, in other words, operates as a 
																																																						
51 As Grace Elizabeth Hale discusses, such efforts to impose stricter standards of racial purity 
functioned as a response to anxieties about the blurring of racial categories under conditions of 
modernity. Train travel, for instance, took individuals “beyond the reach of personalized local 
relations of class and racial authority” and placed them “in close proximity to people they did not 




signifier of bourgeois respectability. In this context, queer desire represents a threat to 
hard-won racial freedoms. Doyle reads Larsen’s Quicksand (1928) as a text that 
anticipates Passing’s exploration of same-sex intimacy and “provides a transatlantic 
backstory for” the later novel (“Transatlantic History” 550). During one scene in 
Quicksand, the protagonist, Helga Crane, finds herself drawn to another light-skinned 
black woman during a party in Harlem; as the woman dances, Helga notices how “[h]er 
long, slender body swayed with an eager, pulsing motion” (Q 92). Arguably, this moment 
of disorienting same-sex attraction is what drives Helga to Denmark, since the next 
chapter begins with her embarking on this journey (Doyle, “Transatlantic History” 554). 
As Helga crosses the Atlantic in reverse, so Larsen pushes back against the racist, 
exclusionary freedom narrative that migrated to America from Europe. But Quicksand 
ultimately indicates that Helga cannot find the freedom she craves—either in Europe, 
where she soon grows tired of performing the role of racial exotic for her white relatives, 
or in America, where she marries and has children with a man who “rouse[s] in her a 
deep and contemptible hatred” (Q 160). With Passing, Larsen extends Quicksand’s 
critique of respectable, bourgeois marriage and similarly presents the institution as “a site 
of female entrapment” (Pines 77).  
 






By representing the inner lives of Helga in Quicksand and Irene Redfield in 
Passing, Larsen foregrounds the experiences of those who have historically gained little 
acknowledgment from Anglo-American culture’s more advantaged classes. In this 
respect, her work has a precedent in, for instance, Forster’s depiction of Leonard Bast in 
Howards End. But Larsen crucially adds race as an aspect of her characters’ 
marginalization. By attending to the psychological experiences of racialized colonial 
subjects, Larsen emphasizes that the consequences of being ‘known’ as ‘black’ in the Jim 
Crow era are potentially a matter of life and death. This point is one that Irene’s visibly 
dark-skinned husband Brian makes during a dinnertime conversation in the Redfield 
household: after Ted, one of his and Irene’s sons, asks, “Dad, why is it that they only 
lynch colored people?” (P 102), Brian responds, “Because they hate ‘em, son” (102). 
Those, like Irene, light-skinned enough to pass have some ability to elude their culture’s 
insistent demand to know their race and thus have more opportunity to claim the 
freedoms (political, economic, social, or otherwise) that white Americans have 
historically seen as their prerogative. But passing also opens one up to the threat of 
unwanted exposure. 
Perpetually negotiating this stark divide between secrecy and openness, Irene has 
little chance to arrive at the epistemological middle ground of acknowledgment. The 
result is that, perhaps counterintuitively, Larsen’s modernism proves more aligned with 
Ford’s than with Woolf’s. I’ve argued that To the Lighthouse proves more hopeful 
concerning possibilities of acknowledgment than The Good Soldier does: unlike Ford, 




the inner lives of multiple characters; unlike Dowell, Lily grows more comfortable with 
the epistemological stance of acknowledgment as her story proceeds. Whereas Dowell 
spends the novel anxiously trying to ‘pass’ as a guardian of the heteronormative, 
imperialist order Edward represents, Lily declines to follow the traditionally gendered 
path Mrs. Ramsay has taken. Passing, in effect, offers a rejoinder to this trajectory. Like 
Ford’s novel, it presents only one, highly circumscribed view of the events it narrates. 
Like The Good Soldier, it laments the lack of acknowledgment that its protagonist 
receives, but it does not offer much positive illustration of what it would look like to 
redress this lack.   
 Certainly, Irene is well positioned to recognize the epistemological shortcomings 
of America’s racial categorization system. In “Encounter,” the first section of the novel, 
she takes advantage of her racially ambiguous appearance to escape from the hot, 
crowded streets of Chicago and enter the “pleasant, quiet” atmosphere of the Drayton 
Hotel (P 13). As she sits by herself drinking tea, Irene notices “[a]n attractive-looking 
woman” staring at her, prompting her to briefly consider—and then quickly dismiss—the 
possibility that she has been identified as ‘black’ (14). Articulating Irene’s thought 
process via free indirect discourse, Larsen writes,  
Impossible! White people were so stupid about such things for all that they 
usually asserted they were able to tell, and by the most ridiculous means, finger-
nails, palms of hands, … and other equally silly rot…. Never, when she was 
alone, had they even remotely seemed to suspect that she was a Negro. No, the 




Here, Irene gives voice to her thoroughgoing—and justified—disdain for the white 
world’s epistemological methods, which consistently fail to yield ‘correct’ knowledge of 
her racial identity.  
 Though scholars have not previously read Passing in these terms, this moment 
highlights the Wittgensteinian dimensions of Larsen’s novel. Because she thinks of 
herself as black and because white America rarely perceives her as such, Irene acutely 
senses the disjunction between her outer appearance and inner sense of self. Irene’s racial 
identity functions like Wittgenstein’s ‘beetle in the box’: Irene knows what her beetle 
looks like, and she feels no one else can look inside her to see what kind of beetle she 
has. Moreover, as Deborah McDowell was the first scholar to discuss, Irene’s racial 
passing functions as a screen for sexual passing: “Though superficially, Irene’s is an 
account of … racial passing and the related issues of racial identity and loyalty, 
underneath the safety of that surface is the more dangerous story—if not named 
explicitly—of Irene’s awakening sexual desire for” her old friend Clare Kendry (90). 
McDowell’s reading suggests that Irene’s sense of hiddenness stems not only from her 
non-white racial identity, but also—and more distressingly, for Irene—from her non-
straight sexual identity.52 This reading ascribes to Irene a hidden ‘beetle’ with two 
																																																						
52 McDowell’s reading has set the terms for much of the subsequent critical conversation around 
Larsen’s novel. David Blackmore expands on McDowell’s insights by arguing that the novel also 
contains intimations of homosexual desire on the part of Irene’s husband, Brian. Judith Butler 
argues that we must understand the novel’s explorations of racial identity and sexual identity as 
working together, informing each other, asking, “[H]ow might we understand homosexuality and 
miscegenation to converge at and as the constitutive outside of a normative heterosexuality that is 
at once the regulation of a racially pure production?” (167). Brian Carr, reflecting on the growing 
body of scholarship that finds a narrative of sexual passing in Larsen’s text, cautions against 




significant components, and in so doing it links the fear of racial outing to the limitations 
of heterosexual marriage.  
 The opening scene at the Drayton showcases Irene’s resistance to systems of 
knowledge that seek to bind her. When Clare, the woman at the next table, addresses 
Irene, saying, “Pardon me … but I think I know you,” Irene responds, “I’m afraid you’re 
mistaken,” a comment that reflects her knee-jerk dismissal of whatever knowledge this 
apparently white woman claims to have of her (P 17). But the scene also exposes—more 
fully than Irene sees—the limits of her own epistemological schema. After she realizes 
who Clare is, Irene loses herself in the further contemplation of her old friend’s 
appearance, thinking that Clare has 
[a]rresting eyes, slow and mesmeric, with, for all their warmth, something 
withdrawn and secret about them. 
 Ah! Surely! They were Negro eyes, mysterious and concealing. (29) 
Irene suddenly draws the conclusion—punctuated by repeated exclamation points—that 
despite her friend’s passing as white and her marriage to a white man, Clare remains 
“Negro.” As Irene sees it, Clare’s identity as ‘black’ can be concealed, made “secret,” but 
not invalidated. However, Larsen puts her readers in a position to see the irony of Irene’s 
claim that Clare’s eyes signal her essential blackness: earlier in the scene, before she has 
recognized Clare, Irene has also pointed to the woman’s “dark, almost black eyes”—but 
she has done so without any suspicion that the other might also be passing (14). Thus, at 
																																																						
arguing that apparent textual evidence for homosexuality often grows more ambiguous upon 




precisely the moment when she silently ridicules white people for their inability to 
identify African-Americans in their midst, Irene—unbeknownst to her—exhibits this 
same inability. Then, after pointing to the “ridiculous means” that the white world uses to 
delineate race—finger-nails, palms of hands—Irene proclaims her own ability to 
delineate race through the “eyes.” Lest we think that Irene’s status as a woman who can 
pass endows her with superior detective abilities, the text casts serious doubt upon this 
possibility. 
 Passing indicates that, despite understanding the constructed nature of American 
racial classifications, Irene has nonetheless internalized the fundamental logic of this 
epistemological system. That is to say, though clearly in a position to see ‘black’ and 
‘white’ as contingent, culturally determined concepts, Irene still treats racial identity as a 
fact to be known. Despite her avowed desire to be “through with Clare Kendry” after 
their meeting in the Drayton (31), Irene proves incapable of simply removing this other 
woman from her life. According to Irene, this inability results from her and Clare’s 
shared membership in the same racial group: “She had to Clare Kendry a duty. She was 
bound to her by those very ties of race, which, for all her repudiation of them, Clare had 
been unable to completely sever…. Clare Kendry cared nothing for the race. She only 
belonged to it” (52).53 In Irene’s account, though Clare neither appears black nor spends 
much time with black people, she remains inalterably a member of the race. While 
Irene’s racial loyalty makes practical sense, insofar as it stems from the view that 
																																																						
53 Irene’s unspoken attraction to Clare, of course, provides an alternative explanation for this 




members of a marginalized group need to stick together, her attitude toward Clare 
nonetheless shows her accepting and reproducing the logic of the one-drop rule.  
 In a later scene, when her white friend Hugh Wentworth asks her how she 
discerns racial identity, Irene struggles to articulate the basis for her belief in a black-
white racial binary. She tells Hugh, “There are ways. But they’re not definite or tangible” 
(77). She then recounts an instance in which she discovered the racial identity of 
someone in their social circle: “In less than five minutes, I knew she was ‘fay’ [i.e., 
white]. Not from anything she did or said or anything in her appearance. Just—just 
something. A thing that couldn’t be registered” (77). Again, as in her attitude toward 
Clare, we see that for Irene race transcends both appearance and behavior. Despite 
believing in a core racial identity inherent to every individual, Irene shows that she can 
define this identity only negatively. When she concludes by pointing anti-climactically to 
“just something. A thing that couldn’t be registered,” Irene implicitly indicates the 
difficulty of arriving at an articulable justification for America’s arbitrary system of racial 
classification. Like the skeptical speaker Wittgenstein ventriloquizes in Philosophical 
Investigations, Irene maintains that everyone has “a Something” inside (§296), even as 
she finds language inadequate to explain how one might discern the “something” of 
another. Irene takes the same stance toward other people’s race that Cavell describes the 
skeptic taking toward other people’s pain: she wants to know it, beyond all doubt, and her 
overemphasis on knowledge prevents her from envisioning the alternative 




of her culture, which works strenuously to foreclose acknowledgment from anyone it 
defines as black.54  
 Irene applies this same mentality to her marriage. Like Othello, she searches for 
total knowledge of her spouse, and she grows increasingly anxious and frustrated upon 
finding that she cannot achieve the certainty she craves. As Pines notes, Irene 
understands marriage as an expression of respectability politics; having a husband who is 
a doctor in Harlem cements her social and financial security as a member of America’s 
emergent black middle class (86-7). Irene seeks to reproduce, in her own historical and 
national context, Victorian social norms concerning proper gendered conduct; as Judith 
Butler writes, Irene operates according to an idealized vision “of bourgeois family life in 
which women retain their place in the family” (178).55 Following, in her own way, the 
examples of Dowell and Mrs. Ramsay, Irene articulates her commitment to a view of 
heterosexual marriage as a best case of knowledge. Trying to make sense of Brian’s 
seeming unhappiness, she reflects on his erstwhile desire to move to Brazil: 
																																																						
54 Indeed, by believing in essential racial identity even though she cannot articulate any positive 
content to this identity, Irene proves curiously united with Clare’s white husband, Jack Bellew, 
the least likeable, most overtly racist character in the novel. When Jack tells Clare, “You can get 
as black as you please as far as I’m concerned, since I know you’re no nigger” (P 40), he draws a 
sharp distinction between an accidental quality (physical appearance) and essential racial identity. 
Jack’s comment might represent the flagrantly illogical assertion of an ignorant white 
supremacist, but the novel suggests that Irene herself has internalized a version of this same sharp 
distinction. 
55 Frank Hering also explores how Passing critiques Irene’s vision of “idealized domesticity” 
(37). At the same time, as Anthony Dawahare discusses, alongside this more traditionalist vision 
Passing also “represent[s] racial identity as unavoidably shaped by the modern political economy 
of capitalism. Larsen's characters want to be bourgeois because they are afraid of being associated 
with the black working class, which has been exploited and defined as inferior. Their class 
identifications appear racial, however, because the institutions and ideologies of modern 




[T]here had been, in all the years that they had lived together since then, no other 
talk of it…. But because, so she insisted, the bond of flesh and spirit between 
them was so strong, she knew, had always known, that his dissatisfaction had 
continued….  
 A feeling of uneasiness stole upon her at the inconceivable suspicion that 
she might have been wrong in her estimate of her husband’s character. But she 
squirmed away from it. Impossible! She couldn’t have been wrong. Everything 
proved that she had been right. More than right, if such a thing could be. And all, 
she assured herself, because she understood him so well, because she had, 
actually, a special talent for understanding him.… She knew him as well as he 
knew himself, or better. 
 Then why worry? This thing, this discontent … would surely die, flicker 
out, at last. True, she had in the past often been tempted to believe it had died, 
only to become conscious … that she had been merely deceiving herself for a 
while…. But it would die. Of that she was certain. (P 57-8) 
This passage highlights Irene’s conviction as to how much she knows about her 
husband’s unexpressed inner life. The language through which the novel renders her 
interior monologue expresses her confidence in no uncertain terms: “Everything proved” 
she has been right to believe Brian’s interest in Brazil would fade—not just “right,” in 
fact, but “[m]ore than right.” She is “certain” this desire will die; she knows her husband 
“as well as he knew himself, or better.” While claiming knowledge of another’s feelings 




more than emotive: she insists that she “know[s]” his dissatisfaction, but she struggles to 
acknowledge its justifiable causes: namely, his position as a visibly black man in Jim 
Crow America.56 When she asserts her “special talent for understanding” Brian, Irene 
signals her view that the marital bond gives her privileged knowledge of him, knowledge 
no one else can have. This view recalls Dowell’s hope to get “behind [the] eyebrows” of 
his beloved, as well as Mrs. Ramsay’s image of marriage as “two notes sounding 
together.” 
 At the same time, the language of the passage calls into question Irene’s 
epistemological confidence, indicating that—as with Dowell and Mrs. Ramsay—Irene’s 
idealized conception of knowledge sets her up for disappointment. Here and elsewhere, 
Larsen’s use of third person limited perspective gives readers insight into Irene’s 
consciousness, but it also preserves sufficient distance from this character to signal the 
ways in which her logic breaks down. For instance, while Irene intends the claim that she 
has been “[m]ore than right” to demonstrate the strength of her position, in fact such an 
assertion undercuts precisely the point she wants it to bolster, since it raises the question 
of what it could possibly mean for her to be “[m]ore than right” about Brian’s wants. 
Similarly, a phrase like, “so she insisted,” in the second sentence of the passage, reminds 
us that Irene is the one insisting on the strength of this “bond of flesh and spirit” and that 
we need not follow her in this insistence. Indeed, given that Irene and Brian seemingly 
																																																						
56 Brian’s desire to move to Brazil underscores why epistemological issues carry such weight in 
Larsen’s novel; Brian has only wanted to move in the first place because he is afraid of how his 





participate in a sexless marriage, in which each keeps his or her thoughts and desires 
largely hidden from the other, one may reasonably wonder exactly where Irene has 
gathered her evidence concerning the strength of their bond.  
 As the text undercuts Irene’s assertions of the close connection between her and 
Brian, so it also suggests her most intimate bond may not be with her husband at all, but 
rather with Clare. As in the case of Dowell’s sense of intimacy with Edward, Irene proves 
resistant to naming her feelings for Clare; for instance, recalling the “look on Clare’s 
incredibly beautiful face,” Irene describes it as “unfathomable, utterly beyond any 
experience or comprehension of hers” (45). Irene’s inability to specify the nature of her 
feelings for Clare dovetails with Sedgwick’s account of same-sex desire as 
“unspeakable” (BM 94), and it reflects a cultural climate in which homosexual 
relationships, while growing in visibility, remain incompatible with the codes of middle 
class respectability by which Irene wishes to abide.57 Anxiety about her social position 
renders Irene susceptible to the kind of “homosexual panic” Sedgwick describes (BM 89); 
like Dowell, she resists any evidence of a ‘something’ inside her incompatible with her 
social and political goals. But Passing also—unlike To the Lighthouse—challenges 
Sedgwick’s suggestion that homosexual panic is less likely to affect women than it is 
men. Given how difficult it has been, historically speaking, for African-Americans to 
attain the degree of economic security the Redfields enjoy, Passing suggests the inherent 
tenuousness of Irene’s social status and indicates that failing to perform heterosexuality 
																																																						
57 Michael Bronski discusses how Harlem offered a haven for queer people, both white and of 
color, during the 1920s (113), but he also notes the hostility to homosexuality that existed within 




would carry greater consequences for her than it would for someone like Lily Briscoe. 
Whereas Sedgwick argues that relations between men rely on a much stricter conceptual 
divide between homosociality and homosexuality than relations between women do, 
Irene believes deeply in this same divide, seeing (for instance) her charitable work within 
the Harlem community as compatible with her social goals in a way that her attraction to 
Clare is not.58 The homoerotic bond between Irene and Clare makes Passing an 
illustrative example of the kind of lesbian “counterplotting” Terry Castle discusses (74); 
responding to Sedgwick’s work, Castle focuses specifically on “female homosocial 
desire” (83), which she characterizes as “a kind of dismantling or displacement of the 
male homosocial triangle” (82).59  
In the opening scene at the Drayton, Irene indicates her sense of the depth of 
access that she and Clare have to each other’s minds. After Irene thinks that her old 
friend is “really almost too good-looking,” she watches as “a sly, ironical smile peeped 
out on [Clare’s] red full lips, as if she had been in the secret of the other’s thoughts and 
was mocking her” (P 23). This sentence aptly reflects Cavell’s description of being 
closeted as a state of simultaneously fearing and desiring exposure: Irene experiences 
																																																						
58 By contrast, Clare, who takes more pleasure in flouting conventions of bourgeois respectability, 
does not abide by this same conceptual divide, seeing her flirtatious socializing with Irene as 
perfectly consistent with her goal of participating more fully in the life of Harlem’s black (and 
black female) community.     
59 Castle challenges Sedgwick’s inclination to make homosexual panic the exclusive province of 
male-male relations, arguing that “[t]he homosexual panic elicited by women publicly signaling 
their sexual interest in one another continues … to be just as virulent as that inspired by male 
homosexuality, if not more so” (72). See Castle 67-74 for her complete response to Sedgwick. H. 
Landry Jordan also notes the relevance of Castle’s theory to Passing; Jordan argues that, by virtue 
of the racial antipathy Brian and Jack Bellew hold for each other, the text suppresses the potential 





Clare’s evident penetration into her private thoughts as frightening and thrilling at the 
same time. Moreover, the passage suggests that Irene feels similarly cognizant of Clare’s 
interiority; it is not just that Clare knows, but that Irene knows she knows.60 A few 
paragraphs later, as she continues to stare at Clare, Irene experiences “an offended feeling 
that behind what was now only an ivory mask lurked a scornful amusement” (24). In this 
moment as well, Irene assumes the same epistemological stance toward Clare that she 
elsewhere assumes toward Brian, claiming an ability to discern the true feelings hidden 
behind the other’s external “mask.” 
 However, given the ambivalent nature of her feelings for Clare, Irene periodically 
seeks to de-emphasize the extent of their intimacy. Resolving, as she often does, not to 
see Clare anymore, she tells herself that 
[s]ince childhood their lives had never really touched. Actually they were 
strangers. Strangers in their ways and means of living. Strangers in their desires 
and ambitions. Strangers even in their racial consciousness. Between them the 
barrier was just as high, just as broad, and just as firm as if in Clare did not run 
that strain of black blood. In truth, it was higher, broader, and firmer; because for 
her there were perils, not known, or imagined, by those others who had no such 
secrets to alarm or endanger them. (62-3) 
																																																						
60 Gabrielle McIntire similarly notes that “Clare seems to possess an unusual ability to divine … 
Irene’s … private thoughts” (“Toward a Narratology” 783). McIntire draws a contrast between 
the access Clare has to Irene’s mind and Clare’s hiddenness from Irene. But often, as here, Irene 




While elsewhere asserting that their shared racial identity necessarily connects her with 
Clare, here Irene seeks to deny or negate this connection. She expresses a version of 
Wittgenstein’s comment “that one human being can be a complete enigma to another,” 
that on occasion we may simply prove unable to “find our feet” with the cultural and 
linguistic practices of others (PI II, §325). As is often the case, Larsen’s rendering of 
interior monologue undercuts her protagonist’s claims: Irene’s insistent repetition of 
“Strangers” sounds a false note, overemphasizing her and Clare’s distance from each 
other. Irene similarly overplays her hand when she states that the “barrier” between the 
two women is even “higher, broader, and firmer” than it would be if Clare didn’t possess 
“black blood” at all. In the final clause of the passage, Irene offers a confusing 
justification for this claim: she seems to be saying that passing puts Clare in a uniquely 
dangerous situation, exposing her to “perils” that other African-Americans cannot 
understand—as though those who are visibly black in the Jim Crow era would have no 
sense of what it means to live dangerously. But Irene’s use of the pronoun “her” is 
ambiguous: it might also obliquely refer back to Irene herself, reflecting her unarticulated 
sense that her attraction to Clare leaves her with a dangerous secret of her own. This 
ambiguity weakens the ostensible thrust of the passage, bringing Irene and Clare together 
as plausible antecedents of “her,” even while Irene seeks to keep them separate.  
The action of the novel soon undercuts Irene’s claims even further: later in this 
same chapter (and on this same day), Clare shows up unannounced at Irene’s Harlem 
residence. In stark contrast to Irene’s professions that they are strangers, the conversation 




attunement. When Clare, hurt that Irene has not responded to her letter, suggests that 
Irene doesn’t want to see her, Irene says, “No, Clare, it’s not that. But even you must see 
that it’s terribly foolish, and not just the right thing” (P 65).61 In response to Irene’s 
attempt to keep her at arm’s length, Clare exclaims, “The right thing! … You don’t, you 
really can’t mean exactly that” (66). Here, Clare indicates to Irene—and to readers—how 
much knowledge she does have of the other woman’s inner life, since she accurately 
discerns that Irene has not said exactly what she means. Clare sees Irene’s appeal to “the 
right thing” for what it is: a vague excuse, through which Irene imperfectly conceals the 
complex mixture of desire and aversion she feels for her interlocutor. Such moments put 
pressure on Irene’s claim that her relationship with Brian constitutes an epistemological 
best case. For, although Irene claims privileged access to Brian’s psyche, in fact the text 
suggests how much distance exists between the two. By contrast, although Irene casts 
herself and Clare as enigmas to each other, the text suggests how intimately linked they 
turn out to be. Passing thereby contests—in ways Irene tries not to see—the cultural 
positioning of heterosexual marriage as the necessary best case for knowing another 
mind.      
As she attempts to negotiate between these two competing forms of intimacy (her 
marriage to Brian; her connection to Clare), Irene finds herself facing an additional 
complication when she discovers (she thinks) that Brian and Clare are having an affair. In 
																																																						
61 Notice the awkward syntax here: Irene does not say that it’s ‘just not the right thing,’ but rather 
that it’s “not just the right thing.” This phrasing carries with it the possibility that Irene, perhaps 
unwittingly, uses “just” to mean something like ‘exactly,’—i.e., that seeing Clare would be not 




this respect, the interpersonal dynamics of Passing recall those of The Good Soldier—
though with the genders reversed, as in Castle’s re-writing of Sedgwick’s model. In their 
epistemological attitudes toward spousal infidelity, however, Irene and Dowell could not 
be more different. Whereas Dowell takes the skeptic’s stance of refusing to claim 
knowledge of anything, despite being confronted with overwhelming evidence of his 
wife’s adultery, Irene continues to insist on how much she knows about Brian, and thus 
she quickly convinces herself that the affair is real, despite possessing only scanty 
evidence for its existence. Irene’s supposed realization comes after Brian admits that he 
has invited Clare to a party without consulting her: Irene thinks, “Clare Kendry! So that 
was it!” and from this moment on largely treats Brian’s infidelity as established fact (89). 
Her interior monologue consistently addresses the affair through the language of 
knowledge: for instance, she thinks, “Knowing, stumbling on this thing, had changed 
her” (91). She wishes she could “shut out the knowledge from which had arisen this 
turmoil” (96), and in a characteristic overstatement, she reminds herself that the affair 
“had happened. She knew it, and knew that she knew it” (106). In another moment, Irene 
considers taking a more measured epistemological position, admitting that “[s]he had 
seen nothing, heard nothing. She had no facts or proofs” (96). But, increasingly as the 
novel approaches its climax, “facts” and “proofs” fail to check her aggressive drive for 
knowledge—the same drive that has led her to insist on her certain grasp of her 
husband’s inner life. Evidently, she finds that even the pain caused by believing in the 




 To the end, Irene remains committed to treating her world as an object of 
knowledge, rather than an occasion for acknowledgment. In the same way that Othello, 
attempting to achieve certainty with respect to his wife’s fidelity, is increasingly driven 
mad by the impossibility of this effort, so Irene undergoes a similar trajectory with 
respect to Brian’s alleged affair. The novel concludes with Clare dying in sudden, 
mysterious circumstances—she falls, jumps, or perhaps is pushed out a sixth story 
window—and commentators have often cast Irene as the cause of Clare’s death.62 If such 
a reading is correct, it seems that Irene, like Othello, turns to murder in a desperate 
attempt to satisfy her increasingly acute craving for total knowledge.63 Whatever else it 
achieves, killing Clare re-establishes the “security” (P 107) of certainty in Irene’s life; it 
irrevocably terminates the alleged affair, allowing Irene to retain at least the appearance 
of domestic tranquility with Brian, and it abruptly checks the development of Irene’s own 
disorienting feelings for this other woman.64 But readings that posit Irene as Clare’s 
murderer de-emphasize the way in which Larsen’s ending frustrates whatever desire for 
certainty readers may be feeling. As Gabrielle McIntire writes, readers are “forced to 
																																																						
62 For readings that present Irene as Clare’s likely murderer, see McDowell 93; McLendon 108-9; 
Cutter 96; Hering 42; and Pines 89.  
63 While Cavell does not say much about race in his reading of Othello, it seems that both 
Shakespeare and Larsen present the experience of living in a racist society as a contributing factor 
in their protagonists’ epistemological desperation: in cultures that deprive marginalized groups of 
so much, both authors suggest, members of these groups who have attained a certain degree of 
economic and social standing are likely to place great stock in maintaining what they have 
gained—including, in both cases, unchallenged claim to their spouses.   
64 A point about plot: Irene’s concern about the continuance of the affair has just spiked because 
Bellew has learned his wife’s ‘true’ racial identity. Irene is worried that the dissolution of this 
marriage will leave Clare with nothing to prevent her from re-settling in Harlem permanently. As 
Irene runs across the room toward Clare (maybe to save her, maybe not), the text tells us that 
“[o]ne thought possessed her. She couldn’t have Clare Kendy cast aside by Bellew. She couldn’t 




mimic Irene's struggles with the indecipherability of others, since this text can have no 
final reading” (“Toward a Narratology” 789). Irene responds to Clare’s death with a 
concerted mental effort to convince herself that she is not responsible: “‘It was an 
accident, a terrible accident,’ she muttered fiercely. ‘It was’” (P 112). But Larsen’s use of 
third person limited perspective means that, while we can question Irene’s view, we have 
no alternative perspective available to us through which we might construct a satisfying 
account of Clare’s death—an imperfect epistemological position reminiscent of that in 
which The Good Soldier leaves its readers.   
 By exposing the limits of knowledge in this way, Passing also follows The Good 
Soldier in making an urgent, if largely implicit, call for acknowledgment. Larsen suggests 
that Irene seeks to know Brian and Clare, to gain and maintain access to their minds, as a 
way of deflecting from her own emotional isolation. In one scene, as Irene inwardly 
mulls over their alleged affair while attempting to remain outwardly unruffled, Larsen 
describes her protagonist’s “want[ing] suddenly to shock people, to hurt them, to make 
them notice her, to be aware of her suffering” (92). This line captures Irene’s unvoiced 
desire to gain acknowledgment, even if she must take the kind of aggressive tack that 
someone like Mr. Ramsay employs. But, as in the case of Dowell, Irene struggles to 
achieve much diegetic acknowledgment of her suffering; it is left to us, the readers, to 
recognize the private pain that her interior monologue conveys. Passing enables us to see 
how Irene’s overarching desire for security prompts her to de-emphasize the problems in 
her marriage and to avoid an honest articulation (even to herself) of her feelings for 




she largely dismisses Brian’s concerns about living, and raising sons, as a visibly black 
man in Jim Crow America; she remains unsympathetic to Clare’s sadness about being cut 
off from the African-American community. In her representation of a world conditioned 
by heteronormative, white supremacist fantasies of knowledge, Larsen emphasizes how 
difficult it can be for someone in Irene’s position to give and receive acknowledgment, or 
even to gain much clarity about what it would look like to do so.  
*   *   * 
 The Good Soldier, To the Lighthouse, and Passing all critique the Victorian model 
of heterosexual marriage, showing not only that this traditional social form is oppressive, 
but also that its particular mode of oppressiveness involves its imposition of unrealistic 
standards for what it would mean to know another human being. At worst, as in the case 
of Dowell, these idealized standards give rise to extreme forms of skepticism; at best, as 
in the case of Mrs. Ramsay, they breed disappointment and doubts about language. In 
their portrayals of same-sex bonds as modes of interpersonal relation liberated from 
Victorian mores, all three novels respond to and extend the modern cultural imagining of 
such non-normative forms of intimacy. But the particular perceptiveness of Ford, Woolf, 
and Larsen consists in their recognition that participants in such non-normative relations 
are liable to reproduce the same unrealistic epistemological expectations associated with 
heterosexual marriage. All three novelists anticipate Cavell’s suggestion in The Claim of 
Reason that perhaps the kind of knowledge we already have of one another is as much of 
a ‘best case’ as we can find: “Mightn’t it be that … just this radiation of relationships, of 




best be expressed?” (439). Cavell goes on to propose such examples as “hiding inside a 
marriage” and “hiding outside a marriage” as “perhaps the most that knowing others 
comes to, or has come to for me” (439). Marriage is an important test case for Cavell’s 
Wittgenstein-informed philosophy, because in marriage we are likely to know a lot about 
our partner, even as they still remain hidden from us in inalterable ways, and knowing a 
great deal about someone should theoretically (but often only theoretically) improve our 
understanding of what it would look like to acknowledge that person.65 This same logic 
also applies to other forms of intimate relation: not only relationships between romantic 
partners, but also those between parents and children and between siblings. In his 
representations of the modernizing U.S. South, William Faulkner vividly portrays how 
altered material realities affect familial dynamics of acknowledgment. For an 
investigation of these shifting dynamics, we turn now to his fiction.  
																																																						
65 As Robert Chodat writes, “Marriage embodies this condition of simultaneous intimacy and 
fragility, and it’s this constant vulnerability—our consent always endangered by separation—that 




CHAPTER THREE: FRAGMENTING FAMILIES, PRIVATE LANGUAGE 
FANTASIES: FAULKNER’S THE SOUND AND THE FURY AND AS I LAY 
DYING 
 
 “That the world is my world,” Wittgenstein writes in the Tractatus (1921), “shows 
itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the language which I understand) mean 
the limits of my world” (5.62). In context, this remark helps Wittgenstein to develop his 
claim that language cannot speak coherently about anything “outside the world” (T 6.41); 
since I can never view the world apart from my own subjective perspective on it, it seems 
that “the language which I understand” contains within it the possibilities of meaningful 
expression as such. In his later work, Wittgenstein attends more fully to the diversity and 
multiplicity of human linguistic practices, revising his youthful assumption that the 
language possessed by one individual speaker might provide sufficient evidence for an 
overarching analysis of the relations between word and world.1 In the late ‘20s, just as 
Wittgenstein began to develop his so-called ‘ordinary language philosophy,’ William 
Faulkner wrote the two novels that would put him on the map as a major modernist 
writer—The Sound and the Fury (1929) and As I Lay Dying (1930). These texts function 
as fictional explorations of the early Wittgensteinian notion “[t]hat the world is my 
world.” In both novels, Faulkner uses stream-of-consciousness narration to give voice to 
																																																						
1 As Michael North discusses, Wittgenstein’s use of the English word “limit” points to a 
conceptual problem in the project of the Tractatus, since “limit” is a translation of the German 
word “grenze,” which can also be translated as “boundary.” The difference in meaning between 
these two words is significant: “there is nothing beyond a limit, but a boundary has another side” 
(Reading 37). More than “limit,” then, “boundary” suggests the rough divisions between different 
spheres of human language practice that Wittgenstein sets out to trace in his later work. For a 




the inner lives of his characters, showing the inability of speakers to transcend their own 
subjective viewpoints and conceptions of language. Frederic Jameson has written that 
modernist texts take “the experience of atrocious solitude” as their fundamental theme 
(Postmodernism 14). In this respect Faulkner’s novels and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 
exhibit a similar modernist sensibility.  
 Just as the Tractatus seeks to mark out the limits of language, so Faulkner’s 
speakers lament their own discovery of these limits. The Sound and the Fury shows the 
mute Benjy Compson “trying”—and failing—“to say” (53). As I Lay Dying contains 
Addie Bundren’s bitter contention that “words are no good” (171). Faulkner scholars 
have often pointed to these two memorable lines as indexing broader attitudes on the part 
of the author toward his literary project. For example, James A. Snead argues that 
Faulkner uses Benjy’s line to convey a fundamental insight about linguistic signification: 
“Human language cannot echo God’s performance in Genesis …. From the first word we 
are unable to ‘say,’ and ‘trying to say’ only worsens things” (29). Similarly, with respect 
to As I Lay Dying, Donald M. Kartiganer finds that Addie’s conception of a stark 
“division between words and deeds ... underlies the whole novel” (24).2 Such analyses are 
																																																						
2 These two examples provide particularly clear expressions of a viewpoint that has been widely 
held by Faulkner scholars. For instance, André Bleikasten writes, “Is not the entire first section 
[of The Sound and the Fury] a ‘trying to say’? One could even go further and extend the meaning 
of the phrase to the whole of the novel” (83). Similarly, readings have proliferated that assume 
Faulkner writes As I Lay Dying in order to endorse and confirm Addie’s statement: Floyd C. 
Watkins comments that Addie articulates Faulkner’s “denial of the efficacy of a moral 
vocabulary” and preference for “concrete … action” (182); Bleikasten sees the Addie section as 
showing how language “can never be more than a poor substitute for experience” (137). In a 
more recent reading, Marc Hewson testifies to the persistence of this viewpoint with his claim 
that “the importance of intuitive love and of language’s inadequacy to express it … maintains 




undeniably correct in their recognition that, as Deborah Clarke puts it, “[f]ew writers 
focus on the problematic nature of language more thoroughly than Faulkner” (57). But 
should we, as readers, be so quick to assume that Faulkner endorses the linguistic 
skepticism these characters express? After all, Philosophical Investigations (1953) offers 
a corrective to Wittgenstein’s youthful philosophy of language by attending more fully to 
the specific social circumstances in which words get used. Our scholarly understanding 
of Faulkner requires a similar corrective; rather than understanding Benjy and Addie’s 
statements as capturing broader truths about the limits of language, we should examine 
how the particular cultural and material circumstances these characters confront condition 
their pictures of language. The rich body of historicist scholarship on Faulkner has 
productively clarified his representation of economic modernization in the rural South 
and the new iterations of traditional social conflicts that arise as a result. What remains is 
to take this historically-informed understanding of Faulkner’s fiction and to synthesize it 
with his philosophical meditations on the limits of language. To this end, Wittgenstein’s 
attention to ordinary language enables an exploration of how words inform and structure 
the world of Faulkner’s characters. Through such a framework, the question becomes: 
Why has language become so problematic in this specific world? What are the historical 
conditions that make Faulkner’s speakers feel so dubious about their ability to “say,” to 
make themselves understood? To what extent does Faulkner’s fiction really endorse this 
linguistic skepticism, and to what extent does it expose and lament the oppressive social 




 This chapter reads The Sound and the Fury and As I Lay Dying as registering the 
philosophical consequences of modernity on members of two families, the Compsons and 
the Bundrens. Both families understand the modernization of the economy as 
precipitating the decline of their own financial and social power; as a result, members of 
both grow increasingly isolated from one another and begin to pursue individual 
economic and social interests, rather than familial ones. Both novels show how emergent 
economic uncertainties, combined with ongoing commitments to traditional social codes, 
make characters feel increasingly convinced of the absolute, “monadlike” privacy of their 
own experiences and thus of their incapacity to convey their frustrations and traumas to 
others (Jameson, Postmodernism 15). In the Investigations, Wittgenstein considers the 
possibility of private language, which he defines as a language in which “words … refer 
to what only the speaker can know—to his immediate private sensations. So another 
person cannot understand the language” (PI §243). Wittgenstein pushes back against such 
a possibility, suggesting that we understand what words mean only by virtue of growing 
up into a social world that teaches us to use them in particular ways. In his extension of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, Cavell suggests that the speaker who believes in private 
language overlooks the capacity of language to grant acknowledgment; that is to say, she 
maintains that words cannot enable others to know her internal experiences, while 
neglecting to recognize that a statement like “I know you are in pain” does not function 
as an expression of certainty, but rather of “sympathy” (MWM 263). 
 Cavell goes on to argue, via a reading of King Lear (1608/1623), that family 




acknowledgment.3 He writes that family dynamics reveal “what people will have to say 
and try to mean to one another when they are incapable of acknowledging to one another 
what they have to acknowledge” (284). Cavell’s own focus on Shakespeare 
notwithstanding, his discussion of family relations proves uniquely relevant to the 
historical circumstances Faulkner’s characters confront. Using the formal device of 
interior monologue, Faulkner depicts a series of characters who understand themselves as 
speaking into a world they cannot impact and struggling accordingly to gain 
acknowledgment from their family members. These characters give voice to what Cavell 
calls “the fantasy of … private language,” which registers a person’s “fear … of 
inexpressiveness” (CR 351). Like Wittgenstein’s Investigations, Faulkner’s texts dissolve 
these fantasies by highlighting the degree to which all the Compsons and Bundrens—
even Benjy—participate in the broader linguistic practices of their world. At the same 
time, Faulkner’s texts explore the individual as well as collective motivations behind 
these linguistic fantasies, suggesting the culturally-induced reasons why characters distort 
or misconstrue the ordinary meanings of words.  
 
The Modernizing South and the Philosophical Problem of Privacy 
 
 Before we turn to the novels themselves, it will be instructive to establish more 
fully the historical conditions Faulkner attributes to his imagined Yoknapatawpha 
																																																						
3 For a fuller discussion of Wittgenstein’s comments on private language and Cavell’s extension 




County. In the 1920s, the U.S. South was in the late stages of a lengthy and fraught 
economic transition, during which landowners persistently “resisted attempts … to 
translate the bound laborer into the free employee” (Godden, Fictions 115). While white 
Southerners have often upheld the loss of the Civil War as the irrevocable end to an old 
way of life, in fact this loss represented not the end of the plantation system so much as 
its reconstitution. During Reconstruction, wealthy landowning families like the 
Compsons began once again using exploitatively cheap black labor to produce their 
cotton. In addition, the white aristocracy continued to enforce strict prohibitions on 
miscegenation and female sexuality, wanting to maintain a system of patrilineal 
succession and to ensure smooth transitions of power to white sons. As for poorer whites 
like the Bundrens, before the Civil War they primarily engaged in subsistence farming, 
occasionally bartering with their neighbors but rarely entering into economic transactions 
that took them much out of their own environs (Doyle 306). During and after the war, 
with the price of cotton soaring, many of these same farmers shifted to producing more 
goods for the external marketplace (Beckert 289). Doing so, however, subjected the 
livelihoods of these laborers to the whims of national and international markets; prices 
fluctuated “in ways that to farmers in Mississippi seemed totally disconnected from the 
amount of labor they put into producing the cotton” (Doyle 307). When forced to 
confront the inevitable bust cycles in cotton demand, these farmers found it difficult to 
return to more self-sufficient habits. Many lost their familiar livelihoods altogether, 
“forfeited their land to creditors,” and turned to sharecropping, joining African-American 




By the 1920s, cotton prices had reached historic lows, and white landowners were 
forced to confront the reality that their society was moving away from the plantation 
system and toward an economy increasingly defined by industrial wage labor (Godden, 
Fictions 117). Shifts in economic relations also opened up space for new challenges to 
strict social codes.4 In The Sound and the Fury and As I Lay Dying, Faulkner chronicles 
this moment of economic modernization by focusing on the sense of disorientation it 
produced in Southern white families. As such, to the extent that modernization seems like 
a narrative of decline in both novels, it bears remembering that those expressing this 
attitude tend to be white characters who sense their economic prospects growing less 
secure than they once were. In response to economic uncertainty, these characters look to 
preserve epistemological stability. One way of doing so involves maintaining and 
reaffirming the old social order, which denies acknowledgment to anyone who refuses to 
abide by its strict codes.   
 Modernization disrupts formerly stable assumptions on the part of Faulkner’s 
white characters concerning their ability to share their private experiences with others, as 
Elaine Scarry’s The Body in Pain (1985) helps to show. As I note in my introduction, 
when Wittgenstein considers the inclination to understand oneself as speaking a private 
language, his investigation of this attitude remains disconnected from any particular 
																																																						
4 One response to these economic shifts was the Great Migration; African-Americans increasingly 
left Southern, rural environments in order to pursue wage labor employment in Northern and/or 
urban ones (Godden, “Difficult Economy” 11). In some of his later fiction, most notably Go 
Down, Moses (1942), Faulkner more directly represents the consequences of black emigration 
from the South. My fourth chapter examines texts by two African-American writers—Richard 
Wright and Ralph Ellison—who participated in this migratory movement themselves. For more 




historical circumstances. As such, Scarry’s account of the relationship between bodily 
privacy and modern capitalism provides a helpful bridge between Wittgenstein’s 
inquiries and the historical situation represented in Faulkner’s texts.5 For Scarry, the 
creation of material products extends the human body out into the world, placing it into 
relationships with other bodies. Under pre-industrial economic conditions, such 
exchanges of labor mitigate the “deep privacy” of embodied human experience (252). 
When we wear clothes our acquaintances have made, or eat food they have grown, we 
connect ourselves to these others via their creative products. Industrial capitalism, under 
which the frequency of economic exchange accelerates, would seem to represent the next 
step in this process of bodily interconnection, a positive development for the 
“socialization of sentience” (256). But Scarry, working in a Marxian tradition, describes 
how the capitalist economy restructures this sharing of made products, creating a 
situation wherein the many exert themselves to create goods that benefit the few and 
receive little in return. Under modern economic conditions, social and economic relations 
no longer mitigate the individual’s pain (unless that individual is part of the minority who 
controls the means of production) but rather exacerbate it.  
Faulkner’s fiction, understood through Scarry’s scheme, shows formerly wealthy 
white families belatedly experiencing the disorienting consequences of economic 
modernization. While the plantation economy certainly exhibits its own rapacious, 
																																																						
5 Though Wittgenstein’s work constitutes a crucial precursor to her own, Scarry does not 
explicitly name Wittgenstein as a major influence in the way that Cavell does. The Body in Pain 




capitalist logic,6 this older economic model also privileges families like the Compsons, 
who would have controlled the means of production. White landowners, relying on the 
disingenuous logic of paternalism, could claim to feel a sense of personal connection with 
the laborers who produced their food, conveniently looking past the suffering of the 
enslaved or exploited workers on the other end of this equation.7 But as the plantation 
system falls apart, the Compsons must accustom themselves to an economic order under 
which it becomes increasingly difficult for them to benefit from the labor of those with 
whom they are personally acquainted. Whereas poor whites never received the same 
economic benefits from the plantation system as richer families did, modern economic 
conditions likewise made it more difficult for the lower classes to enter into exchanges of 
labor with relatives and others in their immediate environs. As members of the Compson 
and Bundren families grapple with these new economic realities, they grow increasingly 
skeptical about the possibility of sharing a language with those around them.   
 
The Sound and the Fury: Benjy’s Initiation into Language   
 
Philip Weinstein has written that Faulkner’s formally innovative representations 
of interiority explode the epistemological paradigms of nineteenth-century realism. 
Whereas the protagonist of a realist novel moves toward an increased state of knowledge 
																																																						
6 Beckert describes the traditional plantation economy as an example of “war capitalism,” an 
economic system “resting on the violent expropriation of land and labor” (xv). 
7 As Philip Hanson notes, the logic of paternalism cast the plantation as both “a family and an 
economic unit” and placed landowners in the dual roles of “father” and “master” (6). For perhaps 




and clarity, Faulkner’s modernist subjects remain suspended in a state of “crisis,” 
incapable of overcoming their private traumas or of seeing themselves clearly (Weinstein, 
Unknowing 116).8 But Faulkner’s fiction does more than simply attack traditional 
paradigms of knowledge. Via its formally innovation representations of consciousness, 
The Sound and the Fury bears out Cavell’s conception of acknowledgment as a middle 
path between outdated claims to knowledge and the defeatist impulses of other-mind 
skepticism. The great power of Faulkner’s modernist aesthetic relies on its capacity to 
achieve two conflicting goals simultaneously: to the extent that Faulkner’s 
representations of interiority prove disorientating or inaccessible to readers, such effects 
reflect the characters’ isolation and their concomitant tendencies to experience and 
conceptualize the world in seemingly bizarre ways. At the same time, to the extent that 
Faulkner’s representations rely on a shared understanding of language between author, 
character, and reader, the novel allows readers to develop a certain insight into the 
Compsons’ operative ideologies and to experience a certain compassion for these 
psychologically damaged figures. Faulkner thereby invites readers to acknowledge the 
pain at the root of his characters’ stories.9 
																																																						
8 For more on the aesthetic and epistemological assumptions of realism, and how Faulkner 
challenges these assumptions, see Unknowing 21-76, 111-4, 143-57, 186-93, 231-7, and 244-5.  
9 Michael Kreyling has expressed concern that attempts on the part of readers to empathize with 
Faulkner’s characters run the risk of “reduc[ing] his texts to referential content” (264). It is 
precisely because I share this concern that I prefer the term ‘acknowledgment’ to ‘empathy’: to 
read Faulkner’s fiction as cultivating acknowledgment is to understand the formal features of his 
texts as indispensable to this project. Given that Faulkner’s efforts at acknowledgment, in both 
The Sound and the Fury and As I Lay Dying, are so deeply bound up with his formal 
representations of interiority, my focus will be on those speakers from whose perspective 
Faulkner writes. This focus will involve saying more about the brothers in the Compson family 
than about Caddy or Caroline, for example; in the case of these latter characters, readers must 




Over the course of its four sections, The Sound and the Fury gradually replaces a 
picture of language as private and incommunicable with a picture of language as shared 
and social. The novel opens with a character whose limited expressive resources make it 
uniquely challenging for him to share language with or gain acknowledgment from those 
around him. Others use Benjy’s inability to speak as an excuse to deny the existence of 
his inner life; his brother Jason suggests that if the family had sent Benjy to the mental 
institution at Jackson “he’d never have known the difference”—a claim that Benjy’s 
section of narration obviously disputes (SF 263). Commentators have generally agreed 
with Noel Polk that Benjy is “nonlingual” and therefore that “the language of Benjy’s 
section is Faulkner’s language” (105).10 The small body of criticism that reads Faulkner 
through Wittgenstein only adds to this scholarly consensus. Rupert Read compares 
Benjy’s consciousness with that of a severe schizophrenic, and he argues that it is an 
“illusion” to think the words of such figures “mean anything at all” to those of us who 
speak in ordinary language (280). “We have a language” for Benjy’s mind, Read writes, 
																																																						
enable an acknowledgment of their pain in the same way. For more on why I’ve chosen to follow 
Cavell in focusing on ‘acknowledgment,’ as opposed to foregrounding other, potentially similar 
terms (like ‘empathy’), see my introduction. 
10 In a similar vein, L. Cecil Moffitt writes that “most of the talk which swirls around [Benjy] is, 
to him, merely sound” (37). For Bleikasten, “[t]he severe restrictions imposed on [Benjy’s] 
linguistic abilities reveal the extent of his mental deficiencies. Benjy is an idiot, and all that is left 
to him is sensory and emotional response, perception without intellection, and a capacity for the 
raw intensities of pleasure and pain” (71). The position of Judith Lockyer is more nuanced and 
thus closer to my own; she writes that “[w]ords cannot produce Benjy’s actual state…. The 
language in this section serves a conscious function as the ordering device, the translator of an 
otherwise incomprehensible mind” (53). I agree with her that Faulkner often represents in words 
sensations Benjy is likely to process non-linguistically, but I would go farther than she does by 
emphasizing that Benjy often does have some conceptual understanding of the terms he hears 




“but we do not … have knowledge of it” (277).11 Insisting that Faulkner cannot provide 
knowledge of Benjy’s mind, Read overlooks the capacity of Faulkner’s representation to 
enable acknowledgment; that is to say, Faulkner certainly points out Benjy’s conceptual 
difference, but he also uses the resources of the English language to give readers a degree 
of insight into this character’s pain.  
Contra Read, understanding Benjy through Wittgenstein reveals the depth of the 
character’s embeddedness in the linguistic practices of his society. In the Investigations, 
Wittgenstein writes: “[I]n order to want to say something one must also have mastered a 
language; and yet it is clear that one can want to speak without speaking” (§338).12 While 
it would hardly be fair to say that Benjy has “mastered” the language of his society, 
nonetheless his desire “to say” reflects his partial grasp of what and how words mean. 
Faulkner casts Benjy as a kind of limit case in how his characters grow up into the 
																																																						
11 Read’s approach to Faulkner is informed by that of James Guetti, who argues that the language 
of Benjy’s section “ceases to be dominated by the rules of the grammars we bring to it; it 
becomes, for its duration, itself the dominating language” (88). In other words, it is not that Benjy 
speaks our language but that we come to speak his. Guetti provides a plausible description of 
what happens when we read the Benjy section, but his reading becomes less persuasive when we 
understand Benjy as a historically constituted character. For Read, Guetti does not go far enough 
in asserting Benjy’s incoherence and inaccessibility: “[D]iscourse such as Benjy’s … does not 
involve any ordinary signification [and] … does not really make sense” (276). Read’s primary 
aim seems to be to evaluate our capacity to learn about the inner experiences of actual 
schizophrenics, and he evidently assumes that the Benjy section is relevant to his interest in 
schizophrenic consciousness, even though—by the terms of his own argument—this 
consciousness is so inaccessible that no one is in a position to say whether Benjy would qualify as 
a schizophrenic or not. The amount of space Read devotes to actually quoting from the novel 
(almost none) makes his priorities clear.   
12 Shortly after this remark, Wittgenstein argues against William James’s claim that “thought is 
possible without speech,” a claim James supports by quoting from the reminiscences of a deaf-
mute, “who wrote that in his early youth, even before he could speak, he had had thoughts about 
God and the world” (PI §342). Wittgenstein asks incredulously, “What could that mean!?” 
Wittgenstein suggests that, whenever we think “in words,” we do so via the language we have 




language of their world; though Benjy is deeply separate from the rest of his society in 
many ways, he has nonetheless learned significant portions of its linguistic fabric. The 
opening of the novel captures Benjy’s simultaneous participation in and alienation from 
shared linguistic practices:  
Through the fence, between the curling flower spaces, I could see them hitting. 
They were coming toward where the flag was, and I went along the fence. Luster 
was hunting in the grass by the flower tree. They took the flag out, and they were 
hitting. Then they put the flag back and they went to the table, and he hit and the 
other hit. Then they went on …  
 “Here, caddie.” He hit. … 
 “Listen at you now.” Luster said. “Aint you something, thirty three years 
old, going on that way.” (SF 3) 
Certainly, Benjy’s perspective proves disorienting, particularly for a first time reader, but 
his account of what he observes in fact relies on the use of familiar words in (mostly) 
familiar contexts. As Benjy looks out onto the golf course that was formerly his family’s 
pasture land, Faulkner shows that the youngest Compson brother understands what a 
“fence” is, as well as a “flag,” and he even understands what the golfers are doing as an 
example of “hitting.” One might argue that such correct uses of terms are simply the 
result of Faulkner writing Benjy through his own authorial language—except that the 
passage also features multiple departures from common usage, which reflect concepts 
Benjy has learned only partially. Benjy evidently does not know the name for this 




Similarly, Benjy describes the golfers’ tee box as a “table”—an example of his using 
language in a way that, while literally incorrect, still suggests a certain familiarity with 
common parlance. Cavell, describing a hypothetical child’s gradual acquisition of 
language, makes the following comment, relevant to our understanding of Benjy:  
Before the child is a master of our language he or she may not discriminate 
between a table and a tray. Here I find I do not want to say that we do not agree 
about what a table (or a tray) is—the child will call a table anything (well, lots of 
things) I call a table, and I will call almost everything the child calls a table a table 
…. One might say that our agreement on this point lacks a certain depth, but this 
lack pales before the vastness of agreement implied in our (provisional) 
agreement that trays are tables. (CHAU 94) 
Cavell’s discussion suggests that a child who calls a tray a table has already learned a 
great deal about what makes something a table—that it is flat, say, and holds food, and is 
often rectangular. In calling the tee box a table, Benjy displays a shakier grasp of “table” 
than this child does. Still, even this misuse demonstrates Benjy’s ability to learn concepts 
based on the words those around him speak. He has perhaps understood the key criterion 
of a table to be flatness—a necessary feature of tables (good ones, anyway), though 
hardly a sufficient one. Not knowing what a “tee box” is, he applies the closest concept 
that he does know, that he has learned from his society’s shared linguistic practices.  
 Benjy’s unusual uses of language in the opening passage reflect his struggle to 
grasp more contingent, culturally specific concepts—like “golf.” The fact that the golf 




revolution in southern land use (Godden, Fictions 46), indexing broader economic shifts 
that Benjy does not know how to conceptualize. Benjy’s difficulty with shifting 
terminology is also evident in his response to the golfer’s shout of “caddie.” When Benjy 
hears “caddie,” he associates it with his departed sister Caddy and begins crying—an 
action that Luster’s comment registers, though Benjy does not note it himself. Benjy’s 
difficulty processing the shift from “Caddy” (sister) to “caddie” (salaried employee) 
shows his struggle to incorporate more modern forms of social relation into his 
conceptual understanding of the world. That said, the usual reading of this passage—
namely, that Benjy does not see how one signifier can refer to two different signifieds—
may not give him enough credit.13 Recently, Taylor Hagood has suggested that the 
different spellings of the two terms (“Caddy” versus “caddie”) may be Faulkner’s way of 
indicating that Benjy does distinguish between them (103). Extending this line of 
argument, we could say that “Caddy” represents Benjy’s concept for his sister, whereas 
“caddie” represents his concept for someone-who-is-not-his-sister-but-still-gets-called-
by-her-name. So Benjy starts crying because it disturbs him to hear his sister’s name used 
to refer to a strange person on his pasture.   
 Central to Wittgenstein’s philosophy, as we have seen, is the idea that humans 
learn language through social interaction, through observing and reproducing the 
practices of other, more experienced speakers. When we learn language, Cavell writes, 
we learn  
																																																						
13 Weinstein effectively summarizes this standard view, writing that “[s]ince [Benjy] cannot 




not merely … the pronunciation of sounds, and their grammatical orders, but the 
‘forms of life’ which make those sounds the words they are, do what they do— 
e.g., name, call, point, express a wish or an affection, indicate a choice or an 
aversion, etc. … 
Instead, then, of saying either that we tell beginners what words mean, or 
that we teach them what objects are, I will say: We initiate them into the relevant 
forms of life held in language and gathered around the objects and persons of our 
world. (CR 177-8)    
Initiating children into such “forms of life” involves taking them seriously as prospective 
participants (or, participants in training) in the language practices of a culture. Benjy’s 
chapter demonstrates how this process has unfolded in his unique case. Upon discovering 
her youngest son’s non-normative cognitive processes, Caroline Compson decides to re-
name him so that he will no longer share a name with her brother Maury. The howling, 
slobbering Benjy is hardly conducive to Caroline’s own efforts to maintain her social 
status; as such, she signals her disinclination to acknowledge Benjy as a member of her 
family. Instead, Caddy, still a child herself, steps into this role, telling her mother, “You 
dont need to bother with him.… I like to take care of him” (63). Caddy endeavors to 
initiate Benjy into his society’s uses of language: “She broke the top of the water and 
held a piece of it against my face. ‘Ice. That means how cold it is’” (13).14 Along with 
Caddy, Dilsey and her family members act as Benjy’s primary caregivers; the Gibsons 
																																																						
14 The fact that Benjy still refers to the ice as “water” suggests that, in this case, the initiation 




provide the labor that produces food for Benjy and otherwise attend to his needs.15 Benjy 
develops a partial grasp of public language, then, to the extent that speakers like Caddy 
and the Gibsons acknowledge him as someone who deserves to be initiated into this form 
of life. When the teenage Caddy sits with a suitor named Charlie in the family porch 
swing, her insistent “He can see,” in response to Charlie’s more dismissive “He cant talk” 
(47), concisely captures two distinct criteria by which to evaluate whether or not Benjy 
merits acknowledgment.  
 Because Caddy and others acknowledge him as a partial participant in this form 
of life (albeit a mute one), Benjy manages to learn a set of terms associated with the 
economic and social practices of his youth. In his recollections of pre-industrial farm life, 
Benjy’s narration shows his degree of fluency with the relevant concepts: “Roskus was 
milking at the barn. He was milking with one hand, and groaning. Some birds sat on the 
barn door and watched him. One of them came down and ate with the cows” (28). What 
is notable about this passage, taken on its own, is the clarity of the narration: in stark 
contrast to the frequently disorienting effects of Benjy’s language, here the novel names 
and describes everything that takes place in ways consistent with common usage. The use 
of a word like “milking” suggests the degree of conceptual precision the text ascribes to 
Benjy here; Faulkner does not write, for instance, ‘pulling at the cow,’ suggesting both 
																																																						
15 Readers learn, for instance, that Dilsey has not only baked Benjy’s birthday cake, but that she 




that Benjy understands “milking” as distinct from other actions, and that he understands 
this term to be the proper one for what Roskus is doing.16  
 Given the prominent role the Gibson family plays in taking care of Benjy, 
Faulkner portrays him as both enmeshed in and alienated from the language practices of 
the novel’s black characters. Benjy’s section provides an apt illustration of Michael 
North’s argument that black and white speakers in modernism are “tongue-tied”—that is, 
that expressive acts across racial lines are liable to produce confusion and 
misunderstanding, even as the “two tongues are … inextricably joined” (Dialect 8). As 
Richard Godden has noted, the decline of the South’s plantation economy lays bare the 
tongue-tied relation of black and white within this culture, forcing landowners to confront 
the black labor at the heart of white wealth (Fictions 4). By providing for Benjy through 
their bodily labor, and by giving him credit for having an inner life, the Compsons’ black 
domestics serve to counteract Benjy’s experience of radical privacy more than members 
of his own family do. At the same time, Benjy proves separate from his black 
interlocutors in that he does not really understand them as black; that is, he does not 
understand how the socially constructed concept of race has functioned to place families 
like the Gibsons into their role as care-givers for families like his own.   
 In light of Benjy’s position as simultaneously linked to and separate from the 
Gibsons, his section of narration raises questions about the degree to which he 
understands the speech of these characters. “Curiously,” Polk writes, “Faulkner renders 
																																																						
16 Benjy also registers, though without comment, the pain that years of arduous physical labor 
have inflicted on Roskus: the passage notes Roskus’ “groaning” and indicates that he has 




black dialect in Benjy’s section almost completely in standard English” (130), but 
Faulkner’s typographical choices become less curious once we see that Benjy often 
understands the words black characters speak.17 When dialect spelling does appear in 
Benjy’s section, Faulkner typically uses it to represent speech Benjy hears rather than the 
character’s own monologue. For instance, the novel records Dilsey instructing Luster to 
take Benjy “to the liberry” (SF 60), and Benjy follows this comment by narrating how he 
and Luster “went to the library” (61). The standard spelling18 of “library” in the second 
instance indicates that Benjy grasps this concept, but it is hard to say whether or not 
Benjy understands Dilsey’s “liberry” as synonymous with “library”; he may simply be 
recording the sound he hears her make. By contrast, during his recollection of Caddy’s 
wedding, Benjy records T.P.’s saying “sassprilluh,” and Benjy’s internal monologue then 
reproduces this same spelling (38). Since the novel rarely represents Benjy’s own 
consciousness using dialect spelling, here Faulkner suggests that Benjy does not know 
what “sassprilluh” is, so his only access to this concept is through the strange sound he 
has just heard T.P. utter (38). He is, in this moment, trying to hear, trying to make sense 
of his world by listening to the word-sounds spoken around him. Perhaps the most fitting 
illustration of Benjy and the Gibsons as “tongue-tied” occurs during the scene of 
																																																						
17 In one memory, for instance, Benjy recalls Versh saying “Hold still now … Now stomp,” while 
helping Benjy with his shoes (SF 8). Since the scene indicates that Benjy follows Versh’s 
instructions successfully, it implies that Benjy has learned a term like “stomp” in part because 
Versh and the other Gibsons have initiated him into the forms of life relevant to its use. 
18 North also reminds us that notions of standard spelling are themselves culturally and 
historically contingent. See Dialect 3-34 for a discussion of the “linguistic standardization” 
movement that gained steam alongside the development of literary modernism in the early years 




Damuddy’s death, when the young Jason asks what a funeral is, and Frony replies, 
“Where they moans. … They moaned two days on Sis Beulah Clay” (33). Benjy’s 
consciousness then immediately shifts to the occasion of Roskus’ death, thinking, “They 
moaned at Dilsey’s house” (33). For Benjy, moaning becomes a stand-in for ‘mourning,’ 
a more abstract concept he does not possess. But moaning is also metonymic of 
mourning, and Faulkner’s text leaves open the question of which word Frony has ‘meant’ 
to say. This moment in Benjy’s narration fittingly captures both how important the 
Gibsons have been to his initiation into language and how this initiation has necessarily 
proceeded through miscommunication.   
By indicating the level of Benjy’s attunement with the language practices of his 
society, Faulkner shows that Benjy’s cognitive difficulties often do not concern learning 
language as such, but rather learning the words associated with an emergent set of social 
and economic conditions. Like Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Benjy endeavors to map reality 
using one set of linguistic terms; whatever exists beyond “the limits of [his] language” he 
struggles to incorporate into his picture of the world. While Wittgenstein eventually 
recognizes the shortcomings of the Tractatus’ pretensions to universality and 
incorporates a much wider range of linguistic practices into his later philosophy, Benjy 
remains stuck with a pre-industrial vocabulary, using words he understands to describe a 
world he does not.19 Cavell writes that growing into a form of life requires us to “project” 
familiar words into new contexts (CR 182), and that language “allow[s]” some 
																																																						
19 Of course, Benjy does not understand how the plantation economy works either, but his 
family’s participation in this economic system exposes Benjy to a range of concepts—“fence,” 




projections but not others (183).20 After Caddy leaves the family home, and as the 
modernizing economy increasingly saturates the Compsons’ lives, Benjy grows more and 
more alienated from the language practices around him, increasingly projecting words 
into contexts where they don’t fit. For instance, he struggles to grasp the role of money 
within industrial capitalism, as becomes clear when he describes Luster and another black 
man looking for a quarter by saying that “[t]hey played in the branch” (SF 15). For 
Luster, economically disenfranchised and desperate to acquire enough cash to see the 
traveling show, this search hardly qualifies as “playing,” but Benjy does not recognize 
anything wrong with his projection of this word. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein 
writes that “[o]ur language can be regarded as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and 
squares, of old and new houses, of houses with extensions from various periods, and all 
this surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs” (§18). Wittgenstein provides a fitting 
image for Benjy’s dilemma: the youngest Compson brother proves much more at home in 
the “ancient city” of his language than in its “new suburbs,” just as he grows disoriented 
whenever he strays too far from the familiar environs of the Compson property. His 
struggle to keep up with evolving language practices is similarly evident when he 
describes Caddy’s jewelry box as “full of stars” (SF 41). With “stars,” Benjy refers to 
Caddy’s jewelry—representative of her more modern attitude toward sexuality—using a 
term from the natural world, one with a stable meaning he has learned and continues to 
																																																						
20 Cavell describes language as both “tolerant” and “intolerant”; while language allows for 
projection, “not just any projection will be acceptable, i.e., will communicate” (182). For 
instance, he writes, “[y]ou can ‘feed peanuts to a monkey’ and ‘feed pennies to a meter,’ but … if 




apply.21 Such moments show Benjy’s increasing lack of attunement with his society. His 
world has evolved more quickly than his words.  
 
Quentin and the Retreat from Linguistic Contingency  
 
 Whereas Benjy struggles to grasp emergent forms of economic and social 
relation, his brother Quentin understands these altered relations perfectly well but wishes 
he did not. Like Benjy, Quentin struggles to achieve connection with his family members 
through mutually beneficial exchanges of labor. His recollections show that his mother 
has repudiated her eldest son alongside her youngest, telling her husband, “let me have 
Jason and you keep the others they’re not my flesh and blood like he is strangers nothing 
of mine” (104).22 Caroline’s comment “nothing of mine” is perhaps more apt than she 
realizes, since it speaks to her refusal to participate in any labor that would connect her 
offspring to the creative products of her body. As for Mr. Compson, his influence on his 
eldest son only increases Quentin’s isolation. By selling a portion of the family land to 
pay for Quentin’s Harvard tuition, Mr. Compson converts “immovable property 
(Compson land) into moveable property (money)” (Godden, Fictions 46). The older 
																																																						
21 Another example along similar lines involves Benjy’s inability to understand the workings of 
electricity, evident when his monologue states, “The room went away” to describe Dilsey’s 
turning off the lights (44). While electricity may be beyond Benjy’s conceptual grasp regardless, 
this scene—set in 1908—may also reflect Benjy’s difficulty accustoming himself to a new 
development in his environment, since many Mississippi homes were gaining electricity around 
this time (Doyle 333). 
22 In dividing up her children into ones she acknowledges as hers and ones she doesn’t, Caroline 
looks ahead to Addie Bundren, whose rationale for effecting such divisions Faulkner explores 




social and economic order—oppressive for many, but idealized by traditionalists like 
Quentin—holds that “dependencies of blood … have an absolute value”; by contrast, Mr. 
Compson’s sale conveys the message that “they have a variable price” (46).23 So this 
transaction disrupts the stable economic foundation of Mr. Compson’s relationship with 
Quentin.  
 Apart from tuition money, what does Mr. Compson give to Quentin? The answer 
involves another system of arbitrary signification: words. With his picture of language, 
Mr. Compson reconciles himself to more modern forms of social and sexual relation, and 
he endeavors to pass these attitudes along to Quentin.24 When he tells Quentin that “it 
was men invented virginity not women” (SF 78), Mr. Compson casts both the meaning 
and the significance of “virginity” as socially constructed. As he evidently recognizes, 
patriarchal linguistic practices associated with the plantation system insist on the essential 
importance of “virginity”; the high value attached to this term has, historically speaking, 
facilitated efforts to control female sexuality. Mr. Compson also evacuates other 
traditional moral language of its significance; he presents “courage” as personally defined 
(“every man is the arbiter of his own virtues whether or not you consider it courageous is 
																																																						
23 Since money is an indirect, rather than a direct, result of bodily labor, Scarry suggests that the 
use of money always already intervenes in the interconnection of individual subjects; see 259-61.    
24 While many critics have traced Mr. Compson’s substantial influence on Quentin’s psychology, 
previous discussions of this relationship have generally read it in psychoanalytic terms. These 
readings tend to essentialize human psycho- and sexual development, and thus they do not fully 
account for the specific historical factors that shape Mr. Compson’s conversations with Quentin. 
The foundational reading along these lines is John Irwin’s Doubling and Incest/ Repetition and 
Revenge, which contends that Quentin wants Mr. Compson to “punish[…]” him for his 
incestuous desire for Caddy and, in so doing, to give Quentin “proof that his masculinity had ever 
been potent enough to constitute a threat to the father” (49). For a reading along similar lines, see 




of more importance than the act itself” [176]), and he questions the meaningfulness of 
“battle” and “victory” (“Because no battle is ever won, he said. They are not even fought. 
The field only reveals to man his own folly and despair, and victory is an illusion of 
philosophers and fools” [76]). For Mr. Compson, insisting on the meaninglessness of 
words mitigates their potential to traumatize; as his daughter challenges traditional moral 
codes, he responds by telling himself that they don’t matter anyway. Similarly, if he 
senses that his family is losing out in a more modernized economy, he determines that 
winning and losing are no more than mental constructs. Having come of age in the post-
Civil War South, Mr. Compson evidently understands himself as part of a lost generation, 
one whose time has passed.25 Perhaps for this reason, his emphasis on linguistic 
contingency does not serve any broader social project of challenging dominant ideology 
to reshape social values; he is content to tear down the old codes of conduct without 
constructing anything new in their place. 
 While Mr. Compson is content to philosophize nihilistically and drink himself to 
death, Quentin confronts the question of how one might actually go on living in the 
modern world. Against his father’s claims about the contingency of moral language, 
Quentin imagines himself fighting a solitary fight to retain the stable meanings of the 
words he has learned. As Kevin Railey points out, Quentin’s anxious refrain, “Did you 
																																																						
25 Mr. Compson’s sense of his own tragic belatedness is evident in Quentin’s recollection of his 
father saying that “was” is “the saddest word of all” and that “there is nothing else in the world” 
(178). It is as though he imagines himself voicing Macbeth’s famous monologue, confirming that 
“[l]ife’s but a walking shadow” before stepping off the stage (Macbeth V.v.23). Barbara Ladd 
makes a related point, discussing how the generational difference between Mr. Compson and 





ever have a sister?” (SF 166), aimed at both Gerald Bland and Dalton Ames, captures not 
simply “Quentin’s personal pain” but also his “ideological position” (87). Quentin sees 
white men like himself as protectors of the opposite sex, and he finds men like Gerald 
and Dalton insufficiently committed to preserving the old order.26 In response to his 
father’s suggestion that Quentin might “come to believe that even [Caddy] was not quite 
worth despair,” Quentin’s anguished assertion “i will never do that nobody knows what i 
know” (SF 178) shows his deep commitment to a traditional value system, which 
compels him to feel outraged and ashamed by the loss of his sister. Quentin’s insistence 
on the privacy of his knowledge indicates his desire for acknowledgment—a desire he 
struggles to communicate.27  
Quentin’s desire to have his pain acknowledged takes shape in a fantasy of radical 
linguistic power: he imagines speaking incest into reality. After Mr. Compson wonders 
whether Quentin has tried to make Caddy commit incest with him, Quentin responds, “i 
was afraid to i was afraid she might and then it wouldnt have done any good but if i could 
tell you we did it would have been so and then the others wouldnt be so and then the 
world would roar away” (177). What Quentin imagines doing, in other words, is making 
																																																						
26 Along similar lines, Hanson contrasts two moments in Quentin’s section in order to illustrate 
the character’s commitment to paternalism and disdain for modern capitalism: whereas Quentin 
fondly recalls giving a black man a quarter while taking the train to the South (SF 87), in the 
present day Harvard of 1910 he gives one black bootblack a cigar and the other a nickel, before 
observing sardonically that “[t]he one with the cigar was trying to sell it to the other for a nickel” 
(7; SF 83). 
27 Warwick Wadlington argues that this sense of incommunicability heightens if one assumes that 
Quentin has not actually had this conversation with his father—a reading consistent with 
Faulkner’s own public comments (84; Gwynn and Blotner 262-3). While we may not be able to 
say definitively whether or not Quentin is recalling a real conversation—and we need not take 
Faulkner’s word as the final one—the salient point is that the novel gives readers access to this 




incest into a performative utterance. Given the patriarchal social norms of the Old South, 
Quentin naturally turns to his father to assess the legitimacy of this speech act.28 
Quentin’s idea seems to be that Mr. Compson would punish his children for their 
incestuous act, banishing them to their own private hell. The punishment Quentin 
imagines is specifically one that reasserts the power of traditional Christian morality; by 
speaking incest into being Quentin makes himself and Caddy sinners, and by damning 
them Mr. Compson validates the significance of their sin. Since Quentin has evidently 
understood the loss of Caddy as a version of The Fall, his incest fantasy involves the 
attempted restoration of language to its prelapsarian potency. In Eden, designation is 
synonymous with essence; when Adam names the animals, he does not simply assign 
them arbitrary names but rather speaks their identities into being: “whatever the man 
called every living creature, that was its name” (New Oxford Annotated Bible, Genesis 
2.19).29 Quentin hopes to wield such linguistic power himself, wanting to hold at bay the 
threat of arbitrary signification. Of course, when Adam names the animals, he is the only 
human on earth; no communal linguistic practices have yet been established. By contrast, 
Quentin experiences this Adam-like sense of alienation, but without the corresponding 
linguistic power. 
																																																						
28 In a different memory, Quentin presents another version of this fantasy, telling Caddy, “it was a 
crime we did a terrible crime,” and then, after she tries to change the subject, insisting, “Ill tell 
Father then itll have to be” (148). On this occasion as well, then, Quentin suggests that the 
important thing is not actually to commit incest, but to tell his father that he has.  
29 It is this prelapsarian linguistic power that Snead invokes in his discussion of the novel, which I 




As an act of performative language, Quentin’s incest fantasy seems bizarre, if not 
insane—but his fantasy also constitutes an example of what Cavell calls a “passionate 
utterance” (PTDAT 185). Such an utterance makes “a demand” upon the interlocutor, a 
demand for acknowledgment (179). Under J.L. Austin’s theory of speech acts, 
performative utterances require “an accepted conventional procedure” to succeed (How 
15).30 Cavell offers his concept of passionate utterances as an extension of Austin’s 
theory, and he emphasizes that, in the case of a passionate utterance, “[t]here is no 
accepted conventional procedure …. The speaker is on his or her own to create the 
desired effect” (PTDAT 180). To the extent that Quentin’s suffering is bound up with 
new, modern forms of social relation, it seems that no conventional procedures exist for 
him to put into words what he feels. His incest fantasy constitutes his desperate attempt to 
emphasize to his father the extremity of his pain. Understood as passionate utterance, as 
demand for acknowledgment, Quentin’s utterance still fails, but it is not a failure of 
language so much as one of human relations.31 It reveals less about the distance between 
signifier and signified, and more about the distance between father and son.  
																																																						
30 For example, to say “I do … take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife” functions as a 
happy performative only in the context of a marriage ceremony (How 5). Unsuccessful 
performatives, says Austin, involve the “misinvocation of a procedure—either because there is … 
no such procedure, or because the procedure in question cannot be made to apply in the way 
attempted” (17).  
31 Wadlington similarly describes Mr. Compson’s response to Quentin as a failure of 
acknowledgment; he writes of how, in discussing language and morality with his son, Mr. 
Compson takes a consistently intellectualized approach, which “reductively” posits knowledge as 
the “essential requirement of one’s interest in or involvement with others” (85-6). While I agree 
with Wadlington that Mr. Compson’s reactions to Quentin constitute a failure of 
acknowledgment, I would argue that Mr. Compson exhibits a skeptical stance rather than a 
knowing one, insofar as he destroys old moral paradigms without asserting new ones in their 




As he moves through the last day of his life, Quentin simultaneously recognizes 
and resists evidence of linguistic contingency, of the limited power of traditional 
signifiers. As John Matthews writes, “Quentin deeply distrusts words … because he 
senses that they displace and substitute” (Play 82-3). To speak about Caddy, for instance, 
is to recognize that she is already lost, that his fantasy of sending them to hell together 
has not taken place. Similarly, when he thinks, “if I’d just had a mother so I could say 
Mother Mother,” Quentin suggests that his distant relationship with his mother has made 
saying “Mother” painful, because it reminds him that to say “Mother” is not to turn his 
mother into a mother (SF 172). Quentin also thinks sardonically about the lost potency of 
Christian discourse; when he envisions that “on the day when He says Rise only the flat-
iron would come floating up,” he deflates the prophetic language of Revelation (80).32 
One of Wittgenstein’s remarks in the Investigations aptly characterizes the conception of 
language with which Quentin operates. Wittgenstein writes: “A picture is conjured up 
which seems to fix the sense unambiguously. The actual use, compared with that traced 
by the picture, seems like something muddied” (§426). Wittgenstein’s description of the 
problematic tendency to view “actual use” as “muddied” proves particularly relevant to a 
novel that makes Caddy’s “muddy” drawers into the paradigmatic image of postlapsarian 
modern life (SF 39). Quentin’s incest fantasy puts forth a vision of language as 
																																																						
in Absalom, Absalom!, wherein Quentin constructs a narrative detailing Thomas Sutpen’s refusal 
to acknowledge his part black son Charles Bon. 
32 The original passage to which Quentin refers reads: “And the sea gave up the dead that were in 
it, Death and Hades gave up the dead that were in them, and all were judged according to what 
they had done” (Revelation 20:13). Quentin envisions a situation wherein divine language will no 




“unambiguously” powerful, in contrast to which the actual workings of language that 
Quentin observes around him fall frustratingly short. 
 Having reluctantly acknowledged the limits of language, Quentin increasingly 
aims at silence—a state that will take him outside words altogether. Recalling the story 
Versh has told him about “a man who mutilated himself” (115), Quentin thinks,  
A broken razor flinging them backward over his shoulder the same motion 
complete the jerked skein of blood backward not looping. But that’s not it. It’s not 
not having them. It’s never to have had them then I could say O That That’s 
Chinese I dont know Chinese. (116) 
After fantasizing briefly about castrating himself, Quentin determines that such an act 
would not solve his problems; as Cavell might put it, Quentin has already been initiated 
into the forms of life relevant to speaking about sexuality. So he has become irrevocably 
aware of his failure to live up to his idealized image of the potent Southern aristocrat. 
Quentin then imagines that the real solution would have been “never to have had” 
testicles, and he pursues this fantasy by equating sexuality with a foreign language. 
Under the terms of this fantasy, Quentin imagines extricating himself from the 
shortcomings of language and his own sexual shortcomings in one fell swoop.33 His wish 
to free himself from the language of sexuality may be bound up with his refusal to 
																																																						
33 Quentin’s fantasy misconstrues the deep embeddedness of sexuality within human existence; 
though the particular words we use to speak about sexual identities and relations are socially 
constructed, it’s hard to imagine a human society that has no words at all to address these 
matters. We have language for discussing sexuality, Cavell might say, because “we learn 
language and learn the world together” (MWM 19), and sexual relations are part of our world—




confront his own homosexual inclinations, which are strongly implicit in both this novel 
and Absalom, Absalom!. To name these desires would be to acknowledge them, and 
Quentin would prefer to cut himself off from the very possibility of naming.  
 Quentin’s fantasy of spending eternity in a private hell with Caddy also reflects 
his desire to achieve a state of uninterrupted silence. As he explains the rationale behind 
this fantasy to his father, “it was to isolate her out of the loud world so that it would have 
to flee us of necessity and then the sound of it would be as though it had never been” 
(177). In this respect, Quentin’s aims perversely mirror those of the Tractatus, which 
endeavors to show, first, that “[w]hat can be said at all can be said clearly” and, second, 
that “[w]hereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent” (“Preface” 27). Like the 
early Wittgenstein, Quentin endeavors to establish clarity in the relationship between his 
words and his world. For Quentin as for the young Wittgenstein, the only palatable 
alternative to clarity is not muddiness but silence. Wittgenstein evidently determined that 
he could preserve the state of silence, reached at the end of the Tractatus, only by retiring 
from philosophy—though, of course, he did eventually return. In Quentin’s case, the 
attempt to preserve silence takes an even more extreme form: suicide.34 With this act, 
Quentin irreversibly abandons his attempt to induce his interlocutors to acknowledge his 
																																																						
34 The possibility of suicide always lingered in the background of Wittgenstein’s life as well. It is 
likely that three of Wittgenstein’s brothers killed themselves, and Wittgenstein himself 
contemplated suicide before he began studying philosophy under Bertrand Russell’s tutelage 
(Monk 11-2, 41). By effusively affirming his young pupil’s talent for philosophy, Russell gave 
Wittgenstein a sense of direction; Wittgenstein’s biographer writes that Russell may have, “quite 




pain. Unable to accept the muddiness of language, Quentin finds in the silence of death 
the linguistic purity he craves.  
 
Jason and the Limits of “I say”   
 
 Whereas Benjy cannot understand modern society and Quentin cannot accept it, 
Jason participates more fully and actively in the economic and linguistic practices of the 
modernizing South. Jason’s trading on the cotton future market testifies to his distance 
from the plantation system; whereas some traders in the cotton market would actually 
have grown cotton themselves, Jason belongs to the subgroup of speculators who “have 
no interest or stake in the underlying commodity” (Westbrook 54-5).35 All of Jason’s 
financial pursuits—his speculation, his wage labor in Earl’s store, his embezzlement of 
Caddy’s money—mark his participation in industrial capitalism; he does not actually 
produce anything himself, and he largely misses out on the mutually beneficial exchanges 
of labor that Scarry describes. Jason takes the logic of capitalist self-sufficiency to 
monstrous extremes, conceiving of all social interaction in terms of what he stands to 
gain or lose from it financially. When he complains about having “a kitchen full of 
niggers to feed” (SF 230), he presents the Gibson family as nothing more than a drain on 
his finances.36 Similarly, Jason understands Miss Quentin’s presence in his life as the 
																																																						
35 See Westbrook for a more extensive history of the cotton futures market and a detailed account 
of the market fluctuations Faulkner describes over the course of Jason’s section.  
36 In this respect, as Hanson points out, Jason repudiates the logic of paternalism that Quentin 




result of a deal gone wrong: “when she sent Quentin home for me to feed too I says I 
guess that’s right too, instead of me having to go way up north for a job they sent the job 
down here to me” (SF 196). So instead of receiving the bank job Herbert Head has 
promised him, he receives Caddy’s illegitimate child.  
 Even as Jason operates according to the logic of market capitalism, he also resists 
this system for its consequences upon his own social preeminence. Watching cotton 
prices rise in the telegraph office, Jason thinks, “I’ll be damned if it hasn’t come to a 
pretty pass when any damn foreigner that cant make a living in the country where God 
put him, can come to this one and take money right out of an American’s pockets. … But 
hell, they were right there and knew what was going on” (192). This moment captures the 
sense of dispossession that modern economic practices make Jason feel, even as he tries 
to profit from them. Jason finds that his economic fate is increasingly tied to the decisions 
of geographically distant strangers, whom he has never met, and whom he has no trouble 
denigrating as “a bunch of dam eastern jews” (191). Jason’s act of pooling his capital 
with these distant financiers might be understood as his engaging in a communal project, 
except that this type of association of individuals does not mitigate bodily privacy in the 
way Scarry describes. As Alan Trachtenberg explains, the association of individual 
financial agents to form corporations “was understood as strictly contractual, not 
necessarily comprised of people acquainted with each other or joined by any common 




increased competition from African-Americans and other whites, whom in the past he 
might have more comfortably denigrated as members of the societal underclass.37   
 Jason’s unstable class position informs his attitude toward language. Believing 
deeply in his own self-sufficiency, but concerned about new social and economic rivals, 
Jason challenges his society to accept his linguistic authority. Jason’s attitude toward 
language is on display from the opening sentence of his section: “Once a bitch always a 
bitch, what I say” (180). With this bitter, misogynistic assessment of his niece, Jason 
shows his wish to make “I say” correspond to what is: if he labels someone “a bitch,” 
then she is one. In one sense, Jason displays the same approach to language as Quentin 
has with his incest fantasy: both brothers attempt to use words to exert control over an 
increasingly chaotic modern world. However, whereas Quentin’s recognition of 
language’s contingency precipitates his retreat into a Wittgensteinian state of silence, 
Jason remains determined to participate in—indeed, to shape—the linguistic and cultural 
practices around him. He combines the Tractatus’ commitment to knowingly asserting 
how language works with the Investigations’ commitment to examining actual usage.  
Like the Tractatus, Jason’s interior monologue claims to present a logical system 
that comprehensively outlines the relations between word and world. Wittgenstein states 
in the work’s preface that “the truth of the thoughts communicated here seems to me 
unassailable and definitive,” and Jason would likely take the same position with respect 
																																																						
37 Jason’s concern about rival African-American laborers is evident in his bitterness toward Job, 
his black co-worker at Earl’s store. His class pretensions are evident in his hostility toward the 
man with the red tie, given that red neckties were associated with supporters of populist 




to his own thoughts (28); his statement “I know I’m right” provides an apt summary of 
his attitude toward language (SF 192). North argues that, when contrasted with 
Wittgenstein’s later, more “anthropological” conception of language (Reading 42), the 
Tractatus proves “imperial in its pretensions” (38). Jason displays his own version of this 
imperialist bias: he assumes that, as a white man from the traditional aristocratic class, his 
ways of defining and describing reality should be equated with reality as such. Truly, 
Jason’s interior monologue bears out the Tractatus’ assertion that “solipsism strictly 
carried out coincides with pure realism” (5.64). Jason reveals his bitter, paranoiac 
outlook, his total refusal to consider alternative perspectives, but as far as he is concerned 
his actions epitomize reasonableness and realism. 
 Jason persists in the belief that he speaks reasonably even when his statements 
result in contradictions—as with his comment that “money has no value; it’s just the way 
you spend it. It dont belong to anybody, so why try to hoard it” (SF 194). In the 
Tractatus, Wittgenstein holds that contradictions “are without sense” because they “are 
not pictures of the reality” (4.461, 4.462). An inferior logician, Jason does not address the 
possibility that there might be something inconsistent about his making this statement 
while hiding thousands of dollars in cash in his room. When Jason thinks these words, he 
seems to mean them fully, and he assumes that they accurately picture not only the reality 
of how he acts but also how other people should. As far as Jason is concerned, this 
contradictory statement does in fact picture something crucial about his reality; namely, it 




wherein one must save (or “hoard”) in order to spend, while simultaneously needing to 
spend or invest in order to earn money that one can save (“hoard”).  
Like his brothers, Jason endeavors to exert control over language—and, hence, 
over the world—by keeping contingency at bay. For Jason, this resistance takes the form 
of an attempted refusal to let anyone mean words differently than he does. For instance, 
Jason recalls how, in the immediate aftermath of Mr. Compson’s funeral, Caddy visits in 
secret and pays Jason money to let her “see” her newborn child for “a minute” (SF 204). 
Jason agrees to the arrangement on the condition that Caddy will depart immediately 
afterwards, telling her, “Only you’ll have to do just like I say, now” (204). Jason then 
drives by Caddy in a wagon, holding the baby out so that Caddy sees her momentarily as 
he passes, thereby interpreting ‘see her a minute’ in a way that clearly departs from what 
Caddy has envisioned (204). When Caddy, instead of leaving town, visits Jason again and 
calls him a liar, he responds, “Are you crazy? … What do you mean?” (205). Jason 
claims that he has kept his word, because he wants to insist that his ways of meaning 
“see” and “minute” possess exclusive validity—i.e., that “see” means something like ‘lay 
one’s eyes upon’ and “a minute” means, literally, a minute. So when Caddy challenges 
his ways of meaning these words, Jason protests that she is “crazy,” that she does not 
speak meaningfully. Against the position Jason takes here, Cavell argues that learning the 
implications of people’s utterances “is part of learning the language” (MWM 11, italics 
removed); implications “are an essential part of what we communicate when we talk” 
(12). With the request to “see” the infant Quentin for “a minute,” Caddy certainly implies 




her wishes more explicit precisely because she assumes that Jason understands exactly 
what her words mean in this context. But Jason rejects the implied meanings of Caddy’s 
words as contrary to what he has in mind.38  
Even while staunchly asserting his linguistic authority, Jason repeatedly tests his 
understanding of language against that of the broader social world. Despite his general 
aversion to other people, Jason actually converses with those around him much more than 
either of his brothers do. Whereas Quentin chooses silence and Benjy cannot choose 
anything else, Jason is constantly making sound and displaying fury. When he instructs 
Miss Quentin to stop “playing out of school” (SF 180), Jason says, “Remember what I 
say … I mean it” (188). His conviction is that, because he has told Miss Quentin to act a 
certain way and has emphasized that he “mean[s] it,” the world should cooperate by 
making his words reflect reality. So his niece’s continued flaunting of his commands 
infuriates Jason—even as it also confirms his self-righteous sense that he must constantly 
be on guard against those impudent enough to question his authority. In the novel’s 
fourth section, after Jason discovers Miss Quentin’s theft of his money, his Easter 
morning visit to the sheriff’s house demonstrates his conviction that his own word should 
be sufficient to stir others to action. Jason tells the sheriff, “My house has been robbed. I 
know who did it and I know where they are” (303). In response, the sheriff points out that 
																																																						
38 Cavell distinguishes between the “semantics” of an utterance, its literal meaning, and the 
“pragmatics,” the way it is used (MWM 11). Whereas Caddy assumes that she and her brother 
share a pragmatics, Jason presents himself as someone who abides by the exclusive authority of 
dictionary definitions. At the same time, he also distorts these definitions; his description of the 
scene suggests that he has not let Caddy look at her daughter for even a full “minute” (i.e., sixty 




Jason has “no proof” of his accusations and refuses to help him (304). Such moments 
portray Jason as daring the world to show him exactly what he does not want to see: the 
limits of his linguistic power.   
Because he refuses to accept the linguistic authority of others, Jason has difficulty 
articulating his need for acknowledgment—even to himself. To the extent that Jason is 
aware of himself as wanting anything from the those around him, he conceives of this 
desire in purely financial terms. Matthews writes that “Jason’s need for impersonal, 
collectible, hoardable money springs from his inability to speak his grief” (Play 94). 
Expressing grief, for Jason, would mean acknowledging his finitude, accepting that 
language is not only a tool for knowing and defining the world but also for (among other 
things) conveying emotion and requesting help. Since he refuses to admit the possibility 
that he might be in any way reliant on other people, Jason remains closed off from the 
possibility of acknowledgment. On occasion, his interior monologue approaches, and 
then pulls back from, an honest expression of grief. Recalling his father’s funeral, for 
instance, Jason describes how the family “stood there, looking at the grave, and then I got 
to thinking about when we were little and one thing and another and I got to feeling 
funny again” (SF 203). This passage gestures indirectly toward Jason’s sadness, his 
feeling that his father did not devote sufficient attention to him. But Jason can only make 
this point explicitly through the language of economic grievance: “I never heard of him 
offering to sell anything to send me to Harvard” (197).  
Tellingly, when Jason speaks harshly to Caddy after Mr. Compson’s death, she 




(202). Here, Caddy shows her unique talent for recognizing what troubles her brothers 
and endeavoring to acknowledge their pain. But Jason has already stopped seeing Caddy 
as a family member who might give him comfort and started seeing her as a debtor who 
might give him payment. He justifies his later embezzlement of her money on the 
grounds that she owes him, and in the final lines of his section he explains the motivation 
behind all his bitter, oppressive actions: “I just want an even chance to get my money 
back” (262). While easier to follow than either Benjy’s or Quentin’s chapter, Jason’s may 
nonetheless be the most difficult of the three to read, because Faulkner forces us to see 
the world from this hateful, hypocritical perspective. But, as in his representation of the 
other Compson brothers, Faulkner’s representation also enables readers to acknowledge 
the pain buried deep within this character’s psyche.  
 
“Faulkner” and the Acknowledgment of Finitude  
 
The fourth and final chapter, which Faulkner in an interview describes as being 
narrated by himself (Gwynn and Blotner 32), marks the final stage in the novel’s 
movement away from a model of language as private and incommunicable and toward a 
model of language as shared and social. Benjy’s inability to “say” prevents him from 
conveying the depth of his mental complexity to those around him, and Quentin’s sense 
of everyday usage as irreparably “muddied” precipitates his desperate retreat from 
language. More than his brothers, Jason regularly communicates with his interlocutors, 




cynicism when they do not. With this final section of narration, Faulkner more readily 
acknowledges his own perspectival limits. The chapter indicates that one individual 
speaker can neither control nor even fully understand all his society’s language practices. 
In this way, the movement of the novel also tracks the trajectory of Wittgenstein’s career, 
insofar as the philosopher’s later work increasingly emphasizes the multiplicity of ways 
that words get used.39 
 Faulkner attends to this multiplicity by calling attention to a set of cultural and 
linguistic practices from which the Compsons are excluded. In a novel primarily focused 
on white experience, the scene in the Gibsons’ church provides the fullest account of 
black characters outside of their interactions with whites. This scene extends the 
examination of black and white speech as “tongue-tied,” separate but deeply linked, 
within the cultural milieu that Faulkner both wrote about and inhabited. As David Hein 
discusses, the Easter sermon scene takes place in a “word-centered” Baptist church (561); 
the parishioners do not have an Easter meal, but they join together for the spiritually 
significant rituals of “praise, prayer, and—most of all—preaching” (562). The power of 
preaching in such churches, Hein points out, harkens back to forms of religious practice 
under slavery; given that most slaves were illiterate, listening to the preacher’s spoken 
words became an essential spiritual ritual (563). Hein also notes the “sparse” (SF 292) 
decorations in the church (566), which present it as operating at a remove from the profit-
driven, capitalist pursuits that are so ubiquitous elsewhere in the novel.   
																																																						
39 As Wittgenstein writes in the Investigations, “It is interesting to compare the diversity of the 
tools of language and of the ways they are used … with what logicians have said about the 




 In this context, the scene indicates that experiences of mutual acknowledgment 
between individuals remain possible in the modern world. As Faulkner describes it, the 
Reverend Shegog’s speech produces a powerful effect on Dilsey and the other 
parishioners: 
With his body he seemed to feed the voice that, succubus like, had fleshed its 
teeth in him. And the congregation seemed to watch with its own eyes while the 
voice consumed him, until he was nothing and they were nothing and there was 
not even a voice but instead their hearts were speaking to one another in chanting 
measures beyond the need for words … (294) 
In a novel famous for its isolated protagonists, here Faulkner presents an image of 
seemingly total connection. Polk reads this scene as a moment that transcends the limits 
of language upon which the novel elsewhere insists; he writes that the connection 
between Shegog and his audience can occur “only … when language breaks completely 
down, and they don’t need to rely on it for the communication of their deepest beliefs” 
(135). But to equate the ritual’s powerful effect with its transcendence of language is to 
overlook the necessary role language plays in producing this effect. It is Shegog’s use of 
these particular words in this particular context that moves his audience so deeply. As the 
preacher impassionedly recounts the story of Christ’s death and resurrection, he 
acknowledges his parishioners’ shared religious faith, endorsing and re-affirming their 
belief that “de darkness and de death everlastin upon de generations” (SF 296) eventually 
gives way to “de resurrection and de light” (297). He thereby demonstrates language’s 




powerful effect on Dilsey, who “continue[s] to weep” after leaving the church (297); as 
Matthews suggests, Shegog’s words have apparently enabled her to “fit[…] the rise and 
fall of her particular Compson family into the inevitable cycles of human history” (Play 
108).40 
 The scene implies that Faulkner can effect an acknowledgment of Dilsey’s 
perspective only by acknowledging the limits of his own. The church scene signals the 
partial exclusion of white figures from the powerful rituals taking place: Benjy is the only 
white person present, and—as Matthews points out—he “sits ‘rapt’ in a ‘gaze’ of perfect 
incomprehension” (SF 297; qtd. “Whose America?” 83). Benjy’s exclusion mirrors the 
author’s own; Faulkner signals his outsider status via his repetition of “seemed” in his 
description of Shegog’s sermon, quoted above. When read in this light, the passage 
suggests that the image of hearts communicating represents the narrator’s impression of 
what takes place, his way of making sense of a ritual he does not fully understand. By 
placing the scene’s readers in the same position as himself and Benjy—outsiders and 
observers at once—Faulkner figures them as white (or, at least, as excluded from the 
culture of the church-goers).41 In addition, by refusing to write from Dilsey’s perspective, 
																																																						
40 Matthews identifies a series of implicit connections between the content of Shegog’s sermon 
and the story of the Compsons, writing of how “Christ’s death on the sacred tree may recall the 
fatal trees in which Caddy loses her innocence, dies to Benjy and Quentin, and provokes the 
eldest son’s self-sacrifice” (109). For another discussion that connects the sermon with the 
Compsons’ story, see Wadlington 80.   
41 The heavy use of dialect in the representation of Shegog’s speech lends further support to 
North’s conception of “tongue-tied” communicative utterances. The scene suggests that Shegog 
and readers do share a language, insofar as the representation of dialect does not obscure the 
meanings of words—the non-standardized spelling of “Wus a po man,” for example, does not 
prevent readers, even those unfamiliar with such speech practices, from understanding the sense 
of this phrase (SF 295). At the same time, for readers more familiar with standardized spellings, 




Faulkner obfuscates the inner workings of her psyche. The scene never precisely explains 
how Dilsey has understood the sermon, and her comments in its aftermath—“I’ve seed de 
first en de last … I seed de beginnin, en now I sees de endin”—while certainly prophetic, 
nonetheless remain ambiguous (297). With his representation of Dilsey, Faulkner 
suggests the limits of his authorial capacity to articulate the inner life of a character 
separated from him by lines of race, gender, and class.42 In his willingness to 
acknowledge Dilsey’s alterity, Faulkner indicates that he himself is not trapped within the 
solipsistic fantasy of private language that binds the Compson characters. But the 
consequence of this acknowledgment is that, after intensively representing the 
interiorities of the Compson brothers, the novel does not enable comparable insight into 
Dilsey’s consciousness. Acknowledging difference without attempting to capture 
similarity, Faulkner leaves Dilsey’s mind largely unknown to readers.    
 Faulkner reiterates his sense of his own outsider status in the “Appendix” that he 
composed for the novel in 1945. Dilsey makes two significant appearances in this final 
addition to the Compson saga. In the first of these, a vignette set in 1943, the Jefferson 
librarian Melissa Meek discovers a picture of Caddy in “a slick magazine” (209), sitting 
in a sports car next to “a German staffgeneral” in Vichy France (210), and travels to 
Memphis, where the Gibsons now live, to show it to Dilsey. Handing Dilsey the picture, 
																																																						
experience. Matthews also points out that Shegog’s “rhetorical effects arise from the passage 
between black and white forms” (“Whose America” 83); when he begins speaking, Shegog 
sounds “like a white man” and Faulkner does not initially represent his prose in dialect (SF 294).  
42 In Chapter One, I make a similar point about Forster’s portrayal of Jacky in Howards End 
(1910), a character with a different gender and class identity than her author. With its 
representation of Dilsey, The Sound and the Fury adds racial difference to the list of factors liable 




Melissa explains her wish to “try to save her [i.e., Caddy]” (211). But Dilsey only hands 
back the clipping, saying, “My eyes aint any good anymore. … I cant see it” (211)—a 
lack of sight that contrasts with her prophetic vision in the church scene. Dilsey’s 
reaction implies that, now that she no longer works for the Compsons, she has little desire 
to involve herself once more in the affairs of a family that consistently failed to grant her 
the acknowledgment she deserved. But Dilsey’s state of mind can only be inferred, since 
once again Faulkner represents her experience through the perspective of a white 
character—in this case, a new character he seems to have created specifically for this 
purpose.  
 Dilsey’s second and final appearance, if it can be called an appearance at all, 
occurs at the very end of the “Appendix.” After providing detailed biographical sketches 
of the Compson family members, Faulkner concludes with an entry for Dilsey, which 
consists of two telling words: “They endured” (215). With the first of these words, 
Faulkner indicates the degree to which the Gibson family remains external to his own 
authorial conception of community, making an exclusionary gesture similar to that which 
the narrator of Howards End makes toward “the very poor” (HE 45), as discussed in 
Chapter One. The second word underscores the limits of Faulkner’s imaginative efforts: 
though presumably meant as a kind of acknowledgment, in fact it shows his reluctance to 
provide readers with any additional detail about what the Gibsons’ experience of 
endurance has entailed.43 
																																																						
43 Faulkner makes a similar acknowledgment of authorial limitation in the opening paragraph of 
“Pantaloon in Black” (1942), when the narrator describes the site where Rider has just buried his 





As I Lay Dying: The Bundrens in the Modern South 
  
With As I Lay Dying, Faulkner shifts his focus to a poor white family, showing 
how the economic uncertainties of the period prompt a re-conception of human relations 
within the Bundren family that parallels that taking place in the Compson household.44 As 
with The Sound and Fury, Faulkner’s representations of interiority show members of the 
Bundren family imagining that they speak in ways no one else understands, even while 
the novel as a whole indicates the degree to which they participate in the broader 
linguistic practices of their society. The breaks between chapters enact the divides 
between characters, just as the contents of the different monologues show the degree to 
which each figure conceals major concerns and preoccupations from the others.45 At the 
same time, in this novel more than in its predecessor, multiple narrators adopt their own 
																																																						
and old brick and other objects insignificant to sight but actually of a profound meaning, which 
no white man could have read” (131-2). Notably, this moment in Go Down, Moses precedes a 
sustained endeavor on the narrator’s part to represent the consciousness of a black character—a 
rare instance in Faulkner’s career when he moves beyond the representational limits on display in 
both The Sound and the Fury and the “Appendix.” For more on the successes and limitations in 
Faulkner’s representation of black characters, see Weinstein’s Faulkner’s Subject, especially 42-
81; see also Davis.  
44 My discussion of As I Lay Dying builds off the work of other scholars who have analyzed how 
the economic conditions of modernity inform and structure the Bundrens’ lives. Susan Willis 
provides one of the foundational readings along these lines, arguing that as the family journeys 
into town “it sheds its connection with the land and … relinquishes the agricultural mode of 
production” (588). Along similar lines, Matthews explores how the Bundrens have been 
“constituted by the dialectical history of capitalist agriculture, commodified economic and social 
relations, and homogenizations of mass culture” (“Machine Age” 74). He identifies Addie’s death 
as “a synecdoche for a whole set of disintegrative events in the novel’s world” (84).  
45 Dorothy Hale similarly discusses Faulkner’s use of interior monologue as illustrating the 




versions of Faulkner’s distinctive prose style, a stylistic convergence at odds with the 
alienation the individual speakers express, as though Faulkner wishes to partially 
counteract the separateness of his characters through his own authorial voice. His use of 
similar language to depict discrete interiorities constitutes an act of acknowledgment on 
his part, suggesting commonalities in the inner lives of speakers who imagine themselves 
to be uniquely isolated.  
 As with Jason’s unsuccessful attempts to profit off the cotton market, here 
Faulkner similarly captures the frustrations produced by participating in a modernizing 
economy while living so far from major centers of commerce.46 Anse voices a version of 
Scarry’s point about the unequal relation between urban consumer and rural producer, 
complaining about “them that runs the stores in town, doing no sweating, living off of 
them that sweats … the hardworking man, the farmer” (AILD 110). Along similar lines, 
Cora Tull indicates that she and her husband have a limited capacity to enjoy the products 
of their own labor: after they “lost so many of” their chickens, she explains, “we couldn’t 
afford to use the eggs ourselves” (7). With her elaborate account of saving eggs to bake 
cakes for an unnamed “lady” in town, Cora captures the uncertainty that poor white 
laborers experience as a result of producing for a marketplace characterized by seemingly 
random shifts in consumer demand; after all Cora’s work, the lady “change[s] her mind” 
and decides she does not want the cakes (7). Because the market value of their labor 
fluctuates in such disorienting ways, the novel’s characters wish to acquire material 
																																																						
46 Faulkner began As I Lay Dying on October 25, 1929, the day after Black Thursday (Blotner 
633). This fact suggests that he would have been acutely aware of the economic difficulties of the 




possessions themselves, as a way of adding stability to their uncertain existences. Cash, 
for one, saves money to buy a gramophone, commenting, “It’s a comfortable thing, music 
is” (236). So when Anse repurposes the money Cash had been saving, Cash’s loss 
fittingly testifies to the economic and epistemological unmooring these characters 
experience.  
 In response to these economic conditions, members of the Bundren family begin 
to look out for their own financial interests, rather than those of their relatives. The two 
individuals who do so most overtly, though each in his own way, are Jewel and Anse. 
Whether or not he is aware of his unique parentage, Jewel seems deeply resentful of his 
association with the Bundrens, and the horse he purchases, earned through many nights 
of secret labor, testifies to his individualistic spirit in both emotional and economic 
terms.47 When Anse complains that the horse burdens him with another mouth to feed, 
Jewel retorts in a way that emphasizes his conception of the horse as his (not the 
Bundrens’): “He won’t never eat a mouthful of yours … . I’ll kill him first” (136). For 
Jewel, the horse is a product of his labor that he wants to keep to himself, keep private, 
rather than an extension of his body to share with his near relations.  
 Anse, too, acts as a self-interested economic agent, though he continues to pay lip 
service to the notion of cohesive familial bonds. Anse attempts to have it both ways and 
largely succeeds—taking advantage of his membership in a family whenever it proves 
																																																						
47 The horse is of course an indirect product of Jewel’s labor, rather than a direct one: in exchange 
for working Quick’s fields, Jewel earns money, which he uses to purchase Quick’s horse. As with 
the money Mr. Compson spends on Quentin’s tuition, this intermediate stage of financial 
payment already testifies to the weakening of the bond between laborer and beneficiary of that 




convenient to do so, while also regularly acting in his own interests, against his relations’. 
Hence, though he initially complains about Jewel’s purchase of the horse, he has no 
problem selling it himself—along with Cash’s savings—to pay for a new team of mules. 
When Darl comments that he has “never seen a sweat stain on [Anse’s] shirt,” he reveals 
the hypocrisy of Anse’s complaints about the plight of the hardworking farmer (17). Anse 
has no interest in undertaking labor to benefit his family members, but he is interested in 
benefiting himself by making use of what his relations possess. Taking ten dollars from 
Dewey Dell to facilitate his purchase of new teeth, he exploits the rhetoric of family 
cohesiveness to his own ends. He tells her, “I have fed and sheltered you. I give you love 
and care” (256), making the case that he and his daughter participate in a relationship of 
mutual giving, and therefore that she should be willing to part with her money. But Anse 
has perverted Scarry’s logic of bodily extension and exchange here: when Dewey Dell is 
fed, it is not with food that Anse makes (and if he is giving her love, he has a strange way 
of doing so). Taking more from his family members than he gives in return, Anse 
simultaneously facilitates his own economic autonomy and heightens his relations’ 
feelings of radical privacy. It is in his wife, Addie, that these feelings prove most 
pronounced.  
 
Addie’s Subversive Skepticism  
 
 In moving from The Sound and the Fury to As I Lay Dying, Faulkner makes a 




from the perspective of a female character within the novel’s principal family. Whereas 
the Compson brothers’ descriptions and memories of Caddy reveal a great deal about 
male anxieties about female social and sexual behavior, Faulkner’s representation of 
Addie (and, as I discuss below, of Dewey Dell) acknowledges more directly the 
experiences of the women confronting these conditions. Set against Anse’s offhand 
remark that Addie “was ever a private woman” (18)—an example of confident male 
assessment of her character—Addie’s own section of narration shows how fundamentally 
she conceives of herself as unknown and unknowable to those around her, showing that 
the meaningfulness of her husband’s comment extends far beyond what Anse himself can 
imagine. With Addie, Faulkner illuminates potential drawbacks to the later 
Wittgenstein’s picture of language: whereas each Compson brother either mourns or 
resents his perceived exclusion from shared linguistic practices, Addie experiences 
communal speech as an oppressive force and seeks out private language as an 
empowering alternative. As Scott Romine discusses, Faulkner presents Yoknapatawpha 
county as a “hegemonic community”—a society that wields shared narratives in order to 
validate and preserve its coercive, controlling value system (22).48 The bodies of white 
women, as Diane Roberts observes, played a crucial role in the perpetuation of this 
system, enabling the creation of new white male heirs, at the same time that dominant 
discourse conceived of the white woman as curiously “asexual”—a passive, non-agential 
“vessel” (186). Through its “insistence on the white mother’s innate goodness and 
																																																						
48 For an extended examination of how this hegemonic community controls racial discourse, see 




morality” (188), the hegemonic community sought to maintain traditionally patriarchal 
gender relations, even in the face of changing economic conditions, and southern 
religious life helped to police and preserve these traditional attitudes. Churches gave 
white Southerners “a common language” (Doyle 108), which equated moral rectitude for 
women with “duty and obedience” (120).    
 In her section of narration, Addie reveals a deep resentment at the constraints 
imposed by her hegemonic community. She describes childbirth as a “duty,” adding, “I 
gave Anse the children. I did not ask for them” (AILD 174). Addie sees that her society’s 
linguistic practices seek to define and control her experience, and her hostility toward 
language suggests her desire to subvert such hegemonic modes of speech. The blank 
space at the center of Addie’s section (“The shape of my body where I used to be a virgin 
is in the shape of a  ”) suggests that what it means to be a woman cannot be accurately 
represented in the patriarchal language of dominant culture.49 Recognizing that shared 
language relies on shared social norms, Addie wants to emphasize how little she shares 
with her linguistic community, and how little it has chosen to share with her. In light of 
the status of her body in that community, Addie arrives at the skeptical position that 
																																																						
49 Other critics have made a version of this point: Annette Wannamaker, for instance, argues that 
“patriarchal symbolic discourse … is the only language available to Addie, even though she tries 
to find a space outside this language” (119). Sass, too, reads Addie’s resistance to language in 
psychoanalytic terms. These approaches make claims with which I largely agree, but they tend to 
de-emphasize the particular historical conditions that inform the development of Addie’s 
philosophy. Other critics have connected Addie’s resistance to language more fully to the 
particular patriarchal practices of the modernizing South—see, for instance, Roberts 197-202 and 
Gault 441-3. Godden, in his own analysis, emphasizes the religious context for Addie’s views on 
language, writing that she has been raised in an environment of “Fundamentalist theology,” 
which stresses the doctrine of “Original Sin” (“Addie” 107). As a result, Godden argues, Addie 
retreats from language because she ascribes to it a Fallen, postlapsarian quality (109)—an attitude 




shared language is inadequate to capture her unique bodily experience. She wishes to free 
herself from public language, to avoid using others’ words to describe her world.50 
 By opening Addie’s section with an account of her days as a teacher, Faulkner 
suggests that this experience proves crucial to the development of her linguistic 
skepticism. Historically speaking, Addie’s teaching evidently takes place at a transitional 
moment in Southern educational practices, during what James Leloudis describes as a 
shift from the more traditional “common school” method, concerned primarily with 
inculcating in white youth conformity to dominant cultural values, to the more modern 
“graded school” method, which placed more emphasis on individual achievement (16-
24). Faulkner’s description of Addie’s work combines elements of the older and newer 
pedagogical models, as, for example, employing a female teacher would have been more 
characteristic of the later, graded school model (11), while Addie’s use of corporal 
punishment to enforce discipline is a holdover from the common school approach (16-
7).51 Operating at this moment of shifting pedagogical practices, Addie reacts against 
features of each. In castigating her students as “selfish” (AILD 170), she responds to the 
graded school emphasis on individualistic values, while her attempt to play the more 
traditional role of teacher as strict authority highlights the ideological contradictions in 
her work: she is meant to cultivate conformity and deference in her students in order to 
																																																						
50 For more on the feminist implications of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, see Moi, “I am a Woman,” 
esp. 207-45. See also my introduction.      
51 Leloudis explains that, even as the graded school pedagogy created more opportunities for 
women to be teachers, the system still remained “grounded in persistent notions of sexual 
inequality” (76), because men moved into most of the newly created administrative and 




help perpetuate a system by which women such as herself are oppressed by the same 
demands.  
Constrained within a society that consistently requires her to submit to patriarchal 
authority, Addie wields her own authority to force her students into an acknowledgment 
of her experience:  
I would look forward to the times when they faulted, so I could whip them. When 
the switch fell I could feel it upon my flesh […], and I would think with each 
blow of the switch: Now you are aware of me! Now I am something in your secret 
and selfish life … (170) 
Addie discovers, to her frustration, that instructing her students does not yield any sort of 
mutual understanding; they remain “secret” to her, and she to them. As such, she resorts 
to corporal punishment as the only way to effect connection with her pupils. Whipping 
them makes them feel pain, a feeling Addie understands, so she “look[s] forward” to 
inflicting it on others as a way to make them “aware of [her].” Crucially, this shared 
experience of pain is achieved not through language but through violence.52  
 Addie’s work as a teacher, then, conditions her understanding of language: as a 
medium that fails to convey adequately her internal experience. While her experiences do 
suggest that she views language as having a certain pragmatic function, she uses it 
primarily in ways consistent with her ideas about its inadequacy. Perhaps the most 
																																																						
52 It’s worth noting here that between the publication of the Tractatus and his return to philosophy 
in the late ‘20s Wittgenstein worked as a schoolteacher in rural Austria. He was by all accounts 
an irascible and violent instructor, displaying frustration at the limitations in his ability to get 





prominent example of her employing words in this fashion is her request that Anse take 
her body to Jefferson for burial. In this case, Addie trusts language to convey her literal 
meaning, insofar as she expects Anse to follow her instructions. But Addie’s request also 
reflects her sense of the limited capacity of language to capture her private experience. 
For Addie, asking to be buried with her people in Jefferson is an act of “revenge” that, 
she anticipates, “he would never know I was taking” (173).53 It is Addie’s response to the 
submissive, unfulfilling role that Anse has forced her to play, her way of achieving in 
death the freedom from him that she could not achieve in life. Knowing that Anse will 
remain unaware of the deep resentment underlying her request, Addie can speak in a way 
that preserves the distance she sees between conventional speech and private self. Her 
family’s taking her body to Jefferson becomes an example of “doing” that, like whipping 
her students, enables a certain extra-linguistic acknowledgment of her experience (173).54  
 Despite her sense of the gap between her society’s language and her individual 
experience, Addie ‘s own words reveal the depth of her embeddedness in broader 
linguistic practices. The words Addie denounces most vehemently are often constrictive, 
explicitly ideological terms like “motherhood” and “sin.” Whereas Mr. Compson has 
made Quentin anxious about the increased meaninglessness of traditional patriarchal 
																																																						
53 The irony here, of course, is that Addie won’t be aware of taking the revenge either.  
54 Anse’s own explanation of the rationale for the trip contributes to the sense of the inadequacy 
of language in this social context. Anse explains that he “promised [his] word” he would take 
Addie to Jefferson, so she can “rest quiet” (19). Of course, this ostensibly noble description of the 
trip’s function conceals Anse’s true purposes, and the actual events of the trip make a mockery of 
the notion that it is meant to help Addie “rest quiet.” Addie, obviously aware of how her husband 
operates, may be counting on him to carry out the letter, but not the spirit, of her request. By 
extracting this “promise” from him, she sets up a situation that will confirm her conviction as to 




terminology, Addie affirms the continued meaningfulness of terms that restrict the social 
options available to women like herself. As she formulates her rejection of such 
controlling terminology, Addie still reveals herself to be working off shared definitions of 
these very concepts.55 For example, in her critique of “motherhood,” Addie explains how 
the birth of Cash, her first child, teaches her “that motherhood was invented by someone 
who had to have a word for it because the ones that had the children didn’t care whether 
there was a word for it or not” (171-2), implicitly casting “motherhood” as a male-coined 
term, a component of the patriarchal discourse that binds her. However, the sentence by 
which Addie repudiates the communally inscribed definition of “motherhood” in fact 
depends upon this same understanding in order to make sense—an understanding that 
Addie and we as readers share. As she contends that “the ones that had the children”—
i.e., the mothers—don’t need this word to describe themselves, Addie reveals her sense 
that conceiving and bearing children is what “motherhood” entails.56    
Addie’s implicit acceptance of a public meaning for “motherhood” is also evident 
in her image of “words that are not deeds […], fumbling at the deeds like orphans to 
whom are pointed out in a crowd two faces and told, That is your father, your mother” 
(174). Here, Addie emphasizes her view of words as falling short of lived experience, 
capable only of fumbling awkwardly at “deeds” in the attempt to encapsulate them. In 
this case as well, though, Addie’s metaphor relies on, and takes it force from, a shared 
																																																						
55 As Cavell says, “We can disagree in many of our beliefs, but that very disagreement implies 
that we agree in the use of the words which express those beliefs” (MWM 240). Shared language 
is the precondition for differing attitudes toward our concepts. 
56 This element of motherhood, we might say, transcends the strict social codes of Addie’s 




understanding of the word “mother”: the point of the figure is that the orphan’s relation to 
this supposed mother is inadequate, lacking—because having a mother implies being 
familiar with her, implies that she is more than just a face in a crowd. Addie also 
imagines that the orphan is “told” these people are her parents, but the issue is not that the 
words the orphan hears are inadequate or ambiguous; in fact, precisely the opposite is 
true. The orphan does understand the word “mother” (otherwise the metaphor loses its 
power), and it is because she understands the term that hearing it applied to a stranger is 
unsatisfying. So, even as Addie objects to the limitations that a traditional definition of 
“motherhood” imposes on her, she reveals that her understanding of this concept 
nonetheless informs and structures her picture of the world.  
Another word that Addie explicitly disavows is “sin.” To see her participation in 
broader linguistic practices, though, it is worth comparing her use of the word to that of 
Cora and Whitfield, who narrate the sections immediately preceding and following 
Addie’s. As with “motherhood,” Addie imagines that “sin” is invented and used only by 
those who need to describe something they do not experience themselves. Addie 
envisions her affair with Whitfield, the minister, as highlighting and confirming this 
separation between word and world: “I would think of the sin as garments which we 
would remove in order to shape and coerce the terrible blood to the forlorn echo of the 
dead word high in the air” (175). Despite elsewhere emphasizing how little access she 
has to others’ minds, here she attests that Whitfield shares her conception of “sin” as 
restrictive clothing to be cast off: “I would think of him as thinking of me as dressed also 




confines of language, Addie points to Cora as someone who uses “sin” unproblematically 
and in so doing affirms its irrelevance, one of those for whom “sin is just a matter of 
words” (176). 
In one sense, Cora’s use of the term “sin” bolsters Addie’s claim that it has 
become an empty word, for Cora’s positions on its use prove contradictory and 
hypocritical. After Addie admits to having sinned, Cora critiques her for being 
presumptuous enough “to say what is sin and what is not sin,” before going on to 
confidently assert that “the only sin [Addie] ever committed was being partial to Jewel” 
(167). In saying that humans cannot define “sin” and then defining it herself, Cora offers 
an incoherent account of the term’s relation to lived behavior and uses it like the “dead 
sound” Addie imagines it to be (175). However, as the later Wittgenstein reminds us, one 
speaker cannot unilaterally change or negate the meaning of a concept, and to see that 
Cora misuses the term is to affirm, not to deny, that “sin” retains some degree of coherent 
meaning in this society.57 Moreover, Cora and Addie are evidently employing this term 
more similarly than either realizes; a major reason why they are speaking at logger-heads 
in this conversation is because Cora does not know about Addie’s affair with Whitfield. 
The two women do not exhibit identical understandings of how to project the word “sin” 
																																																						
57 In a passage relevant to Cora’s hypocrisy, Cavell writes, “Socrates gets his antagonists to 
withdraw their definitions not because they do not know what their words mean, but because they 
do know what they (their words) mean, and therefore know that Socrates has led them into 
paradox …. To this extent, they had not known themselves, and not known the world” (MWM 
40). Vernon Tull attempts such a Socratic undertaking after he tells his wife the story of the 
Bundrens crossing the river, and she criticizes first the brothers for making the crossing and then 
Anse for not helping them. But Cora is not interested in learning the meaninglessness of her own 
utterances, and when Tull points out her inconsistency, she simply “beg[ins] to sing again” (AILD 




into the contexts of their lives, as Addie would presumably contest Cora’s claim that her 
love for Jewel is sinful. But their understandings remain similar, as both would 
presumably agree that Addie’s extramarital relationship constitutes “sin” as their society 
defines the term. The principal difference between the two speakers is over the 
significance of “sin,” rather than its signification: Addie wishes to reject this term and the 
limitations it places upon her; Cora readily accepts it as an accurate and appropriate 
descriptor of particular human behaviors.   
Whitfield’s section shows that he too employs a conventional understanding of 
“sin.” Whereas Addie imagines him to be a kindred spirit in recognizing the term’s 
inadequacy, Whitfield from the opening of his narrative uses the word in its standard, 
communally inscribed way. He affirms that he “woke to the enormity of my sin” and 
resolves to go to the Bundren household and “confess [my] sin aloud” (177). Here, too, 
however, as for Wittgenstein, the social constructedness of a concept—and the different 
views of its relevance that Addie and Whitfield hold—does not render it meaningless in 
the way Addie imagines. Whitfield ultimately fails to confess his sin, and the blessing he 
gives at the end of the chapter instead—“God’s grace upon this house”—is certainly an 
example of language that falls short (179). However, the shortcomings of his statement in 
no way reflect the broader shortcomings of language; the problem here is simply that 
Whitfield substitutes this evasive and clichéd utterance for an honest admission of his 
transgression against social and religious mores. It is not in his voicing of the word “sin,” 
but precisely in his refusal to speak “sin aloud,” that Whitfield’s visit to Addie’s deathbed 




Addie’s skeptical conception of language, then, results not from the inherent 
inadequacy of the words available to her, but rather from the inadequacy of her 
hegemonic community’s responses to her pain. Whereas her society equates the dominant 
understanding of words like “motherhood” and “sin” with their essential nature, Addie 
recognizes—in a Wittgensteinian way—that the relationship between these terms and 
lived experience is contingent and conventional. Unfortunately, without any interlocutors 
who share her dissatisfaction with dominant discourse, it is difficult for her to imagine a 
world in which people use these words in alternative ways. Her epistemological doubts—
her disbelief in the possibility of knowing others through language—reflect her emotional 
disappointments, the failure of others to acknowledge the particulars of her experience. 
Addie’s repudiation of another word, “love,” may serve to clarify this point. That for her 
“love” is just something Anse says, “just a shape to fill a lack” (172), reflects both her 
own loveless response to this selfish, lazy man, and the emptiness in Anse’s use of the 
term, evident in his treating Addie as little more than a body to bear his children and keep 
his house. In other words, Addie’s philosophical skepticism toward “love” as a linguistic 
sign reflects her unfamiliarity with the lived human experience of marital love.  
Unacknowledged in her own life, so Addie cannot account for how language 
might function to promote acknowledgment. She conceives of words in terms of their 
epistemological functions only, and by this metric she finds them lacking. Other people, 
like words, are “outside the circle” of her identity (172). Unable to discern language’s 
capacity for acknowledgment, Addie—like Quentin—retreats into skeptical silence. In 




“abandoning words means abandoning people” (83), and therefore that Addie’s hostility 
toward language obstructs her ability to respond to the pain of her own children. Addie 
displays her emphasis on knowledge, at the expense of acknowledgment, when she 
reviews the mathematics involved in her decision to have a fourth and fifth child: “I gave 
Anse Dewey Dell to negative Jewel. Then I gave him Vardaman to replace the child I had 
robbed him of. And now he has three children that are his and not mine” (AILD 176)—
Dewey Dell, Vardaman, and Darl.58 Addie wants to insist that the math works, that the 
equation balances, because if it does, then she becomes justified in her disavowal of these 
children.59 Like Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, she hides behind “the crystalline purity of 
logic” ignoring “the rough ground” (PI §107) of ordinary usage and refusing to hear her 
offspring’s calls for acknowledgment.  
 
The Next Generation Searches for Acknowledgment  
 
																																																						
58 Laurel Bollinger helpfully makes the case that Cash and Jewel are the two children Addie 
specifically wishes to claim, responding to another scholar who has suggested otherwise (459, 
fn17).  
59 As for the two children she does claim, Addie’s refusal to account for the possibility of 
acknowledgment leads her to imagine that she genuinely knows Cash and Jewel, that they have 
remained ‘inside’ the circle of her identity, and that she shares a bond with them that transcends 
the limits of language. It is her difficulty accepting these children as other, I would suggest, that 
makes Addie so upset when Jewel purchases his horse. When Jewel is an infant, Addie describes 
herself “lying calm in the slow silence,” sensing her wordless connection with him (AILD 176). 
By contrast, when he comes home with the horse and she learns what he has been doing at night, 
Addie begins “to cry … hard” (135). In this moment, she realizes that Jewel has kept a secret 





 In one way or another, all of Addie’s children display the impact of her linguistic 
skepticism in their own negotiations of the relation between word and world.60 For 
instance, one of the next generation’s paradigmatic responses is the preference for silence 
over speech. In the case of Jewel, the novel indicates this preference by including only 
one brief section of narration from his perspective. The section culminates in Jewel’s 
fantasy of himself and Addie alone “on a high hill and me rolling the rocks down the hill 
at their faces … until she was quiet” (AILD 15). Here, Jewel displays his own version of 
Quentin’s desire to “isolate [Caddy] out of the loud world” (SF 177), wishing to fend off 
all potential interlocutors so that he and his mother can remain in the state of “quiet” they 
both prefer. Even more than Jewel, though, it is Dewey Dell whose resistance to speech 
has been shaped most consequentially by that of her mother. Like Addie, Dewey Dell 
understands the strategic value of silence, the way it functions as an alternative—even if 
ultimately an unsatisfying one—to participation in hegemonic speech practices. This 
similarity in approach is consistent with the fact that, of Addie’s five children, Dewey 
Dell is her only daughter. Just as Addie’s gender constrains her choices and heightens her 
sense of alienation in this socially conservative society, so Dewey Dell occupies a similar 
position, and the Bundren daughter’s inability to procure an abortion indicates that she is 
en route to a constricting experience of motherhood that largely replicates Addie’s own. 
Speaking from this socially marginalized position, Dewey Dell shares her mother’s sense 
that she has no words available to her to describe her private bodily experiences.  
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Dewey Dell’s first section of narration highlights her separation from her family 
members, none of whom help her pick cotton: “Pa dassent sweat”; “Jewel dont care about 
anything, he is not kin to us in caring, not care-kin”; Cash is too busy sawing the coffin; 
and she “did not think that Darl would” (AILD 26). Rather than working with her “kin” to 
share the products of collective labor, Dewey Dell does the work no one else wants to do 
and receives few economic or social gains in return. Under these circumstances, Dewey 
Dell—like her mother—doubts language’s ability to bridge the gap between herself and 
others. Just as Addie describes herself as a closed circle, Dewey Dell feels her identity to 
be similarly self-contained: “It’s like everything in the world for me is inside a tub full of 
guts” (58). Concomitant to this sense of isolation is her reluctance to vocalize emotional 
anguish. Looking at Peabody during his visit to her mother’s deathbed, Dewey Dell 
thinks, “I am I and you are you and I know it and you dont know it” (51), her twin 
tautological statements emphasizing her conception of herself as clearly cut off from the 
family doctor. For Dewey Dell, this stark divide between “I” and “you” ensures an 
asymmetry in knowledge: she knows “it” (her self, her pregnancy, her pain), and he does 
not. Though she does not outline her theory of language as explicitly as Addie does, 
Dewey Dell similarly imagines that being “I” means feeling pain one cannot convey to 
others. 
 A further similarity between Dewey Dell and Addie is that the daughter also 
conceives of knowledge in epistemological, rather than emotive, terms. When she thinks 
that if she “were not alone, everybody would know it” (59), Dewey Dell uses “know” to 




along, if she were more fully aware of the child within her womb, then others would be 
aware of it as well, and she wishes to forestall this kind of knowledge, for she rightly 
recognizes that it would cause her problems within both her family and her society more 
broadly. In light of her hegemonic community’s deep hostility toward women’s sexuality 
outside wedlock, she finds she cannot share her pregnancy with Peabody, even though he 
would “know,” epistemologically speaking, what to do about it. Her culture’s oppressive 
value system has produced consequential gaps in Dewey Dell’s own knowledge, which in 
turn contribute to her emotional isolation. Given her lack of exposure to medical 
information about the reproductive processes, she literally does not have the words to ask 
for an abortifacient, as her failed trips to the pharmacy make all too clear.61   
 Whenever Dewey Dell does experience connections with others, the novel always 
figures such knowledge as oppressive and violating. Reflecting on the progression of her 
pregnancy, Dewey Dell thinks, “the process of coming unalone is terrible” (62). Her 
unwanted pregnancy embodies a relationship that involves knowledge but not 
acknowledgement; Dewey Dell is certain of the incipient existence of this other being, 
but her intimate physical involvement with it does nothing to mitigate her emotional 
isolation.62 Indeed, in Dewey Dell’s experience, physical connection is consistently 
disarticulated from empathy: Lafe impregnates and abandons her; MacGowan rapes her. 
																																																						
61 Historically, Dewey Dell’s unplanned pregnancy coincides with the efforts of Margaret Sanger 
and other activists to challenge “obscenity statues that prevented circulation of birth control 
information,” as Ladd discusses (Resisting 24). Living in a rural, socially conservative area, 
Dewey Dell has not felt the effects of this burgeoning revolution around women’s reproductive 
rights.   
62 Ironically, Dewey Dell makes this realization while she is in the barn, preparing to milk the 




 The other key relationship in Dewey Dell’s life that produces knowledge rather 
than acknowledgement is with her brother Darl, who has unique access to her 
unexpressed thoughts. As she relates a conversation that they have “without the words” 
(27), Dewey Dell portrays the siblings’ shared, nonverbalized language as frightening 
and intrusive: “And that’s why I can talk to him with knowing with hating because he 
knows” (27).63 The novel reinforces this idea when, describing Darl looking at her, 
Dewey Dell thinks, “[T]hen my dress is gone: I sit naked on the seat above the 
unhurrying mules” (121). As the sexually charged language of this passage affirms, 
Darl’s knowledge of her is an unwanted intimacy comparable to that she experiences at 
the hands of Lafe and MacGowan. 
 Darl’s own picture of language at once partakes of and departs from his mother’s. 
Like Addie, Darl tends to overlook language’s emotive capacities, its potential to grant 
acknowledgment. But, more than his mother, he demonstrates confidence in language’s 
ability to convey factual information about people. His unspoken connection with Dewey 
Dell highlights his preoccupation with acquiring epistemological knowledge of her. Their 
nonverbal conversations frequently consist of his asking her questions to further, or 
confirm, his factual understanding of her desires and motivations, as when he wonders if 
she is eager for Addie to die so she can get to town more quickly. In this particular 
																																																						
unwanted distension comparable to that which Dewey Dell undergoes (61). But Dewey Dell 
denies any sense of commonality between her own plight and the cow’s, telling the animal, 
“What you got in you aint nothing to what I got in me, even if you are a woman too” (63).    
63 Erin Edwards describes the siblings’ nonverbal communication as an example of the novel’s 
tendency to “dislocate thought from bodily location” (282). Edwards suggest that, in the case of 
Dewey Dell, such dislocation reflects her lack of knowledge about how the body functions—as 




conversation, Darl thinks, “She wouldn’t say what we both knew”; that is, she would not 
admit to being pregnant (40). Darl’s use of “knew” here is strictly epistemological; he 
“knows” his sister in the sense of being factually aware of her pregnancy, but he does not 
recognize the possibility of an alternative way of knowing her—namely, by sympathizing 
with her plight. Darl repeatedly employs the word “know” in this narrow sense, as when 
he describes his moment of realizing that Jewel is not Anse’s son: “And then I knew that 
I knew. I knew … as plain on that day as I knew about Dewey Dell on that day” (136).64  
 Yet even as Darl seeks to acquire knowledge, he also reveals a craving for 
acknowledgment—a desire that he, like many of Faulkner’s speakers, struggles to 
articulate. His difficulty negotiating between these different modes of knowing mirrors 
his ambivalent relationship toward his own participation in the South’s modernizing 
economy. Deciding to go and transport wood, even though he suspects doing so will 
result in his missing Addie’s death, Darl insistently reiterates the hard fact of the trip’s 
economic payoff: “It means three dollars” (17, 19). Though in the scene Darl advocates 
for the trip while Anse voices reluctance, in fact Darl’s actions here reflect his attempted 
emulation of Anse’s own economic single-mindedness. On the trip itself, however, Darl’s 
thought process shows the degree to which he finds this economic transaction 
emotionally unsatisfying. As he lies waiting for sleep, he reflects on his and Jewel’s 
strange relationship to the wood they are transporting, describing it as “the load that is no 
																																																						
64 In this respect, Darl’s attitude is similar to that of the figure John Gibson terms “the 
Simpleton,” the person who knows but does not acknowledge (104). The Simpleton’s “cognitive 
flaw,” Gibson writes, “lies not in his ‘knowledge’ but in his mind’s inability to move from 
knowing to what this knowledge calls on one to do. What we see in the Simpleton is a failure to 




longer theirs that felled and sawed it nor yet theirs that bought it and which is not ours 
either, lie on our wagon though it does” (80). Matthews reads this moment as Darl’s 
recognition of the “suspended non-existence” of the lumber (Seeing 149); it resides in a 
liminal state—no longer the property of those who grew it, not yet the property of those 
who bought it. As simply the middleman, Darl is excluded from the exchange of made 
goods that Scarry describes as mitigating the human experience of privacy.  
 Seeing that he is neither the creator nor the owner of the wood, Darl grows more 
abstractly philosophical in his thinking, as though searching for other grounds by which 
he might confirm his existence. As he ponders this question, his thought process enacts a 
progression from issues of knowledge to issues of acknowledgement:  
… And Jewel is, so Addie Bundren must be. And then I must be, or I could not 
empty myself for sleep in a strange room. And so if I am not emptied yet, I am is. 
 How often have I lain beneath rain on a strange roof, thinking of home. 
(AILD 80-1) 
In the first section of this passage, Darl draws on logic (convoluted logic, but logic 
nonetheless) to establish confidence in his being, his existence as “I.” Here, and as we’ve 
seen elsewhere, Darl relies on language as a means of establishing facts about the world; 
he seems to believe that if he can just get the reasoning right, he can be confident that he 
is “is,” that he exists.65 In the final sentence of the passage, however, instead of 
																																																						
65 Darl attempts a specifically Cartesian project here, trusting that his rational faculties are 
sufficient to confirm or prove his existence. The passage reflects Faulkner’s attack on “the 
subject’s illusion of self-sufficiency” (Weinstein, Unknowing 149), since Darl’s frantic, 
convoluted thought process suggests that his emotional isolation has traumatized him in ways he 




problematizing the term “I,” taking it as an object of study, Darl uses it in a more 
ordinary way, and in doing so he conveys his loneliness and homesickness. The passage 
suggests Darl’s buried recognition that “home” has become an increasingly unstable 
concept for him, as his relatives prioritize individual economic interests over that of the 
family, and as broader economic forces sow doubts about how long the Bundrens can 
keep their land.  
 Darl’s ultimate rejection of rational, economically driven thinking is his burning 
of Gillespie’s barn. Illogical from an economic standpoint, his act reflects his desire to 
save his mother from the posthumous indignity that the journey to Jefferson has become. 
In response to Darl’s action, his family is quick to write him off as crazy. Only Cash is 
willing to recognize that “crazy” is a contingent, socially constructed term: “Sometimes I 
aint so sho who’s got ere a right to say when a man is crazy and when he aint. Sometimes 
I think it aint none of us pure crazy and none of us pure sane until the balance of us talks 
him that-a-way” (233). Cash’s thought process here is consistent with the Cavellian 
contention that to designate someone insane is to reveal the limits of our capacity for 
understanding: “[I]f I say ‘They are crazy’ or ‘incomprehensible’ then that is not a fact 
but my fate for them. I have gone as far as my imagination, [or] magnanimity … will 
allow” (CR 118). At the same time, even as Cash seems to suggest his solidarity with 
Darl here, his use of the generalized term “a man” abstracts his point in a way that 
obscures the blood relation between them. Ultimately, Cash’s sympathy for Darl does not 
extend to protesting his brother’s institutionalization. Like his mother, Cash determines 




unlike Addie, he is perfectly willing to accept this state of affairs. Cash, the carpenter, has 
taken to heart the later Wittgensteinian idea of words as tools, and his sections of 
narration show that he would rather use language than philosophize about it. He does not 
share Wittgenstein and Cavell’s persistent worry that we may suddenly find ourselves 
unable to go on speaking together, nor their recurrent sense of astonishment when we do.  
 Of all Addie’s children, then, Cash shows the greatest comfort with everyday 
usage. Of course, this comfort follows from the fact that he does not face the same 
restrictive social conditions as, say, Addie and Dewey Dell do. When asked either to 
challenge or to accept the ordinary meanings of words, Cash chooses acceptance. He 
remains committed to this approach even when everyday usage proves counterproductive 
to acknowledgment—as in the case of Darl’s institutionalization. Cavell describes the 
failure to give and receive acknowledgment as a failure to meet another’s eyes, and 
Cash’s rationale for repudiating Darl proves consistent with such descriptions. Cash 
describes a crazy person as someone who “cant see eye to eye with other folks” (234). 
When faced with such an individual, Cash says, “they aint nothing else to do with him 
but what the most folks say is right” (234). Cash also justifies Darl’s institutionalization 
on the grounds that “nothing excuses setting fire to a man’s barn and endangering his 
stock and destroying his property” (233). So Cash evokes the logic of economic self-
sufficiency against his brother; just as words are tools, so is money, and Cash deems 
Darl’s attack on another man’s economic resources unacceptable. Moreover, sending 
Darl away, Cash explains, obviates a great financial risk for the Bundrens: “It was either 




Bundrens’ difficult economic circumstances make them particularly disinclined to defend 
Darl. Put simply, they feel they cannot afford to acknowledge him.  
 Darl’s difficulty asking for and receiving acknowledgment precipitates and 
explains his descent into madness. His preoccupation with how to define and be sure of 
his individual identity creates a fissure, and in his final section of narration he refers to 
himself as both “Darl” and “I.” In this desperate way, he seeks to effect the 
acknowledgement that neither his family nor his broader society provides. Split in two, 
Darl becomes other to himself, thus stepping into the role of someone who can 
acknowledge his pain. “Is that why you are laughing, Darl?” he asks himself (254), 
attempting to recognize and respond to the internal emotional state that has produced this 
laughter. When he thinks, “Darl is our brother, our brother Darl” (254), he acknowledges 
his place within a family, his connection to the rest of the Bundrens—including, 
according to this schizophrenic logic, himself. Unable to find acknowledgement within 
this hegemonic community, Darl creates a community of two in his own mind. 
Vardaman follows Darl in attempting to gain knowledge of the world through 
language; in so doing, the youngest Bundren also replicates the difficulty expressing 
emotional needs displayed by many of his siblings. Just as Darl inherits Addie’s de-
emphasis on the language of acknowledgment, so this same attitude descends to 
Vardaman—not incidentally, another of the children Addie disavows. Perhaps as a 
consequence of their mutual repudiation, Darl plays a formative role in teaching 
Vardaman how language works, in the same way that Caddy plays this role for Benjy. 




distorted rationalism, pushing Vardaman to know their world rather than to acknowledge 
it. For example, when Darl tells him, “Jewel’s mother is a horse,” Vardaman responds, 
“Then mine can be a fish, can’t it, Darl?” (101). So Vardaman follows Darl in attempting 
to unpack the logic of Bundren family relations. As such, this moment constitutes another 
failure of acknowledgment within the family: Darl responds by critiquing Vardaman’s 
logic, without addressing the sense of loss implicit in his brother’s query.   
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein asserts that “[t]he world is the totality of facts” 
(1.2), and Vardaman’s narration shows him engaging in a corrupted version of the 
Tractatus’ project, confusedly endeavoring to pinpoint the shifting facts of his own 
world. Crucial to his linguistic puzzling is the question of whether it makes sense to 
continue employing a word when this word’s referent is no more. How, in light of the 
death of his mother, should he use the term “mother”? Of his mother’s corpse, Vardaman 
thinks, “I thought it was her, but it was not. It was not my mother” (AILD 66). Similarly, 
after cutting up the fish he catches, Vardaman describes it as “not-fish now” (53). 
Vardaman determines that the only way to continue using “mother” is to equate it with 
another word that has lost its referent, thus prompting his famously garbled statement: 
“My mother is a fish” (84). This assertion calls attention to the inefficacy of referential 
language, its inability to help him know his rapidly changing world. Vardaman uses the 
form of logical assertion, “X is Y”—also on display throughout the Tractatus—to make a 
flagrantly illogical claim. Like Quentin’s incest fantasy, Vardaman’s statement is 




Vardaman does not make her a fish, but he does manage to convey some sense of his 
emotional upheaval and disorientation—to the novel’s readers, if not to his own family.66 
 Indeed, it is by turning the focus onto ourselves as readers that we gain a more 
complete view of these novels’ capacities to grant acknowledgment. For, even as 
Faulkner’s characters insist on their own radical isolation, the experience of reading his 
fiction cuts against this skeptical perspective. Our ability to read The Sound and the Fury 
and As I Lay Dying depends upon shared language; Faulkner relies on socially agreed 
upon meanings for the words he uses in the contexts he uses them, meanings that are 
stable enough for the texts to remain comprehensible (insofar as they ever were). By 
highlighting the problematic lack of acknowledgment within the Compson and Bundren 
families and the modernizing South more broadly, Faulkner’s novels express a sense of 
compassion for these characters and lament the difficult social circumstances that restrict 
them. Faulkner thus seeks to develop the emotive capacities of his readers, their ability to 
discern and their willingness to acknowledge pain.67 He shows how urgently these 
capacities are needed, by representing a world from which they prove painfully absent. 
By crafting such vivid representations of the modes of thought by which traditional 
																																																						
66 Vardaman’s concern about how to use “mother” reflects the shifts occurring around him toward 
an economic model that increasingly privileges the individual over the family unit. Vardaman 
evidently recognizes that he exists in relation to other members of his family, and that Addie’s 
death has called these relations into question. As such, he becomes preoccupied with speaking 
and re-speaking these familial connections: “Jewel is my brother … Darl is my brother” (101). 
This preoccupation grows particularly acute when new questions are raised about the stability of 
these relations, as when Darl’s institutionalization leads Vardaman to think, “Darl he went to 
Jackson is my brother Darl is my brother” (249). 
67 Recent insights from cognitive science lend further support to literary-critical about the 
emotional impact of reading modernist texts; for a helpful discussion of this research as it pertains 




Southern culture justifies its exclusionary ideologies, Faulkner became an important 
predecessor to novelists like Richard Wright and Ralph Ellison, whose work attends more 
consistently to the experiences of African-Americans who inhabited this culture and bore 
the brunt of its oppressive practices. In the next and last chapter, we will examine how 
Wright and Ellison take up this even more extreme case of American society’s failure to 




CHAPTER FOUR: SEEING HUMANS AS HUMANS: WRIGHT’S BLACK BOY 
AND ELLISON’S INVISIBLE MAN 
 
 In his essay “Stranger in the Village” (1953), James Baldwin uses his experience 
in a remote Swiss village as a lens through which to examine American racial politics. He 
recalls the sense of “wonder” with which the villagers approach him, the first dark-
skinned person they have ever encountered (166). Certainly, he writes, the villagers’ 
amazement carries with it “no suggestion that I was human” (166). Yet Baldwin also 
identifies “a dreadful abyss between the streets of this village and the streets of the city in 
which I was born, between the children who shout Neger! today and those who shouted 
Nigger! yesterday”—and, he goes on, “the abyss is experience, the American experience” 
(172). The villagers’ simple ignorance is, Baldwin finds, markedly different from the 
repressed knowledge and blind rage that his presence induces in American whites, for 
whom the question of how to conceive of people like him is as old as the nation itself.  
 Baldwin goes on to describe the stakes, as he understands them, of American 
racial conflict. White Americans, the actual or imagined descendants of those European 
emigrants who founded the nation, see themselves as “guardians and defenders” of 
“civilization” (176). As a result,  
… it was impossible for Americans to accept the black man as one of themselves, 
for to do so was to jeopardize their status as white men. But not so to accept him 
was to deny his human reality, his human weight and complexity, and the strain of 
denying the overwhelmingly undeniable forced Americans into rationalizations so 




The history of America is, Baldwin suggests, the history of this collective white refusal to 
admit black humanity—an attitude he sees whites defending all the more stubbornly once 
they begin to sense its indefensibility. Faulkner, the subject of the last chapter, has 
chronicled the “strain” of this mindset arguably as well as any white author in American 
history; indeed, it is a major impetus to the feelings of cultural displacement voiced by 
characters like Quentin and Jason Compson.1  
Thus far, this study has explored the historically specific ways different forms of 
social relation (including marriages and parent-child relationships) offer and foreclose 
what Cavell calls ‘acknowledgment’—a mode of compassionate responsiveness toward 
the inner lives of others that he identifies as crucial to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. In 
this chapter, I turn to an even more fundamental question: How might one have one’s 
status as a human being acknowledged, when one’s interlocutors—and one’s society 
more broadly—consistently withhold such acknowledgment? The years preceding the 
publication of Baldwin’s essay saw the appearance of two literary works that devote 
sustained narrative attention to this question: Richard Wright’s Black Boy (1945) and 
Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man (1952). Both texts explore how black subjects might 
communicate their humanity to a white-dominated world that does not want to hear what 
they have to say. Formally, each text takes on this project from, so to speak, the inside 
																																																						
1 A white character in Faulkner’s Go Down, Moses (1942) offers one strikingly explicit 
summation of this prevailing cultural logic: “Them damn niggers,” the man tells his wife, “… 
they aint human. They look like a man and walk on their hind legs like a man …. But when it 
comes to the normal human feelings and sentiments of human beings, they might as well be a 




out, representing the consciousness of a black protagonist in order to illuminate the kind 
of inner life about which American society would prefer to remain in the dark.  
By grappling with the question of how black subjects might alter the viewpoint of 
white interlocutors, Wright and his protégé-turned-critic Ellison investigate a subject with 
which Wittgenstein, in his own way, also grew increasingly preoccupied in the late 
1940s—the topic known, in Wittgenstein scholarship, as ‘aspect shifts.’ In Part II of the 
posthumously published Philosophical Investigations (1953), Wittgenstein writes, “I 
observe a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not 
changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience ‘noticing as aspect’” (II, §113). 
Implicitly, Wittgenstein’s discussion raises the question of what it means to see another 
human face as human and invites us to consider the contexts in which such perspectival 
shifts do or do not occur. In this respect, it has much in common with Wright and 
Ellison’s fiction.2 
A shared historical backdrop informs the inquiries of all three figures, each of 
whom exhibits a sense of disillusionment with Western modernity. Wright and Ellison’s 
work indicates that economic and technological developments have mainly given 
American society new tools for the violent oppression of black subjects. While the Great 
Migration offered many African-Americans hope of freeing themselves from the worst 
																																																						
2 Both Wright and Ellison pursue this subject by focusing primarily on the experiences of 
African-Americans. Some of their insights are specific to this group, which has suffered 
dehumanization in historically particular ways, while others apply more generally to those who 
are marginalized on the basis of race or ethnicity. Following these authors, I focus primarily and 
most explicitly in this chapter on the experiences of black Americans in the Jim Crow era, while 




excesses of Southern racial inequality, Wright and Ellison—both participants in this 
migratory movement—show that black humanity remains broadly unacknowledged in 
Northern, urban spaces. In Wittgenstein’s case, as Ray Monk discusses, the catastrophic 
events of the Second World War—“the fire-bombs at Dresden, the gas-ovens of the 
concentration camps, the atomic bombs unleashed on Japan”—reinforced his 
“apocalyptic view that … life itself was coming to an end, suffocated by the trappings of 
our industrial age” (489). It was in this post-WWII “mood of deep despair” that 
Wittgenstein wrote the discussion of aspects that eventually appears in part II of the 
Investigations (491).3 While Wittgenstein does not specifically address and critique 
American racial injustice in the way Wright and Ellison do, nonetheless the latest stages 
of his philosophy are shaped by his horror at the Western world’s tendency to 
systematically dehumanize large groups of people.4 In what follows, I demonstrate the 
heretofore unexamined links between Wittgenstein’s investigation into the phenomenon 
of ‘seeing as’ and Wright and Ellison’s more historically-located explorations of this 
same philosophical subject.  
 
“Consequences” of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Aspects 
																																																						
3 Though the earliest formulations of his thinking on aspects appear in the Brown Book, lecture 
notes Wittgenstein wrote in 1934-5, it is in 1947 that he returned to this topic and began preparing 
the remarks that would appear in the Investigations (Monk 507).  
4 This sense of horror was not entirely new to Wittgenstein. He felt similarly after WWI, as I 
discuss in my first chapter. Nonetheless, the violent events of WWII reinforce his pessimism 
concerning the depth of humanity’s capacity for cruelty. It’s worth mentioning here that, in one of 
those curious accidents of history, Wittgenstein and Adolf Hitler were briefly enrolled in the 
same Viennese elementary school, though there is no record of their having ever interacted 





If readers of part II of the Investigations remember anything, they are likely to 




Figure 1: The “duck-rabbit.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 4th edition. © 2009 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Reproduced with permission of John Wiley and Sons, Inc.    
 
This image, which Wittgenstein takes from Joseph Jastrow’s Fact and Fable in 
Psychology (1901), provides a vivid example of what Wittgenstein means when he 
speaks of an aspect shift. It is possible to see the image as a duck and then, suddenly, to 
see it as a rabbit, even as one would presumably hold that the picture itself has not 
changed. As Wittgenstein writes, “The expression of a change of aspect is an expression 
of a new perception and, at the same time, an expression of an unchanged perception (PI 
II, §130). Seeing an aspect is a particular type of seeing, a particular way of using the 
word “see,” and it raises certain philosophical difficulties Wittgenstein sets out to 




external world. The temptation thereby arises to treat one’s “visual impression” as a 
private object, something that “I carry within myself” and that “I can’t show to anyone” 
(II, §132). But this line of thought seems to lead toward exactly the kind of position that 
Wittgenstein has critiqued in his remarks on private language: in the same way that he 
casts one person’s usage as an insufficient criterion to establish the meaning of a word, so 
he is deeply suspicious of the idea that one person’s perception might independently 
determine what kind of object—duck or rabbit—an image depicts (Monk 508, 512). In 
part I, Wittgenstein asserts that “[a]n ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” 
(§580). In part II, it is an open question how this same view might apply in the case of an 
aspect shift: what are the “outward criteria” that determine when (and why) we see one 
aspect of the duck-rabbit, as opposed to the other? 5 
 While I do not have space to delve into the numerous intricacies of Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on aspects, for our purposes it is important to emphasize the connection between 
Wittgenstein’s comments on seeing a picture as a duck (or rabbit) and his comments on 
seeing a face as human. In order to bring out this connection, let us return briefly to part I 
of the Investigations and to Wittgenstein’s contention that we learn the meanings of 
words like “pain” through sharing a world with other people. Wittgenstein points to our 
shared condition of embodiment as facilitating our recognition of pain in others; we learn, 
																																																						
5 It is important to emphasize here that part II of the Investigations is much farther from being a 
finished product than part I. Whereas Wittgenstein meticulously organized and frequently 
reworked the remarks in part I, which comprise the bulk of the Investigations, those in part II 
represent a more provisional stage in his thinking. As such, we should take them as raising 
subjects for philosophical exploration, rather than as providing definitive conclusions. For more 
on this point, see Baz 697-8. For other helpful discussions of what is at stake in Wittgenstein’s 




for instance, to understand particular “facial expressions” as indicative of particular 
internal experiences (§285). At the same time, in a remark expressive of what Cavell calls 
“the truth of skepticism” (CR 496), Wittgenstein admits that a fundamental difference 
obtains between our access to our own pain and our access to other people’s: “If one has 
to imagine someone else’s pain on the model of one’s own, then this is none too easy a 
thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I don’t feel on the model of pain which I do 
feel” (§302). So, even if we treat other people’s bodies as exhibiting pain behavior, we 
remain susceptible to questioning or ignoring the reality of the inner experiences these 
bodies convey.  
In a remark that anticipates his discussion of aspect shifts in part II, Wittgenstein 
considers what it would be like to doubt the humanity of those who behave, outwardly, 
like humans: 
But can’t I imagine that the people around me are automata, lack consciousness, 
even though they behave in the same way as usual? … But just try to hang on to 
this idea in the midst of your ordinary intercourse with others—in the street, say! 
Say to yourself, for example: “The children over there are mere automata; all their 
liveliness is mere automatism.” And you will either find these words becoming 




 Seeing a living human being as an automaton is analogous to seeing one 
figure as a limiting case or variant of another; the cross-pieces of a window as a 
swastika, for example. (§420).6   
This remark contrasts two ways of seeing others: as human versus as automata. 
Wittgenstein displays concern about the prospect that we might treat people like they are 
automata, since this attitude would likely curb our inclination to respond compassionately 
to their expressions of pain. But he suggests that, though it is possible to imagine seeing 
others in this way, it would be difficult “to hang on to this idea” during “ordinary 
intercourse.” Seeing people as something other than human becomes, at least in this 
remark, a possibility that Wittgenstein does not take especially seriously.  
But, on my reading of the Investigations, §420 starts to sound much more 
ominous when read in conjunction with the following remark from part II: 
The question now arises: Could there be human beings lacking the ability to see 
something as something—and what would that be like? What sort of 
consequences would it have?—Would this defect be comparable to colour-
blindness …? We will call it ‘aspect-blindness.’ (II, §257) 
Aspect blindness is a perceptual defect related to—but crucially distinct from—a visual 
impairment like color blindness. It would consist in, for example, the inability to see the 
duck-rabbit as anything other than a duck. From this remark, it is unclear the extent to 
which Wittgenstein understands aspect blindness as an actual, as opposed to merely a 
																																																						





theoretical, phenomenon.7 Regardless, he has trouble identifying what its “consequences” 
might be. In the case of failing to see Jastrow’s image as a rabbit, any consequences are 
likely to be innocuous. But, when we return to the case of seeing another as human, 
aspect blindness suddenly assumes greater significance. When Ellison writes, in the 
opening paragraph of Invisible Man, that people’s refusal “to see” his protagonist stems 
from “a peculiar disposition of … their inner eyes, those eyes with which they look 
through their physical eyes upon reality” (3), he vividly describes this more consequential 
form of aspect blindness.   
 In this light, the Investigations’ difficulty specifying the consequences of aspect 
blindness suggests that Wittgenstein himself experienced a certain failure of sight. Here 
is where differences between Wittgenstein’s life experiences and those of Wright and 
Ellison prove telling. A light-skinned Austrian who lived most of his adult life in 
England, Wittgenstein never made race a major focus of his philosophy. The closest he 
came is probably his expressions of anxiety about his Jewish ancestry; he “oddly 
internalized … Nazi propaganda by writing journal entries expressing doubt about the 
ability of a Jew like himself to be a genius” (Perloff, “To Become” 46). On the history 
and contemporary struggles of peoples of African descent, Wittgenstein was largely 
silent. Certainly, twentieth-century England was a racially heterogeneous place; as 
Urmila Seshagiri notes, WWI “saw the formation of lively … African expatriate 
																																																						
7 Later in the same remark, he asks whether a hypothetical aspect-blind person is “supposed to be 
blind to the similarity between two faces” and then writes, “I do not want to settle this.” In 
context, “this” might be the larger topic of aspect blindness, or the more localized question (of 




communities in London” (7), and Britain was hardly immune from the racialized violence 
that plagued Jim Crow America.8 But if these social dynamics exerted an influence on 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, it is hard to tell what that influence might have been. When, 
for instance, Wittgenstein writes that “[o]nly of what behaves like a human being can one 
say that it has pains” (PI §283), he suggests a clear path from human-like behavior to our 
inference of pain. This remark leaves unaddressed the historically contemporaneous 
forces that refuse to see the behavior of blacks as human behavior and accordingly fail to 
acknowledge what Baldwin calls the “human reality” of black pain.  
 Cavell, born in Atlanta in 1926, lived in closer proximity to Jim Crow culture than 
Wittgenstein did, and his discussion of aspect blindness in The Claim of Reason (1979) 
touches more directly on the history of black dehumanization.9 Exploring what it might 
mean to see human beings as anything other than human, Cavell proposes the example of 
the “slaveowner [sic],” (CR 375), whose attitude toward his slaves suggests that he does 
not see them as human, or anyway not as fully human. The slave owner  
																																																						
8 For instance, in both Liverpool and Cardiff in 1919, “[w]hite workers in bitter economic 
competition with black workers were mobilized into lynch mobs” (Fryer 312). For a helpful 
account of post-WWI racial tensions in Britain, see Fryer, esp. 298-316. For more on the role of 
race as a formative factor in the development of British modernism, see Seshagiri. For a 
discussion of the origins of the term “Jim Crow,” see Wilkerson 40-1. 
9 In his memoir, Little Did I Know (2010), Cavell discusses the gradual development of his own 
racial awareness. For instance, he discusses playing music in an integrated band, while his family 
was living in Sacramento in 1941, and how “no auditorium we know of … would agree to rent 
their space to us. The craziness of the fact that this was a national condition, that a large segment 
of the musical genius of the country, some of it the most famous, found non-musical obstacles in 
the way of reaching a large segment of those who craved to hear it, had not, at my age of fifteen, 
yet broken over me” (75). For more on Cavell’s encounters with Jim Crow-era racism, see LDIK 




… means, indefinitely, that they are not purely human …. He means, indefinitely, 
that slaves are different …. He need not deny the supremacy of justice; he may be 
eloquent on that subject. He need deny only that certain others are to be 
acknowledged as falling within its realm. It could be said that what he denies is 
that the slave is ‘other’, i.e., other to his one. They are as it were merely other; not 
simply separate, but different. (376-7) 
Cavell suggests that the slaveholder justifies the institution of slavery by excluding slaves 
from the realm of ordinary human intercourse. Slaves are not simply “other” in the way 
that another human subject is “separate” from oneself; rather, they comprise another 
category altogether, a category of creatures who fail to qualify for acknowledgment as 
full human beings, and whose mistreatment the slaveholder justifies on this basis.10 The 
slave owner treats his slaves as what the philosopher Charles Mills calls “subpersons”: 
that is, “humanoid entities who, because of deficiencies linked with race, lack the moral 
status requisite for enjoyment of the bundle of rights and freedoms appropriate for 
persons” (218).11 Although Cavell does not cast the slave holder’s relation with his slaves 
																																																						
10 Cavell’s description of the slave owner’s attitude as a failure of acknowledgment is appropriate, 
given the etymological connection between the English word “acknowledgment” and the German 
word “Anerkennung,” which means, roughly, recognition, and which G.W.F. Hegel uses in his 
own account of the master-slave relation (Eldridge 8-9). As in Hegel’s formulation, the failure of 
Cavell’s slaveholder to recognize the humanity of his slaves shows that he is also “missing 
something about himself, … about his connection with these people” (CR 376). Susan Buck-
Morss argues that Hegel developed his conception of the master-slave dialectic after reading 
newspaper accounts of the Haitian Revolution (50). Her effort to draw links between Hegel’s 
abstract philosophy and the black liberationist movements of his historical moment has analogies 
with my own approach to Wittgenstein here.   
11 Mills’s term, subperson, speaks helpfully to Cavell’s point that the slave holder does treat his 
slaves as at least partially human. Cavell writes that the slave owner “does not go to great lengths 
either to convert his horses to Christianity or to prevent their getting wind of it. Everything in his 




as a specifically racial relation, in an American context the racial implications of his 
discussion are hard to miss. At the same time, by focusing on the figure of the slave 
holder, The Claim of Reason also relegates race-based aspect blindness to America’s past, 
overlooking how this phenomenon continues into—and beyond—the Jim Crow era.  
 What about the experiences of those who perceive this blindness in others, who 
recognize that their humanity has, in some measure, been denied? At a later point in his 
discussion, Cavell writes, “The question whether there are other minds is exactly as much 
a question about me as about anyone else. If anyone is an other mind, I am one—i.e., I 
am an other to the others …. Then the question is: Do others know of my existence?” (CR 
442). Cavell employs the term “passive skepticism” (446) to describe this flipped 
perspective on the problem of other minds. Passive skeptics are those who, rather than 
assuming a skeptical stance toward the existence of other minds, recognize that others 
assume a skeptical stance toward the existence of theirs. This notion of passive 
skepticism offers a helpful framework for reflecting on the experiences of those treated as 
racial subpersons. Indeed, passive skepticism has much in common with W.E.B. Du 
Bois’s concept of double-consciousness—which Du Bois describes as “this sense of 
always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others” (45).  
If, looking at myself as others look at me, I discover that my interlocutors do not 
see me as fully human, the question becomes: how might I alter this situation, how might 
																																																						
his disappointments, his jealousies, his fears, his punishments, his attachments …” (CR 376). 
Cavell’s formulation “more or less human” is a less precise way of expressing what Mills means 
by subpersons: that is, the slaves are humanoid entities, but they lack the moral status of ‘true’ 




I contest my passively skeptical condition? This question lies at the heart of much 
African-American literature. But Black Boy and Invisible Man are two works that draw 
out this philosophical problem in particularly vivid fashion. In both works, first-person 
narrators devote sustained attention to imagining how whites have imagined them, and 
both speakers pursue various strategies for conveying the reality of their inner lives to 
interlocutors.12 In this way, Wright and Ellison connect the threat of other-mind 
skepticism to the historical realities of black experience in the Jim Crow era, and their 
fiction—like Wittgenstein’s philosophy—aims to dissolve or push back against this 
skeptical threat.    
 
Wright, Ellison, and Conditions of Jim Crow Racial Oppression 
 
 It is a fact of U.S. history that the refusal to acknowledge black humanity has 
persisted well beyond the formal abolition of slavery. In the years following the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification in 1865, white Southerners made a concerted effort 
to maintain an inhumane, white supremacist social system, and in 1896 the Supreme 
Court’s infamous Plessy v. Ferguson decision established Jim Crow racial segregation as 
the law of the land throughout much of the American South. Even as many white 
Southerners subscribed to the Lost Cause rhetoric, which presented the antebellum years 
																																																						
12 Since both texts depict their protagonists taking active steps to contest their dehumanized 
condition, the term “passive” skepticism is perhaps misleading. In my discussion, references to 
the ‘passive’ form of skepticism should not be taken to imply that those in this position refuse to 




in falsely idealized terms, these same Southerners mobilized specifically modern 
technologies toward the ongoing oppression of African-Americans.13 For instance, as 
Grace Hale notes, railroads brought people “beyond the reach of personalized local 
relations,” as “travelers found themselves in close proximity to people they did not 
know” (128); hence, segregated train cars became a crucial way of reconciling the 
traditional white supremacist system with modern possibilities of mobility. Even more 
chillingly, as modern consumer culture increasingly found its way into Southern spaces, 
white Southerners “made an important contribution to the rapidly evolving forms of 
leisure in twentieth-century America: they modernized and perfected violence, in the 
form of spectator lynching” (203). Hale highlights the extent to which the culture of 
lynchings as mass entertainment made use of and relied on modern technological 
innovation: 
Lynchers drove cars, spectators used cameras, out-of-town visitors arrived on 
specially chartered excursion trains, and the towns and counties in which these 
horrifying events happened had newspapers, telegraph offices, and even radio 
stations that announced times and locations of these upcoming violent spectacles 
(201).14 
Such rituals at once reflected and contributed to a cultural environment in which the 
reduction of African-Americans to subperson status was not just quietly tolerated, but 
publicly celebrated.  
																																																						
13 Grace Hale characterizes the Lost Cause mythos as “celebrat[ing] a plantation pastoral of racial 
harmony, and a noble war of principle and valor” (48).    




 Under such conditions, leaving the South became an increasingly appealing—and, 
as the twentieth century progressed, increasingly viable—option for many African-
Americans. During WWI, immigration to the U.S. plunged by more than ninety per cent, 
and Northern centers of industry began to look elsewhere for cheap labor, giving 
Southern blacks an economic incentive to relocate (Wilkerson 161). The scale of this 
migration was significant: roughly 550,000 African-Americans left the South during the 
decade of the First World War, more than had departed in all the years since the 
Emancipation Proclamation (161-2). Many re-settled in cities like Chicago and New 
York, where they provided a point of contact for those left behind in the South, thus 
encouraging subsequent waves of people to make the journey.15 Upon arriving in 
Northern cities, migrants found that racial hostility remained a significant factor in their 
lives, but that it functioned differently than it had in the South. In Harlem, for instance, 
white residents protested aggressively against the influx of black migrants looking for 
housing, but efforts to prevent property owners from renting to black tenants failed—not 
because of some high-minded neighborhood commitment to racial tolerance but simply 
because “the more fluid culture and economics of the North” ensured that renting to black 
tenants at increased rates was the most profitable option—and therefore the one most 
property owners chose (Wilkerson 250). In contrast to the “starkly material violence” 
African-Americans faced in the South, black arrivals in the North faced a different kind 
																																																						
15 In Chicago, the black population increased by 150% between 1910 and ’20, and by over 100% 
again between 1920 and ’30. In New York City, the black population grew almost as rapidly, 
increasing 60% between 1910 and ’20 (Weems 11-3). The scale of the Migration grew to 
unprecedented heights during WWII, with 1.6 million African-Americans leaving the South in the 




of racially-inflected oppression: namely, “the violence of expropriated labor and class 
inequality that grounded American capitalism” (Hale 295).  
 Wright and Ellison were two of the millions who participated in the Great 
Migration, and their writing shows them grappling with its legacy. Black Boy, Wright’s 
memoir, chronicles his experiences moving from small-town Mississippi to Memphis 
and, eventually, to Chicago, where his first novel, Native Son (1940), takes place. Ellison 
grew up in Oklahoma, a state he characterizes as “lack[ing] many of the intensities of 
custom, tradition and manners which ‘colored’ the institutions of the Old South” (CE 
659). Still, he, like the protagonist of his eventual novel, did attend college in a former 
Confederate state before heading north to New York City. In 1937, Ellison met Wright, 
who had recently moved to New York after a falling out with the Communist Party of 
Chicago, and who began to encourage the younger man’s literary ambitions (Jackson, 
“Birth” 321-2).   
Because any attempt to write about Wright and Ellison together necessarily 
functions as a reconsideration of their complex relationship, it is worth briefly reviewing 
the salient details of this acquaintance. Initially, at least in the public sphere, Ellison took 
a consistently laudatory stance toward Wright’s work. In “Richard Wright’s Blues” 
(1945), Ellison defends Black Boy against criticism that it has presented an overly bleak 
vision of twentieth-century black life:  
For certainly in the historical sense Wright is no exception. Born on a Mississippi 
plantation, he was subjected to all those blasting pressures which in a scant eighty 




slavery to emancipation, from log cabin to city tenement, from the white folks’ 
fields and kitchens to factory assembly lines, and which, between two wars, have 
shattered the wholeness of its folk consciousness into a thousand writhing pieces. 
(CE 131) 
Ellison describes Wright as elucidating the condition of black Americans under 
modernity by providing a detailed account “of one Negro childhood,” his own (131). 
Wright, perhaps unsurprisingly, praised Ellison’s review. But, beneath these displays of 
mutual admiration, fissures were already beginning to form in their relationship, with 
Wright beginning to worry that Ellison’s abilities as a novelist might actually surpass his 
own.16 After the publication of Invisible Man, these fears largely came to fruition. 
Ellison’s novel was widely and immediately praised, even as Wright himself “played 
down [its] artistic and intellectual significance,” believing that it was not Invisible Man 
but rather his own novel-in-progress, The Outsider—published to mixed reviews in 
1953—“that would stand as the enduring comment” on black life in the West (Jackson, 
“Birth” 346). Wright continued writing until his death in 1960, but he never again 
reached the levels of critical and popular success he had achieved with his earlier works.  
																																																						
16 As Lawrence Jackson writes, “The qualities that had at first made Ellison seem an 
extraordinary and distinctive comrade had the potential to become threatening to Wright: a keen 
mind, a passion for reading, and a diligent work ethic” (“Birth” 326). Wright tells Ellison that, 
given the strength of his writing in “Richard Wright’s Blues,” he should consider making the 
“switch … to non-fiction” (qtd. in Jackson 338)—a comment in which Wright tellingly couches 




 While Ellison never publicly split with his former mentor before the older man’s 
death, in the ‘60s he makes a point of distancing Wright’s literary aims from his own.17 In 
“That Same Pain, That Same Pleasure,” an interview he gave in 1961, Ellison 
characterizes Wright as “overcommitted to ideology” and says he “found it disturbing” 
that Bigger Thomas, Wright’s most famous character, “had none of the finer qualities of” 
Wright himself (CE 74). Then, in “The World and the Jug,” a pair of essays published in 
’63 and ’64, Ellison accelerates his effort to place rhetorical distance between Wright and 
himself, taking the white literary critic Irving Howe to task for his simplistic assumption 
that Wright must have been Ellison’s primary influence. In this piece, Ellison makes the 
bold statement that a writer cannot choose “one’s relatives,” only “one’s ‘ancestors,’” and 
that Wright was in this sense nothing more than a relative to him (CE 185).18 While this 
statement has remained probably Ellison’s most enduring comment on his relationship 
with Wright, Ellison would eventually return to offering qualified praise of Wright’s 
work: in “Remembering Richard Wright” (1971), he describes Native Son as “one of the 
major … events in the history of American literature,” even while maintaining that he has 
“certain reservations about its view of reality” (CE 670).  
																																																						
17 By refusing to voice his criticisms publicly while Wright was alive, Ellison adopted a different 
approach to the older man’s legacy than that taken by Baldwin, another younger writer whom 
Wright had once mentored. Baldwin’s essay “Everybody’s Protest Novel” (1949) contains an 
attack on Native Son that, while brief, was sufficiently scathing as to create a permanent rift 
between the two writers. See Baldwin 13-23, esp. 22-3. For more on the relationship between 
Wright and Baldwin, see Fabre 290, 362-3; Jackson, Indignant 283-90, 386-7, 408.    
18 Ellison contrasts Wright with Ernest Hemingway, whom he describes as an ancestor. For an 




While in no way disputing Ellison’s point that his artistic influences were various 
and culturally diverse, my discussion seeks to establish previously unexplored resonances 
between Black Boy and Invisible Man.19 In its own way, each text exemplifies the 
conception of modernism I have been seeking to illuminate in this study—a conception 
that at once relies on and departs from the standard scholarly view. Scholars often 
understand works of modernist fiction as representing a world in which economic and 
cultural upheaval shatters stable paradigms of knowledge, with the result that “the whole 
system of … words enters into crisis” (Jameson, ASM 155). In response to this historical 
situation, I’ve argued that even as modernist writers from Forster to Faulkner move away 
from a view of language as a means of gaining knowledge, they also underscore its 
capacity to grant acknowledgment. In their own ways, both Black Boy and Invisible Man 
represent crucial developments in this literary tradition, wielding modernist strategies for 
representing consciousness in order to encourage acknowledgment of black humanity.20   
 
Black Boy: Learning Language in a White Supremacist World 
 
																																																						
19 For a revealing account of how Invisible Man signals the influence of several canonical white 
literary figures, see Nadel. For an account of how Ellison’s modernist style owes a debt to 
Faulknerian strategies for representing consciousness, see Chase.  
20 Both texts also illustrate Toril Moi’s understanding of modernism as the “aesthetic antithesis” 
(Ibsen 5) of nineteenth-century idealism, which holds “that the task of art … is to uplift us” and 
equates “beauty, truth, and goodness” (4). Black Boy and Invisible Man challenge this equation, 
honestly representing the violence of a deeply racist world without offering even the slightest 




 In Black Boy, recalling a dispute with a white employer at a drug store, Wright 
writes, “My words were innocent enough, but they indicated, it seemed, a consciousness 
on my part that infuriated white people” (BB 196). This sentence captures the core 
elements of the ongoing dilemma Wright narrates in Black Boy. Like all speakers of a 
language, the young Richard21 uses words to express the workings of his inner life. His 
white interlocutors, however, are committed to viewing him as a racial subperson who 
lacks the capacity for complex thought. So Richard infuriates them whenever he speaks 
words that seem to challenge their dehumanized view of him. More than Native Son, 
Black Boy constitutes an investigation of the condition Cavell calls “passive skepticism.” 
Whereas Bigger, Native Son‘s protagonist, has trouble viewing the world from any 
perspective other than his own, Richard is quick to recognize the subhuman way whites 
see him, and he explores how language might enable him to push back against the 
pervasive other-mind skepticism of white supremacist culture.22 This extensive 
preoccupation with the role of language in constructing and communicating selfhood 
																																																						
21 In an effort to minimize confusion, I will refer to the author of Black Boy as “Wright” and to 
the youthful figure represented within the text as “Richard.” 
22 While scholars have previously understood Wright as a novelist with significant philosophical 
interests, they have generally described these interests as emerging only after he moves to France 
in 1946 and develops a heightened familiarity with French existentialist thought. Paul Gilroy, for 
instance, identifies The Outsider as Wright’s major philosophical novel. Even when scholars have 
discussed Native Son or Black Boy in philosophical terms, they have continued to read these texts 
through the lens of European existentialist and phenomenological thought, projecting Wright’s 
later interest in these movements back into his earlier work. (For examples along these lines, see 
Gordon; Haile.) Wright’s fiction has generally not been read in conjunction with language 




makes Black Boy the most paradigmatically modernist of Wright’s texts; neither Native 
Son nor The Outsider exhibits this same level of linguistic self-consciousness.23 
The early chapters of Black Boy offer an illustrative example of the process 
Wittgenstein describes as growing into a “form of life” (PI §19)—a process that involves 
learning the relations between the words one’s interlocutors use and the world one 
inhabits.24 As Wright writes early in the text, before introducing a catalogue of childhood 
memories, “Each event spoke with a cryptic tongue. And the moments of living slowly 
revealed their coded meanings” (BB 7). For a black boy growing up in the Jim Crow 
South, an important part of learning these “coded meanings” involves learning the 
strange, far-from-intuitive terms of the white supremacist social system. For instance, 
Wright details his early, fumbling attempts to tell the difference between “white” and 
“black” people: 
Though I had long known that there were people called “white” people, it had 
never meant anything to me emotionally. I had seen white men and women upon 
the streets a thousand times, but they had never looked particularly “white.” To 
me they were merely people like other people, yet somehow strangely different 
																																																						
23 Black Boy has not typically been read as a work of modernism. Carla Cappetti offers one 
exception to this rule when she describes Wright’s text as an example of modernist 
künstlerroman, a “portrait-of-the-artist narrative” comparable to James Joyce’s first published 
novel (199). One reason why the modernism of Black Boy has not been fully appreciated is that 
the work has often been categorized as a memoir rather than a novel. But this categorization relies 
on an overly rigid distinction between fictional and non-fictional stories, as Ellison recognizes 
when he writes that Wright “could have called it a ‘nonfiction’ novel” (CE 672). Precisely in the 
act of representing his youthful experiences in language and shaping them into a narrative, 
Wright necessarily fictionalizes them. So Black Boy provides an imaginative treatment of actual, 
historical events—like all the literary works discussed in this study.   
24 The ‘Benjy’ section of The Sound and the Fury (1929) pursues a similar project, as discussed in 




because I had never come in close touch with any of them…. It might have been 
that my tardiness in learning to sense white people as “white” people came from 
the fact that many of my relatives were “white”-looking people. My grandmother, 
who was white as any “white” person, had never looked “white” to me. (23) 
In this passage, Wright gives an example of his younger self’s incomplete immersion 
within this particular form of life. Importantly, the young Richard has grasped the role 
that certain linguistic concepts play within his society; namely, he understands the words 
“white” and “black” as referring to specific colors. He would likely not have any trouble 
distinguishing between white and black rocks, or white and black houses. But the passage 
shows that, because “white” and “black” function differently when applied to people, 
Richard still faces two additional challenges in learning how to use these terms. The first 
is that the color of “white” skin is not actually the same as the color of other white things; 
the skin of a recognizably white American is not the same color as the paint on a 
recognizably white house. Thus, white people have “never looked particularly ‘white.’” 
The second challenge is that American racial concepts rely on but also depart from 
straightforward distinctions in skin color. So, even once Richard learns what it means to 
be a white person (as opposed to a white house), he will remain inadequately prepared to 
understand why his light-skinned grandmother is not “white.” At this point in Richard’s 




people”; he has yet to learn the ideological and material foundations for his lack of “close 
touch with any of them.”25 
 Black Boy also casts the young Richard’s efforts to familiarize himself with racial 
terminology as inextricable from his learning to navigate the unique institutions of 
modern life. Thus, Wright describes a railroad trip from Mississippi to Arkansas as a 
moment of emerging racial awareness: “At last we were at the railroad station with our 
bags, … and for the first time I noticed that there were two lines of people … , a ‘white’ 
line and a ‘black’ line” (46). Wright’s account of this scene bears out Hale’s point about 
railway cars as symbols of modern mobility and, thus, sites in which racial segregation is 
strictly enforced, lest white supremacist hierarchies break down. The quotation marks 
around ‘white’ and ‘black’ suggest that Richard’s knowledge of these racial concepts is 
already bound up with an awareness of their contingency. As the scene continues, 
Richard begins to learn that “white”-“black” divisions are not innocuous but reflect a 
rigid system of control: “When I boarded the train I was aware that we Negroes were in 
one part … and that whites were in another. Naively I wanted to go and see how whites 
looked while sitting in their part of the train” (46). But when he asks his mother if he can 
go look at the ‘white’ section of the train, she quickly and empathically tells him to “keep 
still” (46).  
																																																						
25 Richard’s comment that his grandmother has “never looked ‘white’” to him also suggests that, 
on some level, he does understand whiteness as a category of social power from which she is 
excluded, whatever she looks like physically. The line is one in which the youthful perspective of 
Richard-as-character blends with the mature perspective of Wright-as-author, so that it becomes 
difficult to say precisely what the speaker understands, when. (For a photograph of Margaret 




In light of this newfound knowledge of the specific contexts in which black 
people must remain separate from whites, Richard recognizes the extent to which his 
understanding of these concepts remains shaky. He engages his mother in the following 
dialogue in an attempt to figure out what he is missing: 
 “Mama, is Granny white?” I asked as the train rolled through the darkness. 
 “If you’ve got eyes, you can see what color she is,” my mother said.  
 “I mean, do the white folks think she’s white?”  
 “Why don’t you ask the white folks that?” she countered.  
 [...] 
 “Granny looks white,” I said, hoping to establish one fact, at least. “Then 
why is she living with us colored folks?”  
 “Don’t you want Granny to live with us?” she asked, blunting my 
question.  
 […] 
 “Did Granny become colored when she married Grandpa?”  
 “Will you stop asking silly questions!” 
 […] 
 Again I was being shut out of the secret, the thing, the reality I felt 
somewhere beneath all the words and silences. (47) 
Wright presents his younger self in this passage as having developed a clearer idea than 
he had earlier in his childhood of how the colors “white” and “black” map onto 




how his society uses the term. However, since his grandmother lives with black people, 
Richard senses that his understanding of this color terminology remains imperfect and 
questions his mother accordingly. Given the current state of his understanding, her first 
response above (“If you’ve got eyes”) fails to clarify his picture of racial meaning, since 
he understands that seeing color is not synonymous with knowing race. With his 
statement, “Granny looks white,” Richard seeks to ground the discussion upon the “one 
fact” he does think he knows, but again his mother’s response proves unenlightening. 
With his final question (“Did Granny become colored […]?”), he tries out the hypothesis 
that perhaps marriage serves as the crucial determinate of racial identity. So he is 
frustrated when, rather than affirming or denying this theory, his mother seeks to cut off 
his line of questioning altogether. When he refers to “the secret, the thing, the reality,” 
Wright presents his younger self as still unable to articulate more precise clarifying 
concepts; he has not grown into the language of his world fully enough to employ terms 
like ‘Jim Crow segregation’ or ‘systemic racism.’  
 His mother’s evasiveness here indexes a larger dynamic that Wright depicts as 
fundamental to his childhood years: his family’s attempt to make him deferential in order 
to prepare him for life in a racist world. Wright’s narrative suggests that, when his mother 
tells him to “stop asking silly questions,” it is because she operates according to the logic 
that too much curiosity about, and potential dissatisfaction with, the terms of one’s life is 
counterproductive, even dangerous, for someone in his position.26 Wright repeatedly 
																																																						
26 Since its publication, Black Boy’s critical portrayal of his Wright’s family has been one of the 
most controversial aspects of the text (Jackson, Indignant 202-3). It is precisely this element of 




describes how familial attempts to make him behave properly give rise to linguistic 
misunderstanding. For instance, when his uncle Tom wakes him up and asks him for the 
time, Richard tells him it is “[e]ighteen past five” (156), and then adds, upon further 
questioning, “If it’s a little slow or fast, it’s not far wrong” (157). When Tom reacts 
angrily to this response—asking, “What on earth do you mean, boy?”—Richard becomes 
confused: “‘What do I mean?’ I asked, bewildered. ‘I mean what I said’” (157). His 
confusion here results from his Wittgensteinian view that “the meaning of a word is its 
use in the language” (PI §43); he cannot fathom what would be objectionable about his 
answers, since he simply uses words according to their shared, socially accepted 
meanings. Cavell writes that “an individual’s intentions or wishes can no more produce 
the general meaning for a word than they can produce horses for beggars, or home runs 
from pop flies” (MWM 39). Richard’s point is similar: he does not create, or seek to alter 
unilaterally, the meanings of the words he uses; he merely accepts and reproduces them. 
Tom has asked for the time, and he has answered.  
Against this view, Tom’s position seems to be that Richard has given an overly 
cavalier response, that he has failed to demonstrate the level of deference appropriate to 
interactions with figures of authority. In his own way, Tom makes a Wittgensteinian 
point about the uses of words in specific social situations: he takes the position that, for 
																																																						
casts the behavior of Wright’s relatives as a natural response to the harsh realities of Jim Crow 
segregation. Ellison writes, for instance, that “[i]n the South the sensibilities of both blacks and 
whites are inhibited by the rigidly defined environment. For the Negro there is relative safety as 
long as the impulse toward individuality is suppressed …. And it is the task of the Negro family 
to adjust the child to the Southern milieu” (CE 139). For more on Ellison’s defense of Black Boy, 




African-Americans living in the Jim Crow South, saying what one means is often a 
foolish thing to do. Tom seems to have taken particular issue with the imprecision of 
Richard’s “If it’s a little slow or fast, it’s not far wrong.” Yes, Richard has answered his 
question about what time it is, but—in Tom’s view—the boy still has not spoken as he 
should. Given the pervasive threat of racial terror, Tom suggests that a black speaker’s 
primary goal should be to convey respect and obedience, and he chastises his nephew for 
losing sight of this goal. Richard’s frequent disputes with his family often stem from the 
fact that, when he is younger, he has not learned this linguistic lesson, and, when he is 
older, he has not accepted it.27 This difference of outlook between Richard and his family 
leaves him feeling deeply isolated throughout his childhood years.28  
 
Speaking as Human: Richard’s Interactions with White Interlocutors  
 
																																																						
27 Tuhkanen discusses how, in Wright’s portrayal, the antebellum practices of surveillance and 
slave-breaking have transformed, during the Jim Crow era, into practices of “self-surveillance and 
self-breaking” (99). Poulos discusses how Richard’s family relentlessly criticizes him for his use 
of improper language, even as the text also indicates that “[b]ad language can be good” (54); that 
is, Black Boy shows Richard repurposing so-called ‘improper’ language, turning it into a tool of 
self-expression. While Richard often differs with his family members over the best responses to 
living in a deeply racist world, Black Boy nonetheless describes racialized violence as a real and 
omnipresent threat, as when Wright recounts how his uncle Hoskins was lynched by whites who 
were jealous of “his flourishing liquor business” (BB 54).  
28 A significant component of this alienation involves Wright’s repudiation of his family’s 
religious faith. Recalling an occasion on which his mother encourages him to publicly accept God 
during a church service, Wright writes, “In essence, the tribe was asking us whether we shared its 
feelings; if we refused to join the church, it was equivalent to saying no” (154). Wright’s use of 
the word “tribe” here is significant, since it is a word that Wittgenstein also uses to describe a 
group of speakers (in Investigations §6, for instance). In both Wittgenstein and Wright’s 
accounts, the threat of isolation looms for those unable or unwilling to share in the tribe’s 




 As Richard grows older and begins looking for work, he demonstrates in his 
interactions with white employers his resistance to the linguistic “training” his family has 
imparted (PI §5). In these scenes, Black Boy contrasts Richard’s inherent awareness of 
his own humanity against the white world’s myopic, stereotyped view of him. Through 
his use of first-person interior monologue, Wright reveals the depth and complexity of his 
younger self’s inner life, even as—on the diegetic level—Richard’s white interlocutors 
generally refuse to treat him as human. Whereas the white people of his childhood years 
have attempted to know him, to interpret him according to simplistic and dehumanizing 
epistemological frameworks, the written narrative of these childhood years encourages its 
readers to acknowledge him, to recognize the human psyche that has suffered through 
these experiences and has lived to recast them in words. 
 In one of his early encounters with white supremacist epistemology, Richard 
applies for a job with a white family who wants someone to do household chores. In 
recounting his conversation with the white woman who interviews him, Wright reveals 
the racial dynamics that his narrative seeks to combat:    
“Do you steal?” she asked me, seriously.  
I burst into a laugh, then checked myself.  
“What’s so damn funny about that?” she asked.  
“Lady, if I was a thief, I’d never tell anybody.”  
“What do you mean?” she blazed with a red face. (BB 145) 
Despite all his family’s efforts to teach him proper behavior for interacting with whites, 




contravenes the established language games of his culture by acting too much like 
himself. Once again, Richard finds that his natural tendency to speak honestly is met with 
incomprehension. As far as he is concerned, he simply uses words according to their 
established, public meanings. Yet his words are not the ones whites expect to hear from 
blacks in such contexts. Still unaccustomed to conversing with white people, Richard 
learns he has underestimated the extent to which white supremacist epistemology distorts 
and circumscribes the linguistic foundation of these interactions. Walking home, 
wondering why the woman has asked him such a direct question, Richard “recall[s] 
hearing that white people looked upon Negroes as a variety of children, and it was only in 
light of that that her question made any sense” (147). Because of her presumed 
knowledge of African-Americans, the white woman assumes that Richard will not have 
the wherewithal to dissemble when asked directly if he steals. Richard’s amused response 
operates as an assertion of what is obvious to him—namely, that of course he has this 
wherewithal. By articulating his reflections as he walks home, the text illuminates his 
ability to imagine what the woman has been thinking, thus contesting her own implicit 
assumption that such imaginative acts exceed his intellectual capacity.  
 Such scenes in Wright’s narrative have a double function: they illuminate his 
failures to get racist Southern whites to see him as human, while simultaneously signaling 
his hope that he can succeed in this goal with respect to the readers of his text. Narrating 
a subsequent scene from his adolescence, Wright once again represents in language the 
inability of language to effect an acknowledgment of his humanity. While working in a 




employer. When he goes to report the bite to his boss, he struggles to find the words that 
will convince his interlocutor to acknowledge his pain:  
[H]e grunted, then laughed. “A dog bite can’t hurt a nigger.”  
“It’s swelling and it hurts,” I said.  
“If it bothers you, let me know,” he said. “But I never saw a dog yet that 
could really hurt a nigger.” (163) 
Richard’s boss operates according to an epistemological framework within which black 
pain fails to register. Richard tries to express this pain in language, only to find that his 
employer holds too tightly to an oppressive, dehumanizing mental picture for Richard’s 
words to have any effect. The white man tells Richard, “If it bothers you, let me know” 
with unintended irony, since if Richard’s previous words—“It’s swelling and it hurts”—
have failed to convey his pain, it is hard to imagine what words might succeed.29 
 As he grows older and gains more experience interacting with whites, Richard 
increasingly discovers the strategic value of selectively misrepresenting his inner 
experiences. At the age of sixteen, he accepts a job in a white-owned clothing store that 
caters to a black clientele. This job reflects the South’s gradual movement toward a more 
modern, consumerist economy, and the shifting social dynamics to which economic 
modernization gave rise. Jim Crow segregation relied on a “contradiction between market 
incentives and the desire to encode white racial supremacy within the changing features 
of the region” (Hale 133). Since white-owned businesses generally could not afford to 
																																																						
29 An additional irony here involves how Richard’s boss pairs unquestioned confidence about a 
black person’s capacity to feel pain with a similarly unwarranted certainty about a dog’s capacity 




exclude paying customers, “the collective white need for superiority clashed headlong 
with white individuals’ desire for greater income, and money often won” (188). In Black 
Boy, Richard’s employers respond to their ambivalence about serving black customers by 
treating them “with open contempt” and forcing them to pay exploitatively high prices 
(BB 179). Richard maintains a steely silence as he observes the mistreatment of black 
customers, until one day the boss’s son asks him, “What’s on your mind?” (182). Richard 
responds by saying, “Nothing, sir,” realizing that an honest answer to this question would 
certainly result in his losing his job (182). In this instance, Richard’s economic 
disenfranchisement prompts him to withhold the inner workings of his consciousness. For 
financial reasons, he finds himself unable to challenge white ignorance of black minds.30  
 In such scenes, Black Boy shows how comprehensively Jim Crow culture 
circumscribes the speech practices of African-Americans. Cavell emphasizes “that we 
learn language and learn the world together, that they become elaborated and distorted 
together, and in the same places” (MWM 19). In their more abstract philosophizing on 
language, however, Wittgenstein and Cavell do not account for the specific kinds of 
linguistic distortion with which those treated as racial subpersons must grapple. Black 
Boy illuminates how much its narrator understands about the ways language maps onto 
the world, but it also shows how little of this understanding Richard can express. These 
restrictive dynamics prove self-reinforcing: whites see blacks as less than human, and 
they rigidly prevent blacks from using words in ways that would challenge this view. 
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Though Richard generally maintains his conviction as to his own humanity, he is not 
immune from the psychological effects of these social forces, as when he imagines 
himself “a non-man, something that knew vaguely that it was human but felt that it was 
not” (BB 194). Wright thereby shows how the discursive practices of Jim Crow America 
create in blacks a particular form of subjectivity, one that involves pervasive doubts about 
one’s own human status. Frantz Fanon makes a similar point in Black Skin, White Masks 
(1952), emphasizing the difficulty of recognizing one’s own humanity when one receives 
so little recognition from others. Fanon writes, “In order to win the certainty of oneself, 
… recognition is essential” (217), and he defines “a human world” as “a world of 
reciprocal recognitions” (218).31 Fanon’s analysis helps to establish Black Boy as an 
exemplary case of modernist fiction’s interest in alienated subjectivity, since Wright’s 
account of his upbringing shows how Jim Crow causes blacks to feel cut off from the 
category of humanity itself.  
 Wright presents his culture’s unwillingness to acknowledge black humanity as so 
pervasive that it even overpowers and negates the efforts of individually sympathetic 
																																																						
31 This section of Fanon’s book is titled “The Negro and Hegel” and takes Hegel’s account of the 
master-slave dialectic as its point of departure. Later in this same section, as part of a discussion 
of suicide, Fanon quotes one of Wright’s white characters saying “If I were a Negro I’d kill 
myself” (qtd. 219 fn.6). While Fanon identifies the source of this line as “one of [Wright’s] 
stories” (219 fn.6), in fact it comes from the first published edition of Black Boy; it is part of a 
scene that Wright wrote in order to replace a more sexually explicit conversation his editors asked 
him to cut. Therefore, this citation shows that Fanon was familiar with Black Boy and suggests 
that Wright’s book informed his account of black subjectivity. (For the version of the scene as 
Wright originally wrote it, see BB 188. For the censored version, from which Fanon quotes, see 




whites. After Richard moves to Memphis and begins working for an optical company, he 
delivers a pair of eyeglasses to a Northern white man who attempts to express solidarity:  
“Tell me, boy, are you hungry?” he asked seriously.  
I stared at him. He had spoken one word that touched the very soul of me, 
but I could not talk to him, could not let him know that I was starving myself to 
save money to go north. I did not trust him. But my face did not change its 
expression.  
“Oh no, sir,” I said, managing a smile.  
I was hungry and he knew it; but he was a white man and I felt that if I 
told him I was hungry I would have been revealing something shameful. (231) 
The more the man encourages Richard to admit his hunger, the more Richard steadfastly 
refuses to do so. Their exchange encapsulates how the social dynamics of this world 
discourage black speakers from conveying their inner experiences to white interlocutors, 
even on those rare occasions when whites appear to express sincere willingness to 
acknowledge black pain. Richard soon changes the subject to what he has studied in 
school, in an attempt to return the conversation to “safe and sound Southern ground” 
(232). His use of “ground” intriguingly anticipates Wittgenstein’s famous dictum “Back 
to the rough ground!”—a statement encouraging us to examine language in the context of 
actual human usage (PI §107). Wittgenstein presents this exhortation as a liberating 
move, giving his readers permission to take seriously the diverse ways in which ordinary 




Crow conversation is deeply restrictive, littered with barriers and overrun with dangerous 
paths.  
As the comment “I did not trust him” shows, Wright’s account of this scene is 
consistent with Danielle Allen’s discussion of the absence of trust in American racial 
relations. Allen defines “[t]rust in one’s fellow citizens” as “the belief, simply, that one is 
safe with them,” and she describes “[s]peech” as “a crucial tool of trust production” 
(62).32 Since white Americans in the Jim Crow era have given blacks so little reason to 
trust them, even isolated attempts to forge trust through speech—like the one we see 
here—prove liable to misfire. Rather than feeling grateful to the Northerner for his 
kindness, Richard merely resents the man for putting him in a potentially dangerous 
situation: “I avoided him after that. Whenever I saw him I felt in a queer way that he was 
my enemy, for he knew how I felt and the safety of my life in the South depended upon 
how well I concealed from all whites what I felt” (BB 233). Language may be a crucial 
tool for providing acknowledgment, and thus for building trust, but it is not a tool 
Richard finds much opportunity to use. Richard’s subjectivity proves enduringly marked 
by the need to suppress humanity: he emphasizes that part of what he “felt,” throughout 
this interaction, is the necessity of concealing what he “felt.” The incommunicability of 
selfhood becomes, for someone like Richard, a major component of selfhood as such. 
Under such circumstances, when Richard considers the prospect of making his humanity 
known to his interlocutors, he thinks despairingly that he is “facing a wall [he] would 
																																																						





never breech” (191). The cultural conditions of this world are such that Richard finds it 
impossible to initiate aspect shifts in white interlocutors.  
 
Northern Language Games  
 
Upon migrating to Chicago in Part Two of Black Boy, Richard finds that this 
Northern form of life offers him new possibilities for gaining acknowledgment through 
language—but also that it frustrates these possibilities in new ways.33 When, in 1927, 
Richard arrives in Chicago with his aunt, his initial impressions highlight the difference 
between this major Northern city and the Southern landscapes he has known:  
I looked about to see if there were signs saying: FOR WHITE—FOR COLORED. 
I saw none. Black people and white people moved about, each seemingly intent 
upon his private mission. There was no racial fear. Indeed, each person acted as 
though no one existed but himself. (261) 
Richard finds, to his surprise, that formalized, de jure racial segregation does not exist in 
Chicago as it has in the South. The absence of the “signs” to which he has grown 
accustomed suggests that the distorted language practices of the Jim Crow South do not 
obtain in this Northern, urban space.   
However, far from idealizing this Northern environment, Black Boy soon 
indicates that it restricts acknowledgment in its own ways. In his portrayal of Chicago, 
																																																						
33 Part Two was not originally included in the first published edition of Black Boy, though a 
portion of it appeared in The Atlantic in 1944, under the title “I Tried to be a Communist” (Fabre 




Wright suggests how capitalist pressures toward profitability and efficiency have created 
a culture of inward-facing people, focused exclusively on “private” ambitions and 
concerns. With the comment that “each person acted as though no one existed but 
himself,” Wright indicts these Northerners for their total lack of interest in other minds. 
Such indifference to others amounts—in his account—to its own kind of skepticism. He 
describes boarding a streetcar and watching as his fellow travelers refuse to acknowledge 
one another’s existence: “People got on and off […], but they never glanced at one 
another. Each person seemed to regard the other as part of the city landscape” (262). 
Wright thereby indicates how the cultures of Mississippi and Chicago each refuse to 
grant acknowledgment to African-Americans like himself, albeit in different ways. 
Whereas Southern whites aggressively deny the reality of black humanity, these more 
individualistic Northerners simply do not bother to give the nature of black inner life 
much thought. Even in this altered cultural environment, Richard still finds himself 
trapped in the condition of passive skepticism, struggling to convey his humanity to 
anyone who might notice it.  
Wright’s portrayal of his work experiences in Chicago shows how his younger 
self regularly encounters this characteristically Northern form of skepticism. For instance, 
when Richard works at a medical research institute, his bosses impose rigid efficiency 
standards, which dictate that he clean the building with impossible speed. Washing stairs, 
“[w]orking against time,” he grows furious at the “unthinking” white people who 
“plopped their feet down into the dirty water and muddied” the steps he has been 




oblivious to his Sisyphean labor. At this same institute, a confrontation between two of 
Richard’s black co-workers dislodges a number of cages, dramatically freeing the 
animals inside (which are subjects in medical experiments). As Richard and his co-
workers clean up the mess, haphazardly guessing which animal goes in which cage, 
Wright caustically highlights how the white doctors’ attitude toward their black 
employees has ensured the difficulty of the task: “We did not know a tubercular mouse 
from a cancerous mouse; the white doctors had made sure that we would not know. They 
had never taken the time to answer a single question; though we worked in the institute, 
we were as remote from the meaning of the experiments as if we lived on the moon” 
(312). Richard considers telling the director of the institute what has happened but 
ultimately decides against it. Remembering that the director has been the one who 
ordered the efficiency initiative, Richard thinks, “He did not regard me as a human being. 
I did not share his world” (314). Thus, Wright points out that—just as the omnipresent 
threat of violence in the South makes it nearly impossible for blacks to gain linguistic 
acknowledgment from whites—so the exploitative labor conditions of Northern 
capitalism have a similarly divisive effect.  
This frustration with his inability to make his voice heard is what initially draws 
Richard to Communism. As he begins to read Communist publications, he is “amazed to 
find that there did exist in this world an organized search for the truth of the lives of the 
oppressed and the isolated”; his identification with these stories of marginalized people 
makes him feel “for the first time that I could speak to listening ears” (318). Communist 




the Party will allow him to extend acknowledgment to others in similar circumstances. 
However, while the Communists are theoretically sympathetic to the experiences of black 
Americans, once he becomes an active member of the Party Richard finds his Communist 
interlocutors trafficking in overly broad claims to knowledge, which prove 
counterproductive to acknowledgment: “The Communists … had oversimplified the 
experience of those whom they sought to lead. In their efforts to recruit masses, they had 
missed the meaning of the lives of the masses, had conceived of people in too abstract a 
manner” (320). Like the thought of Wittgenstein and Cavell, the Communists’ broad 
philosophical claims do not adequately capture the experiences and speech practices of 
specific marginalized subjects. When Richard tries to express this point to white 
Communists, he finds that their craving for generality prevents them from grasping his 
critique: “Words lost their usual meanings. Simple motives took on sinister colors…. 
Ideas turned into their opposites while you were talking to a person you thought you 
knew” (339). All his attempts at self-assertion succeed in doing is turning his Communist 
brethren against him. Their better intentions notwithstanding, the Communists’ blindness 
to the particularly of his human experience replicates the lack of acknowledgment he has 
received in the South. Once again, Richard finds “[a]n invisible wall … building slowly 
between” him and his interlocutors (332).  
Black Boy offers an episodic narrative in which Wright describes a series of 
efforts on the part of his younger self to have his humanity acknowledged. Despite 
fleeting moments of optimism, Black Boy describes each of these efforts—refusing to 




Communists—as falling short. In this light, the written-ness of Wright’s narrative 
becomes crucial. Though the cultural conditions of his upbringing have made it nearly 
impossible for him to achieve acknowledgment via language, Wright’s text shows that he 
has nonetheless maintained faith in the capacity of language to effect acknowledgment. 
With this sustained, first-person account of his experiences, Wright offers readers an 
avenue into his inner life, one that transcends the rigidly controlled language games of his 
youth. Wright’s readers—simply by reading—cannot remain in a position of 
thoroughgoing skepticism and indifference toward this speaker; the text necessarily 
provides them with at least some understanding of his inner life. At the same time, Black 
Boy challenges whatever oversimplified claims to knowledge its readers might hold, in 
the sense that Wright presents his text as an articulation of one individual’s distinctive 
experiences and attitudes, liable to defy attempts at generalization and stereotype.     
 In this way, Black Boy highlights the sui generis role of literature, of narrative, in 
conveying what Wittgenstein calls “the silent soliloquy of others” (PI II, §316). Scholars 
who write on Black Boy do not generally comment on the epigraph for Part Two, an 
excerpt from a “negro folk song” [capitalization removed], and yet it represents a crucial 
window into Wright’s literary project:  
Sometimes I wonder, huh,  
Wonder if other people wonder, huh 
Just like I do, oh, my Lord, just like I do!” (BB 260)34 
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This song expresses, in its own way, what Cavell calls “the truth of skepticism” (CR 
496); it captures the disjunction between our immediate, inescapable awareness of our 
own inner life and our weaker, more fragile understanding of other people’s. As the lyrics 
suggest, this epistemological position may make us “wonder” if others think and feel the 
same things we do. Wright indicates that, in his own case, the isolation of his upbringing 
has left him acutely attuned to this sense of skepticism, struggling to find interlocutors 
with whom he might share his experience, and whom he can trust to take his words as 
they are meant. At the same time, Black Boy endeavors to instill this sense of “wonder” in 
myopic, implicitly white readers, who are liable to discover the reflective, wondering 
subjectivity that narrates these experiences.  
 The final lines of Black Boy reiterate its project of encouraging acknowledgment 
by narrating interiority. The book concludes with the following passage: 
I wanted to try to build a bridge of words between me and that world outside, that 
world which was so distant and elusive that it seemed unreal. 
 I would hurl words into this darkness and wait for an echo, and if an echo 
sounded, no matter how faintly, I would send other words to tell, to march, to 
fight, to create a sense of the hunger for life that gnaws in us all, to keep alive in 
our hearts a sense of the inexpressibly human. (384) 
Wright suggests that, while words can never erase the gap between self and “world,” they 
can nonetheless form a communicative “bridge” between speaker and audience. When he 
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imagines using words “to tell, to march, to fight, to create a sense of the hunger for life,” 
Wright leaves readers with a list of potentially productive purposes to which words can 
be put, in the same way that the Investigations emphasizes “the diversity of the tools of 
language and of the ways they are used” (§23).35 With his final phrase—“a sense of the 
inexpressibly human”—Wright indicates that a person’s humanity can never be 
definitively expressed or rationally proven; the humanity of another, as Cavell might say, 
is meant not “to be known, but acknowledged” (MWM 324). Through his modernist 
memoir, Wright attempts to provide readers with the tools that would make such 
acknowledgment possible.  
  
Wright’s Project, in Ellison’s Terms 
 
 Before moving on to discuss Invisible Man, I want to look more closely at how 
Ellison reads Black Boy in “Richard Wright’s Blues.” Ellison’s later qualifications of his 
praise for Wright notwithstanding, his assessment of Wright’s memoir in this essay 
provides a revealing window into his aesthetic commitments circa 1945, the same year he 
began writing his own nove (IM vii).36 To the extent that scholars have read “Richard 
Wright’s Blues” as an early expression of Ellison’s literary goals, they have largely 
																																																						
35 The word “hunger,” in Wright’s passage, also points back to the original title of his memoir, 
American Hunger. Besides referring to the literal hunger of his childhood years, this title also 
registers his persistent craving for acknowledgment.  
36 Wright’s novella The Man Who Lived Underground, also published in 1945, provides another 
important literary antecedent for Ellison’s novel. The conceit of Wright’s novella—a socially 
marginalized black man gains a degree of freedom by venturing underground—is one that 




focused on how Ellison eventually develops his own version of the “blues” sensibility he 
identifies in Wright’s writing, with “the blues” defined by Ellison as “an impulse to keep 
the painful details and episodes of a brutal experience alive” (CE 129).37 But, alongside 
this discussion of Wright’s “blues” technique, Ellison also makes a point to praise the 
memoir for attempting to force readers to acknowledge the inner life of a black subject. 
Ellison describes Black Boy as an expression of “Negro humanity,” which simultaneously 
reveals the “extent to which the Southern community renders the fulfillment of human 
destiny impossible” (131). As we’ve seen, Wright’s use of first-person narrative 
perspective becomes crucial in his articulation of this “Negro humanity,” since he 
employs language to communicate his younger self’s inner experiences, while also 
showing how deeply his upbringing twisted the meanings of his words.   
Ellison writes of how Southern whites “claim to ‘know’ the Negro,” but their so-
called knowledge consists only of racist stereotypes (141). Like Wright, he casts white 
supremacy as a distorted epistemological framework, one that stubbornly insists on 
treating African-Americans as racial subpersons, despite all evidence to the contrary. 
Getting whites to recognize black humanity is “as difficult,” Ellison suggests,  
as finding a wounded quail against the brown and yellow leaves of a Mississippi 
thicket; even the spilled blood blends with the background. Having himself been 
in the position of the quail—to expand the metaphor—Wright’s wounds have told 
him both the question and the answer which every successful hunter must 
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discover for himself: “Where would I hide if I were a wounded quail?” But 
perhaps that requires more sympathy with one’s quarry than most hunters possess. 
Certainly it requires such a sensitivity to the shifting guises of humanity under 
pressure as to allow them to identify themselves with the human content, 
whatever its outer form … (143)    
Ellison’s description of Wright’s project in this passage demonstrates marked similarities 
with Cavell’s conception of passive skepticism. Just as the passive skeptic finds that her 
interlocutors are unable to imagine the workings of her inner life, so Ellison describes 
Wright as speaking from the position of “the quail,” making this same realization about 
hunters, few of whom have sufficient “sympathy” to voice the viewpoint of their 
“quarry.” The words of Wright’s narrative, Ellison suggests, encourage these “hunters”—
those capable of shocking violence—to take this imaginative leap and “identify 
themselves” with their prospective victims, attempting to see what the world looks like 
through an unfamiliar first-person (or first-quail) perspective. Ellison commends Wright 
for his ability to articulate the “human content,” which an individual’s “outer form” at 
once disguises and reveals. In making this point, Ellison looks ahead to the project of his 
own novel, which follows Black Boy in its use of first-person point of view to push back 
against the narrator’s condition of passive skepticism.  
  





   In an interview with the Paris Review, published three years after Invisible Man, 
Ellison describes his own literary project in terms that echo his earlier description of 
Wright’s. Ellison suggests that “perhaps the white reader draws his whiteness around 
himself when he sits down to read. He doesn’t want to identify himself with Negro 
characters in terms of our immediate racial and social situation, though on the deeper 
human level, identification can become compelling when the situation is rendered 
artistically” (CE 212). Ellison presents a hypothetical white reader disinclined to imagine 
the inner lives of African-American subjects, and he proposes that a fictional articulation 
of black experience might counteract this tendency. Ellison’s idea, following Wright’s 
project in Black Boy, would be to initiate aspect shifts in skeptical white readers, to get 
them to look beyond racial difference and identify with individuals “on the deeper human 
level.”  
Ellison reiterates this artistic goal in his “Introduction” to Invisible Man, written 
in 1981:  
[M]y task was one of revealing the human universals hidden within the plight of 
one who was both black and American, … as a way of dealing with the sheer 
rhetorical challenge involved in communicating across our barriers of race and 
religion, class, color and region …. And to defeat this national tendency to deny 
the common humanity shared by my character and those who might happen to 
read of his experience, … I would have to approach racial stereotypes as a given 
fact of the social process and proceed … to reveal the human complexity which 




With this contrast between “stereotypes” and “human complexity,” Ellison presents his 
novel as an attempt to dislodge American society’s problematic claims to knowledge of 
black subjects.38  When he describes the “rhetorical challenge involved in communicating 
across” the various social “barriers” that divide us, Ellison presents this challenge as 
specifically linguistic in nature. He confronts the dilemma of how to use words 
effectively, but he benefits—like Wright before him—from the inherently social nature of 
language, its capacity to express such “human universals” as fear, pain, and hope. Just as 
Ellison invokes this idea of “human universals,” so Wittgenstein points to the existence 
of certain fundamental features—what he terms the “bedrock”—of our experience as 
human beings, our shared human form of life (PI §217). 
 From its opening paragraphs, Invisible Man foregrounds its project of 
encouraging readers to recognize its narrator’s humanity. The novel begins as a 
Wittgenstein-style investigation into different “uses of the word ‘see’” (PI II, §111). Just 
as Part II of the Investigations distinguishes more straightforward expressions registering 
visual perception (say, “I see a face at the window”) from specialized statements 
describing the dawning of an aspect (say, “I see this face as similar to that one”), so 
Ellison’s opening turns on a similar distinction. “I am an invisible man,” the unnamed 
narrator announces (IM 3). He then clarifies what he means: “No, I am not a spook like 
																																																						
38 In its attempt to counteract “racial stereotypes,” Invisible Man primarily focuses on the 
experience of black Americans, rather than people of color more generally. John Carlos Rowe 
asks, “[W]here are the Native Americans, Asian Americans, Latinos, and other ethnic minorities 
missing from the novel’s settings in the rural South and New York City?” (107). The invisible 
man is also an invisible man; Ellison’s novel devotes little attention to the distinctive racial and 
gendered experiences of women of color. For discussions of Invisible Man’s treatment of women, 




those who haunted Edgar Allan Poe; nor am I one of your Hollywood-movie ectoplasms. 
I am a man of substance, of flesh and bone” (3). The narrator makes clear that his 
invisibility does not stem from any supernatural source; those with whom he comes into 
contact are perfectly capable of perceiving his physical body. Rather, he is invisible in the 
sense that his interlocutors do not see him as human. “Being human,” Cavell writes in 
The Claim of Reason, involves “the power to grant being human. Something about flesh 
and blood elicits this grant from us, and something about flesh and blood can also repel 
it” (397). Ellison’s opening bears out Cavell’s point: seeing another’s “flesh” is not 
synonymous with, nor does it guarantee, recognizing their humanity. In this respect, 
skepticism toward the humanity of others is crucially distinct from skepticism toward the 
reality of the material world, as Peter Dula points out, in a comment with obvious 
relevance to Ellison’s novel: “[T]here is something we want to know about humans that 
isn't reducible to the senses, something invisible which makes a human a human and not 
just something that looks like a human” (136-7, emphasis mine). As Ellison’s protagonist 
discovers, it is possible for others to see his body, to hear his words, and still refuse to 
acknowledge this “invisible” humanity.  
 Ellison’s narrator explains how this condition of invisibility infects him with a 
sense of skepticism, directed toward himself: 
[Y]ou often doubt if you really exist. You wonder whether you aren’t simply a 
phantom in other people’s minds. Say, a figure in a nightmare which the speaker 
tries with all his strength to destroy. … You ache with the need to convince 




anguish, and you strike out with your fists, you curse and you swear to make them 
recognize you. And, alas, it’s seldom successful. (IM 4) 
Like Richard in Black Boy, the invisible man describes himself as suffering from the 
condition of passive skepticism; he recognizes that other individuals question the reality 
of his inner life. To the extent that his interlocutors imagine him at all, the invisible man 
suggests, they think of him as “a phantom” or “a figure in a nightmare,” rather than 
considering him a full human being in his own right. Ellison also reinforces Wright’s 
point—and Fanon’s—about how others’ skepticism regarding one’s human status is 
liable to make one “doubt” this status oneself. Invisible Man offers an even more extreme 
picture of this inwardly-directed doubt than Black Boy does, showing how the narrator’s 
lack of acknowledgment leads him to question not just his humanity but his very 
existence. As the invisible man explains, he has reacted to these doubts with a desperate 
desire to affirm his human reality, even in the face of its chronic denial.39  
 The first chapter of the novel, the battle royal scene, vividly illustrates the 
extreme denial of humanity the invisible man has faced in the Jim Crow South. The scene 
evokes Hale’s description of the lynching ritual as a distinctly modern form of collective 
entertainment. The assorted “big shots” (17) of the invisible man’s hometown force the 
narrator and other young black men to fight with one another and then to compete for 
gold coins on what turns out to be an “electrified” rug (27), while the white men look on 
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Faulkner’s title, The Sound and the Fury. By describing his protagonist’s desire to be “part of” 
this “sound and anguish,” Ellison implicitly gestures toward his project of extending Faulknerian 




amusedly. As the narrator recalls the “hot, violent force” that “tore through [his] body” 
when he contacts this rug, the novel indicates how Jim Crow culture mobilizes modern 
technology toward the violent subjugation of black Americans (27). At one point, in an 
effort to escape the rug, the invisible man grabs one of the white observers. The 
protagonist describes how this man, “looking at me with soberness dead in the eye, 
kicked me viciously in the chest” (28). Wittgenstein writes in the Investigations that, 
when one wishes to acknowledge another’s pain, “one looks into his eyes” (§286). In this 
scene, by contrast, the white man looks the narrator “dead in the eye,” only to intensify 
his suffering by kicking him in the chest. The text thereby highlights the white man’s 
aspect blindness, his extreme unwillingness to see these eyes as those of a human being 
in pain. 
 
A Mechanized Man?  
 
The battle royal scene expands on Black Boy’s account of how the Jim Crow 
system refuses to acknowledge black humanity, showing how the invisible man—like the 
adolescent Richard—must constantly confront what he describes as “the harsh, 
uninterested-in-you-as-a-human-being stare … I’d known in the South” (IM 302).40 But, 
																																																						
40 Martha Nussbaum has also written that the novel concerns “a refusal of acknowledgment, a 
humanity that has been effaced” (“Invisibility” 259). By way of pursuing this point, she compares 
the invisible man to Sophocles’ Philoctetes, writing that both characters are “portrayed as agents, 
who have grappled with their circumstances and who retain a human dignity” (261-2). 
Nussbaum’s discussion of Ellison is representative of her characteristically ahistorical approach 




more than Black Boy, Invisible Man takes up a separate but related line of inquiry: 
namely, how to distinguish between a human being and an automaton. Chronologically 
the latest work examined in this study, Invisible Man bespeaks more recent cultural 
anxieties about the increased bureaucratization of American society and the new 
technological possibilities of the post-WWII world.41 In so doing, it bears out Louis 
Chude-Sokei’s argument “that how we have come to know and understand technology 
has long been intertwined in how we have deployed and made sense of race,” with “the 
language of one … consistently dependent on or infected with the language of the other” 
(2). For example, the word “robot,” first used in English in 1923, derives from the Czech 
word “robota,” meaning serf or forced laborer (21). The etymology of this word points to 
the history of racialized labor that necessarily informs twentieth-century imaginings of 
automaton-like figures.42 The automaton and the slave laborer function as appropriate 
stand-ins for “each other symbolically because they did exactly that historically” (Chude-
Sokei 45), with both conscripted into the role of mindless laborer and “feared for their 
potential independence” (3).  
																																																						
of Ellison and Sophocles attends insufficiently to the historical particularities of the world 
Invisible Man describes (Worldly Acts 143).    
41 Scott Selisker reads “the automaton” alongside “the total institution … as complementary 
concepts in postwar U.S. cultural texts,” arguing that these related concepts register the threat that 
large bureaucratic organizations would deprive individuals of their autonomy (73). 
42 As J.L. Austin writes, a word “hardly ever … shakes off its etymology and its formation. In 
spite of all changes in and extensions of and additions to its meanings, … there will still persist 
the old idea” (“Excuses” 27-8). The word ‘robot’ comes to us from Karel Čapek’s play R.U.R. 
(Rossum’s Universal Robots) (1920); for more on this play, see Chude-Sokei, esp. 50-68. For a 




In underscoring this historical link between race and technology, Ellison’s novel 
takes one key thread from each of Wright’s and Wittgenstein’s projects and weaves them 
together. Wright investigates the particular kind of aspect shift that involves seeing 
blacks as racial subpersons versus seeing them as humans; Wittgenstein considers the 
possibility of seeing humanoid figures as automata rather than as human. But it is only 
once we arrive at Ellison’s text that these lines of inquiry truly merge. Discussing what he 
calls Ellison’s “vocabulary of mechanization” (Worldly Acts 136), Robert Chodat argues 
“that the central problem of Invisible Man is what it means to be treated not as a … self-
legislating entity, but as a non-intentional thing” (137). More than either Wright or 
Wittgenstein, Ellison recognizes that automata and racial subpersons are two related 
types of non-intentional thing, and he portrays the invisible man as struggling to convince 
his interlocutors that he is neither a racial subperson nor an automaton, but rather a 
human being.  
When Wittgenstein discusses the possibility of mistaking a human being for an 
automaton, he implicitly registers the concern that technological innovation might raise 
new, distinctly modern epistemological problems—a concern that Invisible Man takes up. 
In a remark that closely follows §420, in which he imagines the possibility of seeing 
others as automata, Wittgenstein seeks to discourage the belief “that the essential thing 
about a human being [is] the outward form” (PI §430). This remark sounds markedly 
similar to the distinction Ellison makes between “outer form” and “human content” in 
“Richard Wright’s Blues,” and it shows Wittgenstein pushing back against the view that 




others’ internal experiences. Just because we do not have direct access to the inner lives 
of others, Wittgenstein argues, does not mean we have grounds to treat our interlocutors 
as automaton-like entities, all outer form and no inner content. Wittgenstein’s discussion 
speaks to the intersections between his thought and that of his Cambridge colleague Alan 
Turing, who was arguably the first thinker to devote sustained attention to the topic of 
“machine intelligence” (Copeland and Proudfoot 494), and whose ‘Turing test’—
developed in 1950—poses the question of how to differentiate between the expressive 
acts of machines and those of humans.43 
 In The Claim of Reason, Cavell once again expands on Wittgenstein’s work, 
offering a more sustained discussion of the potential challenges involved in 
distinguishing human beings from automata. Cavell embarks on a series of thought 
experiments involving a craftsman who designs a “perfected automaton” (CR 403). In 
successive versions of this thought experiment, Cavell imagines the craftsman’s 
mechanical “friend” growing “progressively more lifelike,” until one day the craftsman 
rips off the automaton’s chest to expose, “for all the world, the insides of a human being” 
(404). Cavell continues: 
																																																						
43 As Juliet Floyd has shown, Wittgenstein and Turing each exerted an important influence on the 
other’s work. Their intellectual relationship dates at least as far back as 1937, when the two men 
met to discuss a paper of Turing’s that the younger man had sent to Wittgenstein (“Chains” 9, 
23). In 1939, Turing attended Wittgenstein’s lectures on mathematics, and his exchanges with 
Wittgenstein soon “became so essential that when [Turing] announced he would not be attending 
a certain lecture, Wittgenstein told the class that, therefore, the lecture would have to be 
‘somewhat parenthetical’” (Monk 418). Though Monk characterizes the relationship between 
Turing and Wittgenstein as antagonistic, Floyd has contested this view, writing that “Turing 
shifted logicians’ attention … away from philosophical theories and toward an emphasis on us, 
on what we do. Just here, his ideas orbit in the same general area as those of Wittgenstein, as both 
of them realized” (“Turing” 220). For a more complete account of Turing’s influence on 




Recoiled, aghast, I can hardly attend to the craftsman’s delighted words: “Of 
course, it’s far from perfect, and most of it is superficial fakery, especially the 
bones …. As matters stand, the pain-responses are too—how shall I say?—on and 
off. Don’t you agree?” (He demonstrates by prodding the friend’s left hand. The 
response is quick but definitely mechanical.) (404) 
Cavell’s account of his “aghast” reaction captures his imagined shock at the degree to 
which the craftsman has blurred the epistemological boundaries between human and 
machine. In a subsequent version of the thought experiment, Cavell imagines the 
craftsman producing his knife, intending to open the automaton’s chest, when the 
automaton “suddenly leaps up, as if threatened, and begins grappling with the 
craftsman…. The friend is producing these words: ‘No more. It hurts. It hurts too much’” 
(405). Cavell then asks, “Do I intervene? On whose behalf?” (405). In this version of the 
scenario, the craftsman’s technological innovations have proceeded to the point that 
Cavell, the imagined observer, finds it increasingly impossible to distinguish between 
automaton ‘pain’ and human pain.  
 Ellison’s protagonist suffers his own anxieties about how to convince others—
and, along the way, himself—that he experiences human pain, rather than automaton 
‘pain.’ He traces these uncertainties back to his upbringing in the Jim Crow South, 
highlighting the extent to which he, unlike Richard in Black Boy, has internalized the 
white supremacist demand that he speak and act with total obedience. The speech he 
gives during the battle royal scene provides an early example of this tendency; his call for 




counterpoint to the brutal ritual of racial control he has just undergone. During his college 
years, the invisible man describes how he and his fellow students moved about the 
campus with “uniforms pressed, shoes shined, minds laced up, eyes blind like those of 
robots” (36). This description suggests the narrator’s retrospective realization that he and 
his college classmates have been trained to play the role of an obedient racial underclass 
in a white supremacist system. During the invisible man’s fateful encounter with the 
white trustee Mr. Norton, one of the shell-shocked veterans at the Golden Day makes a 
version of this same point; after calling the protagonist a “mechanical man” (94) and an 
“automaton” (95), the veteran criticizes him for “believ[ing] in that great false wisdom … 
that white is right” (95). The veteran’s taunts imply that, in his refusal to challenge the 
white supremacist status quo, the protagonist allows himself to be treated like a non-
agential thing. Norton also wields this dehumanizing language of mechanization himself, 
cautioning the protagonist against becoming a “defective cog” in his grand design (45).44  
 After the invisible man moves north to New York City, the novel extends its 
critique of mechanization, adding Northern industrial capitalism as a target of this 
critique. That is to say, while Ellison certainly condemns the Southern system of racial 
control for forcing marginalized figures like his protagonist to act in rigid accordance 
with its oppressive dictates, his novel also attacks the culture of New York City on 
similar grounds. Upon first arriving in New York, the invisible man is surprised by how 
																																																						
44 As others have pointed out, the novel’s use of Norton as a mouthpiece for this sentiment 
reflects Ellison’s critique of overgeneralized, sociological accounts of black experience (and 
human experience generally). For more on this point, see Warren 61; Chodat, Matter 140-51; 
Selisker 76-8. For an example of Ellison’s critique of sociological analysis, see his review of 




indifferent the other city dwellers seem to his existence. During an excursion to Wall 
Street, he describes how “[t]he streets were full of hurrying people who walked as though 
they had been wound up and were directed by some unseen control” (164). As in 
Wright’s portrayal of Chicago, Ellison describes the capitalist dynamics of this major 
Northern city as conditioning its participants to act with single-minded efficiency, the 
presence of their fellow city dwellers barely registering upon their psyches. Also like 
Black Boy, Invisible Man highlights the inhuman labor conditions faced by the workers 
who sustain this system. When the invisible man goes to work for Lucius Brockway, who 
operates the boilers in the basement of Liberty Paints, the older man tells him proudly, 
“They got all this machinery, but that ain’t everything; we the machines inside the 
machine” (217). Brockway’s rhetoric minimizes the distinction between his human self 
and his institutional function. The dangers—physical and psychological—of such work 
quickly become apparent: Brockway’s paranoia about his job security causes him to lash 
out against the narrator, and after a physical scuffle between the two men, the invisible 
man loses consciousness, having inadequately monitored the machine gauges.  
 He awakens in the paint factory hospital, and the novel’s account of his 
experience there extends its ominous blurring of human and automaton. While hooked up 
to a machine that administers a series of painful electric shocks, the invisible man 
overhears the conversation of his doctors. After one explains enthusiastically that “[t]he 
machine will produce the results of a prefrontal lobotomy without the negative effects of 
the knife,” another asks, “But what of his psychology?” and the first responds, 




more interested in experimenting with cutting-edge medical technology than in worrying 
about how this treatment might affect the invisible man. As Scott Selisker writes, the 
scene exposes “the reductive gaze of the postwar institution upon African Americans …. 
For Ellison, the automatism of his protagonist went hand in hand with his invisibility 
under the institution’s gaze” (74). The doctors display the characteristic priorities of 
behaviorist thinkers, who focus on a subject’s “outputs” rather than attempting to discern 
the nature of internal experience (Selisker 14).  
The scene suggests that the doctors succeed in making the invisible man feel 
increasingly automaton-like: “I wanted to be angry, murderously angry. But somehow the 
pulse of the current smashing through my body prevented me. Something had been 
disconnected. … I tried to imagine myself angry—only to discover a deeper sense of 
remoteness” (IM 237).45 This sense of emotional detachment raises the alarming 
possibility that the invisible man has morphed into the non-human entity that the medical 
establishment—and American society more generally—has conditioned him to be. He 
becomes the behaviorist specimen par excellence, a series of automatic gestures and 
reactions—“My teeth chattered. … Warm blood filled my mouth”—with little or no inner 
life (237).  
																																																						
45 Ellison may once again be obliquely echoing Faulkner here, since the passage is reminiscent of 
the emotional paralysis Joe Christmas experiences in Light in August (1932) upon receiving a 
brutal beating from a stranger: “He did not know how long he lay there. He was not thinking at 
all, not suffering. Perhaps he was conscious of somewhere within him the two severed wireends 
of volition and sentience lying, not touching now, waiting to touch, to knit anew so that he could 




 As the scene shows the protagonist becoming increasingly automaton-like, so it 
also raises questions about the stability of his sense of self. The scene asks about the 
criteria by which individuals understand themselves as discrete subjects, as one particular 
“I,” moving through space and forward in time. One doctor holds up a card that reads, 
“WHAT IS YOUR NAME?” and the invisible man is distraught to discover that he 
cannot remember: “Who am I? I asked myself. But it was like trying to identify one 
particular cell that coursed through the torpid veins of my body. Maybe I was just this 
blackness and bewilderment and pain” (240). The invisible man’s inability to recall his 
name reflects his difficulty establishing and maintaining a coherent sense of social 
identity—a difficulty that, though it becomes particularly acute in this scene, in fact 
persists throughout the novel, which never does name its protagonist.46 By invoking the 
challenge of “trying to identify one particular cell,” the invisible man calls attention to 
the difficulty of pinpointing one’s identity or producing some rational proof that one 
remains the same person from moment to moment. The invisible man is aware that he 
experiences sensations—“blackness and bewilderment and pain”—but he is no longer 
sure that these sensations cohere to form a stable human subject. In this way, the hospital 
scene foregrounds a couple of motifs that scholars have identified as fundamental to 
postmodernist—rather than modernist—fiction: not only the “social and institutional 
																																																						
46 The doctor subsequently holds up a card that reads: “BOY, WHO WAS BRER RABBIT?” 
(242), evoking a character popularized by Southern writer Joel Chandler Harris’ “Uncle Remus” 
stories, which represent African-Americans in stereotyped, dehumanized ways. With both the 
address of the invisible man as “BOY” and the reference to Brer Rabbit, the doctor suggests that a 
return to ‘normal’ identity, for the invisible man, would consist in deferentially accepting his 




consequences of technological innovation” (McHale 66), but also the idea that identity 
consists in “the performance of roles” rather than the possession of a stable self 
(Weinstein, “Postmodern” 20).  
Wittgenstein’s Investigations similarly explores the related questions of what it 
means to be an “I” and of how we identify pains as our own. In a series of remarks 
written in 1944 (Monk 483), the year before Ellison began composing Invisible Man, 
Wittgenstein wonders, “What does it mean to know who is in pain?” (PI §404). He 
proposes the following hypothetical scenario:  
Imagine several people standing in a circle, myself among them. One of us, 
sometimes this one, sometimes that, is connected to the poles of an electrostatic 
generator without our being able to see this. I observe the faces of the others and 
try to see which of us has just been given an electric shock. — At one point I say: 
“Now I know who it is—it’s me.” (§409) 
This remark constructs a circumscribed scenario that encourages us to scrutinize our 
understanding of how we identify and communicate pain. Without definitively resolving 
the question either way, Wittgenstein wonders whether this remark presents a fair picture 
of what it would be like to recognize that I—as opposed to someone else—am 
experiencing pain. The remark reflects broader anxieties of this historical moment, in 
which “the global spread of technological capitalism” threatened to “erase[...] the very 
meaning of ‘the individual’” (Weinstein, “Postmodern” 20). Like Ellison’s hospital 




to express selfhood, given the curiously detached way in which the speaker registers the 
pain of electric shock: “Now I know who it is—it’s me.”  
Lest we wish to dismiss this picture too readily as inapplicable to actual human 
experience, Wittgenstein reminds us that circumstances do arise in which it proves 
difficult to determine the parameters of identity. Inviting readers to consider the 
“practical … applications” of the question, “Is this foot my foot?,” he writes, “Think of 
cases in which my foot is anaesthetized or paralyzed,” suggesting that in such 
circumstances we might perceive a foot and be legitimately unsure whether it qualifies as 
ours or not (PI §411). Once again, Wittgenstein’s attempt to trouble our picture of 
discrete identity returns us to Ellison’s portrayal of his confused, anaesthetized 
protagonist. Wittgenstein next invites us to consider the question: “Is this body my 
body?” (§411). Imagining a situation in which someone would actually say these words, 
he writes, “[O]ne might be pointing to a reflection in a mirror (§411). This line 
underscores the degree to which Wittgenstein and Ellison treat similar subject matter, 
despite working in different disciplines. After all, the title of Ellison’s novel reflects the 
narrator’s difficulty seeing himself—the same kind of difficulty Wittgenstein imagines 
here—and Ellison explicitly employs mirror imagery in the novel’s first paragraph to 
convey his speaker’s alienation: “Like the bodiless heads you see in circus sideshows, it 
is as though I have been surrounded by mirrors of hard, distorting glass” (IM 3). With 
such passages, Ellison emphasizes how the distorting effects of Jim Crow racism make it 





 Ultimately, none of these remarks from Wittgenstein are meant to deny the 
coherence of human selfhood, only to encourage further scrutiny of the criteria by which 
we establish our identities. In a remark from an earlier section of the Investigations, 
Wittgenstein seeks to refute the charge that he is a behaviorist. He first ventriloquizes the 
perspective of an unconvinced interlocutor, who asks him, “But doesn’t what you say 
amount to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour?” (PI §281). 
Insisting that this interlocutor has mischaracterized his views, Wittgenstein responds, “It 
amounts to this: that only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a 
living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is 
conscious or unconscious” (§281). Wittgenstein emphasizes that—as long as we 
acknowledge the humanity of our interlocutors—we can understand their external actions 
as expressive of internal sensation and consciousness. Implicitly, this remark contests a 
postmodern model of identity as simply the performance of roles. Wittgenstein suggests 
that behavior often reveals a person’s humanity, but he does not suggest that humanity is 
reducible to behavior. Against the accusation of behaviorism, Wittgenstein indicates that 
he is interested in language and social behavior for what it reveals about others’ inner 
lives, their silent soliloquies. It is for this reason that I see the later Wittgenstein as 
putting forth a characteristically modernist conception of selfhood—that is, a model of 
the self as alienated but “intent upon grasping its place in a real world populated by 
others” (Weinstein, Unknowing 91)—and not a postmodernist conception, which moves 




 Like Wittgenstein, Ellison ultimately remains committed to a modernist 
understanding of subjectivity, while also emphasizing the unique difficulties a black 
speaker faces in conveying selfhood to others. In §281, Wittgenstein suggests that 
whenever we talk about the pain behavior of a “human being,” we should treat this 
behavior as expressive of inner life. But what Wittgenstein leaves out—and Ellison fills 
in—is how the denial of black humanity complicates this picture. For, when a culture 
vehemently excludes a certain group from the category of humanity, then the connection 
Wittgenstein sets up between outer behavior and inner life no longer obtains. Blacks 
might behave like human beings, but—so the distorted logic of Jim Crow insists—they 
are not human beings; hence, their behavior does not necessarily reveal anything about 
the nature or reality of their internal experience.  
 Under these conditions, Invisible Man, like Black Boy before it, upholds the 
importance of first-person narration as a tool for contesting American society’s pervasive 
denial of black humanity. Even as the hospital scene shows the invisible man doubting 
the stability of his identity, his retrospective narration of this scene reminds readers that 
he does possess a coherent self and an active inner life. The invisible man gives the 
following description of the alienation and disorientation he suffers while in the hospital:  
I lay beneath a slab of glass, feeling deflated. … I lay experiencing the vague 
processes of my body. I seemed to have lost all sense of proportion. Where did 
my body end and the crystal and white world begin? Thoughts evaded me, hiding 




of receding grays. … I seemed to exist in some other dimension, utterly alone. 
(IM 238) 
The passage shows the narrator relating to his younger self via the language of 
acknowledgment. Through the act of recounting these experiences, the invisible man 
strives to attain a level of sympathetic engagement with his own suffering that he was 
unable to achieve while actually in the hospital. By granting himself sympathy in this 
manner, he encourages readers to do likewise. Even as he describes “experiencing the 
vague processes of [his] body,” his narration of this experience affirms that he is more 
than just these “vague processes”; he also possesses a consciousness capable of putting 
them into words. Similarly, though he notes that “[t]houghts evaded” him while he lay 
beneath the glass, his ability to recount this experience shows that thoughts evade him no 
longer. If he were the mindless automaton that the hospital scene makes him out to be, he 
would not be able to describe feeling like a mindless automaton. Thus, a scene that 
questions the stability of the narrator’s identity ends up—through the device of first-
person narration—reaffirming this stability. This scene locates itself firmly within the 
modernist tradition of representing alienated subjectivity, while also showing how the 
emergent technologies and institutions of mid-century Western life exert dehumanizing 
pressure upon an individual’s psychology. Though it invokes the postmodern idea of 




would be to de-emphasize the underlying “human content” (CE 143) that Ellison 
encourages his readers to see and to acknowledge.47 
 
Efforts to Express Humanity  
 
 The invisible man largely spends the rest of the novel endeavoring to find the 
words by which he might convey this “human content” to his interlocutors, endeavoring 
to assuage their doubts—and his own—concerning his possession of an inner life. For 
much of this time, he sees his work with the Brotherhood as the vehicle through which he 
might challenge American society’s refusal to acknowledge his humanity. When his 
friend Tod Clifton leaves the organization, the invisible man objects on the grounds that 
“only in the Brotherhood could we make ourselves known, could we avoid becoming 
empty Sambo dolls” (IM 434). He takes this image of “empty Sambo dolls” from the 
spieling act he finds Clifton performing on the streets of Manhattan, an act in which 
																																																						
47 For a reading of Invisible Man that more fully explores its postmodernist tendencies, see 
Weinstein, “Postmodern Intimations.” As Weinstein notes, the postmodernist understanding of 
identity comes across clearly during the later scene in which the invisible man impersonates the 
figure of Rinehart. Rinehart, Weinstein writes, is at once “runner, preacher, gambler, lover. He is 
the ultimate in unsanctioned performativity, in depthless simulacra” (32)—all the more so as he 
does not actually appear in the novel. As a range of Harlem residents mistake him for Rinehart, 
the invisible man wonders, “If dark glasses and a white hat could blot out my identity so quickly, 
who actually was who?” (IM 493). But the text ultimately refuses to endorse the Rinehart model 
of depthless performativity. The sustained attention Ellison devotes to representing his 
protagonist’s interiority highlights the distance between the invisible man and Rinehart, who 
remains an idea, a possibility, more than an actual character. During a scene in which he objects 
to the Brotherhood’s injunction that he incite the people of Harlem to action “more slowly,” the 
invisible man protests that to do so would be “Rinehartism—cynicism” and would make him feel 
“[l]ike a charlatan” (504). Here, the novel mounts an early critique of postmodernist 
performativity and irony, portraying these emergent cultural tropes as disingenuous and 




Clifton employs “[a] grinning doll of orange-and-black tissue paper … which some 
mysterious mechanism was causing to move up and down in a loose-jointed, shoulder-
shaking, infuriatingly sensuous motion” (431). The Sambo doll is a racialized automaton: 
an unthinking, unfeeling entity that moves in human-like fashion, it encapsulates 
precisely the dehumanized view of black bodies the novel seeks to contest.48 For the 
invisible man, Clifton’s prop underscores the necessity of communicating his own inner 
life to others, so that his society might view him as more than an empty doll.  
 Part of why the invisible man initially believes in the Brotherhood’s mission is 
because the organization gives him a prominent role as an orator—a position that, he 
imagines, will enable him to wield words in order to convey publicly his humanity, as 
well as that of the Harlem residents he represents. The first official speech he makes as a 
member of the Brotherhood testifies to the high hopes he has for this work. As he walks 
onto the stage, preparing to address his audience, the novel captures the stakes of the 
performance he is about to give: “I could no longer see the audience, the bowl of human 
faces. It was as though a semi-transparent curtain had dropped between us …. I felt the 
hard, mechanical isolation of the hospital machine and I didn’t like it” (341). Ellison’s 
text casts this anticipatory moment as a perilous one; the narrator has an opportunity to 
forge a connection with his audience, but his speech also runs the risk of leaving him in 
																																																						
48 The invisible man eventually discovers an “invisible” thread, attached to the Sambo doll, which 
makes it move (446). This figure of the doll controlled by hidden thread stands as an image of the 
social role that, as the novel proceeds, the invisible man grows increasingly conscious of not 
wanting to play himself; he wants to avoid “[r]unning” around (33), automaton-like, to carry out 




his isolated, unacknowledged condition—a state of alienation that his time in the hospital 
emblematizes.  
 Once the invisible man begins speaking, he grows increasingly animated by the 
energy of his listeners. After thanking the audience for its support, he hears a man in the 
front call out, “We with you, Brother! You pitch ‘em we catch ‘em,” and he thinks, “That 
was all I needed, I’d made a contact” (342). Such experiences of “contact”—a sense that 
his words have been heard and understood—have been rare ones for the narrator. Spurred 
on by this successful communicative act, he gives a rousing speech protesting the 
people’s “dispossession” at the hands of their oppressors (343). As the audience’s 
enthusiasm builds, the invisible man suddenly and spontaneously decides to make a 
“confession” (345).49 He tells his listeners, “Something strange and miraculous and 
transforming is taking place in me right now… as I stand here before you! … I feel, I feel 
suddenly that I have become more human. Do you understand? More human” (346). The 
invisible man’s increased confidence about his own human status speaks to the powerful 
capacity of language to enable acknowledgment. The invisible man feels that he has 
finally been given a chance to express himself honestly, in front of a sympathetic 
																																																						
49 The use of this word is significant: not only this speech but the entire novel functions as a 
“confession” from the narrator. Indeed, Mark Shiffman reads Invisible Man in the tradition of 
Augustine’s Confessions (400), arguing that both texts employ “the shared narrative strategy of 
recollecting and examining one’s own earlier life from a qualitatively different, better informed 
moral and intellectual vantage point” (344). (By this definition, of course, Black Boy constitutes a 
confession as well.) Shiffman’s invocation of Augustine is notable, given that Wittgenstein 
begins the Investigations with a quotation from Augustine’s Confessions—and Cavell argues that 




audience, and his belief that his words are—for once—hitting their targets immediately 
counteracts his socially conditioned skepticism about his own human status.50  
 Unfortunately for Ellison’s protagonist, the aftermath of his speech undercuts his 
optimism and teaches him that his goal of conveying humanity remains a work in 
progress. Members of the Brotherhood leadership criticize his speech as “reactionary” 
and “the antithesis of the scientific approach” (350), and the invisible man gradually 
realizes that efforts to express his particular human experience conflict with the 
Brotherhood precept that “individuals … don’t count” (291). As the invisible man 
himself says, while attempting to dissuade a magazine editor from writing a profile of 
him, “I’m a cog in a machine. We here in the Brotherhood work as a unit” (396-7). The 
problem with this modus operandi, as the invisible man eventually realizes, is that it 
prioritizes knowledge over acknowledgment; the Brotherhood seeks to impose its 
progressive theory of history and its “scientific approach to society” on all its members, 
and it refuses to tolerate anything other than rigid conformity to its operative ideology 
(350).51 In this regard, Ellison’s portrayal of the Brotherhood has much in common with 
																																																						
50 As Leslie Larkin notes, the power of this moment for the invisible man results partially from 
the fact that he is speaking to a majority black audience (113). Unable “to remember the correct 
words and phrases from the pamphlets” of the Brotherhood, the invisible man explains that he 
“fall[s] back upon tradition and … select[s] one of the political techniques that I’d heard so often 
at home: The old down-to-earth, I’m-sick-and-tired-of-the-way-they’ve-been-treating-us 
approach” (IM 342). So the speech succeeds in part because he employs a mode of oratorical 
address familiar to him from his youth. While the scene strengthens (at least temporarily) the 
invisible man’s conviction as to his own humanity, it has its limits as a successful act of 
communication across racial lines.  
51 Leigh Anne Duck discusses how the novel challenges progressive theories of history, replacing 
the narrative of history as “an arrow” with the invisible man’s own preferred image of history as 
“a boomerang” (IM 6). As Duck explains, Invisible Man’s understanding as history-as-
boomerang challenges imperialist and expansionist discourses of the Cold War era. See Duck 




Wright’s critique of the Communist Party; what the invisible man originally saw as a 
platform through which marginalized peoples could fight oppression and intolerance 
turns out to perpetuate oppressive, intolerant attitudes of its own. As Brother Jack says to 
the invisible man, “We do not shape our policies to the mistaken and infantile notions of 
the man in the street. Our job is not to ask them what they think but to tell them!” (473).  
 When a police officer kills Clifton, the invisible man—in the absence of specific 
instructions from the Brotherhood leadership—gives a funeral oration in Harlem on 
behalf of his deceased friend. On this occasion, more than in any of his speeches since the 
first one he gave for the Brotherhood, the invisible man foregoes the organization’s 
standard talking points and instead chooses to speak honestly about his own confusion 
and grief. He begins by expressing his anger at the inadequacy of language on such an 
occasion: “What are you waiting for me to tell you? … What good will it do? … Can I 
say in twenty minutes what was building twenty-one years and ended in twenty 
seconds?” (454-5). In contrast to his earlier naïve belief “that there was a magic in spoken 
words” (381), here the invisible man admits the inevitable limits of words: they cannot 
bring Clifton back from the dead, nor even do justice to the fullness of his life. He tells 
his listeners, “Here are the facts. He was standing and he fell. He fell and he kneeled. He 
kneeled and he bled. He bled and he died” (456). With this catalogue of “facts,” the 
invisible man questions the value of the Brotherhood’s rationalism. His use of these short 
sentences, with no subordinate clauses, illustrates his sarcastic attempt to give his 
audience nothing but “facts.” In so doing, he shows that such “facts,” even (or especially) 




Yet, precisely through such honest expressions of frustration, the invisible man’s 
speech succeeds in promoting acknowledgment. Near the end of the speech, the invisible 
man tells his listeners, “I don’t know if Tod Clifton had a soul. I only know the ache that 
I feel in my heart, my own sense of loss” (459). This statement offers a re-working of 
Wittgenstein’s comment in the Investigations that “[t]he human body is the best picture 
of the human soul” (II, §25). This remark constitutes another moment at which 
Wittgenstein emphasizes that he is not a behaviorist; far from denying the importance of 
human inner life, Wittgenstein suggests that the expressive acts of the “body” constitute 
our best avenue toward gaining an understanding of the “soul”—a word that 
Wittgenstein, never a doctrinally religious thinker, evidently uses to describe that elusive 
inner quality I’ve been calling ‘humanity.’52 With his comment on Clifton’s soul, the 
invisible man provides an apt expression of what Cavell calls “the truth of skepticism” 
(CR 496); the invisible man admits that he has had limited access to Clifton’s interiority, 
and therefore that he cannot be certain what (or whether) Clifton has felt. At the same 
time, the invisible man emphasizes that he has treated Clifton as a human, that—to use 
Wittgenstein’s formulation—his “attitude towards” Clifton has always been “an attitude 
towards a soul” (PI II, §23). It is because of his willingness to acknowledge Clifton’s 
humanity that the invisible man feels this powerful “sense of loss” upon his friend’s 
																																																						
52 As Dula notes, part of Wittgenstein’s point in this remark is to challenge Cartesian dualism 
(144-5). In The Claim of Reason, Cavell connects this remark directly to his discussion of 
acknowledgment, writing, “The crucified human body is our best picture of the unacknowledged 
human soul” (430). If we replace the word “crucified” with the word “lynched,” the relevance of 
this comment to African-American experience in the Jim Crow era becomes clear. For more on 
Wittgenstein’s religious views, see Perloff, “To Become.” For a discussion that brings out the 




death. Though the invisible man’s “attitude” toward Clifton remains an instance of intra-
racial acknowledgment, nonetheless the novel offers his eulogy for Clifton as a model of 
acknowledging black humanity. By granting such acknowledgment to Clifton, the 
invisible man also encourages his listeners—who include the novel’s readers—to 
acknowledge him. His description of Clifton’s fate doubles as an expression of anxiety 
about his own: “He had struggled for Brotherhood on a hundred street corners, and he 
thought it would make him more human, but he died like any dog in a road” (IM 457). 
So, even as the invisible man admits the limits of words, he uses them to communicate a 
sense of his human experience to others.   
 The Brotherhood’s unsympathetic response to Clifton’s death confirms the 
invisible man’s disillusionment with the organization, as he realizes that all his efforts to 
execute its mission have not fundamentally altered his unacknowledged condition. 
Cavell, in his interpretation of King Lear (1608/1623), notes “the obsessive sight imagery 
of the play,” its sustained preoccupation with the “avoidance of eyes” (MWM 274). 
Cavell argues that this imagery signals the play’s interest in the refusal of 
acknowledgment, “the failure to recognize others” (277), which is also “a failure to let 
others recognize you” (277-8). In its account of the protagonist’s split from the 
Brotherhood, Invisible Man employs sight imagery similarly. After discovering that 
Brother Jack has a glass eye, the invisible man thinks, “He doesn’t see me. He doesn’t 
even see me” (IM 475). Jack’s literal “blindness” (in one eye, anyway) is symbolic of his 
aspect blindness, his myopia toward the protagonist’s humanity (475). In a passage that 




remains unseen, the invisible man thinks, “I was and yet I was invisible …. I was and yet 
I was unseen” (507). Though the Brotherhood, like his society more broadly, has 
continually refused to acknowledge his distinctive humanity, the invisible man’s repeated 
assertion of “I was” shows his growing self-confidence concerning his human status. 
Here, once again, the words of his narrative become a crucial avenue through which he 
encourages others to acknowledge his inner life, his incontrovertible “I was” forging a 
direct link between his consciousness and those of the novel’s readers.  
 Like Wright at the end of Black Boy, Ellison in the epilogue to Invisible Man 
grows even more explicit about the importance of written, first-person narrative in 
conveying the humanity of individuals like his protagonist. After his attempts at more 
overt political engagement—first through the Brotherhood; second through his 
participation in the Harlem riot—do not yield any sustained acknowledgment of his 
humanity, the invisible man retreats underground, eventually settling in the secret 
apartment from which he narrates his story. In the prologue, commenting on this 
trajectory, he has asserted: “A hibernation is a covert preparation for a more overt action” 
(13).53 In the epilogue, he returns to this point, explaining, “I couldn’t be still even in 
hibernation. Because, damn it, there’s the mind, the mind. It wouldn’t let me rest” (573). 
Given the ceaseless activity of his mind, his continued reflection on his experience, the 
																																																						
53 Also in the prologue, making a similar point about his apparent abdication of political 
responsibility, he writes, “Responsibility rests upon recognition, and recognition is a form of 
agreement” (14). So he points out that his society’s refusal to see his humanity complicates his 
capacity to exercise political responsibility. As Stefanie Schäfer writes, recognition “necessitates 
a commitment from both sides” and “hinges on seeing the other as socially acceptable human 
being” (621). Allen similarly describes the novel as an attempt “to define the political agency of 




invisible man determines that he should “at least tell a few people about it” (579). On the 
final page of the novel, he underscores this view of the narrative’s function, asking 
readers, “What else could I do? What else but try to tell you what was really happening 
while your eyes were looking through?” (581). The phrase “looking through” evokes the 
aspect blindness of the narrator’s society, which has viewed him as an empty doll, whose 
external features transparently signify subhuman inner life. As such, the narrator hopes 
that his articulation of interiority might succeed in provoking an aspect shift, at least in 
the “few people” that comprise his readership.  
 The invisible man concludes his narrative by wondering whether, “on the lower 
frequencies, I speak for you?” (581). This final line emphasizes the way in which he has 
usurped the role of speaking subject, typically reserved for whites, and has forced his 
presumed white readership to listen to this lengthy account of his “silent soliloquy” (PI 
II, §316). He challenges readers to recognize themselves in his narrative, to acknowledge 
his suitability as a chronicler of what Ellison calls “human universals” (IM xxii): broadly 
shared sentiments like pain, grief, or hope. By noting, in the novel’s penultimate line, that 
assuming this role “frightens” him (581), the invisible man signals the inherent riskiness 
and danger of his project, since readers might refuse to see what he wants them to see or 
react angrily to his words.54 As Chodat notes, the question mark with which the novel 
ends “registers how fragile our communally sustained norms can be” (Worldly Acts 154); 
even if the invisible man has succeeded in contesting his passively skeptical condition 
																																																						
54 Larkin similarly suggests that “[t]he narrator’s qualms about speaking for the reader can be 
explained by … his lack of control over the meaning of his own speech, by his subjection to how 




and getting readers to acknowledge his humanity, Ellison has no way of guaranteeing that 
their newly broadened perspectives will last, or that their encounter with his narrative will 
generate any concrete changes in the material conditions faced by marginalized figures 
like his protagonist.    
 
Conclusion: An Endpoint to Acknowledgment  
 
 On the one hand, then, Ellison indicates that literature has a crucial role to play in 
encouraging actual, lived human beings to adopt an attitude of acknowledgment. Works 
of modernist fiction like Invisible Man offer readers unique, unparalleled access to the 
subjectivities of historically-constituted characters, giving voice to experiences of social 
marginalization, and helping readers to see why such figures might exhibit skeptical 
attitudes toward the communicative capacities of words. On the other hand, Ellison’s 
epilogue makes an important case for the limits of literary texts. Though the invisible 
man certainly hopes that his narrative has heightened readers’ understanding of his 
experience, he also asserts that “[w]ithout the possibility of action, all knowledge comes 
to one labeled ‘file and forget’” (IM 579). Ellison thereby suggests that the kind of 
knowledge-as-acknowledgment afforded by literary texts remains incomplete as long as 
these books are simply read and filed away, as long as the understanding they enable 
remains unaccompanied by any sort of “action.” The narrator strengthens this suggestion 
when he announces that “a decision has been made. … I’m coming out, … since there’s a 




declares his intention to move away from the confessional mode and re-engage with the 
world through more direct (though unspecified) forms of social and political 
involvement.  
In this respect, the end of Invisible Man recalls that of the Tractatus (1921), 
another work that concludes by signaling its own limits. After the penultimate 
proposition invites readers to “throw away the ladder, after [they have] climbed up on it” 
(T 6.54), the final proposition—“Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” 
(7)—at once advocates and enacts this cessation of linguistic communication. Likewise, 
Ellison suggests that readers who have climbed this far up the ladder of his own narrative 
may wish to move beyond the particular mode of acknowledging other subjectivities—
namely, reading about them—that the novel has encouraged. The epilogue does not 
recommend throwing away the invisible man’s story, exactly, but it does recommend 
setting it aside. Despite his life-long efforts to highlight the unique importance of the 
literary arts, it may be that Ellison had already grown skeptical of the social and political 
value of literature by the time he finished the novel that would make him famous.55 If 
there is any truth to this suggestion, it would once again link Ellison to Wittgenstein, who 
spent his entire post-Tractatus career deeply ambivalent about the project of philosophy, 
periodically trying his hand at more “practical … tasks” in an effort to pull himself away 
from the work that—he suspected and feared—was the only thing he really knew how to 
																																																						
55 In his biography of Ellison, Arnold Rampersand notes “the high psychological price he paid for 
his success,” which heightens “the distance … between himself and his brother and between 
himself and his memory of his father and mother” (266). Rampersand continues, “The challenge 




do (Monk 191).56 And, just as the Tractatus would be the only book of philosophy 
Wittgenstein published in his lifetime, so Invisible Man would be the only novel Ellison 
ever managed to complete.57  
Wittgenstein’s death in 1951 and the publication of Ellison’s novel in 1952 thus 
mark fitting historical endpoints for this study of modernist fiction’s interest in 
acknowledgment. In the first chapter, we saw how the disorienting events of early 
twentieth-century history, culminating with World War I, led writers like Forster and 
Woolf to compose formally experimental novels, which sought to inculcate an attitude of 
acknowledgment in readers. If the early years of the twentieth century encouraged such 
literary efforts, then perhaps it makes sense that the middle years of the century would, in 
turn, have discouraged them. By 1952, after a second World War and in the midst of 
ongoing racial violence in the U.S. South, it might have seemed to someone like Ellison 
that modernist fiction’s revolutionary power to acknowledge the silent soliloquy of others 
had begun to wear off. Shortly after Invisible Man’s publication, the dominant mode of 
literary fiction would shift from modernism to postmodernism, replacing traumatized, 
“monadlike” subjectivities with depthless, decentered ones (Jameson, Postmodernism 
15), and thereby frustrating efforts to treat reading as an act of acknowledging private 
																																																						
56 For instances of such ambivalence on Wittgenstein’s part, see Monk 191-2, 234-5, 334-5, 431-
33.  
57 Rampersand notes how historical developments in the real world complicate Ellison’s efforts to 
complete his second major work of fiction. For instance, the unfinished novel centers on the 
attempted assassination of a U.S. senator, so the assassinations of John F. Kennedy, Martin 
Luther King, Jr., and other high-profile political figures “challenge the … finally optimistic and 




pain.58 Now, sixty-six years after its initial appearance, the end of Ellison’s novel still 
cautions those of us who would alter the social and linguistic practices of our own world 
against growing too comfortable in our underground bunkers, lest we avoid staring 




58 As Weinstein notes (Unknowing 199-201), the opening of John Barth’s novel The End of the 
Road (1958) emblematizes this altered mode of literary representation: “In a sense, I am Jacob 
Horner” (1). The differences between Barth’s opening and Ellison’s—“I am an invisible man” 
(IM 3)—are telling, indicative of the “waning of affect” that Fredric Jameson finds in 
postmodernist fiction more broadly (Postmodernism 15). For more on the historical shift from 




CODA: WITTGENSTEIN’S MODERNISM, IN A POSTMODERN CONTEXT 
 
 The year 1979 saw the publication of two major responses to Wittgenstein’s 
thought: Cavell’s The Claim of Reason and Jean-François Lyotard’s The Postmodern 
Condition. Coming roughly a quarter century after Wittgenstein’s death (in 1951) and the 
posthumous publication of Philosophical Investigations (in 1953), these two works put 
forward markedly different readings of Wittgenstein, and their differences are 
emblematic of the broader historical transition from modern to postmodern culture that 
had taken place in the intervening years. In The Claim of Reason, Cavell returns to his 
distinctive interpretation of Wittgenstein’s work as “modernist” (CR xx), initially 
formulated a decade earlier in Must We Mean What We Say? (1969), and develops this 
reading over nearly five hundred pages. Moving ambitiously from epistemology to moral 
philosophy and back again, The Claim of Reason is the work that cements Cavell’s status 
as a canonical figure in twentieth-century American philosophy—an interpretation of his 
oeuvre to which Cavell’s memoir itself lends credence, as the narrative of the 
philosopher’s life terminates around the point at which he finally completes this book.1 
Still, perhaps due to its dense prose or its defiance of standard disciplinary boundaries, 
Cavell’s book did not immediately attain the stature it holds today, and it is only in the 
																																																						
1 After recounting his lengthy struggle to finish The Claim of Reason, Cavell briefly lists all the 
new pieces of writing he managed to produce in the subsequent year, attributing this newfound 
productiveness to “the quality of liberation” that he associates with “the completing of The Claim 
of Reason” (LDIK 455). Evidently, the completion of this book marks the point in Cavell’s life 
when—at the age of fifty-two—he manages to achieve clarity with respect to his intellectual 




past fifteen years or so that a critical mass of scholars has begun to explore how Cavell’s 
reading of Wittgenstein might bear on literary studies. In The Postmodern Condition, 
meanwhile, Lyotard invokes the Investigations’ concept of “language games” (PC 10), 
each possessing its own set of rules, to support his account of postmodernism’s 
“incredulity toward metanarratives” (xxiv). In contrast to the belated, partial recognition 
that The Claim of Reason has achieved, Lyotard’s volume—not incidentally, much 
slimmer than Cavell’s—quickly became one of the essential texts of postmodernist 
theory, all the more so after its translation into English in 1984.   
 This study has argued that Cavell’s work helps us to understand Wittgenstein as a 
major modernist figure—someone who, like the literary modernists, produced formally 
experimental work in response to the disorienting conditions of modern life. Cavell’s key 
contribution consists in his bringing to light Wittgenstein’s interest in acknowledgment—
a mode of language use that offers a middle path between metaphysical claims to 
knowledge and the self-defeating lure of other-mind skepticism. I have argued that signal 
modernist works from Forster’s Howards End (1910) to Ellison’s Invisible Man (1952) 
share this interest in the language of acknowledgment, and that these novels cannot be 
fully understood unless we read them as urgent attempts to track the successes and 
failures of acknowledgment within historically-specific contexts. The question then 
becomes: what allows Cavell to arrive at this important interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
work, which proves so amenable to re-shaping our understanding of modernist fiction? 
Conversely, what does Lyotard’s reading miss about Wittgenstein’s modernism? And 




Wittgenstein’s thought, why has The Postmodern Condition been the more widely cited 
text in literary studies?  
 Little Did I Know (2010), Cavell’s memoir, helps us to answer the first of these 
questions. Cavell’s recollections of his upbringing underscore two important—and 
related—points: one is that Cavell’s childhood experiences crucially inform his later 
philosophical interests, and the other is that his childhood experiences are crucially 
informed by the distinctive historical conditions of early twentieth-century American 
modernity. This first realization is one that Cavell makes explicitly. Early in the memoir, 
he writes that the intellectual interests of his adult years “had to come by way of the 
precise events of just this childhood and adolescence” (LDIK 9). Later, in an account of 
his experiences undergoing psychoanalysis, he gives a more detailed articulation of this 
same point:    
The simultaneous fear of inexpressiveness and of overexpressiveness is a 
recurrent topic in the material I had just decided to put aside as eluding 
completion by me, … [eventually] published as The Claim of Reason. We [Cavell 
and his analyst] sometimes used this uncompleted work as promptings … to 
consider my early life in relation to ideas of childhood abuse and abandonment 
and neglect, in other words, in relation to isolation and despair and to inexplicable 
bouts of ecstasy, including intellectual ecstasy. (110) 
By this point in the memoir, Cavell’s readers understand that his fears of 
“inexpressiveness” and “overexpressiveness” and his interest in “abandonment” and 




conviction, dating back to early childhood, that his father “wanted me not to exist” (18)—
a belief that, accurate or not, might certainly spur an adult recalling this childhood to take 
seriously the issue of acknowledgment.   
 The source of Cavell’s tensions with his father brings us to the second point I 
made above: namely, that the emotional difficulties of Cavell’s childhood register and 
reflect broader social and economic developments characteristic of this period in 
American history. A Polish immigrant, Cavell’s father joined the wave of Eastern 
European migrants who settled in Atlanta around “the end of the nineteenth and the 
beginning of the twentieth century” (2). He shuttled his wife and only son back and forth 
across the country between Atlanta and Sacramento “five times” in the 1930s, as his 
“efforts to maintain small shops, starting with jewelry stores, successively failed” (3). His 
immigrant status proved a constant source of shame for Cavell’s father; Cavell identifies 
the fact that his own “English was unaccented” as one “of the causes [his father] had for 
hating him” (10). As an elaboration on this point, Cavell relates the following 
representative anecdote, which would have taken place around 1936: 
Early in our stays in Sacramento, I would have been no more than ten years old, at 
a restaurant having supper … , a rather loud, good-hearted waitress and my father 
carried on some banter on first meeting; then after she brought our orders … , she 
asked my father where he came from. He ignored her, but she persisted. “I mean, 
I can’t place your accent.”—“Do you think I have an accent?” He asked for the 




know, or imagine, to decide whether to love him for suffering so terribly or to 
despise him for sacrificing us to his self-contempt?” (13) 
More than thirty years later, the son in this anecdote would go on to publish a reading of 
King Lear that presents Lear and Gloucester as two fathers who refuse to grant 
acknowledgment to their children, and that identifies “shame” as one of the causes of the 
“withholding of recognition” (MWM 278).2 Moreover, it bears emphasizing that Cavell’s 
father’s acute sensitivity to his status as an immigrant in a rapidly modernizing America 
takes place at the peak of an era in which modernist art was attempting to capture the 
dislocations of modernity—at the very moment writers like Woolf, Faulkner, and Wright 
were crafting their own literary responses to the cultural and economic upheavals of the 
interwar years. Roughly a generation younger than these novelists, Cavell would not 
formulate a coherent intellectual response to this period of Western history until many 
years later. But when he does, he is primed to recognize Wittgenstein’s interest in 
acknowledgment, with his (Cavell’s) own father remaining in his memory as a vivid 
example of someone whose social marginalization and economic anxiety make it difficult 
for him to acknowledge his interlocutors.   
																																																						
2 Notably, Cavell’s father’s original last name was not ‘Cavell’ but rather ‘Kavelieruskii,’ a name 
that was “judged unintelligible” at Ellis Island and changed to Goldstein (10). Cavell recalls how, 
at the age of seventeen, “I introduced myself to a young woman as Stan Cavell. The first two 
syllables of the family’s original Russian name … broke away as cleanly as if I had flawlessly cut 
a diamond” (200). The passage puns implicitly on his new last name; he breaks from the old 
“cleanly”—in other words, without a single cavil. Cavell goes on to describe this name change as 
simultaneously a rejection and an extension of his father’s influence upon him; it was, he writes, 
“an epitome of our differences, … but at the same time a mark of our sameness, since now, like 




 Little Did I Know also records the intellectual influences in Cavell’s life that 
enable him to elaborate the notion of acknowledgment in ways relevant to our study of 
literature. The memoir makes clear that his interest in literature—including modernist 
literature—both precedes and propels his interest in academic philosophy. Cavell, who 
majored in music at Berkeley and briefly attended Julliard, describes how writing the 
musical accompaniment for a production of King Lear leads him, “not without 
considerable anxiety, to the first clear inklings … that I was more interested in the actions 
and ideas and language of the play, and in learning and understanding what might be said 
about them, and what I felt I had to say about them, than I was in the music” (LDIK 215). 
From the start, then, Cavell’s interest in philosophy takes the form of an interest in 
literature.3 (His reading of King Lear would eventually allow him to return to this origin 
point of his philosophical interests.) It would be another decade and a half before, in 
1959, Cavell “becom[es] immersed” in Wittgenstein’s philosophy (374); in the 
meantime, he continues to add to his collection of literary influences, mentioning Ibsen, 
Proust, Kafka (306), and Forster (377) as among the writers whose work he read during 
this period of his life.4  
																																																						
3 Another stage of this movement from literature to philosophy occurs a few years later when 
Cavell begins taking classes at UCLA, having now definitively abandoned a career in music. He 
initially gravitates toward literature classes but finds “[t]he theoretical discussions there … 
formless and uselessly abstract” and “the level of literary criticism irrelevant to the psychic 
emergency I was living in” (242). Discouraged by what literary studies has to offer, he turns to 
philosophy for the simple reason that “[e]ventually … names of members of the philosophy 
department began to be invoked by students asking the most interesting questions” (242).   
4 The specific Forster novel Cavell mentions is Howards End; see Chapter One for a discussion 
of Cavell’s comments on this text. Cavell also includes modernists like Beckett (422), Conrad, 
Mann (460), and Hemingway (541) among his major literary influences, though without 




 Taken together, these biographical details help us to understand Cavell as a 
careful reader of modernity. By 1959, when Cavell first reads Wittgenstein seriously in 
preparation to write a review essay of the Blue and Brown Books (published for the first 
time in that same year), he is already in a position to identify Wittgenstein’s work as 
making a distinctive contribution to the broader early twentieth-century aesthetic 
movement we have come to know as modernism. While I have been making the case for 
Wittgenstein’s modernist philosophical vision throughout, one aspect of Cavell’s reading 
I would like to draw out here—for purposes of contrast with Lyotard’s—concerns what 
The Claim of Reason calls “Wittgenstein’s discovery, or re-discovery, of the depth of 
convention in human life” (CR 111). Often, for Cavell’s Wittgenstein, so-called 
“conventions” that determine the meanings of words “are fixed not by custom or … 
convenience…. They are, rather, fixed by the nature of human life itself, the human fix 
itself” (110). In the Investigations, for example, Wittgenstein writes: “What we are 
supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings; not curiosities, 
however, but facts that no one has doubted, which have escaped notice only because they 
are always before our eyes” (PI §415). As examples of such unnoticed but obvious 
“facts,” Cavell lists “the fact that the realization of intention requires action, that action 
requires movement, that movement involves consequences we had not intended, that our 
knowledge (and ignorance) of ourselves and of others depends upon the way our minds 
are expressed (and distorted) in word and deed” (CR 110). It is an interest in this kind of 
‘convention’ that leads Wittgenstein to his picture of, for instance, how we learn to 




famously but ambiguously, calls the human “form of life” (PI §241). Thus, Cavell writes, 
the Investigations’ view of ‘conventions’ places less weight on “patterns of life which 
differentiate human beings from one another” and more on “those exigencies of conduct 
and feeling which all humans share” (CR 111). In a later work, This New Yet 
Unapproachable America (1989), Cavell distinguishes between “the ethnological … or 
horizontal sense” of forms of life and “the biological or vertical sense” (41), writing that 
Wittgenstein’s term encompasses both, and that we misunderstand the Investigations if 
we focus only on the former.5 
 The Postmodern Condition makes exactly this mistake, ignoring or overlooking 
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the “depth of convention.” In contrast to Cavell’s 
Wittgenstein, Lyotard’s Wittgenstein points to the arbitrariness—we might say, the 
shallowness—of linguistic convention. Lyotard wields Wittgenstein in support of the 
claim that, now more than ever before, what counts as ‘knowledge’ depends on the 
specific epistemological conventions of different disciplines. According to Lyotard, the 
spread of global capitalism ensures that knowledge is inextricably bound up with power. 
“Nation-states … collaborate with corporations” (PC 45) to fund research; as a result, 
“science laboratories” prioritize “the development of saleable programs,” generating 
marketable pieces of ‘knowledge’ that suit the particular interests of their “financial 
backers” (46). Lyotard argues that the Investigations’ concept of “language-games” (PI 
																																																						
5 As Toril Moi writes, the term ‘forms of life’ includes “both our cultural practices and their 
connectedness to the natural conditions of our lives…. Cutting across the nature/ culture divide, 
the concept of ‘forms of life’ is elastic enough to range from the purely biological to the 
completely cultural, to encompass the human body as well as the finest distinctions of the 




§23) helps us to explain this postmodern moment. In Lyotard’s account, what 
Wittgenstein “means” by this coinage “is that each of the various categories of utterance 
can be defined in terms of rules specifying their properties and the uses to which they can 
be put—in exactly the same way as the game of chess is defined by a set of rules 
determining the properties of each of the pieces” (PC 10, my emphasis). Thus, each field 
of knowledge is its own game with its own contingent, wholly conventional set of rules. 
The rules of one discipline have no necessary bearing on those of another, and 
practitioners of the former may be unable to speak the language of the latter. One 
implication of Lyotard’s argument is that the players of a particular language game 
“invent the rules” (10). On this view, knowledge is a product of language; it is performed 
and performative.  
Lyotard arrived at this theory against the backdrop of worrisome political 
developments in his own professional life. In the ‘70s, Lyotard taught at the Experimental 
University Centre at Vincennes, which had been founded in direct response to the protest 
movement of May 1968 (Bamford 95), in which he had been “an active participant” (66). 
At first, the Experimental University welcomed non-traditional students and educational 
methods (95) and gave students an unusual degree of control over the direction of their 
studies (98).6 By 1979, however, the Experimental University was facing an “imminent 
move … from Vincennes to St. Denis,” which Lyotard saw as an attempt to restrict its 
autonomy and re-incorporate it into the larger bureaucratic apparatus of the French state. 
																																																						
6 The Experimental University’s philosophy department was founded by Michel Foucault, though 




One of the targets of critique in The Postmodern Condition is “a kind of education under 
capitalism that … socially reproduces students to fulfill the technical demands of the 
system” (Peters 47), and Lyotard could personally attest to this trend toward a more 
market-driven style of education.  
 Given that The Postmodern Condition offers an anti-authoritarian critique of 
corporate interests, it is easy to see why cultural critics would have found Lyotard’s work 
compelling in the late twentieth-century—a moment of neo-liberal economic ascendency 
and accelerating levels of wealth inequality. In Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of 
Late Capitalism (1991), Fredric Jameson explicitly links this economic situation to 
developments in the realm of aesthetics, writing, “[A]esthetic production has been 
integrated into commodity production generally: the frantic economic urgency of 
producing fresh waves of ever more novel-seeming goods (from clothing to airplanes), at 
ever greater rates of turnover, now assigns an increasingly essential structural function 
and position to aesthetic innovation and experimentation” (4-5). Consistent with 
Lyotard’s account of how the players of a game “invent the rules,” works of 
postmodernist fiction signal their innovativeness by disregarding the conventions of 
earlier fictional modes, even those modernism had left in place—as when such works 
comment self-referentially on the process of their own composition, for instance.7 
																																																						
7 John Barth’s short story “Lost in the Funhouse” (1967) provides a paradigmatic example of this 
self-referentiality: after opening with a description of a character, Ambrose M  , on a 
family trip to Ocean City, the story abruptly makes the following comment: “Description of 
physical appearance and mannerisms is one of several standard methods of characterization used 
by writers of fiction” (73-4). Rather than representing how its characters use words to make sense 
of the world around them, as modernist fiction does, “Lost in the Funhouse” creates a world of 




Postmodernist fiction also reworks modernist characterization strategies, replacing 
discrete, alienated subjects with depthless, fragmented ones, and thereby lending support 
to a view of identity as “arbitrary performance” (Weinstein, Unknowing 201).  
 The problem with Lyotard’s reading of Wittgenstein is not that it fails to critique 
entrenched hierarchies of power or to explain recent aesthetic developments. The 
problem is that Lyotard does not accurately describe Wittgenstein’s notion of language 
games, suggesting that he has not read the Investigations very carefully. Wittgenstein first 
describes a language game as “one of those games by means of which children learn their 
native language” (PI §7), and he goes on to list the following examples of language 
games: 
Giving orders, and acting on them— 
Describing an object by its appearance, or by its measurements 
Constructing an object from a description […]— 
Reporting an event— 
Speculating about the event— 
Forming and testing a hypothesis— 
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams— 
Making up a story; and reading one— 
Acting in a play— (§23) 
As in Lyotard’s account, then, Wittgenstein identifies a heterogeneous set of language 
games, each with its own, distinct rules. Like Lyotard, Wittgenstein distinguishes 




hypothesis”) and language games associated with other activities (“Acting in a play”). 
For Wittgenstein, however, the point is that all these language games, taken together, 
help us to understand the different roles that words play in our lives as human beings. 
When we form and test hypotheses, we are liable to use many of the same words that we 
use to speculate about an event, and we may even use them in the same ways, to mean the 
same things. It is in the movement between these language games—what Cavell calls the 
“projection” of words from one context to another (CR 183)—that we learn the 
conventions for how language works. Each language game is different, but each also 
contributes to our broader understanding of “language and the activities into which it is 
woven” (§7).  
Wittgenstein does compare learning the rules of language to learning the rules of 
chess, but, as Cavell makes clear, the disanalogy between these two cases is just as 
important as the analogy. So it is not accurate to claim, as Lyotard does, that the rules of 
Wittgenstein’s language games are “exactly” like those of chess. Chess has a finite set of 
rules; these rules can be (and often are) written down in the form of a list, and when a 
disagreement arises between players, they can refer back to this list to resolve their 
dispute. Meanwhile, as Cavell writes, “[t]hat everyday language does not, in fact or in 
essence, depend upon such a structure and conception of rules, and yet that the absence of 
such a structure in no way impairs its functioning, is what the picture of language drawn 
in [Wittgenstein’s] later philosophy is about” (MWM 48).8 Cavell emphasizes that “the 
																																																						
8 We might say that the rules of everyday language are “exactly” like those of chess in certain 




ultimate appeal for Wittgenstein” (50) is what the Investigations calls ‘forms of life’ or, 
elsewhere, “very general facts of nature” (II, §365). These conditions of our world 
constitute the “bedrock” that underlies our language practices (§217). In the works of 
modernist fiction I’ve discussed in this study—as opposed to in postmodernist fiction—
speakers stand firmly upon this bedrock. Whatever experimental narrative or perspectival 
strategies they use, all these novels depict more or less the same historical world: a world 
in which WWI began in 1914,9 and in which human beings cannot fly unaided. 
Wittgenstein, like the novelists I’ve discussed, investigates what it is like to learn words 
as an inhabitant of this world.  
Lyotard’s misreading of Wittgenstein comes through clearly in one of the few 
places where The Postmodern Condition quotes directly from the Investigations. In the 
remark Lyotard quotes, Wittgenstein writes, “Our language can be regarded as an ancient 
city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, of houses with extensions 
from various periods, and all this surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs with straight 
and regular streets and uniform houses” (§18).10 Lyotard argues that Wittgenstein uses 
this remark “to drive home that the principle of unitotality—or synthesis under the 
authority of a metadiscourse of knowledge—is inapplicable” (40). But this reading 
overlooks a crucial element of Wittgenstein’s remark. Wittgenstein does envision various 
neighborhoods of language—in Lyotard’s account, distinct discourses of knowledge—
																																																						
9 Or will begin, in the case of a novel like Howards End.   
10 The wording of this remark is slightly different in The Postmodern Condition, because Lyotard 





but he also begins the remark by stating that “language”—singular—“can be described as 
an ancient city.” Thus, the object of Wittgenstein’s investigation is not nearly as 
fragmentary as Lyotard assumes. It is certainly true that, as Wittgenstein says a few 
remarks later, “new language-games … come into existence,” but these still rely on and 
employ words and concepts from the old (§23). In this way, Lyotard either misses or 
ignores the bedrock of our human form of life that Wittgenstein has set out carefully and 
painstakingly to map.  
If The Claim of Reason offers the more persuasive reading of Wittgenstein, why is 
it Lyotard’s work—not Cavell’s—that has proven so fundamental to our scholarly 
understanding of postmodernism? The answer to this question, I think, lies in the last of 
Jameson’s “Four Maxims of Modernity” (ASM 15)—namely: “No ‘theory’ of modernity 
makes sense today unless it comes to terms with the hypothesis of a postmodern break 
from the modern” (94). It is here that, for all its perceptive commentary on Wittgenstein, 
Cavell’s philosophical oeuvre falls short. Tellingly, as Robert Chodat has recently 
discussed, even Cavell’s “twenty-first century memoir” barely registers the postmodern 
realities of its own moment of composition (Matter 234): 
… [T]he narrator of Little Did I Know is someone who never shops or browses or 
purchases very much, or watches TV ads, or is confronted by glossy magazine ads 
for lingerie and pharmaceuticals. He does not hear Muzak in every grocery aisle 
and airport lounge, is not bombarded by junk mail, does not need to close pop-
ups, and is nowhere shown being infiltrated by urgent news of the latest 




contrived outrage among talk-show hosts or what late-night clubbers are wearing, 
and doesn’t seem to get involved in any of the gaudier forms of American tourism 
or attend contemporary mass sporting events. He does not seem, in short, to 
participate in any meaningful way in the consumer culture of post-WWII 
America. (227-8) 
I’ve argued that Cavell’s upbringing and early intellectual influences dispose him to 
become a perceptive commentator on the modernist period—and on Wittgenstein’s role 
therein. But, as Chodat suggests, the converse of this attentiveness to modernity seems to 
be that Cavell has more or less missed postmodernity. Chodat writes that Little Did I 
Know shows Cavell “re-enact[ing] philosophy’s traditional withdrawal from the world” 
(235); if we understand this “withdrawal” to signify a reduced sensitivity to the historical 
developments occurring around him, then we might trace the earliest stages of this 
process back to the late 1950s, when Cavell begins seriously reading Wittgenstein for the 
first time.11 Significantly, “the end of the 1950s” is also when Lyotard argues that 
Western culture entered “the postmodern age” (PC 3).    
While I’ve argued that Cavell’s notion of acknowledgment proves valuable to our 
understanding of literary modernism, it would seem that, the further we move into the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the less explanatory power his distinctive response to 
the philosophical problem of skepticism retains. As I noted in my fourth and last chapter, 
Invisible Man came out in 1952—one year after Wittgenstein’s death, and one year 
																																																						
11 As Chodat also notes, “For someone who brought the study of film into the academy, … 
[Cavell’s] references to popular culture … are to works that almost never date beyond World War 




before the publication of the Investigations—and I’ve argued that Ellison’s novel 
preserves a modernist understanding of isolated human subjectivity, even as it also 
registers the emergence of post-WWII economic and technological developments. The 
conditions of postmodern life, writes Jameson, initiate “not merely a liberation from 
anxiety but a liberation from every other kind of feeling as well, since there is no longer a 
self present to do the feeling” (Postmodernism 15). In light of this widespread “waning of 
affect” (15), the concept of acknowledgment grows increasingly inappropriate to our 
analysis of postmodernist fiction. In Cavell’s work, acknowledgment offers a way of 
accepting and re-framing anxieties about the limitations of human knowledge. As such, 
the concept proves more pertinent to the “epistemological” concerns of modernism 
(McHale 9) than to the “ontological” concerns of postmodernism (10).12 The sense of 
immitigable privacy that motivates other-mind skepticism—a sense that what is inside us 
cannot be externalized—no longer retains relevance in a world of de-centered subjects 
and shiny surfaces.13  
More than Cavell’s The Claim of Reason, Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition 
responds explicitly to the circumstances of late twentieth-century Western life, and its 
																																																						
12 Elaborating on this distinction, Brian McHale writes that modernist works ask questions like, 
“What is there to be known? Who knows it? How do they know it, and with what degree of 
certainty?” (9), whereas postmodernist works ask questions like, “What is a world?; What kinds 
of world are there, [and] how are they constituted … ?; What happens when … boundaries 
between worlds are violated?; What is the mode of existence of a text, and what is the mode of 
existence of the world (or worlds) it projects?” (10). 
13 Espen Hammer makes a version of this point, writing, “Whereas postmodernism (in tandem 
with global capitalism) … celebrat[es] … the world as simulacra and appearance …, a modernist 
rejoinder consists in reminding us of the seriousness that ought to follow from our being 




critique of these historical conditions remains relevant today. In order to make 
Wittgenstein into a prophet of the postmodern, however, Lyotard must misread the 
Investigations. By contrast, Cavell’s more careful reading of the Investigations 
compellingly establishes Wittgenstein’s modernist credentials, even as it also leaves the 
question of Wittgenstein’s relation to postmodernism largely unaddressed. This study 
has, I hope, helped to highlight the degree to which Wittgenstein’s philosophy registers 
and responds to the same historical developments that motivate literary modernism. I 
would like to close by cautioning that, should we wish to account for Wittgenstein’s 
bearing on postmodernist literature, we would likely need to adopt a different approach to 
his work than the one I’ve taken here. Such an approach would, I think, need to begin 
with Cavell’s claim that few philosophers have “entrust[ed] the health of the human spirit 
to ordinary language with Wittgenstein’s completeness” (TNYUA 33) and then proceed to 
explore how thoroughly late capitalism has distorted our sense of what ‘the ordinary’ is 
or means. The Investigations recommends that we “bring words back … to their everyday 
use” (§116). Postmodern culture has made this restorative project difficult in ways that 
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